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Abstract In the second research period of the Advanced Grant ReConFort (2016–
17), precedence of constitution was the central interest for understanding historical
constitutional discourses; these discussions have been further enriched by research
into the Polish case study of 1815, which is also addressed in this volume. On the
functional level as tertium comparationis, precedence of constitution guarantees the
normativity of the modern constitutional concept, comprising the conceptual dif-
ferentiation from ordinary law, the aggravated alterability (sometimes even up to an
‘eternal’ restriction on the constituent power) and the hierarchically supreme jus-
ticiability as legal tests for subordinate laws. Arising out of the American and
French Revolution, the new normativity of the ‘constitution’, now connoted as a
legal text, fixed the whole political order into one legal order. This claimed to be
‘the basis and foundation of government’, as the Virginia Declaration of Rights of
1776 starts, or ‘Le but de toute institution politique’, in the wording of the preamble
of the French 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. However, irre-
spective of the superficial linguistic commonalities, the revolutionary American and
French discourses on constitutional precedence differ significantly, and met widely
varying challenges. Nevertheless, both discourses provided the basic framework for
European constitutional developments of decisive normativity in the late eighteenth
and nineteenth century. Therefore, they act as cornerstones for comparative
research on this key category, reconsidering constitutional formation between old
liberties and new precedence. These foundations have guided not only the Principal
Investigator’s following essay, but also the papers of the ReConFort postdocs and
the contributions of the speakers at the international Brussels conference, on 14
March 2016, which are combined in this volume.
In the case of America, colonist resistance against Westminster produced a
written superior law set above all political power, due to the efforts to justify the
revolution as a legitimate breach of common law. The colonies’ legal argumenta-
tion conducted their case like a common-law litigation and borrowed from a
long-standing constitutional semantic already traceable in early modern European
monarchies. The subordination of ordinary legislative assemblies under funda-
mental laws (lois fondamentales)—as demonstrated in the granting of religious
freedom to all inhabitants in the founding document of the Colony of West New
Jersey (1676)—remained based on the traditional grounds that fundamental laws
had a specific importance that elevated them above ordinary laws. Neither legal
legitimation nor the binding of political authority by very important laws was a new
or even revolutionary concept. The British-American discursive common law
community was built around the prominence of the Magna Carta and the Bill of
Rights, and it was indeed these fundamental laws on which the colonists relied for
recalling their customary old liberties as subjects of the British king. Facing
Westminster’s unitarian legislative absoluteness in the imperial context, the colo-
nists developed the differentiation between legal and constitutional; the Stamp Act
and the Sugar Act, although legal, were argued to be unconstitutional due to the
violation of common law liberties. A complementary legal argument was the dis-
tinction of the Empire from internal colonial polities, which were governed by the
old liberties and privileges as English subjects and not by the superintending power
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of the British Parliament. In the unsettled connexion of the colonies to Britain,
American lawyers relied on Coke’s supremacy concept of common law as immortal
custom, as it was understood through Blackstone’s Commentaries. As long as the
legal debate was kept on the customary level of their old rights as Englishmen, all
questions of precedence were mere questions of the applicability of ordinary law.
This changed with the natural law ‘basis and foundation of government’ expressed
in the Virginia Bill of Rights, which itself was not vested with any superior rank,
but was still analogous to common law.
The Declaration of Independence invoked a united American people, distinct
from the British colonial power. Thereby emerging, the constituent American
people became the reference point for establishing the constitution as law, as well as
its revision and interpretation, though there were only the people of the thirteen
individual states of the Union. Due to the lack of an unitarian state, the supremacy
of the United States Constitution rested not only on it being the legal benchmark for
all political powers to protect freedom and property, but also on it being the
guarantee for the existence of the Union. Such an interlinkage between the
Constitution and the Union invigorated the distinction between superior constitu-
tional law and ordinary statutory law (also of the single federal states), and opened
up the discourse on constitutional jurisdiction. In bidding farewell to the Lockean
idea that there was ‘no judge on earth between the legislative and the people’, the
secular ‘judge’ filled the gap between the legislative branch and the people, which
had been caused by the legal separation of the Constitution from the ordinary
legislation. The ordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court became authorised to
measure the statutory law against the ‘higher will of the people’, meaning the
Constitution. The Lockean right to resistance—addressed in his god-judge equiv-
alence—was taken up by the federal jurisdiction. Marbury v. Madison (1803)
accepted the latter’s prerogative to examine statutory constitutionality or uncon-
stitutionality in a ‘judicial review.’
The common law tradition of the American idea of law was far removed from the
French Rousseauist understanding of law as the expression of the volonté générale.
Freedom by participation in legislation—articulated in Art. 6 Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen as (fraternal-political) equality (liberté, egalité,
fraternité)—is and was totally unknown to the American constitutional discourse.
Furthermore, ‘Le but de toute institution politique’ of the 1789 declaration reached
for the same universal validity, but its philosophical wording only achieved the
appropriate legal status by incorporation in the preamble of the September
Constitution (1791). Whereas the American resistors differentiated constitutional
law and ordinary law conceptually in their effort to justify the revolution as legit-
imate, the French discourse is, even now, very reluctant to review the unconstitu-
tionality of acts of the legislative assembly, disregarding the difference between the
ordinary legislative assembly and the constituent assembly (representing national
sovereignty), following Sieyès’ differentiation between constituent national sover-
eignty and constituted sovereignty. Even under the current French Constitution
(enacted on 4 October 1958), there is no review of statutes for unconstitutionality
except for the narrow scope of the ‘prior question of constitutionality’ (question
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prioritaire de constitutionnalité or QPC) dealing with the a posteriori control of
promulgated statutes being compatible with the rights and liberties guaranteed by
the constitution in Art. 61-1. The failure of Sieyès’ draft of a ‘jury constitution-
naire’ in the Thermidorian debates of the year III (1795; reproduced here in the
French original in Appendix A and in the English translation in Appendix B) was
only the first link in a chain of reasoning to refuse any judicial authority to declare
statutory law to be unconstitutional and overrule it. Sieyès planned for his jury to be
staffed with former congressmen rather than professional judges. However, the
Rousseauistic dogma of the general will and the continuous constituent power of
the French people did not allow for Sieyès’ project to open a window of opportunity
for constitutional complaints to be addressed even by individual citizens in their
own name to the constitutional jury. Together with the skepticism of the
Constitutional Convention about the jury’s resemblance to the judicial privileges of
the Ancien Régime, this led to Sieyès’ petition being rejected unanimously in the
Constitutional Convention of the year III.
Finally, sketching matters of juridification, supremacy, and revision in the public
sphere around the constituent St. Paul’s Church Assembly underlines the inter-
connection not only between the discourses established in the above case studies
(applied in a different context), but also between the key issues of the ReConFort
project as a whole. In spite of the fact that it ultimately failed to come into force, the
German Imperial Constitution of 1849 is a clear example that national sovereignty
(Reconsidering Constitutional Formation I) marked the starting point for the pro-
cess of juridification of sovereignty; constitutional precedence (Reconsidering
Constitutional Formation II) was the legal tool to complete the process of juridi-
fication of sovereignty.
1 Novus Ordo Seclorum
The motto Novus Ordo Seclorum (‘A new order of the ages’), appearing underneath
the unfinished pyramid on the reverse side of the Great Seal of the United States,
was coined in 1782 by Charles Thomson. He adapted it from Virgil’s Eclogue IV, a
pastoral poem of the first century BCE, where a Sibyl prophesied the fate of
the Roman Empire in her longing for a new era of peace and happiness.1
1Translation (by James Rhoades): ‘Now the last age by Cumae’s Sibyl sung/Has come and gone,
and the majestic roll/Of circling centuries begins anew: Justice returns, returns old Saturn's reign,
With a new breed of men sent down from heaven. Only do thou, at the boy's birth in whom/The
iron shall cease, the golden age arise. Under thy guidance, whatso tracks remain/Of our old
wickedness, once done away/Shall free the earth from never-ceasing fear. He shall receive the life
of gods, and see/Heroes with gods commingling, and himself/Be seen of them, and with his
father's worth/Reign o'er a world at peace.’ The oracle of Sybil refers to the Old Testament history,
starting with Adam and Eve, of the reprehensibility of the (five) lineages before the Great Flood.
After the Flood, the ‘golden age’, beginning with Noah, followed. Sibyl was part of this sixth
lineage. People of this age stayed always healthy, did not age, and died peacefully. This was
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Charles Thomson (1729–1824) was the secretary of the Continental Congress;2 his
name appeared on the first published version of the Declaration of Independence in
July 1776, alongside that of John Hancock, the congress’ president.3 Thomson
placed the motto beneath the unfinished pyramid,4 whose vacant peak stood for the
lost monarchy after the renegade colonies have declared themselves independent on
4 July 1776. The pyramid and its motto, therefore, acted as the graphical depiction
that marked ‘the beginning of the new American Era’, commencing from the
Declaration of Independence.
2 Definitions of Normativity and Precedence
Normativity in modern constitutional dogma5 means the obligatory character of the
constitution as a legal regime to control6 and to restrict state power.7 This amounts
to the positivistic, compulsory, and justiciable nature of constitutional law, its
followed by the age of the titans. Cf. Die sibyllinischen Orakel, Die Aussprüche und
Weissagungen der alten Sibylle über die Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft der Welt, Aus
alten Schriften in deutscher Übertragung mit Einleitung und erläuternden Anmerkungen, 2nd ed.,
ed. Richard Clemens (Wiesbaden: Fourier, 1985), 65–6, 80–1, 90–1. The idea of paradisiacal
conditions in present time are the theme of Virgil’s fourth Eclogue. The text describes a new
golden era which begins with the birth of a mysterious boy. This age is characterised by the
absence of misery, hassles, and the enjoyment of the fruits of the earth without the effort of the
people—there being no need for agriculture, commerce, or seafaring. This utopia becomes con-
crete for Virgil with Augustus. See Töns (1977), 154–5. Cf. Ryberg (1958), 112–31. In the first
two pages, Ryberg points out that the golden age was already addressed by Hesiod.
2Thomson served as the secretary of the Continental Congress from its founding in 1774 until its
dissolution in 1789. His role was essentially to keep the minutes of the Congress, undertaking
duties that nowadays are undertaken by the Department of State, the Secretariat of the Senate, and
the Clerk of the House of Representatives. He was considered by his contemporaries to be an
unimpeachable figure whose honesty was above reproach, and documents with his signature were
considered ‘the Truth.’
3Between the founding of the Continental Congress in 1774 and the enacting of the United States
Constitution in 1789, there was no cameral differentiation of the executive and legislative branches;
the Congress occupied both. It also voted for the ‘President of Congress’, as the office of the
President of the United States obviously did not exist at the time.
4The designer of the pyramid in 1782, including the Eye of Providence motif, was a lawyer named
William Barton. He, in turn, was probably influenced by Francis Hopkinson’s pyramid design on
the $50 Continental Currency banknote (1778); Hopkinson had also been consulted in 1780 on the
heraldic design for the Great Seal. For the final design of the reverse side of the Great Seal, Charles
Thomson specified ‘A Pyramide unfinished’. He put a triangle around the eye of Providence, as
suggested by the first committee.
5Cf. for the Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarischer Rat) Badura (1973), 19–20, 23.
6Loewenstein (1975), 127.
7Badura (1973), 19, 22; Friedrich (1953), 135. Cf. Starck (1992), § 164 Recital 1. Unless otherwise
noted, all translations are those of the author.
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differentiation from and hierarchical precedence over ordinary law8 and, moreover,
its aggravated alterability.9 In the specific provisions of the German Basic Law
(Articles 1 section 3, 20 section 3, 79 section 3)10 the so-called ‘eternity clause’ in
Article 79 section 3 restrains even the constituent power.
Reconsidering constitutional formation, one should be very aware that it is the
normativity which is the novelty of the modern constitutional concept arisen out of
the American and the French Revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century.
Neither governmental legitimisation nor legal binding of political authority were
new terms, but rather had long been part of the old constitutional semantics.11 Also,
the subordination of legislative assemblies—as in the founding document of the
Colony of West New Jersey (1676)12—remains on the traditional ground of the
specific importance of fundamental laws (lois fondamentales) that were higher–
ranking than ordinary laws.13 In the case of America, it was the break with the
English mother country that required a new legal fixture of the (whole) political
order. ‘Constitution’ was now connoted as a legal text, fixing the political order into
a legal order. This provided, according to the opening sentence of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 12 June 1776, ‘the basis and foundation of government.’14
8Cf. Kastari (1966), 49–50, 52.
9Badura (1992a), § 159 Recital 1. The term normativity thus describes two different aspects of the
constitution: in a narrow sense, normativity refers to the positivistic mandatory effect of the
constitution as a legal rule, as described in Badura (1992b), vol. VII, § 160 Recital 2; in a broader
sense, normativity is a comprehensive term for the specific legal effects of the constitution.
10For the coherence between Articles 1 (3), 20 (3), 79 (3) cf. Dreier (2007), 3–4, 53–4. Dreier does
not differentiate between the mandatory effect and the precedence of the constitution.
11For details cf. Müßig (2006b), 1–2.
12A dissociation between ordinary and higher-ranking laws already emerged rudimentarily during
the colonial era, especially within the framework of the founding document of the Colony of West
New Jersey from 1676 (‘Concessions and Agreements’). A particular part of this founding doc-
ument, agreed upon in 1677 under the title ‘The Charter or Fundamental Laws, of West New
Jersey’ clearly articulates the subordination of the legislative assembly under these fundamental
articles and states the prohibition to pass laws which contradict these fundamental articles. Cited in
Stourzh (2015), 58. Cf. also Fundamental Laws and Constitutions of New Jersey 1664-1961, ed.
Boyd (1964), 13.
13Cf. fundamental work on the terms lex fundamentalis, lois fondamentales, and constitution:
Mohnhaupt and Grimm (2002), 38–9, 48, 62–3; Mohnhaupt (2016), “Leges fundamentals”, col-
umn 693–695; Gough (1961); Mohnhaupt (1982), 3–33; Mohnhaupt (1998), 121–158; Mohnhaupt
(2011), 697–724.
14‘A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS made by the representatives of the good people of Virginia,
assembled in full and free convention which rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the
basis and foundation of government.’ Compare le but de toute institution politique in the wording
of the preamble of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789: Willoweit and Seif
(=Müßig) (2003), 250.
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Normativity is expressed by the positivation in one unified constitutional text.
The textual ‘seclusiveness’ stands for the differentiation between constitutional law
and ordinary legislature. The old constitutional semantics knew particularly
important, fundamental laws,15 but not the idea of a unified law, which is a gauge
for the legitimacy of all other laws. As James Iredell phrased it in his ‘Instructions
to Chowan County Representatives’ (1783), this was to be a ‘Republic where the
Law is superior to any or all the Individuals, and the Constitution superior even to
the legislature, and of which the judges are guardians and protectors.’16
The central consequence of normativity is the supremacy of the constitution, its
precedence. With the American Revolution, constitutional law and other kinds of
law were conceptually differentiated, contrary to English terminology.17 For the
English legal minds, such as Lord Bolingbroke (1678–1751)18 or William
Blackstone (1723–80),19 there was an equivalence between the constitution (or
frame) of government and the system of laws.20 These theorists and practitioners
neither distinguished between fundamental and statutory law, nor measured the
latter against the first. By 1776, the American resistance against Westminster
produced the notion of a constitution ‘as a written superior law set above the entire
government against which all other law is to be measured.’21 The context for
this was the American effort to justify the revolution as legitimate breach of law.22
15To their priority by ‘advice and approval of the most influential’: Ulrike Seif, “Einleitung”, in
Willoweit and Seif (2003), xii ff.
16The Papers of James Iredell, ed. Higginbotham (1976), vol. II, 449.
17Wood (1969), 260. In 1789, France adopted the English word constitution, with all its blurring of
constitutional discussion, and then only discussed the extent of the division of power that had
become necessary. See also Stern (1984), 9.
18For details, his commitment to the treaty of Utrecht and his literary treatment in the ‘Idea of a
Patriot King’ (1738), cf. Müßig (2008c), 16–17.
19Cf. Müßig (2008c), 18–19.
20Cf. Blackstone, William (1979), Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. I, 126;
Bolingbroke, Henry St. John (1749), The idea of a patriot king, 84 (universal law of reason, given
immediately to all men by god vs. particular law, or constitution of laws, given to man by man);
Bolingbroke, Henry St. John (1754), A Dissertation upon parties, 141–2 in regard to the dis-
tinction between government and constitution: ‘By constitution we mean […] the assemblage of
laws, institutions and customs, derived from certain fix’d objects of public good, that compose the
general system, according to which the community hath agreed to be govern’d […] By govern-
ment we mean […] that particular tenor of conduct, which a chief magistrate, and inferior mag-
istrates, under his direction and influence, hold in the administration of public affairs.’
21Wood (1969), 260.
22Müßig (2006b), 4.
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The taxation of the colonies by the Westminster Parliament without the consent of
the inhabitants, as embodied in the Sugar Act (American Revenue Act/American
Duties Act) of 176423 and the Stamp Act (Duties in American Colonies Act) of
1765,24 was ‘unconstitutional’, while the resistance of the colonies was, it was
argued by those same resistors, ‘constitutional.’25 In the context of the
eighteenth-century British discourse ‘the terms constitutional and unconstitutional,
mean legal and illegal’, as it was explained by William Paley in The Principles of
Moral and Political Philosophy (Philadelphia 1788). It was exactly on this aspect
that the Americans diverged from the English terminology. As John Adams26
articulated in 1773—even before the American Revolutionary War had begun, and
three years prior to the Declaration of Independence—the principal difficulty in the
debate with England lay in the ‘different ideas [about] the words legally and con-
stitutionally’,27 and in the shift of Westminster from the highest common court to
the sovereign lawmaker. This leads us to the analysis of the legal argumentation of
the American colonies, and how they conducted their case like a common law
litigation in the court of Anglophone public opinion.28
23American Duties Act of 29 September 1764, in 4 George III, c. 15. The revenue-raising act,
passed by the Westminster Parliament on 5 April 1764, stated in its preamble: ‘it is expedient that
new provisions and regulations should be established for improving the revenue of this Kingdom
[…] and […] it is just and necessary that a revenue should be raised […] for defraying the
expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the same.’ A significant section of the colonial
economy during the Seven Years’War dealt with supplying food and supplies to the British Army.
Therefore, it is often said that the protests against the Sugar Act were motivated more by economic
needs rather than by the constitutional issue of taxation without representation.
24Duties in American Colonies Act of 22 March 1765, in 5 George III, c. 12.
25‘Therefore the terms constitutional and unconstitutional mean legal and illegal.’ Paley (1825),
372. See also Stourzh (1988), 35, 45ff.; Wood (1969), 10ff., 261.
26John Adams (1735–1826): Graduating from Harvard University in 1755, Adams was a lawyer in
Suffolk County, Massachusetts. As opponent to the Stamp Act he later, in 1768, represented the
city of Boston in the General Court. Growing increasingly prominent in legal and political circles,
Adams became a congressman at the Continental Congress, and served between 1774 and 1777,
and was also a signatory to the Declaration of Independence. His first diplomatic appointment was
as the American minister plenipotentiary to Holland in 1782; three years later, he was appointed as
the American representative at the Court of St. James. He served in this capacity until 1789, when
he became the United States’ first vice president, under George Washington. In 1797, he stood for
president and won the election, and served as the second president of the United States until 1801.
Cf. Dodge and Koed (2005), 542–3; Encyclopædia Britannica (2007) Founding Fathers, 16–25.
27Adams, John, letter to the Boston Gazette (8 February 1773), in The Works of John Adams
(1851), vol. III, 556.
28Greene (2010), 186.
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3 The Constitutionality of the Colonies’ Legal
Argumentation Conducting Their Case like a Common
Law Litigation
The colonial lawyers, such as Richard Bland,29 James Otis,30 Daniel Dulany,31
John Dickinson,32 James Wilson,33 Thomas Jefferson,34 John Adams, Alexander
29Richard Bland (1710–76): A cousin of Thomas Jefferson, Bland was born in Orange County,
Virginia. Bland studied at the College of William and Mary, as well as the University of
Edinburgh. For over three decades (1742–75) he represented Prince George County in the Virginia
House of Burgesses, and was a member of several committees. This made him a logical delegate to
the first and second Continental Congresses (1774–5), following which he took part in the Virginia
Conventions, which opposed continued British rule. Pate (1931), 20.
30James Otis (1725–83): Like Adams a Harvard-trained lawyer, James Otis worked first in Plymouth
before relocating to Boston. In 1761, he gave a speech in the writs of assistance case, which can be
considered the prologue to the American Revolution. Writs of assistance gave the bearer (usually a
British customs or excise official) carte blanche to search any premises for contraband. American
colonists saw this as a dangerous instrument that could be used by officials to further personal
agendas. Otis argued that they were unconstitutional; John Adams, who had watched Otis’ oration,
credited this moment as being the birthplace of ‘the Child Independence.’ Later, Otis was elected to
the lower House of the General Court of Massachusetts. Huitt (1953–4), 152–3.
31Daniel Dulany (1722–97): Born in Maryland, Dulany studied at Eton College and Clare Hall,
Cambridge University. He passed the bar in England in 1742, in Maryland in 1747. From 1751 to
1754 he was a representative in the House of the Maryland Legislative Assembly. From these
beginnings he assumed a number of important positions, including Secretary of the Province
(1761–74). He opposed the imposition of the Stamp Act; nevertheless, he remained a loyalist to the
Crown during the American Revolution, the result of which was the confiscation of his property by
American authorities in 1781. Riggs (1946), 8–15.
32John Dickinson (1732–1808): Dickinson studied law in London and practiced in Philadelphia.
He represented Delaware in the Stamp Act Congress (1765). He was a delegate for Pennsylvania in
the Continental Congress (1774–6), and was re-elected to the Congress in 1779. He prepared
among others the Articles of Confederation, though he voted against the Declaration of
Independence, as he believed reconciliation with Britain was still possible. In 1781 he became the
president of Delaware, and from 1782–5 the president of Pennsylvania. He signed the United
States Constitution as a delegate from Delaware. Gummere (1956), 81–8; Encyclopædia
Britannica (2007) Founding Fathers, 72.
33James Wilson (1742–98): Wilson attended the Universities of St. Andrews, Glasgow, and
Edinburgh, and emigrated to America in 1765. He studied law and was admitted to the bar in 1767;
from 1778 he practiced in Philadelphia. In 1774, he became a member of the Provincial
Convention of Pennsylvania, and was an intermittent member of the Continental Congress. He
represented Pennsylvania at the Constitutional Convention (1787) and was a signatory to the
Constitution. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 2180.
34Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826): A defining and vital figure in early American constitutionalism
and federalism, Thomas Jefferson began work as a lawyer in 1767. Two years later, he became a
member of the Virginia House of Burgesses, a position he relinquished in 1775 to join the
Continental Congress. He was the primary author of and signatory to the Declaration of
Independence. Thereafter he served as governor of Virginia (1779–81) and again as a congressman
(1783–4), before being appointed minister of plenipotentiary to France (1784) and sole minister to
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Hamilton,35 Charles Carroll of Carrollton,36 and James Iredell37 seemed to
‘conduct their case like a common-law litigation in the court of
Anglophone public opinion.’38 Other lay leaders, merchants, printers
and planters, including Stephen Hopkins,39 Benjamin Franklin,40
the King of France (1785). These appointments lasted five years; upon his return he served as
George Washington’s secretary of state until 1793. In 1797 he became John Adams’ vice presi-
dent; in 1801 he was elected as the third president of the United States, and served two terms until
1809. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1326–7; Encyclopædia Britannica
(2007) Founding Fathers, 115–137.
35Alexander Hamilton (1755 or 1757–1804): Hamilton emigrated to America in 1772, where he
received his education, and entered the Continental Army as a captain of the artillery in 1776. He was
a member of the Continental Congress in 1782, 1783, and 1788, and of the New York State
Assembly in 1787. He was a member of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention which adopted
the Constitution, and he also took part in the Ratification Convention of 1788. Together with James
Madison and John Jay, Hamilton wrote the series of essays known as The Federalist, which formed
the basis of all modern interpretations of the Constitution. From 1789 until 1795 he was secretary of
the Treasury in the cabinet of GeorgeWashington. In 1804, he took part in a duel with Vice President
Aaron Burr. Burr was victorious, and Hamilton was mortally wounded. Biographical Directory of
the United States Congress, 1182; Encyclopædia Britannica (2007) Founding Fathers, 96–105.
36Charles Carroll of Carrollton (1737–1832): The third in a line of Charles Carrolls (the others
being Charles Carroll the Settler and Charles Carroll of Annapolis), Carroll was born in Maryland,
and studied law in both France and England. He returned to Maryland in 1765, and in 1775
became a delegate to the Convention of Maryland. The next year, he joined the Continental
Congress, which he served until 1778. He was re-elected in 1780 but declined the appointment. He
was a state senator for Maryland from 1777 until 1800, and a United States senator between 1789
and 1792. A signatory to the Declaration of Independence in 1776, he was also the last surviving
of the original Founding Fathers when he died in 1832. Biographical Directory of the United
States Congress, 790.
37James Iredell (1751–99): A native of Sussex, England, Iredell migrated to America at seventeen
years old, where he studied law. At twenty-six, he was appointed as a judge and, in 1779, he
became the attorney general. He campaigned for the acceptance of the United States Constitution
in North Carolina and, in 1790, he was nominated by Washington to an associate judgeship in the
Supreme Court. Connor (1912), 225–53.
38Greene (2010), 186.
39Stephen Hopkins (1707–85): Raised on a farm on Rhode Island, Hopkins was descended from a
line of important local political figures, including the first governor of Rhode Island, Benedict
Arnold. Hopkins, too, followed this path, becoming a member of the Rhode Island General
Assembly (1732–52; 1770–75). From 1751–54 and once more in 1773, he was the chief justice of
the Superior Court of Rhode Island, and he also served as governor for four non-consecutive
periods between 1755 and 1768. As a member of the Continental Congress from 1774 to 6, he was
also a signatory to the Declaration of Independence. Biographical Directory of the United States
Congress, 1277; Encyclopædia Britannica (2007) Founding Fathers, 110.
40Benjamin Franklin (1706–90): Franklin first made his name as a printer and publisher in
Philadelphia, after having learnt the trade in Boston, Philadelphia, and London. He bought the
Pennsylvania Gazette in 1729. From 1736 to 1750, he was clerk of the Pennsylvania General
Assembly. He held several public offices in the following years. From 1775 to 1776 he was a
member of the Continental Congress and he signed the Declaration of Independence. Afterwards
he became diplomatic commissioner to France and later minister to France from 1776 to 1785.
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1081; Encyclopædia Britannica (2007)
Founding Fathers, 77–91.
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Samuel Adams,41 William Hicks, and William Henry Drayton,42 showed such a
substantive familiarity with the common law reasoning and constitutional thought
that one could think of a discursive community between both sides of the Atlantic.
3.1 The British–American Discursive Common Law
Community
Key to this common law community was the familiarity with the same textbooks.
English and American lawyers alike learned from Blackstone’s Commentaries on
the Laws of England (1765–9),43 whose American edition (1771–2) was the only
legal textbook in the colonies en route to independence.44 The reception of
Blackstone in James Kent’s Commentaries on American Law (1826) demonstrated
his great significance for the American understanding of the common law; indeed, it
was the Blackstone commentaries that inspired the American constitutional fathers
to conceive of the American president as a temporary, substitute monarch, founded
after the ideal of the English king. Blackstone’s conception of the ‘Rights of
Englishmen’ as ‘Rights of Mankind’ is said to be an inspiration for the demand for
universal human rights in the American Revolution.45 He is also called a mentor for
the strong judiciary in the American constitution of 1787.46
41Samuel Adams (1722–1803): A descendent of Puritan migrants, Samuel Adams showed a keen
mind for politics. He entered Harvard at the age of fourteen and eventually achieved a Masters
degree; upon leaving his studies, however, he became a maltster and tax collector. From 1765 to
1774 he was a member of the Massachusetts General Court and from 1774 to 1781 a member of
the Continental Congress. He was a signer of the Declaration of Independence. In 1781 he served
as the president of the Massachusetts State Senate and from 1794 to 1797 he was governor of
Massachusetts. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 543.
42William Henry Drayton (1742–79): Drayton studied in England and returned to South Carolina
in 1764, where he studied law and was admitted to the bar. In 1770, on the order of King
George III, he was appointed privy councillor of South Carolina and shortly thereafter assistant
judge. After taking actions in the revolutionary movement, he was removed from both positions. In
1775 he served as president of the Council of Safety and in 1776 as chief of justice. In 1778 he was
made a member of the Continental Congress, a position he held until his untimely death from
typhus in the following year. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 892.
43Seif (=Müßig) (2008), “Blackstone, William”, column 614.
44Seif (=Müßig) (2008), “Blackstone, William”, column 616.
45The first chapter of the first volume of Blackstone’s Commentaries categorises the principal
absolute rights as those of security, liberty, and property. Blackstone, William (1979),
Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. I, chap. 1, 119ff. See also Hanbury (1950), 318ff.;
Lucas (1963), 142ff. These documents show the influence of Locke’s conception of a general
natural law that binds all government to heed security, liberty, and property of the individual.
46Carrese (2003), 117.
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Blackstone’s well-known comment on parliamentary sovereignty47 is based on
Sir Edward Coke’s seventeenth-century definition of the supreme jurisdiction of the
High Court of Parliament:
Of the power and jurisdiction of the parliament, for making of laws in proceeding by bill, it
is so transcendent and absolute, as it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within
any bounds. Of this court it is truly said: Si antiquitatem spectes, est vetustissima, si
dignitatem, est honoratissima, si jurisdictionem, est capacissima.48
Irrespective of this court conception, Blackstone required for Great Britain as an
empire with colonies, ‘a supreme, irresistible, absolute uncontrolled authority, in
which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty reside[d]’49 and, as the
contemporary Agent for the Province of the Massachusetts Bay in London would
have added, ‘to which all other Powers should be subordinate[d].’50 This unitarian
legislative supremacy in the imperial context was a logical violation of defining
Parliament’s sovereignty on the basis of the court’s conception, and deprived the
British discourse of any possibility to differentiate between legal and constitutional.
This was exactly the legal point at which the colonists had to leave the motherland.
They pleaded to be the ‘better Englishmen’, on the basis of the customary limita-
tions for Westminster’s supremacy in the imperial constitution, which they started
to distinguish from the ordinary law.
3.2 Customary Old Liberties Against Parliamentary
Absoluteness
The first legal point of the colonists was the differentiation between ‘legal’ and
‘constitutional.’ They argued that acts of Parliament, although legal, were against
their ancient liberties under the common law and therefore unconstitutional. Faced
with the Stamp Act and the Sugar Act, it became obvious in the colonies that
Westminster ‘Parliament […] was no longer simply the highest court among others
in the land, but had in truth become the sovereign law-maker of the realm, whose
power, however arbitrary and unreasonable, was uncontrollable.’51 What the
47Blackstone, William (1979), Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. I, chap. 2, 156.
Blackstone literally repeated Coke’s definition.
48Coke, “The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England concerning the Jurisdiction of
Courts” in Coke, Edward (1797), The Institutes of the Law of England, Second to Fourth Parts,
Part IV, 36.
49Blackstone, William (1979), Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. I, 50–1, 178–80.
50Mauduit, Jasper (1766), Legislative Authority of the British Parliament, 11. Mauduit was the
agent in London for the Province of the Massachusetts Bay between 1762 and 1765.
51Cited in Wood (1969), 265. Cf. also the differentiation between judgment and statutes in the
preceding sentence: ‘that law was something more than a judgment, more than simply the acts of a
supreme court that could be interpreted, adjusted, or voided by other courts when required by the
principles of reason and equity that supposedly adhered in all law.’
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colonists risked losing was the supremacy of common law, established by Sir
Edward Coke since the seventeenth century. ‘His’ supremacy of common law
translated the inherent customary consensus on liberties since time immemorial into
legal arguments against the Stuart absolutism52; This common law understanding
was present at Westminster in the Whig differentiation between ordinary legislation
and the fundamental laws of nature,53 benefitting from the theories of natural law
expounded by John Locke in his Second Treatise (1689),54 and Thomas
Rutherforth in his Institutes of Natural Law (1754–6). The fundamental laws of
nature were held by the latter ‘to bind the legislative body itself, and not to be
alterable by its authority.’55 Whereas Rutherforth’s statement saw Westminster as
subject to the fundamental laws of nature, which seemed suitably straightforward
for the colonists’ legal argumentation, it was the Lockean natural ‘Law antecedent
and paramount to all positive Laws of men’56 that lay at the heart of the sovereignty
of the British Parliament. In the constitutional struggles against the absolutism of
the Stuart dynasty, it provided Westminster with the authority of the last word on
public good (publick good; common wealth),57 which could not be left to the
52Müßig (2009), 174–81.
53This was explicitly established by the former attorney general and chief justice of common pleas,
Lord Camden, in two speeches he gave in the House of Lords on 2 February and 7 March 1766:
‘Deriving either “from the Law of Reason and of Nature” or “from [the] Custom and Usage [of]
our own Constitution,” fundamental law consisted of those “public laws” that “prescribe[d] the
form, and establish[ed] the constitutional power of the legislative body of the society.”’ Cit. in
Greene (2010), 95. Both speeches (the first one dates on 2 instead of 6 February) are also compiled
in Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments respecting North America, 1754–1776, ed.
Simmons and Thomas (1983), vol. II, 125f. (via report in the proceedings of 3 February), 147.
54Müßig (2014), “Locke, John”, columns 1029–32.
55Rutherforth (1862), chap. VI (Of Civil Laws), section XX (General division of civil laws), 399.
Rutherforth’s Institutes was one of the most widely cited legal references among the founding
generation of the United States.
56Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIV, § 168, 397–8.
57Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIV, § 168, 397–8: ‘The old
Question will be asked in this matter of Prerogative, “But who shall be Judge when this Power is
made a right use of?” I answer: Between an Executive in being, with such a Prerogative, and a
Legislative that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no Judge on Earth […] the
people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where have no judge on Earth, but to
appeal to heaven […] And therefore, tho’ the People cannot be Judge, so as to have by the
Constitution of that Society any Superiour power, to determine and give effective Sentence in the
case; yet they have, by a Law antecedent and paramount to all positive Laws of men, reserv’d that
ultimate Determination to themselves, which belongs to all Mankind, where there lies no Appeal
on Earth, viz. to judges whether they have just Cause to make their Appeal to Heaven.’ If the
monarch was free to decide upon the public good alone, any restraints the law places on the
execution of prerogative rights would be useless; the monarch would be absolute sovereign in
regard to the connection between Coke’s doctrine of common law based on reason and Locke’s
postulate of an antecedent natural law. Cf. in detail Seif (=Müßig) (2003b), 110–40.
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monarch’s discretion.58 The common law background of the Lockean precepts gave
significant persuasive weight to the colonial contention that Westminster had no
jurisdiction over internal colonial affairs, as well as that the British king had ceased
to be king for the colonies.59 Indeed, the omnipotent reason of the common law—
its reason-based supremacy—was the godfather of the American limitation of any
state power by the state goal to protect property in the sense of life, liberty, and
possession.60 John Phillip Reid explicitly held the ‘American argument [was]
similar to the old Whig case against Charles I and James II, except now the
supremacy of parliament, not the royal prerogative, was the issue.’61 While the
British understanding of the unwritten British constitution puts the sovereign par-
liament at the core, the colonial comprehension of the British complex of statutes,
common-law judicial precedents, particular documents having constitutional status
(such as the famous Magna Carta of 1215), and constitutional conventions for the
structure of government, was a restraint on arbitrary power. The threat of arbi-
trariness could emanate from any centre of power, be it the throne, the House of
Lords, or the House of Commons. Therefore, in the American ‘reading’ of the
unwritten British constitution, arbitrary power could also be vested in Parliament. If
Parliament legislated for the colonies without a check or balance to call it to
account, it ran into danger to act arbitrarily as the Sugar Act and Stamp Act proved.
3.2.1 American Sympathies for the Supremacy of Common Law
According to Sir Edward Coke, the specific historical legitimisation of common
law, amounting to its supreme quality, is based on its age, since it is said to date
back to the Norman Conquest (1066). This idea, however, did not originate with
Coke. The equation of ‘old law’ as ‘good law’ was well established for the common
law since the fifteenth century and its overall roots date back to ‘antiquity’. As John
Fortescue wrote:
[T]he realm has been continuously regulated by the same custom as it is now, customs
which, if they had not been the best, some of those kings would have changed for the sake
of justice or by the impulse of caprice, and totally abolished them. [No other laws] are so
58In the Declaration of the Houses in Defence of the Militia Ordinance of 6 June 1642, Parliament
claimed the ultimate authority to decide on the public good. Likewise, the Nineteen Propositions of
1 June 1642 expressly stated ‘that the great affairs of the kingdom, [held as] matters as concern the
public, […] are proper for the High Court of Parliament, which is your Majesty’s great and
supreme council.’ Cited in The Constitutional Documents, ed. Gardiner (1906), no. 53, 250–1. Cf.
also Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIV, § 159, 392.
59Müßig (2014), “Locke, John”, columns 1029–32.
60Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, § 123ff. Cantor (1997); Hostettler (1997);




rooted in antiquity. Hence there is no gainsaying nor legitimate doubt but that the customs
of the English are not only good but the best.62
This praise of the English law to which Fortescue‘s oeuvre owes its name, In
Praise of the Laws of England (about 1470), deems the proof of the quality of the
common law to reside in its unaltered usage since the oldest ages, since time
immemorial. The continuous general custom legitimised the unwritten common
law: ‘because it is given to all in common it is called common law. And for that
there is no other law than this, it exists as one from of old, and in general councils or
parliament it is suffered to be observed.’63 According to Christopher St. German,
the general custom was a universal consensus: ‘the common law proper was divers
general customs of old time used through all the realm, which have been accepted
and approved by our sovereign lord the King and his progenitors and all their
subjects.’64
On the other hand, the common law was the purview of lawyers, unknown
beyond the realms of the London Inns of Court.65 How can a law, based on the
technicalities of writs and developed by and for the knowledge of a legal elite, be
traced back to the consensus of the people? Nobody, after all, is born as a lawyer.66
How could common law lawyers explain that the customary law respected by the
judiciary could bind the nation as a whole? This could only be achieved by the
judicial consent faking the popular consent. The ‘collective mind of the profession’
thus subsumed and adopted the mantle of authority customarily represented by
popular consent.67 In this way, artificial reason replaced general custom, more as an
interpretative authority68 rather than as legislative consensus.69
62Fortescue (1997), chap. XVII, 26–7.
63Horne (1893), 5. Cf. also Doe (1990), 26; Lieberman (1989), 72.
64St. German (1974), 45. Prior to Blackstone, St. German’s Doctor and Student (1528) was the
primary English legal textbook, with the ‘dialogue’ of the title being a discussion of the role of
equity.
65‘The general customs were the strength and warrant of maximes, which were unknown outside
the Inns of Court.’ St. German (1974), 59. Cf. also Guy (1985), 20–1; Stein (1966), 10.
66‘[T]he common law itselfe is nothing else but reason; which is to be understood of an artificiall
perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of every man´s
naturall reason; for Nemo nascitur artifex.’ Coke, Edward (1794), The First Part of the Institutes of
the Laws of England, 97b.
67Finch (1759), 52–3. Cf. also Dodderidge (1631), 103; Prest (1977), 326–7. Further, the
assessments of the British legal history: Doe (1990), 26; Ives (1983), 161.
68The authority of the general custom for the common law, however, is not negated. Cf. explicitly
Coke, Edward (1826), The Reports, Ninth Reports 75b = 77 ER 843 (Combes’s Case).
69Coke, Edward (1826), The Reports, Second Reports 81a = 76 ER 597 (Lord Cromwel’s Case);
Coke, Edward (1826), The Reports, Sixth Reports (Sir John Molyn’s Case).
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The foundation for this reasoned concept of the common law was established by
Sir Edward Coke in his Reports (1600-15)70 and his quadripartite Institutes of the
Laws of England (1628-44).71 The reasonableness of the common law was the
battle cry of the common law lawyers against Stuart absolutism.72 It governed the
arguments against the prerogative courts and against the royal prerogative. For
instance, as the chief justice of the Common Pleas Court between 1606 and 1613,
and of the King’s Bench Division between 1613 and 1616, Coke made use of this
argumentation to establish the supremacy of the jurisdiction of the common law
over the monarch in the writs of prohibition and the case law, namely the
Prohibitions del Roy (1607), the Case of Proclamations (1611) and the Case of the
Five Knights (1627).
Just as his equation of custom with lawfulness was not new, neither was Coke’s
association of law and reason. As early as Cicero, it had been argued that ‘law is the
perfection of reason, which lies within the human nature.’73 The synonymy of law
and reason therefore marked the medieval Christian state theory by mediation of the
scholasticism; law was, according to Thomas Aquinas, ‘nothing else than a certain
order of reason for the common wealth, promulgated by the responsible for the
community.’74 The reason conception of common law, however, was less based on
the political philosophical theory but more on the linguistic congruency. It was
already in the earliest case law journals (the so-called year books from the thirteenth
century onwards)75 that Latin-ancient-French legal terminology of Norman origin76
proves the linguistic equation of the law (ley = law) and reason (reason, resoun)77:
‘ley est resoun’78; ‘le ley est fond de reason, et ceo que est reason est ley’79; ‘[d]onq
comon reason, quiest comon ley’80; ‘carriens deins le monde parle si
70John Hamilton Baker, “Coke’s Note-Books and the Sources of his Reports”, in Baker (1986),
183, 186–7. It is only the Reports 1–11 that Coke edited himself; Reports 12 and 13 were
published posthumously. Here, the standard edition of the English Reports 1900–1932 (ER 76, 77)
is used.
71Coke’s Second Part (1642) contains a commentary to theMagna Carta and other medieval laws.
Coke’s Fourth Part (1644) depicts the different jurisdictions of England. As books of authority,
they have the nature of legal sources; both parts justify the precedence of common law and the
sovereignty of Parliament as highest court of law.
72Gray (1980), 25–6; (1992), 85–121; Lewis (1968), 330–1.
73Cicero (1959), De legibus, I, v, 19, 316.
74Aquinas, Thomas (1892), Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, quaestio XC, Arg. 4, 152.
75The year books (late thirteenth century till 1535) were replaced by personal decision compila-
tions, such as Coke’s Reports. In 1865, the semi-official redaction entity Incorporated Council of
Law Reporting was introduced, which published the Law Reports. These exist today as the
standard compilation of the All England Law Reports.
76Van Caenegem (1987), 114–15; Pollock and Maitland (1952), 79–80.
77Middle English Dictionary (reason): reison, seyson, resun, resoun, reson, raison, reason. Cf. also
Baker (1979), 176. Ley = law is not to be equated with loi.
7818 & 19 Ed. III (RS), 379 per Stonore J.
79T 14 Hen. VI, 19, 60 at 21 per Vampage.
80H 35 Hen. VI, 52, 17 at 53 per Fortescue CJKB.
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reasonablement come le ley parle.’81 Occasionally, ‘reason’ and ‘justice’ appear
synonymously. For instance, the medieval travel report Mandeville’s Travels from
the fourteenth century demonstrates justice in England through the reasonable and
equal treatment of the poor and the rich: ‘in that ile also er wonder rightwise iuggez,
for they do resoun and trewth to like men, als wele to pouer as to riche.’82 Reginald
Pecock describes the law of England as reasonable law in The Folower to the Donet
(ca. 1453): ‘And as for the lawe of the kyng of englond, what is iugid bi iugis agens
such constreyners, al is taken to be lawe of resoun, which thei callen her common
lawe.’83
When viewed together with common law, ‘reason’ not only means rationality of
the highest degree (ratio summa), but also the intellectual method of the common
law lawyers.84 ‘Reason’ is the capability acquired by means of legal training to
develop legal rules out of the formless85 entirety of the legal knowledge since time
immemorial. This was achieved in an inductive manner, handed down through year
books and reports of preceding lawyers since the thirteenth century. This is
demonstrated by Coke’s terminology of ‘artificial reason’,86 which found its way
into the Prohibitions del Roy (1607).87 Like an artist, the lawyer exercises his legal
capabilities. The reasonableness of the law is perceived as its character; nobody
could be legally knowledgeable if he had not understood that first: ‘The reason of
the law is the life of the law, for though a man can tell the law, yet if he knows not
the reason thereof, he shall soon forget his superficial knowledge.’ In the first part
of his Institutes of the Laws of England, Coke adds to this the need for sustainable
professionality. The reason of the law is nothing to be understood in passing: ‘But
when he findeth the right reason of the law, and so bringeth it to his natural reason,
that he comprehendeth it as his own, this will not only serve him for the under-
standing of that particular case, but also many others, for cognitio legis est copulata
et complicata, and this knowledge will long remain with him.’88 ‘Artificial reason’
81P 13 Hen. VII, 22, 9 at 23 per Fineux CJKB. Cf. further examples at Müßig (2009), 177.
82Mandeville (1932), 141, line 24.
83Pecock (1924), 143. Cf. Green (1945), 12–13.
84Dodderidge (1631), 242; Finch (1759), 52; Noy, William (1641), A Treatise of the Principal
Grounds and Maxims of the Laws of this Kingdom, 1, cited in accordance with Burgess (1992), 40.
Cf. also Sommerville (1986), 92–3.
85Lambarde, William (1619), Eirenarcha, 511.
86The adjective is derived from artifex (lat.: artist) and signified the product of an artist, rather than
‘synthetically man-made.’
87‘…are not to be decided by natural reason but by artificial reason and judgment of law, which
law is an act which requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain to the
cognizance of it.’ Prohibitions del Roy (1607 = Mich. 5 Jacobi 1) 12 Co.Rep. 64 = 77 ER 1342–
1343 per Edward Coke, C.J.
88Coke, Edward (1794), The First Part of the Institutes of the Law of England, 183b. See also
Coke, Edward (1794), The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, 394b: ‘ratio est
anima legis, for then we are said to know the law when we apprehend the reason of the law, that is
when we bring the reason of the law so to our own reason, that we perfectly understand it for our
own.’
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is the collective knowledge of the common law judges and Coke seems to allude to
the scholastic interconnection of human and divine ratio by Thomas Aquinas: ‘ratio
est radius divini luminis.’ The metaphorical contrast between the ‘darkness of
ignorance’ and the ‘light of legal reason’ super-elevates legal training ‘by reasoning
and debating of grave learned men’89 as ratio legis, and cements thereby the
monopoly of interpretation for the learned lawyers and their superiority over the
legally untrained monarch: ‘and thereupon judgement is given according to the law,
which is the perfection of reason.’90 This legitimation of the common law by means
of judicial reasonableness91 corresponds to the authority of the general custom
amended through the ages: ‘if all the reason that were dispersed into so many heads
were united into one, yet would he not make such a law as the law of England is,
because by many successions of ages it hath been fined and refined by so many
learned men.’92
It is by making use of the reason conception that Coke justifies the supremacy of
the common law: a perfect expression of reason that commands what must be done
and bans the opposite. This highest degree of reasonableness as divine wisdom93
may be completed in the human spirit in the form of judicial wisdom.94 The
common law is the judicial understanding of the divine reasonableness and hence of
divine origin: ‘without question lex orta est cum mente divina, and this admirable
unity and consent in such diversity of things proceeded from God the fountain and
founder of all good laws and constitutions.’95 Thereby common law defends liberty.
In the case of the American colonies, the point of rupture was the liberty of no
taxation without political, parliamentary representation. This, they argued, was in
the spirit of the Magna Carta (1215); this was the occasion by which American
theorists differentiated between a fundamental law of nature and ordinary
legislation.
89Coke, Edward (1794), The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, 232b.
90Coke, Edward (1794), The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, 232b. Coke’s
wording mirrors that of Cicero: ‘ratio est radius divini luminis.’ He continues: ‘and by reasoning
and debating of grave learned men the darkness of ignorance is expelled, and by the light of legal
reason the right is discerned, and thereupon judgement is given according to the law, which is the
perfection of reason.’
91‘[G]ood law, if it be well understood; for non in legendo sed intelligendo leges consistunt.’
Coke, Edward (1826), The Reports, Eighth Reports, 167a = 77 ER 726 (The Earl of Cumberland’s
Case).
92Coke, Edward (1794), The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, 97b.
93Cf. the differentiating criteria between good and evil which coincides with the divine spirit: orta
autem est simul cum mente divina. Cicero (1959), De legibus II, iv, 10, 382.
94[Q]uae cum adolevit atque perfecta est, nominatur rite sapientia. Cicero (1959), De legibus I,
viii, 22, 320.
95Coke, Edward (1826), The Reports, Third Reports, iv. In the edition in the English Reports, the
foreword is not printed.
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3.2.2 Liberty Defending Common Law Versus Discretion Granting
Executive from an American Perspective
In the American colonies the reason-based supremacy of law set itself above all
authority, not only above monarchical sovereignty. According to the American
body of knowledge on Coke’s impact on American liberalism,96 the obligation of
the prerogative to adhere to an extra-statutory fundamental law (Fundamental Law
of Nature and Government97; a Law antecedent and paramount to all positive Laws
of men98) was adapted to become the binding force of the state goal to protect life,
liberty, and possession, after the Declaration of Independence (1776) has replaced
the Lockean ‘property’99 with the pursuit of happiness,100 though still tracing
Locke’s idea of property as tied to liberty, consent, and limited government.
Opposing Hobbes’ fear of submission based on mortal danger,101 Locke’s idea of
self-determination as an a priori ownership in oneself, in one’s own manpower and
resources,102 led to the assumption of freedom and equality as intrinsic rights.103
The individual freedom to produce wealth by labour results in the material wealth
of human society.104 From the restriction of ruling onto the protection of life,
liberty, and possession, together with the institutional transferral of rights to the
powers of the community,105 Locke concludes his conception of ruling and gov-
ernance as akin to a legal-fiduciary trust, which is held in the interest of the ruled
ones.106 This amounts to a right of resistance of the people (residual power) in case
of misconduct without questioning the institutional persistence of a common
supreme power, the legislative power as a whole.107
The opposition between common law (which defended liberty) and prerogative
(which provided for monarchical discretion) was fundamental to Locke’s differ-
entiation between legislative and executive power: ‘Where the Legislative and
Executive Power are in distinct hands, (as they are in all moderated Monarchies,
and well-framed Governments) there the good of the Society requires, that several
96Cantor (1997); Hostettler (1997); Stoner (1992). Cf. also Müßig (2008a), “Coke, Edward”,
column 871–5 for further references.
97Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIV, § 159, 392.
98Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIV, § 168, 397f.
99Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. IX (Of the Ends of Political Society
and Government), § 123ff., 368ff.
100Bailyn (1967); Dworetz (1990); Hartz (1955); Schultz (1993); Macpherson (1990).
101Bellum omnium contra omnes; homo homini lupus.
102Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. V, § 27, 305–6.
103Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. VII, § 87, 341–2.
104Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. V, § 41, 314–15.
105Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. IX, § 131, 371.
106Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIII, § 149, 384–5.
107Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIX, § 243, 445–6.
A New Order of the Ages. Normativity and Precedence 19
things should be left to the discretion of him, that has the Executive Power.’108 To
the extent that laws passed by the legislative branch did not contain any rule, the
power of decision-making was afforded to the monarchical executive that had
discretion: ‘Many things there are, which the Law can by no means provide for, and
those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him, that has the Executive Power
in hands, to be ordered by him.’109 This executive, discretionary decision-making
power corresponds to the monarchical prerogative: ‘This power to act according to
discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription of the Law, and sometimes
even against it, is that which is called Prerogative.’110 The public good was the
yardstick for discretionary decisions, ‘[f]or Prerogative is nothing but the Power of
doing publick good without a Rule.’111
Locke, however, was not prepared to leave the decision on the public good to the
arbitrary decision of the monarch. While he acknowledged that some decisions
were, by necessity, within the purview of the executive discretion ‘as the publick
good and advantage shall require’, he continued: ‘nay, ‘tis fit that the Laws
themselves should in some Cases give way to the Executive Power, or rather to this
Fundamental Law of Nature and Government, viz.’112 It was not the will of the
ruler, but rather a natural law that existed a priori and was of the highest,
extra-statutory nature (‘a Law antecedent and paramount to all positive Laws of
men’) that determined the public good, and it was this natural law to which the
discretionary decision of the prerogative had to adhere. As Locke pointed out, ‘[t]he
old Question will be asked in this matter of Prerogative, But who shall be Judge
when this Power is made a right use of?’113 Locke’s answer attributed the ‘ultimate
determination’ of the limits of the prerogative to the ‘Law antecedent and para-
mount to all positive Laws of men’; this was not subject to the final adjudication of
any earthly authority. Indeed, if a government were to continuously abuse its
exercise of power, the only recourse of the people was to appeal to a morally just
‘supreme judge’ to vindicate their cause and resistance. Redress could thus be
achieved through the acquiescence, alteration, or abolition of the offending gov-
ernment, if the popular appeal was based upon the rectitude of their intentions
(‘approving consciences’), moral character capable of self-government, and justness
of cause: ‘yet they have, by a Law antecedent and paramount to all positive Laws of
men, reserv’d that ultimate Determination to themselves, which belongs to all
Mankind, where there lies no Appeal on Earth, viz. to judges whether they have just
Cause to make their Appeal to Heaven.’114
108Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIV, § 159, 392. Note Locke’s
formulation of the idea of the ‘moderated monarchy.’
109Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIV, § 159, 392.
110Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIV, §§ 159–60, 393.
111Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIV, § 166, 396.
112Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIV, § 159, 392.
113Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIV, § 168, 397.
114Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XIV, § 168, 397–8.
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What was ground-breaking for the decisive constitutional normativity in the
revolutions of the eighteenth century was not the institutional realization of the
Treatises’ separation of the legislative and executive power as different state
functions, but the juridification of the starting point to ‘form themselves into a
political Society […and to] become a sovereign State,’115 which was achieved by
building on Locke’s notion of the natural right of people.116 The reasoning of the
Virginian planter and later delegate to the Continental Congress Richard Bland
(1710–76) transformed the Lockean state of nature into the settlement ‘by
Englishmen at their own Expense’, after they had decided ‘to quit the Society of
which they are Members, and to retire to another Country.’117 Bland’s argumen-
tation that ‘they recover their natural Freedom and Independence: The Jurisdiction
and Sovereignty of the State they have quitted ceases’118 was also employed by
Benjamin Franklin in his essay ‘On the Tenure of the Manor of East Greenwich.’119
This indicates the denial of the Parliament’s authority to legislate on colonial
internals to be the second legal point of the common law litigation conducted by the
Americans.
3.3 No Westminster Legislation on the Internal Colonial
Polities
The next step in the common law litigation against the Sugar Act of 1764 was the
argumentation that the Westminster Parliament should be excluded from all leg-
islation over the domestic affairs of the colonies.120 After the differentiation
between ‘legal’ and ‘constitutional’ and the condemnation of legally-issued statutes
infringing upon common law liberties as ‘unconstitutional’, the American revolu-
tionaries introduced the distinction of the internal colonial polities from the Empire
as a whole. Whereas the first are governed by the old liberties and privileges as
English subjects (specifically, the right of not being governed by laws made without
consent, as indicated in the Magna Carta), the latter falls under the general
115Bland, Richard (1766), An Inquiry on the rights of the British colonies, cited in Greene (2010),
89.
116Locke, John (1963), Second Treatise of Government, chap. XI, § 134, 373–5, and § 136ff.,
376ff. Cf. also Dunn (1969), 45–80; Hofmann (2012). Cf. Müßig (2014), “Locke, John”, column
1029–32.
117Bland, Richard (1766), An Inquiry on the rights of the British colonies, in Greene (2010), 89.
118Bland, Richard (1766), An Inquiry on the rights of the British colonies, in Greene (2010), 88.
119Franklin, Benjamin, “On the Tenure of the Manor of East Greenwich” (11 January 1766;
sometimes referred to as of 6 January), in Benjamin Franklin’s Letters to the Press, ed. Crane
(1950), 48.
120Greene (2010), 79.
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superintending power of the British Parliament. This protest, elaborated by the
various provincial assemblies of the thirteen colonies, is remarkable in its references
to the legal status quo of the British Empire. So, in 1764, the Connecticut Assembly
articulated against the proposed stamp duties that it is a ‘fundamental principle of
the British Constitution’ that ‘no law can be made or abrogated without the consent
of the people by their representatives.’121 The wording of the Virginia Assembly’s
protest referred explicitly to the ‘ancient and inestimable Right of being governed
by such Laws respecting their internal Polity and Taxation as are derived from their
own Consent’122—again claimed by the Virginia House of Burgesses and reiterated
similarly in public resolutions by the assemblies of Rhode Island, Maryland, and
Connecticut in September and October 1765.123
Of the nine older North American colonies whose assemblies passed resolutions
against the Stamp Act (those of Georgia, North Carolina, Delaware, and New
Hampshire did not), four claimed exclusive jurisdiction over both taxation and
internal legislation (Virginia, Rhode Island, Maryland, and Connecticut). If one also
counts the Massachusetts House’s October message to Governor Bernard that the
province’s authority to make laws for the ‘internal government and taxation’ had
‘been never […] questioned; but has been constantly recognized by the King and
Parliament’,124 this exclusive jurisdiction applied to a majority of five of the nine
colonies. When the American colonies pleaded for ‘an exclusive Power of making
Laws for their internal Polity and Government,’ they made a recourse to ‘a perfect
internal Liberty, as to the Choice of their own Laws, and in all other Matters that
are purely provincial.’125
3.3.1 Systematic Distinction of ‘Internal’ and ‘External’ Spheres
of Colonial Government
The Virginian Richard Bland was the mastermind for the systematic distinction
between ‘colonies’ “internal” and “external” spheres of government.’126 In The
121See Footnote 120.
122See Footnote 120.
123Greene (2010), 79–80, with references (n. 26) to Virginia Petition (18 December 1764),
Virginia Resolutions (30 May 1765), Rhode Island Resolves (September 1765), Maryland
Resolves (28 September 1765), Connecticut Resolves (25 October 1765), in Edmund (1959), 14,
48, 50–1, 53, 55. All of the assembly resolutions are conveniently collected in the same volume, at
47–62.
124Massachusetts House to Bernard, 23 October 1765, in The Writings of Samuel Adams, ed.
Cushing (1904), vol. I, 17–18.
125“A Letter to the Gentlemen of the Committee of London Merchants Trading to North America”
(London: 1766), 9–10; “Remarks on the Maryland Government,” American Magazine 1 (1741),
30, cited according to Greene (2010), 86.
126According to Greene’s argument in The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution, 81,
and Bailyn’s analysis in The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 2.13, No. 55.
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Colonel Dismounted (1764), he explained that because Virginians were entitled to
all of the ‘liberties and Privileges of English subjects, they must necessarily have a
legal Constitution.’ For him the legal English constitution was defined by ‘a leg-
islature composed in part of the representatives of the people who may enact laws
for the INTERNAL government of the colony and suitable to its various circum-
stances and occasions.’127 ‘Without such a representative,’ for Richard Bland ‘no
law can be made’, and therefore he concluded that Westminster Parliament, in
which the colonists were not represented, ‘had no authority to pass laws for the
“INTERNAL government”’ of the colonies without violating ‘the most valuable
part’ of the colonists’ ‘Birthright’ as Englishmen: the right ‘of being governed by
laws made with our own consent’, as embodied in chapter 12 of the Magna Carta
(1215).128 Parliament’s authority for all aspects of ‘EXTERNAL government’,
however, remained unquestioned.129 This argument continued in Bland’s second
pamphlet, An Inquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies,130 which was pub-
lished early in 1766 after Westminster had passed the Stamp Act against wide-
spread colonial resistance. Bland’s associate in the Virginia House of Burgesses,
Landon Carter (1710–78),131 sang from the same hymn sheet against the Stamp Act
and vigorously supported the colonists’ claim ‘of being solely governed and taxed
by Laws made with the Consent of the Majority of their own Representatives,
according to an Englishman’s inherent Birthright.’132
The colonists’ contention that they were ‘the better Englishmen’ can also be
traced in the note of four members of the Massachusetts Assembly, including
Samuel Adams and James Otis,133 to a London correspondent in December 1765:
‘The general superintending Power of the Parliament over the whole British Empire
is clearly admitted here, so far as in our Circumstances is consistent with the
127Bailyn (1967), 2.13, No. 55. As with those quotes that follow, the emphasis exists in the
original.
128Willoweit and Seif (=Müßig) (2003), 9. Cf. Bland, Richard (1764), The Colonel Dismounted, in
Pamphlets on the American Revolution, ed. Bailyn (1965), 320; cf. also Bailyn (1967), 2.13,
No. 55; and Greene (2010), 81.
129Bland, Richard (1764), The Colonel Dismounted, in Pamphlets of the American Revolution, ed.
Bailyn (1965), 320.
130Bland, Richard (1766), An Inquiry on the rights of the British colonies, in Greene (2010), 88.
131Carter, Landon (1965), The Diary of Colonel Landon Carter of Sabine Hall, 1752–1778, which
provides an account of colonial life immediately prior to the American War of Independence.
132Greene (1968).
133The catchphrase ‘taxation without representation is tyranny’ was ascribed to Otis in 1763, but
there is no evidence that he said it. On the other hand, in 1764 Otis wrote, ‘[That n]o parts of his
Majesty’s dominions can be taxed without their consent.’ Otis, James (1764), Rights of the British
Colonies, 65. Cf. also Smith (2011), 174, n. 13; Breen (1998), 378–403; Samuelson (1999), 493–
523.
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Enjoyment of our essential Rights, as Freemen, and British Subjects.’134 As Adams
pointed out, the ‘general superintending Power over the whole British Empire’ did
not cover internal affairs of the colonies. If the colonists were ‘indeed […] British
Subjects, (& they never can brook to be thought anything less) it seems necessary
that they should exercise this Power within themselves; for they are not represented
in the British Parliam[en]t & their great Distance renders it impracticable.’135Only
if each legislature within the Empire had an exclusive legislative authority within its
own jurisdiction, according to the Massachusetts Assembly, was it able to ensure
‘that equality [of rights and status] which ought ever to subsist among all his
Majesty’s subjects in his wide extended empire.’136
3.3.2 Specific Matters of the Colonies’ Own Nature Versus General
Matters of the Empire
Stephen Hopkins, Rhode’s Island’s elected governor, continued on this point still
further. ‘In an imperial state, which consists of many separate governments each of
which hath peculiar Privileges and of which kind it is evident that the empire of
Great Britain is,’ he argued, ‘no single part, though greater than another part, is by
that superiority entitled to make laws for or to tax such lesser part.’ This was the
reason, Hopkins believed, why each of the colonies had to have ‘a legislature within
itself to take care of its interests and provide for its peace and internal govern-
ment.’137 Again, as with Richard Bland and the Massachusetts representatives,
Westminster’s authority for matters of a general nature within the British Empire
remained unquestioned. The New York pamphleteer William Hicks similarly stands
in this line: To govern the colonies ‘according to the principles of the national
constitution,’ he pointed out, required the colonies to be ‘vested with authority of
legislation’ over all provincial matters ‘and have right to be represented in their
Assemblies, in whom [alone] that authority [was] lodged.’138 A colonists’ supporter
in London describes the autonomy of the internal government as the same for the
English people and the American people: ‘Our Constitution is so tender of the
134Greene (2010), 82.
135Samuel Adams to Reverend G[eorge] W[hitfield], 11 November 1765, in Greene (2010), 82 f.
136Otis, James et al. to Dennys De Berdt, 20 December 1765, in The Writings of Samuel Adams,
ed. Cushing (1904), vol. I, 20, 28–9, 67. See also Greene (2010), 83.
137Hopkins, Stephen (1765), The Rights of the Colonies Examined, in Pamphlets of the American
Revolution, ed. Bailyn (1965), vol. I, 512, 519. See also Greene (2010), 83.
138[Hicks, William] (1765), Considerations upon the Rights of the Colonies to the Privileges of
British Subjects, 11; [Fitch, Thomas et al.] (1764), Reasons Why the British Colonies, in America,
Should Not Be Charged with Internal Taxes, in Pamphlets of the American Revolution, ed. Bailyn
(1965), vol. I, 395, 406. Cf. the argumentation in Greene (2010), 84.
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Rights and Liberties of the Subject,’ wrote the anonymous author of A Vindication
of the Rights of the Americans in 1765, ‘that the People of England have their
Representatives, the Scotch theirs, the Welsh theirs, the Irish theirs, [and] the
Americans theirs, for they have Assemblies and Parliaments, each of which rep-
resent the Bulk of the People, of that Generality, or Division, for which such
Assembly or Parliament is appointed to be held.’139 ‘In extensive Territories not
confined to one Island, or one Continent, but dispersed through a great Part of the
Globe,’ this British voice for the Rights of the American people carries on, ‘the
Laws cannot be put into execution, nor the Rights of the People preserved, without
their being arranged into several Classes’ of coordinate legislatures, because each,
presumably, has its own exclusive jurisdiction over the internal affairs of its
territory.140
All these American statements of the second half of the seventeenth century,
from Richard Bland to William Hicks, circumscribe the exemption of the imperial
constitution from the English constitution of parliamentary supremacy. The cus-
tomary coinage of the colonial status was furthermore elaborated in the third legal
argument developed by the American in their own case.
3.4 Self-reliance of the British Imperial ‘Constitution’
The third legal point was the self-reliance of the imperial constitution with its
principled customary limitation, to be differentiated from the British constitution of
parliamentary supremacy that had emerged by the 1760s. In the line of arguments,
which held Great Britain and the British Empire to be distinct political entities, the
focus lies on history, when different groups of colonists each set forth to establish a
new settlement in North America in different places, at different times, for different
reasons. Some were commercial ventures, others havens of religious liberty for
those who founded them, and at least Georgia began as a penal colony. How could
the British Empire be administered and coordinated in the colonies, then, when the
colonies were at least two months away by ship? One way would have been to
forge a workable intercolonial union that could coordinate the individual colonial
governments for shared goals without repeated recourse concerning individual
policy decisions to the mother country. The failure of this goal narrowed the British
options down to long-distance governance: holding the American colonies together
for purposes of defense and foreign policy and dealing with them directly to reg-
ulate trade and raise revenue. Thus, by 1763, at the conclusion of the Seven Years’
War, the only certainty about constitutional arrangements with the colonies was
uncertainty. Blackstone’s Commentaries only provided his analysis of the
139A Vindication of the Rights of the Americans, 10–11, cited according to N.N. (1765b), Greene
(2010), 84–5.
140See Footnote 139.
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state-organisational status of the ‘American plantations’ as ‘distinct dominions.’ He
analysed them as ‘subject […] to the control of the parliament; though (like Ireland,
Man and the rest) not bound by any acts of parliament, unless particularly
named.’141 He stressed the self-reliance of the colonial justice: ‘they have courts of
justice of their own,’ with a line of appeal ‘to the king in council here in
England.’142 He acknowledged their own legislation: ‘Their general assemblies
which are their house of commons, together with their council of state being their
upper house, with the concurrence of the king or his representative the governor,
make law suited to their own emergencies.’143
The nature of Parliament’s relation to the colonies, however, had not been
defined in the Commentaries. This was the gap for the legal argument of exempting
the imperial constitution out of the sovereignty of Parliament. The reasoning was as
follows: After the Glorious Revolution and the usage of the Bill of Rights during
succeeding decades, Britain had obviously consented to the doctrine of parlia-
mentary supremacy in the domestic sphere. In the colonies, though, neither the
people at large through custom nor their representatives in the several colonial
legislatures had given such consent. There was no point in extending the British
constitution to the Empire conglomerate, as Richard Bland has put it, because it was
‘in vain to search into the civil Constitution of England for Directions in fixing the
proper Connexion between the Colonies and the Mother Kingdom.’144 Whereas the
British constitution was based around the sovereignty of Parliament, the imperial
constitution through which their colonies were connected to Great Britain remained
based on the old common law liberties, usages, and customs, according to the
American view.
It was the ‘loose texture’ of Britain’s ‘extended and diversified’ empire—to
borrow from the wording of Colonel Isaac Barré’s speech in the House of
Commons during the Stamp Act crisis145—that allowed for its deviating interpre-
tations, either in an unitarian way (from the perspective of London), or in a federal
way (from the perspective of the colonies).146 The metropolitan discourse thought
the British Empire to be an unitarian state centred around the sovereign Parliament
141Blackstone, William (1979), Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. I, Introduction,
sec. IV, 105.
142Blackstone, William (1979), Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. I, Introduction,
sec. IV, 105.
143See Footnote 142.
144Bland, Richard (1766), An Inquiry on the rights of the British colonies, in Revolutionary
Virginia, ed. Van Schreeven and Scribner (1973), vol. I, 34.
145Barré, Isaac, Speech to the House of Commons, 24 February 1766, in Proceedings and Debates
of the British Parliaments respecting North America, ed. Simmons and Thomas (1983), vol. II,
296. Cited according to Greene (2010), 102 (n. 74).
146Mauduit, Jasper (1766), Legislative Authority of the British Parliament, 11. Cf. Greene (2010),
102 (n. 74).
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and ‘organized on the principle of devolution.’147 From the colonial point of view, there
was no concentration of authority within the Empire as being ‘predominantly federal in
practice,’148 with London’s authority limited by the delegated colonial authorities. These
constitutional positions on both sides of the Atlantic were irreconcilable.
For the colonies the British move towards extending Westminster as an inter-
colonial Parliament with full authority in taxation and all other colonial concerns
caused fear of ‘a dangerous federal union.’149 In the metropolitan power centre only
singular voices in the Commons and the Lords conceded that there were and have to
be limits upon Parliament’s colonial authority. Charles Pratt, one of the architects of
the Pratt-Yorke opinion of 1757,150 had by now been elevated to the title of Lord
Camden; he favoured ‘the sovereign authority, the omnipotence of the legislature,’
but clearly pointed out that there were ‘some things it [Parliament] cannot do.’151 In
his view the sovereignty did not empower Parliament to act ‘contrary to the fun-
damental laws of nature, contrary to the fundamental laws of this Constitution.’152
His speeches of 2 February and 7 March 1766 were pervaded by implicit distinc-
tions between ordinary law and fundamental law, either borrowing ‘from the Law
of Reason and of Nature’ or ‘from [the] Custom and Usage [of] our own
Constitution.’153 Lord Camden and the likeminded William Pitt the Elder154 in the
147N.N. (1765a), The Political Balance, 45. Cf. Greene (2010), 102 (n. 74).
148Tucker and Hendrickson (1982), 175, 179. Cf. Greene (2010), 102 (n. 74).
149Charles Yorke, speech of 15 February 1765, in Proceedings and Debates of the British
Parliaments respecting North America, ed. Simmons and Thomas (1983), vol. II, 26. Cited
according to Greene (2010), 103.
150Charles Pratt (1714–94), afterwards Lord Camden: A former attorney general and then chief
justice of common pleas, Pratt was one of the authors of the Pratt-Yorke opinion of 1757 (also
known as the Camden-Yorke opinion) on the question of the right to own and govern new
colonies. The opinion was issued in response to a petition from the British East India Company,
over their land disputes either bought or conquerred. According to the official legal Pratt-Yorke
opinion, the British East India Company held property in India according to treaty, but these lands
would be considered under the sovereignty of Great Britain in the same way that territories
acquired by conquest were. This opinion came to apply elsewhere of the developing British
Empire.
151Camden speeches, 2 February and 7 March 1766, in Proceedings and Debates of the British
Parliaments respecting North America, ed. Simmons and Thomas (1983), vol. II, 125ff., 321ff.
152See Footnote 151.
153See Footnote 151.
154William Pitt, 1st Earl of Chatham (1708–78): William Pitt (often referred to as Pitt the Elder,
to distinguish from his son of the same name), was an important English politician of the
eighteenth century, and counterpart of Robert Walpole. An orator of some repute, he was a
member of the Parliament since 1735, from 1766 and 1768 he served as prime minister (be-
forehand between 1757 and 1761 under Newcastle he had a leading role). In spite of his
attempts, both military and political, he was unable to halt the American independence move-
ment, and he died in 1778. His son, William Pitt the Younger (1759–1806), was similarly a
highly influential politician and, twice, prime minister. “Pitt, William”, in Die Brockhaus
Enzyklopädie Online, https://brockhaus.de/sites/default/files/pdfpermlink/pitt-william-
73e49415.pdf (6 May 2014) accessed 14 March 2017.
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Commons were convinced that fundamental laws and old common law liberties
restricted and bound also the legislative body itself and could not be abrogated by
any parliamentary sovereignty. For them the ancient British principle of no taxation
without representation (chapt. 12 Magna Carta 1215) ranked among these funda-
mental laws.155 Due to the authoritative myth of the Magna Carta and this guar-
antee, which has already been into the articles of the Barons,156 Parliament had
‘never levied Internal Taxes on any subject without their own consent.’157 Before
the differentiation between Parliament’s authority to tax and its authority to legislate
for the colonies emerged in the colonial discourse, Pitt held it explicitly ‘essentially
necessary to liberty.’158 For the 1st Earl of Chatham and contrary to Robert
Walpole, ‘this kingdom, as the supreme governing and legislative power, has
always bound the colonies by her laws, by her regulations, and restrictions in trade,
in navigation, in manufactures—in every thing, except that of taking their money
out of their pockets without their consent.’159
Most of the London establishment, though, regarded the power to tax as ‘a nec-
essary part of every Supreme Legislative Authority’ and believed ‘if they have not
that Power over America, they have none, & then America is at once a Kingdom of
itself’,160 as the Connecticut agent Jared Ingersoll reported to his constituents in
February 1765. From the London perspective, the logic of the parliamentary supre-
macy left no space for customary restraints upon the authority of Parliament.
Parliament was ‘the only natural, constitutional Seat of complete Jurisdiction in the
Kingdom’ and that jurisdiction necessarily extended not just throughout the home
islands but ‘over the property and person of every inhabitant of a British colony’ as
well.161 In his reply to Camden, William Murray, Lord Mansfield (1705–93)162
stressed that Parliament represented ‘the whole British empire’ and had ‘authority to
155Willoweit and Seif (=Müßig) (2003), 9.
156Stubbs (ed.) (1905), 289ff.
157Camden’s speech, 7 March 1766; Pitt’s Speech, 14 January 1766, in Proceedings and Debates
of the British Parliaments respecting North America, ed. Simmons and Thomas (1983), vol. II,
81–92, 320–2. Cited according to Greene (2010), 95 (n. 59).
158Pitt’s speech, 14 January 1766, in Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments
respecting North America, ed. Simmons and Thomas (1983), vol. II, 81–92, 320–2. Cited
according to Greene (2010), 95 (n. 59).
159See Footnote 158.
160Jared Ingersoll to Thomas Fitch, February 1765, in Prologue to Revolution, ed. Morgan (1959),
30. Cited according to Greene (2010), 100 (n. 71).
161N.N. (1766), The General Opposition of the Colonies to the Payment of the Stamp Duty, 25–6;
[William Knox] (1765a), A Letter to a Member of Parliament, 21; [William Knox] (1765), The
claim of the colonies to an exemption from internal taxes imposed by authority of Parliament, 2.
Cited according to Greene (2010), 97 (n. 62).
162Lord Mansfield was the judge in in the Somerset’s Case. Here it was held that slavery itself could
not exist in England, because it contradicted the grant object of English law: Liberty. It was therefore
not compatible with the natural laws of the mankind. Shaw (1926), 6; Nadelhaft (1966), 196.
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bind every part and every subject without the least distinction’ in matters of taxation
as well as legislation.163 This position in the debate over the repeal of the Stamp Act
is consistent with his reasoning in the famous Somerset case,164 in which an
American resident was barred from exercising his rights over his slave in England as
against the natural laws of mankind and the common law liberty, ‘if not [allowed] by
positive law.’165 Though celebrated for his enlightened advocacy for freedom,
Mansfield implicitly held that a statute could feasibly allow slavery, though the
institution of slavery was contrary to fundamental laws.
Pitt and Camden were lone voices crying in the wilderness, whereas for most
contemporaries unlimited sovereignty lay in the king-in-Parliament. The over-
whelming majority position in the Stamp Act discourse held that customary
restrictions upon Westminster’s authority were synonymous with infringements
against the sovereignty of the British crown over the colonies. Representing the
metropolitan opinion, Lord Egmont argued that Parliament, by virtue of its
‘supreme, absolute and unlimited’ power, could levy taxes ‘upon the People not by
right of their having representatives but [by virtue of their] being subjects to the
Government.’166
Regardless these arguments, the strength of colonial resistance against the Stamp
Act forced Westminster to retract it. However, the repeal was accompanied by the
Declaratory Act, which explicitly asserted that Westminster ‘had hath, and of right
ought to have, full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force
and validity to bind the colonies and people of America […] in all cases whatso-
ever.’167 This consolidation of the unlimited and inimitable sovereignty of
Parliament effectively meant, for the colonists, the fading of ‘the essence of all their
British ancestors had fought for, took the very savour out of that fine Anglo-Saxon
liberty for which the sages and patriots of England had died.’168 Having slammed
the door, London had thus set the last scene for the American case conducted like a
common law litigation. The legal question of the binding authority of usage and
custom for the colonial constitutions was still very much open to debate, and it was
163Mansfield’s speeches, 3 February 1766, in Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments
respecting North America, ed. Simmons and Thomas (1983), vol. II, 128–130. Cited according to
Greene (2010), 99.
164Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 20 St Tr 1 per Lord Mansfield, who held that English law did not
permit a United States resident to exercise his rights over his slave, declaring slavery to be ‘so
odious that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law.’ As Mansfield pointed out, no
such law existed.
165Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 20 St Tr 1.
166Egmont’s speech, 6 March 1766, in Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments
respecting North America, ed. Simmons and Thomas (1983), vol. II, 126–7, 320–321. Cited
according to Greene (2010), 101 (n. 72), as of 7 March 1766.
167American Colonies Act (1766), 6 Geo 3 c 12.
168Mims (1941), 71.
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exactly this assessment which was needed for justification of the ‘rioting crowds’ in
the upheavals against Stamp Act.169
3.5 Legal Force of Custom in the Unsettled Connexion
of the Colonies to Britain
In their protest against both interference in local affairs by Westminster through
legislation and direct parliamentary taxation throughout the Stamp Act crisis, the
American colonists put enormous stress on the traditional foundation of their rights
in the old common law liberties. In making their arguments for exemption from
Westminster legislation and taxation, the colonies’ spokesmen relied on the
assumption that the colonial constitutions ‘had been established by long custom
and’ that custom ‘was currently sanctioned by accepted usage.’170 This redress to
custom does not appear to be mere rhetoric. Of course, their argumentation would
not have been so convincing if it had not exactly matched the supremacy of law
concept established by Sir Edward Coke on the understanding of common law as
immortal custom. ‘Times immemorial’ was and remains a commonly-employed
phrase by English lawyers. Thus, the customary basis of colonial constitutions
might have been felt by the colonists to be a legal argument in itself, one that could
not be surmounted by common lawyers. The latter could not help but accept
whatever had been done in a community in the very earliest times to be legal, and
whatever had been abstained from to be illegal. When the colonists denounced
London’s violation of their ‘old rights’ through the alteration of their ‘customary
constitution[s]’,171 they were in line with ‘a common law way of thinking about
politics […] viewing each controversy as a matter, not for free invention or for fresh
deduction from first principles, but for judicious choice, with attention to precedent
always in order but authoritative solution always elusive.’172 In the tradition of the
seventeenth-century reasoning the colonists emphasised continuity rather than
novelty and established ‘some reason greater than custom alone, for by common
law, unreasonable customs have no legal force.’173 At the heart of this reason-based
customary longing for rights as Englishmen was the Sullivan Draft174 of the
Declaration and Resolves on Colonial rights of the First Continental Congress of 14
October 1774175 which reads as an American adoption of the English Bill of Rights
169Reid (1974), 1067.




174The Sullivan Draft was named for Major General John Sullivan (1740–95), the delegate from
New Hampshire (and, later, governor) who first presented the resolutions.
175Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, ed. Ford (1904), vol. I, 63–73.
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of 1689.176 Indeed, as late as the nineteenth century, the attachment to the common
law traditions was vivid, as could be heard in Edmund Burke’s Speech on
Conciliation with America: the colonists were ‘not only devoted to liberty, but to
liberty according to English ideas, and on English principles. Abstract liberty, like
other abstractions, is not to be found […] Their love of liberty, as with you, [is]
fixed and attached on this specific point of taxation.’177
Following the Boston Tea Party and the adoption of the Intolerable Acts, del-
egates gathered on 5 September 1774, at Philadelphia, in what was to become the
First Continental Congress. Every colony but Georgia was represented. They voted
on the next day to appoint a committee ‘to state the rights of the Colonies in
general, the several instances in which these rights are violated or infringed, and the
means most proper to be pursued for obtaining a restoration of them.’178 This led to
the proposal of Joseph Galloway, a prominent young Pennsylvanian lawyer.179
Galloway’s Plan of Union was a conservative attempt to unite the colonies within
the Empire. In addition, it advocated the creation of an American colonial parlia-
ment to act in coordination with Westminster.180 Though it achieved a not incon-
siderable degree of support in the First Continental Congress, Galloway’s Plan of
Union was opposed by the more radical delegates in the Congress. Consequently, it
was introduced to the Congress on 28 September 1774, with the latter formally
declining to adopt the plan, six votes to five, on 22 or (sometimes reported) 27
October. With Galloway’s proposal rejected, the delegates instead adopted the
Declaration of Colonial Rights,181 based on Sullivan’s draft. This draft, formulated
176Historical Notes of the American Colonies and Revolution, ed. Griffith (1843), 114.
177Burke’s speech, in The works of the right honourable Edmund Burke, ed. Rivington and
Rivington (1826), 49.
178Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, ed. Ford (1904), vol. I, 26.
179Joseph Galloway (1731–1803): A lawyer by training, Galloway had already made a name for
himself in Pennsylvania at a young age. He became a member of the Assembly of Pennsylvania in
1756, and ten years later became the speaker of the Assembly. He took a critical stance with
regards to the Stamp Act, but he was a Loyalist who opposed independence. His Plan of Union,
which offered a compromise while remaining under the British umbrella, was rejected by the
Continental Congress. As a result of Galloway’s support for Britain, after 1778 he migrated to
Britain. See, for reference, the three-part biography published by Baldwin (1902a, b, c), 161–91
(no. 2), 289–321 (no. 3), and 417–42 (no. 4).
180Galloway’s Plan of Union mooted an American Parliament to act in conjunction with
Westminster, with Westminster maintaining a right of veto. The king would elect a
president-general to act as the enactor of the laws. Baldwin (1902c), 417ff. Baldwin suggests that
the Plan of Union was popular, but its failure was the result of Galloway’s opposition to the
Revolutionary Suffolk Resolves. This would indicate that the Continental Congress was largely
staffed by moderates, with the Resolves being a singular sticking point. On the other hand, Kelly
and Harbison argue that the discussion surrounding the Resolves demonstrates that extremists were
gaining the upper hand. Baldwin (1902b), 317; Kelly and Harbison (1970), 83.
181Curiously, the Plan of Union does not appear in the minutes of the Congress. Some historians
have suggested that it was deliberately expunged; others, taking into account Charles Thomson’s
reputation for honesty, assume that this was a genuine oversight on his part—a curious notion,
given the importance of the Plan. Baldwin (1902b), 317 (n. 3). Cf. also Wood (2015).
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in the manner of common law,182 began by listing Westminster’s unconstitutional
acts; the three statutes of 1774183 were denounced as ‘impolitic, unjust, and cruel,
as well as unconstitutional, and most dangerous and destructive of American
rights.’184 Against ‘these arbitrary proceedings of Parliament and administration’,
as the Sullivan Draft put it:
[t]he good people of the several colonies […] justly alarmed at these arbitrary proceedings
of Parliament and administration, have severally elected, constituted, and appointed
deputies to meet and sit in General Congress, in the city of Philadelphia, in order to obtain
such establishment, as that their religion, laws, and liberties may not be subverted.185
The Sullivan Draft continued with the justification of the colonists’ rights as the
customary rights of Englishmen. As with those of Englishmen still on the Home
Islands, these rights emanated from the ‘very earliest times’ of their ancestors:
Whereupon the deputies so appointed being now assembled, in a full and free represen-
tation of these colonies, taking into their most serious consideration, the best means of
attaining the ends aforesaid, do, in the first place, as Englishmen, their ancestors in like
cases have usually done, for asserting and vindicating their rights and liberties, declare,
That the inhabitants of the English Colonies in North America, by the immutable laws of
nature, the principles of the English constitution, and the several charters or compacts, have
the following rights.186
What followed was the explicit enumeration of these rights; these were related to
‘the rights, liberties, and immunities of free and natural-born subjects, within the
realm of England.’187 Finally, the draft concluded with reference to the
182Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, ed. Ford (1904), vol. I, 63–73.
183These three acts were, respectively, “An act to discontinue, in such manner and for such time as
are therein mentioned, the landing and discharging, lading, or shipping of goods, wares and
merchandise, at the town, and within the harbor of Boston, in the province of Massachusetts Bay,
in North America” (Boston Port Act), “An act for the better regulating the government of the
province of the Massachusetts Bay in New England” (Massachusetts Government Act), and “An
act for the impartial administration of justice, in the cases of persons questioned for any act done
by them in the execution of the law, or for the suppression of riots and tumults, in the province of
the Massachusetts Bay, in New England.” (Administration of Justice Act). Afterwards, another
statute—“for making more effectual provision for the government of the province of Quebec, etc.”
(Quebec Act)—also became contentious. Historical Notes of the American Colonies and
Revolution, ed. Griffith (1843), 114.
184Historical Notes of the American Colonies and Revolution, ed. Griffith (1843), 114.
185Historical Notes of the American Colonies and Revolution, ed. Griffith (1843), 114–15. At this
stage, the ‘several colonies’ to which Sullivan referred were New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay,
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Newcastle, Kent and Sussex on Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina.
186Historical Notes of the American Colonies and Revolution, ed. Griffith, (1843), 115.
187These rights are explicitly defined in Historical Notes of the American Colonies and Revolution,
ed. Griffith (1843), 115–16.
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immutability and irreversibility of the rights and liberties, ‘which cannot be legally
taken from them, altered or abridged by any power whatever, without their own
consent, by their representatives in their several provincial legislatures.’188 The
ending also reinforced the ‘Americans as fellow-subjects in Great Britain’, and
framed the preceding text not as a revolutionary document, but rather a vehicle ‘to
restore harmony between Great Britain and the American colonies.’189
As long as the American colonists deemed themselves common subjects of the
same king, and argued on the customary level of their old rights as Englishmen,
there could not be the idea of the precedence of a written constitutional text. All
questions of precedence were mere questions of the applicability of ordinary law. In
the case of collision of colonial ‘laws, by-laws, usages and customs’ with English
law, Blackstone held them to be ‘utterly void and of no effect.’190 Only in 1776 did
the Americans ‘substitute’ their old rights as Englishmen with ‘natural freedoms.’
Taking the plunge and reorienting the American conception of the law according to
natural law reasoning instead of the immortal customs of common law appeared to
be constitutional ‘pragmatism.’191 In doing so, they declared independence and
were no longer common subjects of the same king. Therefore, any invocation of
their customary rights as Englishmen had been voided.
4 Establishing Constitution as Law
4.1 Emergence of the Constituent American People
4.1.1 Natural Law ‘Basis and Foundation of Government’
It was the Virginia Bill of Rights192 that constituted the decisive move away from
the colonists’ justifications on the grounds of traditional common law liberties. In
this document, no reference at all was made to the customary rights and liberties of
the colonists as Englishmen. The legitimising authority was not ‘custom’ but
188Historical Notes of the American Colonies and Revolution, ed. Griffith (1843), 116.
189Historical Notes of the American Colonies and Revolution, ed. Griffith (1843), 116–17.
190Blackstone, William (1979), Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. I, 105.
191Cf. Bernstein, “The Current Global Resurgence of Pragmatism”, lecture at the Katholische
Akademie in Bayern, Munich, 21 March 2017.
192The Virginia Declaration of Rights had a tremendous influence on the development of the
American constitutional process. It proclaimed the natural equity of man, individual rights, and
that the right to govern derived its legitimacy from the people. This was demonstrated by its
wording, in which its origins were stated to be in the ‘representatives of the good people of
Virginia, assembled in full and free convention; which rights do pertain to them, and their pos-
terity, as the basis and foundation of government.’ It was modelled on the English Bill of Rights.
Hunt (1917), 276, “In Convention—June 12, 1776”, Postscript, no. 72 (14 June 1776), 1. Virginia
Bill of Rights in: McClain (1913), 382.
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‘nature’, the blueprint being the law of nature according to Locke, and the concept
‘[t]hat all men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent
rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any
compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.’ Written by George Mason, and adopted by the Fifth Virginia
Convention on 12 June 1776, the claimed generality as ‘the basis and foundation of
government’ marked the Virginia Bill of Rights as a revolutionary caesura.193 The
first formulation of popular sovereignty can be found in Section 2: ‘That all power
is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are their
trustees and servants and at all times amenable to them.’ The later constitutional
framework of the United States Constitution (1787) is already evident here in the
provision on the government194 and the separation between the legislature and the
executive.195 Section 7 recalls the supremacy of legislation: ‘That all power of
suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without consent of the
representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights and ought not to be exer-
cised.’196 Section 15 makes references to fundamental principles of higher-ranking
authority, but does not yet recognise the precedence of the written constitution:
‘That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any
people but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and
193Cf. le but de toute institution politique in the diction of the preamble of the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), in Willoweit and Seif (=Müßig) (2003), 250.
194Virginia Bill of Rights in: McClain (1913), 383. ‘Section 3. That government is, or ought to be,
instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security, of the people, nation, or community; of
all the various modes and forms of government, that is best, which is capable of producing the
greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of
mal-administration; and that, when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these
purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to
reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.
Section 4. That no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or
privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being
descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary.’ Cf. “In
Convention—June 12, 1776”, Postscript, no. 72 (14 June 1776), 1.
195Virginia Bill of Rights in: McClain (1913), 383. ‘Section 5. That the legislative and executive
powers of the state should be separate and distinct from the judiciary; and that the members of the
two first may be restrained from oppression, by feeling and participating the burthens of the
people, they should, at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return into that body from
which they were originally taken, and the vacancies be supplied by frequent, certain, and regular
elections, in which all, or any part, of the former members, to be again eligible, or ineligible, as the
laws shall direct. Section 6. That elections of members to serve as representatives of the people, in
assembly, ought to be free; and that all men, having sufficient evidence of permanent common
interest with, and attachment to, the community, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed or
deprived of their property for public uses without their own consent or that of their representatives
so elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not, in like manner, assented, for the public
good.’ Cf. “In Convention—June 12, 1776”, Postscript, no. 72 (14 June 1776), 1.
196Stimson (2004), 79.
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virtue and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.’197 Nevertheless, the
Virginia Bill of Rights was regarded at the level of ordinary legislation, not vested
with any superior rank, and still analogous to common law. Later declarations of
rights after the break with England included a series of rights in accordance with
natural law preambles. These rights had previously been enjoyed by the Americans
as rights of Englishman and codified law which has already existed; now, however,
they had been elevated to the new level of superior constitutions.198
4.1.2 Independence from Being Subjects of the ‘Same’ King
In his essay entitled ‘The Irrelevance of the Declaration,’ the New York historian
John Phillip Reid argued that the important part of the Declaration was not its
preamble, but rather the charges it levelled against George III.199 He was right to do
so. In summer 1775, John Dickinson’s Olive Branch Petition addressed a catalogue
of colonists’ complaints to Westminster; its failure to elicit positive action
encouraged the Americans to seriously consider the role of the king as a nonpartisan
patriot monarch of his whole people. This, naturally, must have included the
Americans themselves, as George III’s common, English subjects. Yet, as it became
increasingly obvious in 1775–6 that the king was not willing to intervene in favour
of the colonists against Westminster’s self-understanding as a superior legislative
power, the colonists resorted to formulating a new course of political action that
included both independence from Britain and the creation of ‘an
AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH.’ On their way to declaring themselves inde-
pendent the American colonists made it clear that they were about to terminate the
submission under British statehood as ‘common subjects of the same King.’200
From the point of view of the Americans, Parliament had no say in the relations
between Britain and the colonies; according to the Chief Justice of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, Stephen Hopkins, it was ‘absurd to suppose that the common
people of Great Britain have a sovereign and absolute authority over their fellow
subjects in America, or [indeed] any sort of power whatsoever over them.’201 When
George III refused his arbitration role requested by the colonies, he assumed in their
view full responsibility for the injustices suffered by the colonies. This responsi-
bility was subsequently established in the initial wording of the Declaration of
Independence of 4 July 1776:
197Vetterli and Bryner (1987), 76.
198Stourzh (2015), 58.
199Reid (1981), 46–89.
200“Letter from a Plain Yeoman”, Providence Gazette, 11 May 1765, cited in Prologue to
Revolution, ed. Morgan (1959), 73.
201Philalethes, New York Gazette Post Boy, 8 May 1766, cited in Greene (2010), 88 (n. 41).
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Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which
constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present
King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct
object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts
be submitted to a candid world.202
A close reading of the Declaration immediately reminds the reader of the
structure of the English Bill of Rights of 1689. This began with an enumeration of
all the infringements of James II against the ‘lawes and liberties of this
Kingdome.’203
After the list of all these justifications for the revolution the Declaration states:
Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our British brethren. We have warned them
from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction
over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement
here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured
them by the ties of our common kindred [sic!] to disavow these usurpations, which, would
inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence.
Even at this seemingly terminal point in Anglo-American relations, the
Declaration of Independence still highlighted their discursive commonalities.
Nonetheless, the ‘British brethren’ left their common, transatlantic kin no other
choice, but to declare themselves independent, as ‘[t]hey […] have been deaf to the
voice of justice and of consanguinity.’ By addressing ‘necessity’ the American
colonies claimed their right of resistance as a measure of self-defence, just as
Parliament itself has done standing against the Stuart king, Charles I, when it issued
the Militia Ordinance of 1642.204 The Declaration concluded its justifications by
stating that ‘[w]e must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our
Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in
Peace Friends.’205 The connection with the decision for war and peace in the ending
wording makes the range of this recourse to ‘necessity’ obvious. The central issue
was the question of sovereignty: who had the final say when it really mattered.206
4.1.3 Constitutional American People of the United Colonies (1776–8)
The Declaration of Independence invoked a united American people, one singular
constitutional population, distinct from the British colonial power: ‘When […] it
becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have
202Fröschl (2014); Wills (1978), passim; Armitage (2002), 39–45.
203Willoweit and Seif (=Müßig) (2003), 236–7.
204The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625–1660, ed. Gardiner (1906),
No. 54, 254–5, 257.
205Fröschl (2014); Wills (1978), passim; Armitage (2002), 39–45.
206For further argumentation cf. Müßig (2008b).
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connected them with another.’207 The redress of the initial wording to ‘the separate
and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them,’
thereby alluding to the old phrase from Bracton (‘under God and the law’) increases
the appearance of unity. In spite of this, the American people did not enter the stage
of history homogenously, in the form of a unitarian state, but rather as a federal
union of thirteen individual states. Moreover, though the unanimity of the
Declaration suggested unity, the Declaration itself included the seemingly irrec-
oncilable concept that ‘these United Colonies […] ought to be Free and
Independent States […] And that as Free and Independent states, they have full
power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and
do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.’208
This fundamental contradiction of 1776, in which (supposedly) one people was
divided amongst and represented by thirteen autonomous states, was determinative
for the history of the United States, as almost all discussions on the rights of the
individual states vis-à-vis the central government—for instance, the various States’
Rights debates, the Jacksonian Nullification Crisis of 1832–7, and the secession of
the Confederate states in 1860–1209—may be traced back to it. Indeed, common
political discourse customarily referred to the United States in the plural (‘the
United States are’), with the modern singular usage (‘the United States is’) only
entering general usage after the end of the Civil War in 1865.210 Furthermore,
South Carolina’s Declaration of Secession (24 December 1860), which was one of
the direct casus belli of the Civil War, explicitly justified the separation from the
Union by invoking the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of
Confederation:
In pursuance of this Declaration of Independence [1776], each of the thirteen States pro-
ceeded to exercise its separate sovereignty; adopted for itself a Constitution, and appointed
officers for the administration of government in all its departments – Legislative, Executive
and Judicial. For purposes of defense, they united their arms and their counsels; and, in
1777, they entered into a League known as the Articles of Confederation, whereby they
agreed to entrust the administration of their external relations to a common agent, known as
the Congress of the United States, expressly declaring in the first article, that each State
retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right
which is not, by this Confederation, expressly delegated to the United States in Congress
assembled.211
South Carolina’s justification for secession was that it had never surrendered the
sovereignty it had won as an independent state in 1776, neither to the Continental
Congress under the Articles, nor to the Union under the 1787 Constitution. With the
explicit reference to the Treaty of Paris of September 1783, which brought the War
207Text of the Declaration in Thomas Jefferson, Writings, ed. Peterson (1984), 13–14. For the
assessment as one constitutional people cf. Mansfield (1989), 290.
208Thomas Jefferson, Writings, ed. Peterson (1984), 24.
209Ellis (1987), passim.
210Cf. Fröschl (2015), 40.
211Bruun and Crosby eds. (1999), 340–2.
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of Independence to a close, and the acknowledgement of the individually-named
‘United States’ by the ‘Britannic Majesty’, this single-state legal focus position was
even more underlined and emphasised. In the line of the South Carolinian argu-
ments for the separation from the United States lay also the recourse to the ‘two
great principles asserted by the Colonies, namely: the right of a State to govern
itself; and the right of a people to abolish a Government when it becomes
destructive of the ends for which it was instituted.’212 Undisputable was the final
conclusion of the secessionist state, ‘that each Colony became and was recognized
by the mother Country as a free, sovereign and independent State.’213
This nineteenth-century reasoning reflects the debates at the end of the Stamp
Act crisis, revolving around the legitimacy and desirability of a federal union or an
incorporating union. For a Barbadian pamphleteer, ‘Our Governments […] are
founded on similar Principles’,214 and in March 1766 an anonymous writer in the
Pennsylvania Journal proposed ‘a confederacy of states, independent of each other,
yet united under one head’, concluding that ‘all the powers of legislation may
subsist full and complete in each part, and their respective legislatures be absolutely
independent of each other.’215 The struggle of the ‘Colonies [to be] coordinate
members with each other and with Great Britain, of an empire united by a common
executive sovereign, but not united by any common legislative sovereign’ was the
driving force behind the American Revolution, more so than any other claim or
grievance, as James Madison later observed.216 The necessity of a federative union
was highlighted by the Declaration of Independence, since only a united action in
the war against Great Britain seemed likely to bring success to the colonies. But
separation from Britain by no means resolved this ancient question. To the contrary,
it made it even more challenging by complementing it with the equally vexing
problem of how to forge a viable political and constitutional union out of thirteen
distinct polities that had previously been tied together only by their common
relationship to the British Empire through the emerging imperial constitution.217
Therefore the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia were only adopted on 15 November
1777 after long discussions,218 though any incorporating union (such as the
example of England and Scotland since 1707) was out of question. The first two
articles stipulated that ‘[t]he style of this confederacy shall be “The United States of
212Bruun and Crosby (eds.) (1999), 340–2.
213See Footnote 212.
214Cited in Prologue to Revolution, ed. Morgan (1959), 20.
215F. L., Pennsylvania Journal, 13 March 1766, in Prologue to Revolution, ed. Morgan (1959), 91.
216James Madison, “Notes on the Resolutions, 1799–1800”, in The Writings of James Madison,
ed. Hunt (1906), vol. VI, 373.
217Greene (2010), 188.
218The ratification process was finished with the adoption of Maryland on 1 March 1781.
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America.”’, and ‘[e]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence
[…] which is not expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assem-
bled.’219 The longest of all the provisions, Article IX, amounted to half of the text
of the Articles of Confederation. It regulated that ‘the united states in congress
assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on
peace and war […] of sending and receiving ambassadors—entering into treaties
and alliances […] The united states in congress assembled shall never engage in a
war […] nor enter into any treaties or alliances […] unless nine states assent to the
same.’
All decisions of importance and relevance had to be made by nine out of thirteen
states, which amounted to a necessary majority of seventy percent of the individual
states represented in Congress. Ten years later, the majority in the debates of the
federative United States Constitution of 30 July till 1 August 1787, borrowing from
the historical examples of the Netherlands, the Swiss Confederation, and the Holy
Roman Empire, pointed out that not individuals but individual states were repre-
sented in Congress,220 which was to be done equally and with the need of una-
nimity for general and fundamental matters.221 This proves that winning
independence in 1783, though effectively securing the original goal of the revo-
lutionaries to gain local control over local affairs, left the question of how to bring
the individual states into an ‘effective union.’ The state organisational issue to
distribute authority between the centre and the peripheries was the primary concern
of the American constitutional discourse during the 1780s and particularly during
the national debate over the establishment of a new federal union 1787–8. Indeed, it
might have been the driving force behind the recovering of the constitution as one
legal written document at the core of a polity, defining its government’s powers and
responsibilities and the limits on those powers and specifying the rights of the
people. In examining the United States Constitution of 1787, its focus on sover-
eignty issues between the Union and single states and its understanding as supreme
legal codex for the existence of the union (and therefore nation) becomes readily
apparent.
219Reproduced in The Debate on the Constitution: Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches, Articles
and Letters during the Struggle over Ratification, ed. Bailyn (1993), vol. I, 954–64, and vol. II,
926–36.
220Thomas Jefferson, Writings, ed. Peterson (1984), 28–31.
221The opposition (most prominently, Benjamin Franklin) argued that population figures or eco-
nomic power should be represented proportionately, rather than equally.
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4.2 Constitution as Supreme Legal Codex for Central State
Issues
4.2.1 Focus on the Division of Sovereignty Between Union and Single
States
The United States Constitution was meant to be a ground-breaking document.
Given this, its preamble, beginning with the phraseology ‘[w]e the people of
America do hereby declare’, seems uncharacteristically cautious. There is no other
explicit reference to the sovereignty question within the preamble. This is perhaps
because of the perceived experimental character of the Constitution itself, and its
aim to establish an expansive federal republic by majority decision. The architects
of the Constitution were well aware of this character. In his Federalist Paper No. 85,
Alexander Hamilton invoked the words the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher
David Hume, in order to point out that ‘[t]o balance a large state or society […] on
general laws, is a work of so great difficulty [that] time must bring it to perfection,
and the feeling of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they
INEVITABLY fall into in their first trials and experiments.’222
The delineation of competencies between the Union and the States (Art. 1,
sec. 8, 9, 10) is, along with the separation of powers (Art. I, sec. 1 and Art. 2,
sec. 1)223 the leading constitutional theme in the organisation of the United States.
The address to an internal and external defensive sovereignty224 is not necessary.
The Constitution articulated the rights of the Congress in legislation (Art. I, sec. 8)
—the classical rights of sovereignty—and reduced correspondingly the rights of the
union states, thus demonstrating the focus on the division of sovereignty between
union and union states. It designed a federal state with a strong centralised power.
With the American founding fathers having Blackstone’s Commentaries as a
222The Federalist Papers, published originally as a series of eighty-five essays in two New York
newspapers between 1787 and 1788, were originally intended to help sway New York public
opinion towards acceptance of the draft produced at the Constitutional Convention. Collected and
published together in 1788, they have since become the acknowledged, authentic commentary on
the interpretation of the United States Constitution, and are consulted by the Supreme Court.
Though the essays were written under a collective nom-de-plûme (‘Publius’), there were three
authors: Alexander Hamilton (1755/1757–1804), who wrote the majority; James Madison (1751–
1836), the ‘father of the Constitution’; and John Jay (1745–1829), who focused mostly on foreign
affairs and whose contributions were limited to five essays due to illness. Alexander Hamilton,
Federalist No. 85, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist Papers, 526–7. Cf. David
Hume, “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences”, in Hume (1788), Essays and Treatises,
vol. I, 112.
223The Federalist’s individual analysis of the three powers (Legislature: No. 55-66; Executive:
No. 67-77; Judicial: No. 78-83) puts forward the idea of a mixed constitution, in which, borrowing
from Montesquieu's phrasing, every power is accorded a virtue according to its function: the
legislative, prudence, because of the plurality in advising; the executive, energy, because of its
concentration of power in one person. Cf. Müßig (2013a), paper 5, 15 (n. 129).
224Cf. Müßig (2016), 35–6, 50–1, 74–5.
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model, the image of the President as surrogate monarch was already on the table,
and elucidated in Art. 2, sec. 1’s provision that ‘the executive power shall be vested
in a President.’225 Legislation (Art. I sec. 1, 8) and budgetary sovereignty (Art. I,
sec. 7) were subject to the two chambers of Congress: the House of Representatives,
being the elected representatives of the people (Art. I, sec. 2), and the Senate, being
the representatives of the individual states (Art. I, sec. 3). The bicameral system was
created to enable compromises between the interests of the big states and the small
ones. In the House of Representatives, every state was to have representatives
according to its size (Art. I, sec. 2); in the Senate, according to the principle of
equality of the states, every state was to have two senators (Art. I, sec. 3).
4.2.2 The Constitution as Guarantee for the Existence of the Union
According to the Federalists, such as Hamilton, Madison, and John Jay, the
supremacy of the constitution was self-evident, because it was the benchmark for
the action of all political powers. In the constitution, not only a political order that is
able to protect freedom and property is manifested, but it is also the only system
that can guarantee the existence of the nation. According to Federalist Paper
No. 84, written by Hamilton (writing under the pseudonym ‘Publius’, meaning ‘of
the people’), ‘[t]he great bulk of the citizens of America are with reason convinced,
that Union is the basis of their political happiness.’226 This conviction arose
because this ‘great bulk of the citizens’ was represented by ‘a national government’
(No. 85).227 As for his rhetorical question ‘whether […] the proposed Constitution
has not been satisfactorily vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and
whether it has not been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and nec-
essary to the public safety and prosperity’, Hamilton explained that a decision upon
the constitution was a decision upon the ‘very existence of the nation.’228 His
225The president is directly elected by the people, by way of electors. Despite accountability to
Congress (Art. 2 Section 3 United States Constitution), the president does not depend on the
Congress. The president in turn cannot dissolve Congress. The president’s staff consists of his
personal advisers and is not accountable to Congress. The president’s important role in the leg-
islative process, despite having no formal right of legislative initiative, emerges from the right to
‘recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient’ (Art.
2 Section 3). Further, the president has a suspensive veto (Art. 1 Section 7). Cf. Muß (2013),
passim; Beke-Martos (2012), 155–174.
226Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 84, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers.
227‘A NATION, without a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle’.
Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 84, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 527.
228‘No partial motive, no particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or preju-
dice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his posterity, an improper election of the part he is
to act. Let him beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect that the object upon which
he is to decide is not a particular interest of the community, but the very existence of the nation;
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explanations that the consent to the constitution should be governed by ‘[n]o partial
motive, no particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or prej-
udice,’229 with the decisive aspect being ‘not a particular interest of the community,
but the very existence of the nation’, marks the superiority of the general will
approving the constitution over the consensus to a statute.
The opposition to the federal Constitution, which in 1787 fostered the devel-
opment of hierarchical laws, has been extensively investigated by Gerald Stourzh,
who likened it to the political thought of the nineteenth-century Austrian theorist
Adolf J. Merkl.230 As an example of this, Stourzh referred to the correspondence of
an anonymous anti-Federalist farmer. In his sixth letter, the farmer (assumed to be
the New Yorker Melancton Smith) wrote:
Of rights, some are natural and unalienable, of which even the people cannot deprive
individuals: Some are constitutional or fundamental; these cannot be altered or abolished by
the ordinary laws; but the people, by express acts, may alter or abolish them. These, such as
the trial by jury, the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, &c., individuals claim under the
solemn compacts of the people, as constitutions, or at least under laws so strengthened by
long usage as not to be repealable by the ordinary legislature – and some are common or
mere legal rights, that is, such as individuals claim under laws which the ordinary legis-
lature may alter or abolish at pleasure.231
From this anti-Federalist opposition against the precedence of constitution over
the ordinary laws (both of the union and of the federated states), it becomes clear
that the development of the supremacy of constitution in the American constitu-
tional discourse also comprised the political issue of the state-organisational rela-
tionship between union and single federated states; its preeminence was fostered by
the equivalence of the existence of the Union and the coming-into-existence of the
Constitution.
4.2.3 Constitutional Silence on Precedence
The supremacy of the Constitution as proclaimed in Art. VI clause 2 of the 1787
text was left without statement how to implement the precedence at either federal or
and let him remember that a majority of America has already given its sanction to the plan which
he is to approve or reject.’ Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 84, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay
(1961), The Federalist Papers, 523.
229Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 84, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 523.
230For more on Hans Kelsen and Adolf J. Merkl, please refer to the contribution by Thomas
Olechowski; for a condense overview of Stourzh’ long-standing research on constitutional
precedence please refer to his essay, both in this volume.
231Letters from the Federal Farmer, letter 6, in Storing (ed.) (1981), 261. Only recently has Smith
been assumed to be the author; Smith was a prominent critic and opponent of the United States
Constitution. See also Stourzh (1999), 123, republished in Stourzh (2007), 321. It is through these
works by Stourzh that Smith’s letter, its meaning, and its importance has been brought to my
attention.
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single state level.232 This seems to owe to the discussion leading from the 1760s,
which saw judicial review as a contradiction of popular sovereignty; according to
the introductory preamble, it was this popular sovereignty that legitimated consti-
tutional legislation.233 This reluctance to affirm constitutional supremacy should
also be understood by reference to the common law context of the American
discourse. In the leading Bonham’s Case,234 known also in the colonies, Coke
formulated the precedence of common law even over the laws of Parliament.235 The
willingness of the colonies to adhere to this reasoning was only bolstered during
their struggles against Westminster legislation.
The counter-position of the sovereignty of Parliament236 was about to cause
much unease in the colonies. Contrary to Coke, Blackstone’s Commentaries stip-
ulated that, ‘[w]here the common law and a statute differ, the common law gives
place to the statute.’237 This established the precedence of the legislative over the
judicial. But even before Blackstone’s definition of parliamentary sovereignty was
able to gain a foothold in the colonies, the American discourse had already adopted
the position that there must be limitations to Westminster’s jurisdiction.
With this we return to the justification of the American Revolution as an act of
resistance against the unconstitutional action of the English Parliament. It is true
that the elected colonial representative bodies did not expressly confess to the
invalidity of unpopular parliamentary laws in the protest against the motherland,238
but popular sovereignty took parliamentary sovereignty off the table. The idea of
popular sovereignty was formulated by the Committee of Correspondence of the
232Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. (1. Cranch) 137) in 1803,
the competence to decide the constitutionality of laws passed by Congress is recognised.
233‘We the people of the United States do ordain and establish this constitution for the United
States of America.’ Cited by Willoweit and Seif (=Müßig) (2003), 255.
234‘And it appears in our books that in many cases the common laws will control acts of parliament
and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an act of parliament is against common
right or reason, or repugnant or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it and
adjudge such act to be void.’ 8 Co.Rep. 107a = 77 ER 638; Plucknett (1926/27), 34.
235Coke, however, did not decide on the issue of sovereignty, leaving it open to interpretation. See
also Mosse (1950), 160–1.
236Concerning Parliament’s claim of sovereignty as the highest common law court in the English
constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century, see Müßig (2006a), 48ff.
237Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Introduction, section III, 89. See
also Jezierski (1971), 95–106.
238House of Burgesses of Virginia 1764: ‘And if it were proper for the Parliament to impose Taxes
on the Colonies at all, which the Remonstrants take Leave to think would be inconsistent with the
fundamental Principles of the Constitution, the Exercise of that Power at this Time would be
ruinous to Virginia.’ Cited in Prologue to Revolution, ed. Morgan (1959), 17; Resolution of
Maryland 1765: ‘Unconstitutional and a Direct Violation of the Rights of the Freemen of this
Province’ (Prologue to Revolution, 53); Resolution of Massachusetts 1765: ‘That all Acts made,
by any Power whatever, other than the General Assembly of the Province, imposing Taxes on the
Inhabitants are Infringements of our inherent and unalienable Rights, as Men and British Subjects:
and render void the most valuable Declarations of our Charter’ (Prologue to Revolution, 57).
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city of Boston for the first time in 1772, which quickly spread to the other colo-
nies.239 With the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, the dam broke.240
Nonetheless, the 1787 Constitution remained cautious in its implementation of
popular sovereignty, in contrast to the celebratory rhetoric of its preamble.
Regardless the importance of the Virginia Bill of Rights eleven years earlier, by
1787 conservative reservations against the people as the sovereign power were still
insurmountable. In the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, the conviction that
unlimited popular sovereignty could actually endanger the Constitution still pre-
vailed.241 The exclusion of direct popular involvement in the constitutional
amendment process, and the introduction of the bicameral system went in the same
direction.242 Art. V of the 1787 Constitution clearly demonstrates the distrust of
direct popular involvement in this amendment process:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of
the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by
the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight
hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its
equal Suffrage in the Senate.243
Furthermore, the 1787 text contained no declaration of human rights. It was only
in 1791 that the Bill of Rights became part of the Constitution due to conditions set
239‘All men have a Right to remain in a State of Nature as long as they please: And in case of
intolerable Oppression, Civil or Religious, to leave the Society they belong to, and enter into
another.—When Men enter into Society, it is by voluntary consent; and they have a right to
demand and insist upon the performance of such conditions, and previous limitations as form an
equitable original compact.—Every natural Right not expressly given up or form the nature of a
Social Compact necessarily ceded remains.—All positive and civil laws, should conform as far as
possible, to the Law of natural reason and equity.’ The Writings of Samuel Adams, ed. Cushing
(1904), vol. II, 351–2. Concerning the revolutionary theoretical significance of the idea of popular
sovereignty in the American Revolution see among many Engel (1961), 211; Arendt (1963), 152;
Wood (1969), 353–354; Adams (1973), 138–40.
240‘That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are
their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them […] that government is, or ought to
be, instituted for the common benefit […]; and that, when any government shall be found inad-
equate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalienable,
and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most
conducive to the public weal.’ Swindler (ed.) (1979), 49. See also Stourzh (1976), 397ff.
241At the meeting of 21 July 1787, for example, James Madison referred to unlimited popular
sovereignty as ‘the real source of danger to the American Constitutions.’ Cited in The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Farrand (1911), vol. III, 74.
242Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress and must
also be ratified by three-quarters of the States by legislatures or constitutional conventions (Art. V).
243Willoweit and Seif (=Müßig) (2003), 275–6.
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out during the debates of ratification in the individual states (Amendments). They
lay down a catalogue of individual rights, including those of freedom of religion,
speech, and assembly, as well as the inviolability of the person and property. In
America—the New World—class differentiations were a memory of the old con-
tinent. For that reason, the idea of equality was not as much emphasised as in the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, while the American guar-
antees of freedom of assembly and the right of petition (Article 1 of the
Amendments) have no equivalent in the French Declaration. At this point the
beginning of a tradition becomes noticeable, through which the United States
fostered a unique self-characterisation that differentiated it from its European
forebears. This continued after independence and was strongly emphasised in the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution 15 December 1791: The federal
legislature was prohibited from passing resolutions concerning the creation of a
state religion or the prohibition of the free practice of religion. This prohibition for
the federal legislature also includes the restriction of the freedom of speech and
press, as well as the freedom of assembly and the right to petition.244
Constitutional jurisdiction, which was crucial for the precedence of constitution,
was not included into the 1787 text, as there was no majority in the Convention for
so strong a constitutional jurisdiction.245 Nevertheless, the need for an authoritative
final judge in disputes between the centre and the periphery—disputes that had been
unsolvable in the years between 1765 and 1776—contributed to the American
development of a judicial review and to the revision of Locke’s concept of there
being no competent earthly judge between the legislature and the population.
4.3 Farewell to the Lockean ‘Inter legislatorem et populum
nullus in terris est judex’
According to his letter about tolerance (‘Epistola de tolerantia’, 1689), for John
Locke there was no judge on earth between the legislation and the people. This role
could only be occupied by God, and it was God who personified the figure of
judgemental resistance against executive or legislative excess.246 With the
244The First Amendment was adopted on 15 December 1791. Here it was established that
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.’ It is part of the
Bill of Rights, which was enacted by popular pressure in order to explicitly establish the guar-
antees of individual rights in the face of governmental interference. Nowak and Rotunda (ed.)
(1991), 937.
245For details, see Dippel (1987), 150.
246Locke (1989), A Letter Concerning Toleration, 86. In 1689, Locke answered the question: Quis
erit inter eos judex?—who shall be the judge between them?—with: solus deus (God alone). My
argumentation here follows Stourzh (2015), 113–14.
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separation of legislation and constitution, or the distinction between superior con-
stitutional law and ordinary statutory law, the Americans entertained the possibility
of having a secular judge between the legislation and the people. This would take
the form of judges who were authorised to measure the statutory law against the
‘higher’ will of the American people, as embodied by the constitution. The higher
legitimation by the constituent general will was explained by Hamilton in his
Federalist Paper No. 85.
This process indeed commenced during the 1780s in some of the federal states of
America, especially in the state of North Carolina. By the competence for ordinary
jurisdiction to measure the statutory law against the ‘higher’ will of the people, in
other words the constitution, the feudal right of resistance, as it is assumed by
Locke—where God as judge means resistance—was replaced by the (constitu-
tional) courts.247 The federal jurisdiction adopted this opinion; as a result, it was
applied to the famous legal case of Marbury v. Madison (1803), which is consid-
ered to be the foundation of the ‘judicial review’—the prerogative of the judges to
examine constitutionality or unconstitutionality. Marbury v. Madison held praeter
legem that ‘[i]t is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and
interpret the rule’, and that the Constitution was the superior measurement for
ordinary statutes (‘If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the
operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply’). However, it is crucial
to analyse the context of this decision. That context is provided by Hamilton’s plea
for the introduction of a judicial review, made fifteen years earlier.
The interpretative authority of jurisdiction and the fundamental character of the
Constitution were the starting points for the argumentation set forth in The
Federalist No. 78. According to Hamilton:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular
act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable
variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of
course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the
statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.248
James R. Stoner argues249 that Hamilton’s plea for the judicial review relied on
common law reasoning, irrespective the latter’s super-elevation of Parliament’s
wisdom (also: ultimum sapientiae)250 not to enact any statute ‘against the truth’ due
247Stourzh (1989), 73.
248Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 78, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 467.
249Stoner (1992), 207–9 (n. 41).
250Coke, Edward (1797), The Institutes of the Law of England, Second to Fourth Parts, Part IV, 3.
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to the knowledge of the represented subjects of the whole realm.251 Hamilton
overcame this well-known line of precedence against judicial review, also attached
to Bonham’s case,252 by asserting that a written constitution is a law and therefore
examining the violation of constitution by statute is to be held analogous to the
clash of two statutes. If two statutes on the level of the same legislative authority
were incompatible, it is ‘the nature and reason of thing’253 that decides for the
preference of the more recent. A minore ad maius the analogy leads to preference
for a constitutional provision over a conflicting statute, as ‘the nature and reason of
thing’ says so a fortiori, if the legal provisions of a superior authority were at risk of
being infringed. Hamilton’s statement of the different legal quality of a constitution
relied on his assessment of the uniqueness of the constituent power, which he
expressed in The Federalist No. 83,254 and his tolerance towards implicit, unwritten
powers, as argued in The Federalist No. 33.255 Irrespective of the lack of express
constitutional competences to enforce the goals and limits of a written constitution,
such a judicial power of ‘mitigating the severity and confining the operation of
[unjust and partial] laws,’256 was inferred from the Constitution.257 Anti-Federalist
critics, writing under the pseudonym ‘Brutus’, condemned the idea of judicial
review, on the grounds of unelected judges having the competence to review and
nullify acts of elected legislative representatives.258 In response,259 Hamilton
251Coke, Edward (1826), The Reports, Eleventh Reports, 14a = 77 ER 1163 (Priddle and
Napper’s Case). Whereas Thomas Smith (De Republica Anglorum) and William Lambarde
(Eirenarcha) emphasise consensus of the represented subjects to the parliamentary statute, Coke
stresses the knowledge of the represented subjects on the parliamentary statute: ‘the law intends
that every person hath knowledge thereof, for the parliament represents the body of the whole
realm.’ Coke, Edward (1797), The Institutes of the Law of England, Second to Fourth Parts,
Part IV, 26. The knowledge of the represented subjects on the parliamentary statute is not an
original thought, new is only the reduction of the representation away from the consensus and only
to the aspect of knowledge. Cf. Crompton, Richard (1637), L’authoritie et jurisdiction, fol. 16r.
252Coke’s argumentation in Priddle and Napper’s Case starts: ‘And as it is said in Powden…’
which refers to 8 Co.Rep. 107a = 77 ER 638 (Dr Bonham’s Case).
253Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 78, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 468.
254Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 83, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 497.
255Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 33, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 205.
256Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 78, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 470.
257See Footnote 255.
258‘Brutus’, Essay XI, in Storing ed. (1981), vol. II, 418, 420.
259‘Brutus’, Essay XI, in Storing ed. (1981), vol. II, 358–452. Stoner refers to the complete text of
Brutus’s letter. Stoner considers Hamilton’s opening comments in Federalist No. 81 on the power
of constructing laws according to their spirit to be a direct response to Brutus’ Essay XI. Stoner
(1992), 208 (n. 45). See also Diamond (1976), 249–81.
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argued that ‘in voiding unconstitutional acts the courts serve as the people’s
champion.’260
This defence of judicial review in No. 78 can only be understood in the common
law context of artificial reason, which was established as the seventeenth-century
basis for supremacy of law under the auspices of the oft-quoted Sir Edward Coke.
The conception of ‘artificial reason’, elucidated in the seventeenth-century prece-
dent Prohibitions des Roy,261 was established as being superior to the ‘natural
reason’ of the monarch; this was transformed in the Federalists’ discourse into the
‘solemn and authoritative’ reason of a constituent assembly fully aware of the
‘Decisive Constitutional Normativity’ and its necessity to prevail over the ‘mo-
mentary inclination’ of the people represented by legislature.262 To continue this
argument, it is the spirit (or, rather, reason) of the common law that no particular
legislative act nor any specific legal ruling has the final word on what is just,263 but
only the ‘collective mind of the profession’ which adopted the mantle of authority
customarily represented by popular consent.264
It was in this manner that seventeenth-century common law was the bulwark
against Stuart absolutism;265 artificial reason replaced general custom, more as an
interpretative authority266 rather than as legislative consensus.267 With this as the
common law basis of Hamilton’s argumentation, it is not difficult to follow Publius
(Hamilton) in assessing the judges as ‘the bulwarks of a limited Constitution’268
and ‘faithful guardians of the Constitution,’269 the people as its ‘natural
260Stoner (1992), 209.
261Prohibitions del Roy (1607 = Mich. 5 Jacobi 1) 12 Co.Rep. 64 = 77 ER 1342–1343 per
Edward Coke, C.J.
262Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 78, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 469–70.
263According to Stoner, ‘[t]he most vivid illustration of this way of thinking I know is the criticism
of the Supreme Court Decision in Dred Scott by the great common lawyer, Abraham Lincoln.’
Stoner (1992), 264 (n. 55). See also Johannsen (ed.) (1965), passim.
264Finch, Henry (1759), A Description of the Common Laws of England, 52–3. Cf. also
Dodderidge, John (1631), The English Lawyer, 103; Prest (1977), 326–7; Doe (1990), 26; Ives
(1983), 161.
265Gray (1980), 25–6; Gray (1992), 85–121; Lewis (1968), 330–1.
266The authority of the general custom for the common law, however, is not negated. Cf. explicitly
Coke, Edward (1826), The Reports, Ninth Reports, 75b = 77 ER 843 (Combes’s Case).
267Coke, Edward (1826), The Reports, Second Reports, 81a = 76 ER 597 (Lord Cromwel’s Case);
Coke, Edward (1826), The Reports, Sixth Reports 5b = 77 ER 261 (Sir John Molyn´s Case).
268Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 78, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 469.
269Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 78, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 470.
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Guardians,’270 and ‘the general spirit of the people and of the government’271 as
‘the only solid basis of all our rights.’272
5 Summary of Sections 3 and 4
For all that the American Revolution and the subsequent United States Constitution
were, indeed, revolutionary, this does not mean that either was unprecedented or
unheralded. On the contrary: at every step in the struggle, first with Britain and then
amongst themselves, the minds fashioning the American future continually referred
back to the concepts of law and legitimacy. Unsurprisingly, these concepts had their
origins in the Old World of Europe, as befitting a new society consecrated upon the
foundations of the old. The push for independence was not solely a military
endeavour but also a legal one, as the leading figures of the Revolution referred to
the guiding lights of English common law—William Blackstone and Edward Coke
—in order to demonstrate that it was, in fact, England that had forsaken English
law, by denying loyal English subjects (as the American colonists, until the very
end, argued themselves to be) their rights as Englishmen. This included the right of
representation (which could not conceivably be achieved through the institution of
the Westminster Parliament) and the right not to be taxed without this aforemen-
tioned representation. In part, this explains the ultimate appeal of rebellion: to the
Americans, it was not they who were breaking the law by revolting against Britain,
but in fact the British who were acting illegally by denying fundamental rights
under common law. To the Americans, they were the ‘better Englishmen’ than the
English.
Having established this legitimacy of revolution, the Americans were next faced
with the challenge of legitimising their own governance. This they accomplished
again with reference to European precedent, adapted to their own needs. King
George III was replaced by his secular stand-in, President George Washington.
However, to avoid the very pitfalls that had catalysed the Revolution in the first
place, the Founding Fathers aimed to delineate clear responsibilities and powers
through the use of an explicit, written law of higher character than ordinary law.
The resultant United States Constitutional system, enhanced by the federal prece-
dent Marbury v. Madison (1803), insisted upon formalised mechanisms, such as
judicial review to protect constitutionally-granted rights and liberties, thus intro-
ducing not only a founding body of law but also the means by which that body of
law gained normative precedence. Once again, such a development in some ways
270Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 16, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 117.
271Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist No. 84, in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 514.
272See Footnote 271.
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jettisoned existing European ideas (such as the Lockean model of
God-as-resistance), while adapting others, such as Coke’s superiority of ‘artificial
reason’ over ‘natural reason.’ Ultimately, networks and connections across the
Atlantic amounted to a hoard remaking traditional understandings of constitution-
alism.273 Regardless its substance, by the early nineteenth century, the United
States Constitution was established as the normative, precedential body of law in
the fledgling United States of America. Having been influenced by Europe,
America was, through this development, able to turn the tables, and itself influence
the Old World, while Europe itself went through a major period of transition.
6 Legal Transition of Philosophical Truths
The American Revolution had brought about a Novus Ordo Seclorum on one side
of the Atlantic. Continental Europe’s ‘new order of ages’, which would establish
both normativity and precedence, roughly coincided with the same period. The
starting point for this new order, though, was totally different from that of the
American colonies, as were many of the assumptions and processes that would
shape it.
In 1827, the German poet and playwright Johann Wolfgang von Goethe lyricised
the existence of America in his poem Den Vereinigten Staaten (To the United
States):
America, you are better off than
Our continent, the old.
You have no castles which are fallen,
No basalt to behold.
You’re not disturbed within your innermost being,
Right up till today’s life
By useless remembering
And unrewarding strife.274
Goethe’s verse is, however, less praise of the United States, so much as a lament
of Europe’s ‘historical baggage’—the ‘fallen castles’ and perpetual ‘strife’ that
would colour any radical shift to a new era. Goethe himself had been a witness to
this roughly three decades earlier, as the newly-minted French Republic began its
273Cf. Müßig (2017).
274Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1948), “The United States”, in The Permanent Goethe, ed.
Mann, 655. Cf. the original German: Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1842), “Zahme Xenien: Den
vereinigten Staaten”, in Goethe, Nachgelassene Werke, vol. XVI, 96.
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own constitutional experiment, similar yet distinct to that begun by Washington,
Madison, Hamilton, and the American constitutionalists.
The critical, formative years of this experiment were between the Years III and
VIII (1794/5-9/1800); this period marked the interval between the establishment of
the Directorate and its apotheosis into Bonaparte’s single rule.275 The National
Convention (Convention nationale = la Convention),276 as the first French
assembly elected by a suffrage without class distinctions, set forth the draft of the
radical democratic ‘Jacobin’ or ‘Mountain’ Constitution of the Year I (Acte con-
stitutionnel du 24 juin 1793),277 which planned to wipe out the monarchy. In the
following eight months (from autumn 1793 to spring 1794) these radical democratic
ambitions were discredited by the Terror of the Committee of Public Safety (comité
de Salut public) under the auspices of Maximilien de Robespierre278 and his
Jacobins. During the Thermidorian279 constitutional debate, the majority of the
members of the Convention (conventionnels) had no intention whatsoever to bring
the Jacobin constitution of 1793 into force. With the beginning of the Parisian sans-
culottes insurrection on 1 Prairial III (20 May 1795), which resulted in the storming
of the Convention with the battle cry ‘bread and the constitution of 1793’, the
275Particular attention to the Polish, Belgian, and Italian case studies can be found in vol. I of the
ReConFort proceedings, Müßig (ed.) (2016).
276The National Convention was a constituent assembly that gathered between 20 September 1792
and 26 October 1795, when it was disbanded. Together with the Constituante, the Convention was
addressed by Sieyès as a ‘primary assembly.’
277The Jacobins, centred on the Society of Friends of the Constitution, was the driving political
force behind the revolutionary government, and was divided between the moderate Girondins and
the radical Mountain faction, headed by Robespierre. The enacting of the Constitution of the
Year I marked the consolidation of the Mountain as the dominant faction within the Jacobin Club
(hence the interchangeability of the term ‘Jacobin’ or ‘Mountain’ to with regards the constitution).
See, for example, McPhee (2012), 152–5.
278Maximilien François Marie Isidore de Robespierre (1758–94): Arguably the most famous of the
French Revolutionaries, and a symbol of its excesses, Robespierre was born in 1758 in Arras,
though by the time the Revolution he had considerable influence in the capital; as a result, he was
elected to the National Convention as a Parisian deputy in 1792. As a member of the Constituent
Assembly he had maintained his political independence, though he was soon associated with the
Montagnard (Mountain) faction of the Jacobin Club. His growing notoriety led to Girondist
deputies accusing him of aspiring to dictatorship. He was also accused of being responsible for a
massacre in the prisons of Paris. This only emboldened Robespierre, and he rose to the leadership
of the Mountain. The ultimate responsibility for the execution of King Louis XVI fell to him;
following this, in 1793, he politically crushed the Girondins, before beginning the Terror in order
to destroy them totally. As the president of the Committee of Public Safety, the zenith of his power
came with the trial and execution of his major political rivals Hérault de Séchelles and Robert
Danton. Yet this notoriety also made him a target; just months after Danton and Séchelles’ deaths,
Robespierre was deposed, arrested on the orders of the National Convention, and sent to the
guillotine. Thomas (1915), 2070–1.
279The adjective ‘Thermidorian’ refers to 9 Thermidor Year II (27 July 1794), when Robespierre
and his radical co-revolutionaries came under concerted attack in the National Convention. It also
describes the constitutional discourse in the National Convention (also known as the Thermidorian
Convention) until the introduction of the Directory.
A New Order of the Ages. Normativity and Precedence 51
willingness to promulgate the implementing laws (lois organiques) for the
enforcement of the Mountain Constitution faded. It was only after Robespierre’s
fall that the National Convention could turn to the ‘commission of the eleven’280 to
formulate a new constitution. The eleven commissioners proposed the Directory
Constitution of the Year III (1795), which passed on 22 August 1795 (5 Fructidor of
the Year III).281 Its pillars were the return to the 1791 constitution, the affirmation of
equality within the limits of civil equality, and the ruthless protection of the Republic
against any legislative omnipotence or executive dictatorship. Similarly, protection
was needed against the revolutionary subversive ghost of the faubourg
Saint-Antoine,282 bordering the Bastille. The bicameral legislature was composed of
the Council of Five Hundred, with its right to legislative initiative, and of the Council
of Ancients (sometimes referred to as the Council of Elders; Conseil des Anciens),
whose 250 deputies accepted or rejected proposed bills. Crucially, the executive
power in the hand of five directors283 was vested in an executive college as the
Committee for Public Safety had been. Thus, even if concentration of executive
power was to be avoided by the re-election of one of the directors each year within
the five-year term, the Directory still retained great power. This included emergency
powers to curb freedom of the press and freedom of association.
6.1 Sieyès’ Constitutional Jury (jury constituionnaire)
In this discursive context, the task of legally protecting the Revolution, from itself
as well as outsiders, fell to Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748–1836), the Roman
Catholic abbot and political theorist whose 1789 pamphlet Qu’est-ce que le tiers-
état? (What is the Third Estate?) had become the French Revolution’s guiding
manifesto. Sieyès proposed the introduction of a constitutional jury whose
280On 29 Germinal III (18 April 1795). The commission member were: Antoine-Claire
Thibaudeau, Louis-Marie de La Révellière-Lépeaux, Denis Toussaint Lesage (d’Eure-et-Loir),
François-Antoine Boissy d’Anglas, Jacques-Antoine Creuzé-Latouche, Jean-Baptiste Louvet de
Couvray, Théophile Berlier, Pierre-Claude-François Daunou, Jean-Denis Lanjuinais,
Pierre-Toussaint Durand de Maillane, Pierre-Charles-Louis Baudin (des Ardennes).
281Cf. in regard to the Constitution of the Year III: Mathiez (1934); Lefebvre (1943); Brunel
(1985), 687–96; Pertué (1989), 284–6; Troper (1996); Bart et al. (eds.) (1998); Conac and
Machelon (eds.) (1999); Luzzatto (2001); Troper (2006).
282The so-called Réveillon riots (affaire Réveillon) was one of the first violent upheavals of the
French Revolution, and took place between 26 and 29 April 1789. The target was Jean-Baptiste
Réveillon’s factory in the St. Antoine district of Paris, which produced luxury wallpaper. Facing
the pre-revolutionary economic crisis, Réveillon had responded to it by cutting workers’ wages,
while at the same time calling for the reduction of royal taxes. As a result, the workers demon-
strated in front of the Hôtel de ville, with the catch-cry of ‘the bread for two pennies’ (Le pain à
deux sous).
283The Directors were chosen by the Council of the Ancients, from the list presented by the
Council of Five Hundred.
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juridical-political competences comprised the adjudication of complaints, even by
individuals, regarding constitutional infringements by constituted powers,284 reform
and review of the Constitution itself every ten years. It also included, rather
uniquely, an equitable jurisdiction as ‘court for human rights’285 if asked by official
judicial referral of ordinary courts. This supplementary constitutional equity was
based on natural law (most likely reflecting the character of 1789 Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen) and planned to be accessible if courts declared them-
selves unable to reach a decision in the absence of an applicable positive law or if
they held the decision according to the legal text to be against their conscience.286
Sieyès’ proposal was put forward at a time when normativity and constitutional
precedence were very hard to establish. During the Revolution, the constitution was
primarily conceived as a mean to guarantee the organisation of the powers and their
functions. As Michel Pertué has demonstrated, the Revolution ‘refused always to
convey to any institution outside the legislative body the competence to verify and
to guarantee the democratic process of the legislation and its conformity with the
laws, the principles of the declaration of rights of man and citizen and with the
constitution.’ The dominant légi-centrisme was, in Pertué’s reading, the
Rousseauist understanding of law as the expression of the volonté générale,
immunising the sovereign legislative assembly against the obligation to follow
superior rules.287 Unsurprisingly, then, Sieyès’ draft was rejected unanimously, but
the course of debates illustrates decisive milestones of the French constitutional
‘belief’ after 1789.288
It goes without saying that, in the unpreceded constitutional debates in
Revolutionary France, nominalist certainty or even autonomy of constitutional
semantics was an illusion. Yet, as the ReConFort project with its functional approach
has consistently demonstrated, there was and is a mutual interdependency between
the artifice or constituent making of a constitution and the discourse of public
opinion and understanding.289 With this in mind, the debates in the National
Convention on the 2 and 18 Thermidor Year III (20 July and 5 August 1795) are
crucial not only for the understanding of French constitutional history. More
expansively, they are vital for determining whether there is a common European core
of normativity and precedence or whether modern European integration, though
built since the grounding treaties as legal community, has ignored or not been fully
aware of different national concepts of constitutional normativity and precedence.290
284Bastid, Paul (1939), Les Discours de Sieye ̀s, 32.
285Bastid, Paul (1939), Les Discours de Sieye ̀s, 42.
286Bastid, Paul (1939), Les Discours de Sieye ̀s, 46–7.
287Pertué (2003), 46. Cf. also Maus (2006), 665.
288Cf. especially the first version of the speech of 2 Thermidor III in Bastid, Paul (1939), Les
Discours de Sieye ̀s, 18–20.
289Cf. Müßig, “Juridification by Constitution”, in Müßig (ed.) (2016), 3.
290Elsewhere, I have addressed the methodological naïveté regarding the European Court of
Justice, which, very broadly speaking, evolves between a continental court style and a common
law precedence manner. Seif (=Müßig) (2003a), 1–23.
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In contrast to the American recourse to the feudal-medieval common law right to
resistance and the British reasoning of supreme parliamentary wisdom, the French
starting point of 1789 was completely different. Judges had been figures of privilege
within the Ancien Régime, which made them most suspicious for the revolution-
aries. At the same time, they enthusiastically adopted the dogmatic concept of the
supreme general will by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In conflating the two the revo-
lutionaries ‘invented’ the French aversion to having the acts of sovereign legislative
assemblies controlled by judges.291 This suspicion continues today; modern French
constitutional discourse does not speak of judiciary power (pouvoir), but of judi-
ciary authority (authorité). Freedom by (fraternal-political) equality (liberté,
egalité, fraternité), according to their condensation in Art. 6 Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen, had the consequence that the veritable counter-power
remained with the French people (Art. 2 and 14 Declaration), represented a priori in
the constituent assembly and thus entrusting the constituted legislative assembly
with supreme legitimisation.
As the preeminent theorist of the national constituent sovereignty of the na-
tion,292 and as a major contributor to the September Constitution (1791), Sieyès had
gone into hiding during the Terror, before he reentered the political stage in the
national convention after 9 Thermidor II (27 July 1794) with his intention, stronger
as with other thermidoriens, to ‘finish the revolution.’293 In this pragmatic con-
stitutional thinking the constitution was the legal mean to reach this goal. Therefore
the draft of a constitutional jury of the 18 Thermidor III294 was meant as part of the
legal instruments to end the Revolutionary Terror.295 When the work of the
‘commission of the eleven’ had nearly finished, Sieyès, who was not one of the
eleven, presented his draft on the constitutional jury in the constitutional debates of
2 and 18 Thermidor III (20 July and 5 August 1795).
By his concept of national sovereignty, Sieyès had been the first to differentiate
the constituent power from the constituted power, in order to explain the decisive
process of juridification of sovereignty.296 Concluding from his paradigms that the
291Cf. among others Ky (1926); Sueur (1989); Nicolle (1990); Morabito (2002), 117ff.; Laquièze
(2003), 85–102; Maus (2003), 713ff.; Fioravanti (2007); Mestre (2010). Fioravanti’s work refers to
several Italian authors who have contributed extensively to the discourse surrounding the
Constitution. I have benefitted from these contributions largely as a result of Fioravanti’s extensive
notes. Cf. Di Donato, (2004, 2005); Battaglini (1957); Cappelletti (1968). More recently, Luigi
Lacchè (2000–2002), 41–93, (2016), 259–302.
292Cf. Müßig, “Juridification by Constitution”, in Müßig (ed.) (2016), 18–19.
293Cf. the title of Michel Troper’s monograph Terminer la Révolution, La Constitution de 1795
(2006).
294‘DU JURY CONSTITUTIONNAIRE (AN III)’, Archives Nationales 284 AP 4 doss. 8. This is
also reproduced (in its original French) in Pasquino (1998), Sieyès et l’invention de la Constitution
en France, 193ff. and Bastid, Paul (1939), Les Discours de Sieye ̀s, 30–47. This, as well as an
English translation, appear in this volume in Appendices A and B.
295Bronislaw Baczko, “Le contrat social des Français: Sieyès et Rousseau”, in Baczko (1997),
332–3, cf. also Baczko (1989), 13ff.
296Cf. at length Müßig, “Juridification by Constitution”, in Müßig (ed.) (2016), 18ff.
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will of the nation itself is always lawful and that it is the law in itself, Sieyès
established the inviolability of the constitution against the (constituted) legislative
body. The exclusion of any absolutistic political power on the basis of the imma-
nent differentiation of ordinary legislative bodies from constituent assemblies led to
a ‘superlegality of the constitution’ (superlégalité de la constitution).297 If the
legislative power could not ‘without contradiction and absurdity touch the consti-
tution’ (‘sans contradiction et sans absurdité toucher à la Constitution’), as Sieyès
wrote in his report of the third estate (Compte rendu de Qu’est-ce que le tiers
état?),298 this necessarily implied the existence of a control institution.
Though he was a moderate Jacobin of the Girondin faction, for which he was
persecuted during Robespierre’s Mountain-led Terror, at no point did Sieyès con-
sider accommodation with monarchists of any stripe. He dismissed attempts by the
Friends of the Monarchist Constitution (Les amis de la Constitution Monarchique)
to reconcile pre-constitutional monarchical prerogative with the Revolution’s stated
principle of the rights of man and the sovereign nation, and insisted on the a priori
undivided sovereignty of nation which brought forth the constitutional monarchy as
constituted power just as the ordinary legislative assembly.299 This constitutional
liberalism,300 built on the differentiation between constitution and ordinary legis-
lation, left the door ajar for a guardian of the constitution, with the explicit function
of declaring statutory law to be unconstitutional and the ability to overrule it,
without this guardian being necessarily conceivable as judicial body. Taking into
account the centrality of Rousseau’s ‘general will’ in Revolutionary ideology,
combined with the distrust against any ‘heirs’ of the noblesse de robe, Sieyès did
not propose that his drafted constitutional jury would consist of professional judges,
but of former members of the constituent assemblies, the legislative bodies, or the
Convention.301
297Pasquino (1998), Sieyès et l’invention de la Constitution en France, 94.
298Compte rendu de Qu’est-ce que le tiers état? (1789), Archives Nationales 284 AP 4 doss. 8.
Cited also in Pasquino (1998), Sieyès et l’invention de la Constitution en France, 168.
299During the trial of Louis XVI before the National Convention, Sieyès was among the 361
deputies who voted for the king’s execution. According to some contemporary sources, it was
Sieyès’ vote that convinced others to similarly vote for death, and he is reported to have said
merely ‘I am for death!’ See Johnson (1812), An impartial History of Europe, vol. II, 305.
300For Sieyès’ constitutional theory, cf. among others Bredin (1988); Rjals (1991), 123–38;
Pasquino (1998), Sieyès et l’invention de la Constitution en France; Tyrsenko (2000), 27–45;
Troper (2001), 265–282; Jaume (2002), 199–221; Michel Troper, “La suprématie de la consti-
tution et le jury constitutionnaire”, in Troper (2006), 199–221.
301Arts. II-IV Draft of the Constitutional Jury (Year III); see Appendices A, B.
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6.1.1 Constitutional Debates of 2 and 18 Thermidor III (20 July and 5
August 1795)
Sieyès’ prevailing motive in his interventions before the convention on 2 and 18
Thermidor III (20 July and 5 August 1795) was to reconcile constituent power—as
he had established six years earlier in What is the Third Estate?—with a subor-
dinate authority to control the constitutionality. The constitutional jury proposal
followed the logic which began 1789 with the differentiation between the con-
stituent and the constituted power.302 On the 2 Thermidor III (20 July 1795) Sieyès
presented his ideas on the government and the political constitution:
In regard to the government and the constitution, unity on its own means despotism, and
division on its own means anarchy. Division with the unity gives social guarantee, without
which liberty would be only precarious […] Divide, for hindrance of despotism; centralise
for avoiding the anarchy […] I only know two systems of the division of powers: equi-
librium and competition, or in nearly similar terms, the system of counter-powers and of
organised unity.303
In response to the Jacobin argument that the representative system was
anti-democratic (expressed among others by Hérault de Séchelles and Maximilien
de Robespierre), Sieyès employed a celebrated, though prosaic, metaphor of the
post. Denying representation would be the same as ‘to reserve the right to carry
your letters yourself without trusting them to the public establishment [the post
office] in charge of conveying them.’304 He concluded by demanding the institution
of a constitutional jury, a political organ more than a juridical one: ‘This is the real
body of representatives which I demand, with a special mission to judge the
reclamations against every infringement onto the constitution.’305
In the discourse of 18 Thermidor III (5 August 1795), Sieyès explained the
attributions and the organisation of the constitutional jury, organised according his
draft in seventeen articles306 and charged with the control over the legislature about
the respect of the constitution: ‘The necessity of a constitutional jury’, Sieyès
asserted in front of the National Convention,
302Cf. also Fauré (1999), 29.
303Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph (1795), Moniteur, 2 Thermidor III, 1236: ‘En fait de gouvernement,
et plus généralement en fait de constitution politique, unité toute seule est despotisme, division
toute seule est anarchie. Division avec unité donne la garantie sociale, sans laquelle toute liberté
n’est que précaire. […] Divisez, pour empêcher le despotisme; centraliser, pour éviter l’anarchie.
[…] Je ne connais que deux systèmes de division des pouvoirs: le système de equilibre et celui de
l’unité organisée.’
304Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph (1795), Moniteur, 2 Thermidor III, 1236. Cf. also Lescuyer (2001),
355.
305Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph (1795), Moniteur, 2 Thermidor III, 1237.
306‘Je demande d’abord un jury de Constitution, ou, pour franciser un peu plus le mot de jury, et le
distinguer dans le son de celui de juré, une jury constitutionnaire.’ Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès,
“Opinion de Sieyès sur les attributions et l’organisation du jury constitutionnaire proposé le 2
thermidor, prononcée à la Convention nationale le 18 du même, l’an III de la République”,
Moniteur, 18 Thermidor III, 1311.
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forms a sort of preliminary question; it does not suffer from difficulty. How in fact could the
preview of the legislator accustom itself to the idea of an abandoned constitution, in the
very moment of its coming-into-existence? A constitution is a body of obligatory laws or it
does not exist; if it is body of laws, one asks oneself where is the guardian, where is the
magistrate of this code.307
The constitutional jury, or the ‘depository keeper of the constitutional act’/
dépositaire conservateur de l’acte constitutionnel, as it was named by Sieyès in Art.
I of his proposal, ‘is to be composed of 108 members, a third of them renewed
every year, in the same period as the legislative body’ (Art. II).308 ‘The first for-
mation of the constitutional jury’, the draft proposed, ‘is constituted by the con-
vention by means of a secret ballot, in the manner that a third of its members is
chosen among those of the constituent assembly [la Constituante], another third
among the members of the legislative, and the last third among the members of the
Convention [la Convention]’ (Art. IV).309 It also stipulated that ‘the 36 newcomers
each year are to be chosen by the jury itself among the 250 members who have to
leave the one or the other of the two councils of the legislative bodies’ (Art. III),310
‘[t]he sessions of the constitutional jury will not be open to the public’ (Art. V),311
and ‘the decisions of the constitutional jury will bear the name “decision” [arrêt].’
(Art. VII).312
According to Sieyès’ ‘opinion about the attributions and the organisation of the
constitutional jury’, the jury had three functions. The first competence was to
safeguard the Constitution by functioning as a supreme tribunal for the constitu-
tional order (tribunal de cassation dans l’ordre constitutionnel).313 The second was
to perfect the constitution by presenting projects of constitutional revision as an
atelier de propositions pour les amendemens.314 The third prerogative of the jury
was the most inventive one: it was an equitable constitutional jurisdiction on the
basis of natural law as supplement de juridiction naturelle, if judgements could not
307Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph (1795), “Opinion de Sieyès”, Moniteur, 18 Thermidor III, 1311.
308‘They consist of 108 members, a third of whom are annually replaced, and at the same time as
the legislative body’/II est composé de cent huit membres, qui se renouvelleront annuellement
pariers, et aux mêmes époques que le corps législatif.
309La première formation du jury constitutionnaire se fera au scrutin secret par la Convention, de
manière qu’un tiers des membres soient choisis parmi ceux de l’assemblée nationale, dite
Constituante, un autre tiers parmi ceux de l’assemblée législative, et un autre parmi les membres
de la Convention.
310L’élection du tiers ou des trente-six entrants se fait par le jury constitutionnaire lui-même, sur
les deux cent cinquante membres qui doivent, à la même époque annuelle, sortir de l’un et l’autre
conseil du corps législatif.
311Les séances du jury constitutionnaire ne seront point publiques.
312Les décisions du jury constitutionnaire porteront le nom d’arrêt. The original French—arrêt—
most accurately translates to the English ‘judgement’. However, in modern terminology, ‘judge-
ment’ refers to the first instance jurisdiction', especially in the French context. The modern usage of
the term ‘decision’ is closer to Sieyès’ intention.
313Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph (1795), “Opinion de Sieyès”, Moniteur, 18 Thermidor III, 1311.
314See Footnote 313.
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be issued by ordinary courts due to lacking or to unjust positive law.315 None of
these functions could be exercised on the jury’s initiative itself (Art. XVII).316
‘Jury de Cassation’
The first function of controlling constitutionality was very complex, due to the
Rousseauist preference for supreme legislative legitimacy. The acts that fell under
the jury’s control, according to Sieyès’ plans, were the acts of the legislative
councils (the Council of Five Hundred and the Council of Ancients), unconstitu-
tional acts regarding matters related to ballots, unconstitutional acts of the primary
assemblies, and those of the court of cassation. Art. VIII of the Sieyès project
provided for the annulment of unconstitutional legislative acts: ‘The acts declared
as unconstitutional by the decision of the constitutional jury are null and void.’317 In
any case, the jury could never declare acts to be unconstitutional on its own ini-
tiative, but only if asked to do so by any applicant entitled according to Art. VI of
the draft: ‘The constitutional jury will comment on the violations or the impair-
ments of the Constitution, which will be denounced to them, against the acts, either
by the council of ancients, or by the council of five hundred, or by the electoral
assemblies, or by the primary assemblies, or by the tribunal of cassation.’318 Any
minority out of the said constitutional bodies and even individual citizen could
bring such a denunciation forward.319 The jury de cassation had the legal function
of a supreme constitutional court, annulling acts contrary to the fundamental law.320
It was the expression of a particular vision of the separation of powers,321 and
assured ‘the permanent political relevance of a revolutionary impact finds itself
beyond the year III.’322
315See Footnote 313.
316‘The constitutional jury cannot issue any decision by its own initiative.’ /Le jury constitu-
tionnaire ne peut rendre aucun arrêt du propre mouvement.
317Les actes déclarés inconstitutionnels par arrêt du jury constitutionnaire, sont nuls et commenon
avenus.
318Le jury constitutionnaire prononcera sur les violations ou atteintes faites à la constitution, qui
lui seraient dénoncées contre les actes, Soit du conseil des Anciens, Soit du conseil des Cinq-
Cents, Soit des assemblées électorales, Soit des assemblées primaires, Soit du tribunal de
cassation.
319Art. VI of the project continues ‘When these denunciations will be addressed to them, by the
council of ancients, or by the council of five hundred, or individually by the citizens, they
adjudicate on a similar denunciation addressed to them by the minority against the majority of one
or another of the constitutional bodies mentioned above.’/Lorsque ces dénonciations lui seront
portées, Soit par le conseil des Anciens, Soit par le conseil des Cinq-Cents, Soit par des citoyens
en nom individuel, II prononcera sur semblable dénonciation qui lui serait portée par la minorité
contre la majorité de l’un ou l’autre des susdits corps constitués.
320Fioravanti (2007), 87–103.
321Pasquino (1998), Sieyès et l’invention de la Constitution en France, 13.
322Morabito (2002), 117.
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Sieyès’ proposal to establish a constitutional jury contributed—beyond the
control of the constitutionality of laws—in an original manner to a transition of the
concept of a constitution as mechanism, as the simple distribution of powers, to a
constitution as an obligatory rule, supreme above all the others.323 The consequence
of this ‘super-legality’324 of the Constitution was the possibility to annul uncon-
stitutional acts.325 For Sieyès’ contemporaries, though, Paul Bastid identifies ‘an
incontestable confusion.’326 Michel Troper has substantiated the probable source of
this confusion, noting that the majority of acts addressed as ‘unconstitutional’ in
section one of Art. VI of the project were neither laws nor necessarily legislative
acts of the two branches of the legislative body under the Directorate, and therefore
unconstitutionality is hard to imagine.327 The conventionalists as a whole were
averse to establishing a power of superior control of that of the legislative
assemblies: ‘Due to their preference for the predominance of the law,’ writes
Marcel Morabito, ‘the revolutionary exaltation of the representation remained
incompatible with any idea of controlling the constitutionality.’328 For them, the
constitution of 1795 provided internal guarantees to protect itself: firstly, by the
separation between the councils and the executive power and, secondly, by the fact
that the Council of the Ancients could exercise its own control of constitutionality;
it could refuse its approval for the acts taken by the council of 500 due to the
disrespect for the formes and proceedings previewed in the constitution (Art. 88 of
the Directory Constitution 1795).329
‘Jury de Proposition’
The mastermind of French national sovereignty planned his constitutional jury not
only to be the ‘guardian and defensor of the constitution’,330 but attributed to the
control organ the mandate to improve and perfect the Constitution and the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, responding to new developments and
societal changes.331 This was meant to restrain the Revolution and to control the a
priori unlimited pouvoir constituant, represented in 1789 by the French nation,
which Sieyès’ pamphlet What is the Third Estate? declared ‘to be the supreme
323Clavreul (1982), 163: ‘Le jury constitutionnaire exerçait une garantie de la légalité du système
de normes.’
324Pasquino (1998), Sieyès et l’invention de la Constitution en France, 12.
325Papatolias (2000).
326Bastid, Paul (1970), Sieyès et sa pensée, 436: ‘Un incontestable désordre.’
327Michel Troper, “Sieyès et le jury constitutionnaire”, 273.
328Morabito (2002), 118.
329Cited according to Willoweit and Seif (=Müßig) (2003), 364.
330Schmitt, Carl (1931) Der Hüter der Verfassung, 1; Schmitt, Carl (1929) “Der Hüter der
Verfassung”, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts XVI, 161.
331Azimi (1998), 199–221.
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master of any positive law.’332 The revision competence of the jury was a disci-
plinary restriction of the constituent power. In the words of Michel Pertué,333 ‘the
constituent power attributed to the nation in 1789 by Sieyès [as an] unconditioned
and unlimited [one] became regulated and more and more restricted in the hands of
the constitutional jury of the year III (1795), and afterwards in the hands of the
college of conversators of the Consulate Constitution of the Year VIII (Constitution
de l’an VIII/1799).’334 The challenge to be tackled by the spiritus rector of the
constituent sovereignty and its different uniqueness compared to the constituted
sovereignty was to bring the constituent power under the legal regime of the nor-
mative constitution, without eliminating the differences to the constituted pow-
ers.335 Whereas the latter act only according to the norms of the positive law, the
domain of the constituent power is the natural law. To bridge this gap, Sieyès
intended a periodical progressive amendment of the Constitution by the jury. The
constituent power could then rest with the people, but as a regulated one. In the
midst of the discourse of 18 Thermidor III (5 August 1795), which dealt with the
rights of future generations, Sieyès claimed the unquestionable right of future
generations to make their own constitutional amendments that ‘the authentic
motives of a political constitution rest with the nation, and especially with the
generation which has passed it.’ This singularity of the Constitution’s origins led, in
Sieyès’ words, to ‘the legal need to provide our constitution with the principle of
unlimited perfection, which allows for concession to the needs of every epoch but
never for any possibility of a total reproduction or destruction, neither an aban-
donment by hazard.’336
332‘Le maître suprême de tout droit positif.’ Sieyès (1970), 183. Sieyès continues: ‘Une nation est
indépendante de toute forme; et de quelque manière qu’elle veuille, il suffit que sa volonté paraisse
pour que tout droit positif cesse devant elle comme devant la source et le maître suprême de tout
droit positif.’ Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph (1970), Qu’est-ce que le Tiers état?, 183.
333Pertué (1976), 417.
334Adopted on 24 December 1799, the Consulate Constitution established the Consulate and
General Napoleon Bonaparte as first consul. After the coup of 18 Brumaire (9 November 1799),
this created a statutory justification for the concentration of supreme power in Bonaparte’s hands,
paving the way for his accession to emperor in 1804. Both 18 Brumaire and the application of the
Consulate Constitution are considered the end points of the French Revolution.
335On the constituent power cf. in addition to the literature cited in ReConFort I, ed. Müßig (2016),
83ff.; Klein (1996); Negri (1997); Bockenförde (2000); Troper (2003), 101–11; Le Pillouer
(2005); Cayla (2006), 249–65.
336Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph (1795), “Opinion de Sieyès”, Moniteur, 18 Thermidor III, 1312. The
whole quote reads: ‘Au surplus, sans vouloir disputer aux générations futures le droit de faire à
cet égard, tout ce qui leur conviendra, il est permis, et c’est encore un devoir de remarquer que les
véritables rapports d’une constitution politique sont avec la nation qui reste, plutôt qu’avec telle
génération qui passe; avec les besoins de la nature humaine, communs à tous, plutôt qu’avec des
différences individuelles. Ces considérations nous font une loi de donner à notre acte constitu-
tionnel, ainsi qu’on vient de le dire, un principe de perfectionnement illimité, qui puisse le plier,
l’accommoder aux nécessités de chaque époque, plutôt qu’une faculté de reproduction ou de
destruction totale, abandonnée au hasard des événements.’.
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As the constituent sovereignty rested with the people, the jury could not directly
intervene for constitutional reforms; its role was only to make propositions. To
avoid popular unrest and upheaval during a period of constitutional reform, the jury
had to present every ten years a notebook of constitutional amendments to the
legislative councils and primary assemblies (Art. XI, section 1 and 2).337 The
primary assemblies—reunited every year for the election of the people’s repre-
sentatives—could speak themselves in favour of or against the possibility to del-
egate a temporary constituent power to the actual legislature (Art. XII,
section 1).338 ‘If the majority of the primary assemblies said no,’ the wording of the
draft continued, ‘the notebook with amendments will be seen as void and its
propositions cannot be reproduced before the following tenth year’ (Art. XII,
section 2).339 Art. XII makes it furthermore explicit that the Council of Ancients, if
delegated, had no power to make changes to the jury’s propositions (section 3).340
Art. XIII limits the sessions of the council of Ancients exercising constituent power
on the primary assemblies’ mandate to twelve in total or to two in a decade
(section 2).341 ‘There will be, for the sessions of the constituent power, a separated
written report, in a particular register, which will be, in the end, solemnly placed in
the archives of the constitutional jury’ (Art. XIII, section 3).342 The particularity of
337Section 1: ‘In the course of each tenth year, starting from year 1800, eight of the Republic,
twelfth of the Revolution, the constitutional jury will examine again their opinions registered.’/
Dans le courant de chaque dixième année, à commencer de l’an 1800, huitième de la république,
douzième de la révolution, le jury constitutionnaire examinera de nouveau ses avis consignés dans
son registre. Section 2: ‘They will create their notebook of propositions in order to improve the
constitutional act, and they will officially communicate with the Council of Ancients and that of
Five Hundred, in order to receive the greater publicity. This communication will be made three
months at least before the primary assemblies are annually held.’/Il composera son cahier de
propositions pour améliorer l’acte constitutionnel, Et il en donnera officiellement communication
au conseil des Anciens et à celui des Cinq-Cents, afin qu’il reçoive la plus grande publicité. Cette
communication se fera trois mois au moins avant la tenue annuelle des assemblées primaires.
338‘The primary assemblies will, after having read the notebook of propositions, declare yes or no,
if they understand giving the council of Ancients the power to lay them down as rules.’/Les
assemblées primaires, après lecture faite du cahier de propositions, déclareront oui ou non, si
elles entendent donner au conseil des Anciens le pouvoir d’y statuer.
339Si la majorité des assemblées primaires a dit non, le cahier sera regardé comme non avenu, et
ses propositions ne pourront être reproduites avant la dixième année suivante.
340‘If the majority of the primary assemblies said yes, the constituent power is delegated, by this
fact only, to the Council of Ancients, to lay the propositions made down as rules without being
able to either amend them or to substitute them with others.’/Si la majorité des assemblées
primaires a dit oui, le pouvoir constituant est délégué, par ce seul fait, au conseil des Anciens,
pour statuer sur les propositions faites, sans qu’il puisse ni les amender ni en substituer d’autres.
341‘Altogether, they cannot exceed the number of twelve nor that of two per decade.’/Elles ne
pourront excéder le nombre de douze en tout, ni celui de deux par décade.
342II y aura, pour les séances du pouvoir constituant, un procès-verbal séparé, sur un registre
particulier, qui sera, à la fin, solennellement déposé aux archives du jury constitutionnaire.
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the mandate with constituent power is highlighted in section 1 of the XIII, which
declares ‘the sessions to be exclusively affected.’343
‘Jury of Natural Equity’
The third function of the jury was an equitable control—based in the natural law—
of the judgements of the ordinary courts. Art. XIV section one of Sieyès’ proposal
provided that ‘every year, at least one-tenth of the members of the constitutional
jury, to be taken randomly, will build a jury of natural equity.’344 This function of
an equitable court could only be exercised ‘on the official requests of different
courts, for having a decision of natural equity in the case that the courts declare not
having been able to judge, due to the absence of a positive law which can apply to
that, or to being forced to judge only against their conscience, only according to the
text of the law’ (Art. XIV, section 2).345 These decisions of natural equity were to
be enacted by the relevant tribunal that had made the request in the first place; the
constitutional jury could also select other tribunals to enforce the decisions (Art.
XV).346 They ‘will be officially communicated, within one month, to the Council of
Five Hundred’ (Art. XVI).347 In this way, Sieyès intended that the constitutional
jury would function as a court of natural equity, if the ordinary courts identified or
believed there to be loopholes or iniquities in positive law.
6.1.2 Communicative Implications of the Jury’s Attributions
in the Thermidorian Constitutional Debates
‘Jury de Cassation’
In regard to the communicative interdependencies of constitutional debates, Sieyès’
idea to control the constitutionality of ordinary laws addressed the precedence of
constitution. For this legal function of the constitutional jury he relied on jury
343‘The sessions at which the council of ancients will exercise the constituent power will be
exclusively assigned.’/Les séances où le conseil des Anciens exercera le pouvoir constituant y
seront exclusivement affectées.
344Chaque année, le dixième au moins des membres du jury constitutionnaire, pris au sort, se
formera en jury d'équité naturelle.
345Cette section sera, en sus des deux attributions précédentes, exclusivement chargée de
prononcer sur les demandes officielles qui lui seraient portées par les divers tribunaux, à l’effet
d’avoir un arrêt d’équité naturelle sur les cas qu’ils déclareraient n’avoir pu juger, faute de loi
positive qui pût s’y appliquer, ou ne pouvoir juger que contre leur conscience, d’après le texte seul
de la loi.
346Les arrêts d'équité naturelle seront exécutés par le tribunal qui aura formé la demande offi-
cielle, ou par toute autre, au choix du jury constitutionnaire.
347Les arrêtés d’équité naturelle seront officiellement communiqués, dans le mois, au conseil des
Cinq-Cents.
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members elected by citizens and having already sat in the legislative assemblies, in
order to avoid any allusions to a formal court with professional judges. Like old
wine in new skins, Sieyès referred back to the prerevolutionary parliamentary right
of remonstrance in an attempt to convince his contemporaries of a long-standing
French tradition of legally-restrained sovereignty. Literally borrowing from
Montesquieu’s praise of the French parlement in the Spirit of the Laws (II 4),348 the
jurors are said to fulfill their conservative function ‘with fidelity in the guard of the
constitutional deposit’ (avec fidélité à la garde du dépôt constitutionnel).349
The control of the constitutionality of laws was the attribute of Sieyès’ planned
jury that met with the most acceptance, especially as there were many other
commutated proposals. As demonstrated by the research of Marco Fioravanti the
Girondin Arman-Guy de Kersaint350 had already proposed a tribunal of censors to
control the legislative and the executive in their accordance with the constitution.351
Condorcet had discussed popular veto as a means of protecting the citizens against
legislative arbitrariness,352 which provided for the dissolution of the legislative
assembly if the primary assemblies were against the legislative act.353 Also, the
debate on the Mountain Constitution witnessed proposals to control the constitu-
tionality of legislative acts. Chapter XV of the project of the Mountain Constitution
included provisions for a ‘national grand jury’, though this was rejected.354
348Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu (1994), De l´Esprit des Lois,
in Œuvres complètes, vol. II, 247.
349Bastid, Paul (1939), Discours de Sieyès, 32.
350Armand-Guy Simon de Coëtnempren de Kersaint (1742–1793): Born in Paris (sometimes
stated: Le Havre) to a noble family, Arman-Guy de Kersaint followed the example of his father by
joining the French Navy at fourteen. He distinguished himself in action, and soon made a name for
himself as a result of his bravery and skill. In spite of his upbringing, when the Revolution began
he joined the Jacobin Club, and his ideas of social justice were influenced by Thomas Paine.
A moderate Girondin, he became alarmed at the volatile direction of the Revolution under the
influence of the Montagnard Jacobins; as a member of the National Convention, he voted against
the king’s execution and the rising tide of repression. Because of this, he fell under suspicion and,
in 1793, was arrested, tried, and executed. Thomas (1915), 1433.
351Fioravanti (2007), 89 (n. 16).
352Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat de Condorcet (1743–1794): The Marquis de Condorcet
was born 1743 at Ribemont. He became a mathematician and philosopher and in 1782 was elected
a member of the French Academy. Despite his aristocratic background, he was broadly in favour
of liberalism and was politically active in this regard; he wrote in favour of American
Independence, and published many political treatises. In 1791 he was deputed to the Legislative
Assembly and in 1792 he became a member of the Constitution Committee. In 1793, his moderate
credentials led to him being denounced as a Girondin, and he immediately went into hiding. In
April 1794, he was discovered, arrested, and imprisoned. Rather than facing the guillotine,
Condorcet instead took poison. Thomas (1915), 698; Fioravanti (2007), 89 (n. 17).
353Fioravanti (2007), 89 (n. 18).
354Fioravanti (2007), 89 (n. 19).
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Nevertheless, Marie-Jean Hérault de Séchelles,355 the main redactor of the
Constitutional Act of 1793, positioned himself in favour of a protection against
‘oppression by the legislative body’,356 and found himself in the company of
Robespierre.357 All these proposals, together with le Balancier politique358 and the
Articles proposés pour la réforme de la Constitution 1793,359 accepted the supe-
riority of a control organ not democratically legitimised and seemed to have pre-
pared the path for the legal attribution of cassation of unconstitutional acts in
Sieyès’ drafted jury.
‘Jury de Proposition’
For the revision competence, the communicative readiness was different. Fioravanti
notes that the problem of constitutional revision was appreciated by the contem-
poraries of the Revolution,360 but none of them had Sieyès’ clarity to differentiate
the constituent process of juridification by constitution from the ordinary legislative
proceedings within the constituted legislative assembly. Sieyès explained the
revision or amendment function of the jury by contrasting it with the permanent
subliminal dangers of revolutionary turmoil that could result from radical consti-
tutional changes. As an incremental policy of reform, rather than one employing
great leaps, Sieyès’ constitutional jury would rely on decennial progressive ame-
lioration to secure the Revolutionary acquis of 1791 against recidivism, but also
against overruling. Sieyès did not want to see the convention, like a figure from old
mythology, constantly reborn, because this would invite danger. ‘Will we amuse
ourselves by saying, like the phoenix, that it [the convention] will rise like a
phoenix out of its ashes’, he asked rhetorically. ‘[T]he rebirth of the phoenix is a
chimaera and the periodical return of a convention can be a real calamity.’361 The
revision function of the proposed constitutional jury, however, would avoid the
alternative solution of periodical conventions, which seemed to him at best naïvely
utopian, and at worst dangerous. The proposed amendment, or more exactly the
355Marie-Jean Hérault de Séchelles (1759–1794): Born to an aristocratic family, Hérault de
Séchelles worked as a lawyer. Joining the Jacobin Club on the advent of Revolution, he was
elected to the Legislative Assembly in 1791, where he became the leader of the Jacobins. In 1793,
the proscription of the Girondins led to his ascension to the presidency of the convention; in this
role, he penned the “Constitution of 1793”, and also joined the Committee of Public Safety.
However, his political disagreements with Robespierre and his clear popularity and power made
him a target of the Terror. Denounced by Robespierre, he was arrested and, along with Robert
Danton, executed by beheading. Thomas (1915), 1268.
356Fioravanti (2007), 89 (n. 21).
357Fioravanti (2007), 89 (n. 20).
358Fioravanti (2007), 89 (n. 22).
359Fioravanti (2007), 89 (n. 23).
360Fioravanti (2007), 88–9 (n. 9–14).
361Bastid, Paul (1939), Discours de Sieyès, 38.
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proposed perfection of the Constitution, rewritten every ten years by the jury, was
planned to be presented to the primary assemblies. The assembly members would
then have the ability to grant or not to grant the legislative body the mandate to
exercise constituent power, limited, in this case, to the simple acceptance or to the
refusal of the proposition of the amendment. This was Sieyès’ ‘project of ame-
lioration of the constitutional act’ (projet d’amélioration de l’acte constitution-
nel).362 This complex procedure aimed, on the one hand, to involve the citizens in
the process of revision and, on the other hand, to separate the responsible organs in
charge of the revision’s proposition and its ratification. By his plea for partial
changes at regular intervals, Sieyès communicated the singularity of the constituent
assembly: any repetition carried in itself the risk of radical transformation, a
vocabulary far too familiar to the contemporaries of the Thermodorian debates.
‘Jury of Natural Equity’
The idea of a ‘natural jurisdiction as equitable supplement of the positive juris-
diction’ (supplément de juridiction naturelle aux vides de la juridiction positive)363
was the attribution of the planned constitutional jury that challenged the contem-
poraries most. It raised the constitutional jury not only to an institutional standing as
a court, but in doing so raised concerns that it was little more than a new edition of
the ‘arbitrary jurisprudence’ of the Ancien Régime and its denounced cohorts of
‘commentators and interpreters.’364 Being inspired by the English common law,
Sieyès had drafted the equitable function of the constitutional jury365 and tried to
communicate its supplementary character by the prerequisite that cases could only
be heard before it if they were officially referred to it by other courts. This would
occur if these other courts declared themselves incapable of adjudicating, owing to
the absence of applicable positive law, or if such judgement would occur contrary
to the ‘conscience’ of the court, only according to the text of the law (exclusivement
chargé de se prononcer sur les demandes officielles qui lui seraient portées par les
divers tribunaux, à l’effet d’avoir un arrêt d’équité naturelle sur les cas qu’ils
déclareraient n’avoir pu juger, faute de loi positive qui pût s’y appliquer, ou ne
pouvoir juger que contre leur conscience, d’après le texte seul de la loi).366
Continental Europe had typically understood ‘equity’ to be equivalent to aequitas,
and thus the purview of God. Mercy, in this understanding, was not just a category
of human law but divine will. Therefore, by attributing equity to his constitutional
jury, Sieyès presumed that the jury would hold supreme authority over the ordinary
362Bastid, Paul (1939), Discours de Sieyès, 39.
363Bastid, Paul (1939), Discours de Sieyès, 40.
364Gauchet (1995), 179.
365Fioravanti (2007), 94.
366Bastid, Paul (1939), Les Discours de Sieyès, 46–7.
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courts.367 This, however, could not be inferred; whereas Sieyès pretended a simple
application of equity in the mere English correction manner, the vague character of
natural equity was immediately assumed to be a pass for excessive, even arbitrary
power.368
Analysing the Thermodorian debates, it is evident that this competence of nat-
ural equity enshrined in the proposed constitutional jury might well have been the
decisive issue that led to its unanimous rejection on 25 Thermidor III (12 August
1795).369 All members of the Convention seemed to have gathered behind
Antoine-Claire Thibaudeau,370 the Mountain deputy and former member of the
Committee of Public Safety. Thibaudeau’s speech before the Assembly on 24
Thermidor III (11 August 1795)371 was symptomatic of the dismissive atmosphere
against the project of the constitutional jury. Thibaudeau opposed two models of
‘limiting the power of the organs of the state’ (limitation du pouvoir des organes de
l’État)—essentially, the models of ‘rule’ and ‘balance’372—when concluding the
lack of utility of constitutional control. He preferred, as he suggested vividly, ‘the
liberal constitutionalism of the counterpowers.’ Thibaudeau continued:
If one examines the result of their researches [that of the publicists which have been
interested in the separation of the powers] one will see that they have found two types of
means to contain the powers, the ones which are external for them and the others which are
inherent for them [to the organization even of the powers]. Among the first ones, one can
367Müßig (2013b), 23–65.
368Troper, “Sieyès et le jury constitutionnaire”, 281.
369Moniteur Universel, Reímpression de I’Ancien Moniteur (1842), vol. XXV, 489ff.
370Antoine-Claire Thibaudeau (1765–1854): Thibaudeau was born in 1765 to the family of a
prominent lawyer in Poitiers. Admitted to the bar in 1787, he was an enthusiastic political activist;
after accompanying his father to the Estates General in Versailles in 1789, he set up a local
revolutionary club in Poitiers. In 1792 he was appointed to the National Convention, in which he
—like Sieyès—voted for the execution of Louis XVI. In 1796 he rose to the presidency of the
Council of Five Hundred. He maintained his prominence after the Republic departed along the
imperial path. In 1808 he was elevated to the title of ‘count’, and supported Napoleon during the
Hundred Days campaign in 1815, but went into exile upon his defeat, only returning after the July
Revolution in 1830. Three and a half decades later, Napoleon’s nephew, Napoleon III
(Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte) would appoint him to the Senate. Thibaudeau died in 1854, having
served under the Ancien Régime, the First Republic, the First Empire, the Second Republic, and the
Second Empire. Thomas (1915), 2304.
371Thibaudeau’s speech was reproduced in the Moniteur newspaper. He began by declaring:
‘Sieyès avait imaginé, sous le nom de Jurie constitutionnaire, un corps de censeurs qui, supérieur
à tous les pouvoirs, devait preserver la Constitution de toute atteinte et y proposer des reformes.
Cette institution fut la seule partie de son projet prise en consideration. La commission voulut
l’accommoder à son plan de Constitution et la proposa à la Convention. La jurie y trouva des
défenseurs et des adversaires. Je la combattis (le 24 thermidor), et elle fut rejetée à la
presqu’unanimité. Elle me parut une superfétation inutile et dangereuse.’ Thibaudeau,
Antoine-Claire (1795), Moniteur, 24 Thermidor III, 1239ff. (Reproduced in Moniteur Universel,
Reímpression de l’Ancien Moniteur, vol. XXV, 484 and 487–9). Cf. also Thibaudeau
Antoine-Claire (1824), Mémoires sur la Convention et le Directoire, 186.
372For the distinction between ‘rules’ and ‘balance’, see Manin (1989), 372–89.
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classify the appeal to the people, the censors, or any other body established for judging the
infractions of the constitution.373
After rejecting the idea of the appeal to the people (l’appel au peuple),374
Thibaudeau examined the question posed at the assembly by Sieyès:
Let us now see if a body instituted above the public powers, for examining their acts, as he
[Sieyès] proposes, is capable of guaranteeing their independence and integrity of the
constitution, and I immediately pose myself this question: if the constitutional jury, the
functions of which will be determined by the constitution, exceeds the limits thereof, who
will suppress their usurpation?
According to Thibaudeau no answer could be found to the question who
supervises the jurors:
I admit that I am searching for an answer but can’t find anything satisfying […] I would be
justified in asking that supervisors be given to this jury and this gradual surveillance will be
understood ad infinitum. Thus, [this reminds me of] the people of the Indies, they say that
they commonly believe that the world is carried by an elephant and this elephant by a turtle;
but when they arrive at asking on what the turtle rests, goodbye erudition.375
Subsequent to this criticism, Thibaudeau arrived at exposing his model of the
‘guarantee of the limitation of the powers’ (garantie de la limitation des pouvoirs):
The most sure and natural guardians of the whole constitution are the depositary bodies of
the powers, then all the citizens. […] To prevent the confusion or the usurpation of the
powers, one must give to them who exercise these powers means that sufficiently resist the
attempts directed against them, that they are forced to respect each other by the feeling of
their force and their dignity. In the organisation of the government each of these parts have
373Thibaudeau, Antoine-Claire (1795), Moniteur, 24 Thermidor III, 1239ff.: ‘Si l’on examine le
résultat de leurs recherches [celles des publicistes qui se sont intéressés à la séparation des
pouvoirs], on verra qu’ils ont trouvé deux sortes de moyens de contenir les pouvoirs, les uns qui
leur sont extérieurs, les autres qui leur sont inhérents [à l’organisation même des pouvoirs]. Parmi
les premiers, on peut classer l’appel au peuple, des censeurs, ou tout autre corps établi pour juger
des infractions à la constitution.’.
374Thibaudeau, Antoine-Claire (1795), Moniteur, 24 Thermidor III, 1239ff.: ‘On sait combien il est
dangereux, ou au moins illusoire, de soumettre des questions constitutionnelles à la décision d’une
grande nation; ce sont des épreuves qu’on ne tente pas souvent, sans compromettre l’ordre social
et la tranquillité publique.’
375Thibaudeau, Antoine-Claire (1795), Moniteur, 24 Thermidor III, 1239ff.: ‘Voyons maintenant si
un corps institué au-dessus des pouvoirs publics, pour examiner leurs actes, comme on propose,
est capable de garantir leur indépendance et l’intégrité de la constitution, et je me fais sur-le-
champ cette question: Si le jury constitutionnaire, dont les fonctions seront déterminées par la
constitution, en passe les limites, qui est-ce qui réprimera son usurpation? Je vous avoue que j’ai
beau chercher une réponse, je n’en trouve point de satisfaisante. [...] Ainsi chez un peuple des
Indes la croyance vulgaire est, dit-on, que le monde est porté par un éléphant, et cet éléphant par
une tortue; mais quand on vient à demander sur quoi repose la tortue, adieu l’érudition.’
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to be established and posed in such a manner that they keep all the others at their places;
one must oppose the ambition to the ambition.376
With the paradox of the elephant and the turtle, Thibaudeau asks anew the old
question: who watches the watchers (quis custodiet ipsos custodes?), only to
conclude that there could be no reasonable, erudite solution to this intractable
problem.377
6.2 Defeat of Sieyès’ Jury Proposal and Its Consequences
on the French Constitutional Jurisdiction
Thibaudeau was only one voice in the Convention against Sieyès’ project. The
lawyer Joseph Eschassériaux,378 for example, was better disposed towards the
constitutional jury than Thibaudeau, but he too rejected the function of natural
equity, declaring it ‘useless in our system of civil legislation, and dangerous in
politics.’379 Others, including Louis-Marie de La Révellière-Lépeaux,380 Denis
376‘Les gardiens les plus sûrs et les plus naturels de toute constitution sont les corps dépositaires
des pouvoirs, ensuite tous les citoyens. […] Pour prévenir la confusion ou l’usurpation des
pouvoirs, il faut donner à ceux qui les exercent des moyens tellement suffisants pour résister aux
tentatives dirigées contre eux, qu’ils soient forces à se respecter mutuellement par le sentiment de
leur force et de leur dignité. II faut que dans l’organisation du gouvernement chacune de ses
parties soit établie et posée de manière à retenir toutes les autres dans leur place; il faut, pour
ainsi dire, opposer l’ambition à l’ambition.’ (Emphasis mine.) This expression paraphrases James
Madison’s doctrine of the separation of powers. Madison, James, Federalist No. 51, in Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay (1961), The Federalist Papers, 322: ‘Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition.’ Even so, while the American constitutional system was the first to introduce the control
of the constitutionality of laws, this adoption has remained elusive for the French, up to and
including within the current Fifth Republic.
377Thibaudeau, Antoine-Claire (1795), Moniteur, 30 Thermidor III, 1330: ‘Ainsi chez un peuple
des Indes, la croyance vulgaire est, dit-on, que le monde est porté par un éléphant, et cet éléphant
par une tortue; mais quand on vient demander sur quoi repose la torture, adieu l’érudition.’
378Joseph Eschassériaux (1753–1823/24): Born in 1753 near Saintes, Eschassériaux quickly
became involved in politics, entering the parlement of Bordeaux in the 1770s. Elected to the
Convention in 1792, he was an active member until 1795. He took up a position in the Tribunat in
1800 (being appointed in 1799), and served until 1804. Thomas (1915), 930.
379Eschassériaux, Joseph (1795), Moniteur, 30 Thermidor III, 1329.
380Louis-Marie de La Révellière-Lépeaux (1753–1824): Born in the Vendée in 1753, (de) La
Révellière-Lépeaux became a lawyer as well as a political activist. A moderate republican, he
nevertheless voted for Louis XVI’s execution, though he sided with the Girondins when they were
purged by the Mountain Jacobins. Because of this, he was also condemned to death, but he was
able to escape and evade capture. In 1795, after the fall of Robespierre, he returned to the National
Convention, became a member of the Executive Directory, and rose to president of the department
for science, morals, and religion. He died in 1824. Thomas (1915), 1492.
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Toussaint Lesage,381 and Jean-Baptiste Louvet de Couvray,382 also intervened in
the Convention. According to Louvet de Couvray on 30 Thermidor III (17 August
1795), the control of the constitutionality was already present in the Constitution of
the Year III itself, given the obligation ‘imposed on the executive power to annul
the acts of its subordinates which are unconstitutional and in regard with this
obligation it [the executive] is responsible, as it is for the infringements that it could
committed itself to the constitutional act.’383
Though Sieyès’ ideas of a constitutional jury were roundly defeated in the
discourses of 1795, the concept nevertheless found its way into the Consulate
Constitution of the Year VIII (1799),384 in the form of the College of Conservators
(Collège des conservateurs), later the Conservatory Senate (Sénat).385 This con-
stitution replaced the centrality of the legislative power as characteristic for the
revolutionary tradition with the primacy of the governmental function,386 and
therefore made the control of constitutionality more a political than a juridical
question. As Paul Bastid has demonstrated, ‘[considered] under its political aspect,
the jury or the college represented a kind of great revolutionary academy, where the
traditions of 1789 became seen to be piously conserved and maintained.’387 This
381Denis Toussaint Lesage (1758–96): Toussaint Lesage was born in Chartres in 1758, and took up
law. He was elected to the Convention in 1792 and served until 1795. A member of the Girondin
faction, he was generally progressive in his view that the Revolution should alleviate poverty and,
though he voted to find Louis XVI guilty of treason and for him to be condemned to death, he also
wanted him pardoned. The rise of the Mountain faction and the purging of the Girondins sent him
into hiding, but maintained a strong reputation and, upon his return in 1795, was appointed to the
Council of Five Hundred. He died unexpectedly in 1796, during a sitting of the Council.
Assemblée Nationale (2017), “Denis Toussaint Lesage”.
382Jean-Baptiste Louvet de Couvray (1760–97): Born in Paris in 1760, Louvet first made a name
for himself as an author with revolutionary tendencies. In 1792 he was elected to the Convention
as member of the Girondins; that year, he attacked Maximilien de Robespierre, Jean-Paul Marat,
and other important Montagnards, in a prominent speech. This led to his proscription in 1793. He
escaped Paris, returning in 1794 but only coming out of hiding after Robespierre’s downfall. By
1795 he had been rehabilitated, that he not only returned to the Convention, but became a member
of the Council of the Five Hundred. He was to take up a government position in Palermo, but he
died in 1797 before accepting the post. Thomas (1915), 1586.
383Louvet de Couvray, Jean-Baptiste (1795), Moniteur, 30 Thermidor III, 1328.
384For the 1799 Constitution cf. Bourdon (1942); Ponteil (1954); Pertué (1989), 286–7; Timbal
and Castaldo (2000), 521–5.
385Set up under the Consulate Constitution of the Year VIII following the coup of 18 Brumaire, the
Sénat conservateur (‘Conservative Senate’) met in the Luxembourg Palace since 1799. As core
feature in Napoleon’s regime, competent for the supervision over the survival of the Constitution,
it convened until the Bourbon Restoration of 1814. This first Senate was staffed with only sixty
inamovible (immoveable, i.e. permanent) members, at least forty years old; two supplementary
members were called upon every year for ten years, amounting to twenty supplementary members.
386Pertué (1989), 286: ‘Tournant le dos à la tradition révolutionnaire, la constitution de l’an VIII
confiait exclusivement la proposition des lois au gouvernement.’
387Bastid (1970), 445.
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shift away from a legal understanding towards a more political constitutionalism
was also indicated by the renaming of Sieyès’ jury as a ‘college’ and ‘senate.’388
The college or senate as the a priori highest organ in the constitutional hierarchy
was composed of eighty members, both under the name of the college and the
senate; for becoming member it was necessary to be at least forty years old. The
choice of members was less free because the senate was obliged to choose among
three candidates presented, one by the legislative body (corps législatif), the second
by the tribunat,389 and the third by the first consul; furthermore, if the same can-
didate was presented by all three of them, the Senate had to accept him.
Art. 21 of the 1799 Constitution mandated the Senate with the control of con-
stitutionality of laws and governmental acts,390 but the control authority was limited
in Art. 29 to non-binding recommendations. The Senate’s opinions on the uncon-
stitutionality ‘do not have a necessary consequence nor obliges any constituted
authority to a deliberation’ (Art. 29).391 This was the negation of the jury and the
end of Sieyès’ project, in the very moment where it seemed to be realised. The role
of the Senate, namely to control the respect of the constitution and to guarantee the
constitution’s superiority in relation to other norms via a preventive control (Art.
37),392 remained theoretical. In practice, the disposition of Art. 21 had no effect: on
the one hand, the Senate could not decide all alone and the tribunat was hesitant in
entering any conflict with the government; on the other hand, no governmental act
was ever revoked by the Senate. One historian has correctly remarked that, ‘[u]nder
the consulate and under the two empires, one established a senate as guardian of the
constitution. But this guardian was always a docile instrument between the hands of
the first consul and the emperor.’393
Therefore, the control of constitutionality of laws—theorised by Sieyès in
Year III and constitutionalised in Year VIII—as an important and perhaps the most
innovative part of the Consulate Constitution, was in practice never a functional
element, and its defeat represented the first and the last attempt to create in France a
neutral power of a political-jurisdictional nature.394 Even today, the refusal of
388Jaume (2002), 129: ‘Bien plus ou bien autrement qu’une Cour constitutionnelle, ce jury est un
gardien de la République’.
389The Tribunat assumed some of the functions of the Council of Five Hundred, but its role
consisted only of deliberating projected laws before their adoption by the Corps législatif, with the
legislative initiative remaining with the Council of State.
390‘II [le Senat conservateur] maintient ou annule tous les actes, Constitutions qui ont régi la
France qui lui sont déférés comme inconstitutionnels par le tribunat ou par le gouvernement.’
Constitutions qui ont régi la France, ed. Tripier (1879), 171.
391Constitutions qui ont régi la France, ed. Tripier (1879), 173.
392‘Tout décret du corps législatif, le dixième jour après son émission, est promulgue par le
premier consul, à moins que, dans ce délai, il n’y ait eu recours au Senat pour cause
d’inconstitutionnalité. Ce recours n’a point lieu contre les lois promulguées.’ Constitutions qui ont




Sieyès’ ideas continues to have an effect. The law as expression of the volonté
générale, issued by a sovereign legislative assembly, was also the basis of the 1958
Constitution of the Fifth Republic; this introduced the Constitutional Council
(Conseil constitutionnel),395 but the constitution itself is only very reluctantly
exposed to control of constitutionality embodied in the Conseil, as the priority
question of constitutionality expressed in Art. 61-1 demonstrates. In Art. 89, the
1958 Constitution expressly forbids constitutional revision, because the people are
held to be continuously constituent (le peuple constituant toujours), and there is no
control of constitutionality of constitutional amendments. It is, therefore, unsur-
prising that there is no scholarly consensus as to the precedential role played by
Sieyès’ draft in relation to modern constitutional courts.396
The unanimous refusal of Sieyès’ draft in the Convention was introduced by
Thibaudeau’s statement that ‘one must oppose the ambition to the ambition.’ In
doing so Thibaudeau echoed James Madison’s contention that ‘[a]mbition must be
made to counteract ambition.’397 Though Madison and Thibaudeau seem here to
agree on the issue of the separation of powers, the paradox remains that, at the end
of the eighteenth century, the American constitutional system was able to introduce
a control mechanism for the constitutionality of the laws—the first of its type.
France, on the other hand, found itself unable to countenance this control, or to
reconcile it with the nature of constitutionalism. Thus, while constitutional control
remains a hallmark of the American political system, and has been so since the time
of Madison, the modern French Fifth Republic, like the First, still views such
controls with suspicion and reluctance.
7 Avenues of New Constitutional Research: Sketching
Germany, 1848–9
Reconsidering constitutional formation, it is clear that the early period of European
constitutionalism was characterised by the establishment of constitutional norma-
tivity. This establishment adapted the different ideas of the American and French
Revolutions, though this was hardly a straightforward process. As Goethe’s Zahme
Xenien poetically suggested, the Old World’s transition to the new juridification of
the political order was always destined to be significantly more complex than that of
the (relatively) clean slate of North America. A key example of this complexity was
395In lieu of many: Avril (2005); especially on the légicentrisme de la culture juridique française
and the distrust of judges, Hourquebie (2004).
396In contrast to the majority assessment, as provided by Bastid, Gauchet, Clavreul, and Bredin
(among others), Michel Troper points out that the constitutional jury proposed by Sieyès is
significantly different from the constitutional courts that we know today. Troper, “Sieyès et le jury
constitutionnaire”, 272; cf. also Fioravanti (1999), 117.
397Madison, James, Federalist No. 51, in Hamilton, Madison and Jay (1961), The Federalist
Papers, 322.
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the struggle for national unification in Germany during the revolutionary years of
1848–9. On the one hand, German theorists and activists did not exist in a historical
vacuum, and could draw upon the examples and lessons of both the United States
and France.398 On the other hand, half a century after the efforts of Hamilton and
Madison in the United States, and Sieyès in France, the constitutional debates of St.
Paul’s Church occurred within the context of a substantive politicisation of the
broad population, creating a public discourse of constitutional legal matters in
newspapers and pamphlets.
French theorists tended to view fundamental laws as philosophical truths. The
German protagonists of imperial constitutionalism, on the other hand, relied on
legal techniques against the complicated and irreconcilable backdrop of liberal
claims for an unified government backed with popular representation and demo-
cratic claims for popular representation, together with the demands of the Prussian
and Austrian Ultras, the Hegelian Left and the Junge Deutschland national literary
movement, and political Catholicism.399 By means of a statute the National
Assembly proclaimed the ‘Fundamental Rights of the German People’
(Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes ) and provided for their immediate application
disregarding all the unsolved questions in the constituent St. Paul’s Church
assembly. The Act Relating to the Fundamental Rights of the German People
(Reichsgesetz betreffend die Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes) was proclaimed on
27 December 1848 due to the National Assembly’s resolution six days before,
months before the Frankfurt Imperial Constitution of 28 March 1849, coming into
force on 17 January 1849 before being abrogated by federal decision on 23 August
1851. Prussia, Austria, Bavaria, and Hanover refused the publication of the fun-
damental rights.
Recent research, conducted under the auspices of the ReConFort project by
Franziska Meyer (University of Passau) and Joachim Kummer (Free University of
Berlin), has demonstrated that the public interest surrounding the juridification of
the German national unification movement extended well into the legal aspects and
challenges facing the St. Paul’s delegates.400 This public engagement with the issue
of constitutionalism was facilitated by the publication of numerous newspapers and
pamphlets, and broadly addressed three themes: the aforementioned juridification,
supremacy, and revision.401
398Cf. fundamentally Dippel (1994), 24ff.
399Stolleis (2001), 138.
400Franziska Meyer and Joachim Kummer, per “Constitutional Precedence as Keystone of Modern
Constitutionalism”, Royal Flemish Academy of Science and Art, 14 March 2016.
401http://sources.reconfort.eu.
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7.1 Juridification Matters in the Public Sphere Around
the Constituent St. Paul’s Church Assembly
The differentiation between constitution and ordinary law was addressed in the
German Constitutional Newspaper (Deutsche constitutionelle Zeitung) as basic
legal framework and detailed singular provisions. In an article comparing the
constitutions of Belgium and the United States to the constitution of Bavaria, an
author for the paper distinguished ‘a well drafted constitution [which] should only
regulate fundamental principles and not every detailed legal question’ from the
ordinary law.402 The People’s Friend (Volksfreund) claimed the constituent power
for the people instead for the monarch ‘because it is the most important law.’403
Conversely, the National-Newspaper (National-Zeitung) built the new order on the
unification more than on the constitution: ‘The constitution is necessary, but the
statal unification gives a new quality of legal bonding to the powers.’404 In the same
vein, the criticism of the written crystallization of the constitution in a single
document used the unwritten British constitutional framework as its exemplar,
arguing that its foundation ‘on a solid political custom is far stronger than any
written text’.405
402“Zur Verfassungsfrage Deutschlands”, Deutsche constitutionelle Zeitung, No. 294, 4 November
1848. This idea of a regulation only of ‘fundamental principles’ was established in the final form
of the Reichsverfassung (1849). Many detailed questions were left open, including those regarding
the suspension of fundamental rights (Art. 197 Section 2) as well as constitutional complaint (Art.
126g). The Deutsche constitutionelle Zeitung, a centre-left newspaper, was published from 1
January 1848 until 7 October 1849 in Augsburg and Munich.
403“Die von der Regierung ‘von Gottes Gnaden’ dem Volke angebotene Verfassung”, Der
Volksfreund, No. 27, 23 December 1848: ‘Eine solche Verfassung ist das wichtigste Gesetz des
Staates, sie ist das Staatsgrundgesetz, und da in einem constitutionellen Staate das Volk die
gesetzgebende Gewalt hat, so kann natürlich nur das Volk durch seine Vertreter das wichtigste
alle Gesetze geben, nie die Regierung von Gottes Gnaden.’ Der Volksfreund, which was published
in Bielefeld by Rudolf Rempel and Gustav Adolf Wolff, was issued from 10 June 1848 until 12
July 1850. The newspaper championed republican and pro-revolutionary ideas. See, for instance,
“Die Republik in Vergleichung mit den monarchistischen Verfassungsformen”, Der Volksfreund,
No. 5, 3 February 1849; “Revolution”, Der Volksfreund, No. 10, 10 March 1849.
404“Die Deutsche Verfassung”, National-Zeitung, supplement to No. 36, 8 May 1850: ‘Die
Gerechtigkeit, welche bisher für die einzelnen Staaten immer nur eine kraftlose Idee blieb, wird so
zu einer concreten Macht (wir wollen so die Reichsgewalt im Gegensatz zur einzelnen
Staatsgewalt nennen), und die den Völkern bisher nur durch die Verfassungs-Urkunde gebotene
papierne Bürgschaft für die Gerechtigkeit wird eine reelle.’ The National-Zeitung was founded in
1848, as a consequence of the revolutionary events. The first proprietors and correspondents were
generally cosmopolitan Berlin liberals—politicians, intellectuals, authors, and state officials. The
newspaper published its political program in its first edition, in which it favoured a constitutional
monarchy based upon democratic principles and institutions. By 1850, the National-Zeitung had
some of the highest circulation figures in Berlin. With the failure of the revolutions, the paper
became more moderate, and continued to enjoy a signifiant readership, until it was wound down in
1938. Kahl (1972), 177–80.
405“Ueber constitutionelle Garantien und Ministerverantwortlichkeit”, Deutsche allgemeine
Zeitung, No. 338, 3 December 1848: ‘Nach den Erfahrungen, welche mit den s.g. papieren
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The juridification by constitution was further reflected by reporting on the oath
to be taken by the king, the ministers, parliamentarians, and the military on the
constitution.406 The communicative message of the obligatory oath taken on the
constitution before entering into office was twofold. On the one hand, it raised the
prospect that all political power could only exist as constituted power. On the other
hand, it was a solemn promise to respect the constitution. The latter was noted as
being fragile,407 owing to the lack of a legal consequence in its enforcement.408
Consequences for the breach of oath were left to the regulation by the practical
custom. Referring to the oath of Charles X of France, the constitutional oath of the
king, in particular, was considered to be easily compromised.409
Of primary importance was the potential conflict between the oath sworn on the
constitution by the military and the obligations to the supreme command of a
Verfassungen, d.h. mit Constitutionen und Charten, welche das ganz organische Gesetz eines
Reiches umfassen, bisher gemacht worden sind, überrascht es einigermaßen, daß die Völker noch
immer geneigt sind, darin die Gewähr für Freiheiten und volkstümliche Regierung […] erblicken.
[…] Sieht man in Europa sich nach Ländern um, wo die verfassungsmäßige Freiheit die tiefsten
Wurzeln geschlagen hat, so bleibt nur der Blick auf Großbritannien haften; doch nehmen die
Schweiz in einem verwandten Sinn und das verjüngte Belgien […] daneben eine sehr achtbare
Stelle ein.’ The Deutsche allgemeine Zeitung was published in Leipzig by Heinrich Brockhaus
from 1 April 1843 until 31 December 1879. Politically it belonged to the liberal spectrum. Berbig
(2000), 29. The incapability of the written constitution was also emphasized by the work of a
contemporary, anonymous Bavarian author: Die Grundrechte und die Reichsverfassung für
Deutschland, beleuchtet von einem Bayer (Augsburg: 1849), 74: ‘Mit einer papiernen Verfassung
hat man kein Reich. Papieren aber ist jede Verfassung, die nicht auf das Recht gebaut ist; denn
Gesetze sind als solche aber noch nicht Recht. Das Recht fordert bei jeder Societät, daß die
Interessen des einen Theilnehmers nicht durch das Uebergewicht des Anderen bewältigt werden
können; nur in diesem Falle wird ein gemeinschaftliches Interesse verfolgt werden können.’
406For members of parliament: Art. 113; for ministers: Art. 191; for the head of state: Art.190.
Frankfurter Reichsverfassung (28 March 1849), cited according to Willoweit and Seif (=Müßig)
(2003), 562–88.
407“Zur Verfassungsfrage Deutschlands XI”, Deutsche constitutionelle Zeitung, No. 45, 22
February 1849: ‘Man hätte […] noch einen kleinen Zusatz erwarten sollen, etwa den, daß alle mit
der Reichsverfassung in Widerspruch stehende Gesetze […] an und für sich aufgehoben und
ungültig seien, sobald die Reichsverfassung in Kraft trete.’ See also: “Die Gewähr der
Reichsverfassung”, Deutsche Reichstags-Zeitung, No. 28, 2 February 1849. The Deutsche
Reichstags-Zeitung was published from 21 May 1848 until 2 April 1849 in Bonn by Robert Blum,
Georg Günther, and Wilhelm Schaffrath. Politically it belonged to the left. It frequently issued and
supported the pamphlets of the democratic Centralmärzverein (Central March Association), and
was sceptical towards the Frankfurt Assembly’s practice. See, for example, “Des deutschen Volkes
Mandat an seine Vertreter I”, Deutsche Reichstags-Zeitung, No. 133, 22 October 1848; “Stimmen
aus dem Lande gegen die Erschaffung eines deutschen Kaisers”, Deutsche Reichstags-Zeitung,
No. 12, 15 January 1849.
408Schmidt (2000), 150.
409This article also draws a comparison to the oath of Charles X of France (1757–1836), who
pursued ‘unconstitutional politics.’ “Zur Verfassungsfrage Deutschlands XI”, Deutsche constitu-
tionelle Zeitung, No. 45, 22 February 1849.
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federal state.410 This originated in the simple fact that, though the St. Paul’s debates
concerned the German ‘nation’, the practical institutions of governance remained
the purview of the federal states. This meant that the German armies were
answerable not to the nation—as, indeed, there was no national German army—but
to their individual states, such as Prussia, Hanover, Bavaria, and Württemberg.
Therefore, if the military sworn to uphold a particular command and to serve a
particular state had to pledge loyalty to the national constitution, it would be caught
between two camps. If a federal state were to raise its military forces against the
imperial constitution, to which oath would the military pledge its loyalty: the nation
and its constitution, or the federal state?411 In the same vein, the Prussian politician
and minister of finance, David Justus Ludwig Hansemann, argued ‘that the oath of
the military [on the Constitution] would be a threat to its discipline.’412 Whether
this intractable problem could, in fact, be resolved ultimately became a moot point;
as the Imperial Constitution was never enacted, the fundamental test of the loyalty
and discipline of the armies never came to pass. Nonetheless, as Hansemann had
alluded, at the heart of the military issue was a basic and vital question of prece-
dence, and what the Imperial Constitution (or, indeed, any constitution) represented
in terms of vested power.
410The solution envisaged in Art. 11 of the Frankfurt Reichsverfassung, which eliminated the
supreme command of the federal states, did not come into force. § 11 stated: ‘Der Reichsgewalt
steht die gesammte bewaffnete Macht Deutschlands zur Verfügung.’.
411“23. Oktober”, Deutsche Reform, No. 8, 24 October 1848: ‘Bei einer solch doppelseitigen
Verpflichtung wird nämlich die Armee aus einem gehorchenden in einen beurtheilenden Körper
verwandelt; denn selbst urtheilen und sich mit der Politik befassen, wird jede deutsche Armee
müssen, wenn sie bei Konflikten zwischen der Reichsgewalt und den Einzelregierungen ihre Pflicht
erkennen will.’ The Berlin newspaper Deutsche Reform was founded in 1848. A conservative
newspaper, it had the aim of protecting the constitutional monarchy against liberal democracy and
anarchy. The government supported the newspaper monetarily, while the paper published articles
written by the government. In spite of this (or perhaps because of it), the readership was very
small. In 1849, the newspaper was reformed and removed from the government strategy, but still
did not succeed; it folded in 1851. Berbig (2000), 40–1.
412Hansemann, David (1849), Die Deutsche Verfassung, 8. David Hansemann was an important
German merchant. Born in 1790 as the youngest son of a pastor in Finkenwerder, he entered
commerce at just fifteen years old. In 1817 he founded his own company and succeeded to gain
certain prosperity. This way he was able to spend the following time on his interests in insurance
and social politics, railways, and banking. He founded an insurance company, a credit institute,
and a railway company. He held several public offices, including the presidency of the local
chamber of commerce and the city council. Hansemann was known for his liberal ideas, which
often stood in conflict with the public offices In March 1848, following the outbreak of revolution
across the region, he became the Prussian finance minister. He held this position only until
September, when the rising tide of radical democrats led to his resignation. Hansemann himself
was a German unificationist who supported a federalised ‘Greater German’ (großdeutsch) solution
—the unification of the German states, including Austria, with a strong devolution of powers to the
individual states. At the beginning of the 1850s, he withdrew from politics and founded a credit
cooperative. He died in 1864 in Schlangenbad. “Hansemann, David”, Neue Deutsche Biographie
(1966), 7: 626–9.
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7.2 Supremacy Matters in the Public Sphere Around
the Constituent St. Paul’s Church Assembly
The introductory statute to the Act Relating to the Fundamental Rights of the
German People (hereafter Fundamental Rights Act; 1848)413 ruled that every
federal law contradicting the fundamental law act was either immediately null and
void, or else must be amended within a certain period of time. The fundamental
laws were communicated as obligatory legal standards to be complied with by the
federative governments while also setting the legal requirements to change singular
legal structures accordingly.414 Most prominently, Art. 2 of the Fundamental Rights
Act attracted journalistic attention by abolishing the estates’ privileges. Liberal
newspapers, such as the Deutsche constitutionelle Zeitung, even demanded the
closing of the first chamber of Bavaria, which acted as a legislative body of
hereditary privilege similar to the British House of Lords.415 As an expression of
noble entitlement, the first chamber could no longer be tolerated under Art. 2 of the
Fundamental Rights Act.
What was particularly remarkable was the liberal linguistic turn away from
seeing the Fundamental Rights Act as a protective right, and instead conceptual-
ising it as an active measure to be wielded to change the structure and law of the
federal states. This, however, did not occur without opposition, and conservative
protest was widespread. The New Munich Journal (Neue Münchener Zeitung), for
instance, argued that fundamental laws were not immediately effective; instead,
they had to be approved by the federative government and parliament respectively.
For conservatives, such an implementing approval was the only constitutional way
to introduce the fundamental laws into a federal state.416 This amounted to a
constitutional understanding not as a paramount law but rather as a mere societal
contract.
The nullification of anterior law started as a matter of course. The National
Assembly already agreed in May 1848 that a law contradicting the constitution was
413The Reichsgesetz betreffend die Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes, proclaimed on 27
December 1848, came into force on 17 January 1849.
414This is made clear by the introductory act to the fundamental law. In Arts. 3, 4, and 5 the federal
governments are told to amend themselves according to the fundamental laws.
415“Die deutschen Grundrechte und die bayrische Volksvertretung”, Deutsche constitutionelle
Zeitung, No. 38, 14 February 1849: ‘Das Einführungsgesetz zu den deutschen Grundrechten
verordnet deshalb die Abänderung eines derartigen Zweikammernsystems, und setzt hierfür eine
Frist von 6 Monaten fest […] Also zuerst hinweg mit dieser s.g. ersten Kammer!’.
416“Die Grundrechte”, Neue Münchener Zeitung, No. 99, 27 April 1849: ‘Keineswegs soll hiermit
übrigens die Einführung der Grundrechte in Bayern bekämpft werden; diese soll und wird
geschehen auf verfassungsmäßigem Wege unter Mitwirkung und Zustimmung des Landtages und
der Regierung und so, wie von diesen für das Land möglich, zuträglich anerkannt wird.’ The Neue
Münchener Zeitung existed from 1848 until 1855 (anew: 1856–1862). The newspaper was
founded on suggestion of King Maximilian II; as a result, it relied on the Bavarian government for
both its financial support and its content. Kohnen (1995), 154.
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null and void.417 Art. 30 of the draft constitution went so far as to state explicitly
that ‘[e]very resolution, federal law or treaty between federal states, are void,
insofar as they contradict the National Constitution.’418 The Frankfurt Imperial
Constitution (Reichsverfassung; 1849), however, lacked legal consequences for
laws contradicting the constitution. The relevant Art. 194 simply stated ‘that the
ordinary law must not contradict the national constitution.’419 Despite the hierar-
chisation of constitution and statutes, an explicit nullification of contradictory
statutes was missing. Centre-left newspapers criticised this oversight, and justified
their demand of the nullification with comparative arguments, though these often
included inaccuracies and mischaracterisations.420 So, for example, the Free
People’s Gazette (Freie Volksblätter) reported that the Belgian Constitution (1831)
allowed state officials to refuse the execution of laws they thought to be issued
unconstitutionally.421 In fact, the relevant provision—Art. 107—only referred to
judges, and no other officials.
The public interest in the establishment of a constitutional jurisdiction and the
introduction of a judicial review corresponded with the prominence of judicial
administration and legally established courts within liberal legal thought. Deeply
influenced by Immanuel Kant’s formulation of the liberal state under the rule of
law, Paul Johann Anselm von Feuerbach’s essay on the Bavarian court
417“Die deutsche Einheit”, National-Zeitung, No. 63, 5 June 1848: ‘Die deutsche
Nationalversammlung hat am 27. Mai mit einer entschiedenen Mehrheit nach Wernhers Antrag
beschlossen: die deutsche National-Versammlung, als das aus dem Willen und den Wahlen der
deutschen Nation hervorgegangene Organ zur Begründung der Einheit und der politischen
Freiheit Deutschlands, erklärt, daß alle Bestimmungen einzelner deutscher Verfassungen, welche
mit dem von ihr zu gründen den allgemeinen Verfassungswerke nicht übereinstimmen, nur nach
Maßgabe des letzteren als gültig zu betrachten sind – ihrer bis dahin bestandenen Wirksamkeit
unbeschadet.’.
418Entwurf des deutschen Reichsgrundgesetzes, der Hohen deutschen Bundesversammlung als
Gutachten der siebzehn Männer des öffentlichen Vertrauens überreicht am 26. April 1848,
Frankfurt am Main, 1848, Art. 30, 22: ‘Alle Bundesbeschlüsse, Landesgesetze, und Verträge
zwischen einzelnen deutschen Staaten sind, insoweit sie mit einer Bestimmung des
Reichsgrundgesetzes im Widerspruch stehen, hiermit außer Kraft gesetzt.’
419Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches vom 28. März 1849, Art. 194: ‘Keine Bestimmung in der
Verfassung oder in den Gesetzen eines Einzelstaates darf mit der Reichsverfassung in
Widerspruch stehen.’ Cited in Willoweit and Seif, Europäische Verfassungsgeschichte, 587.
420“Zur Verfassungsfrage Deutschlands XI”, Deutsche constitutionelle Zeitung, No. 45, 22
February 1849: ‘Man hätte […] noch einen kleinen Zusatz erwarten sollen, etwa den, daß alle mit
der Reichsverfassung in Widerspruch stehende Gesetze […] an und für sich aufgehoben und
ungültig seien, sobald die Reichsverfassung in Kraft trete.’
421“Das konstitutionelle System in Deutschland”, Freie Volksblätter, No. 77, 13 October 1848: ‘Er
beruft sich auf Belgien, wo nach der Verfassung jeder Beamte befugt ist, ein Gesetz unvollzogen zu
lassen, dass ihm verfassungswidrig verordnet scheint.’ The Freie Volksblätter (from April until
October 1848) or Freie Blätter (from October 1848 until January 1849) was a democratic
newspaper printed in Cologne and Mülheim. Melis (1998), 301.
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constitution422 and its unaffectedness by means of ministerial and cabinet regula-
tions defined the court constitution as the ‘exterior appearance’ of justice and the
essence of the liberal rule of law state.423 In Feuerbach’s words, the court consti-
tutional legal reservation correlated to the legal commitment of the adjudicating
power: ‘If this court constitution does not by itself exist as a law but as a simple
regulation, then the judiciary in its most interior circle is made dependent on a
non-statute as the highest fundamental rule.’424 Any regulatory competence of the
executive in regard to the court constitution would nip judiciary independence in
the bud, as then the legal validity of judicial actions would not alone be measured
by laws but also by executive orders.425 As opposed to the Rousseau-inspired
super-elevation of the general will and the French distrust against judges, German
liberal writers, such as Klüber, Mittermaier, Pfeiffer, and Zachariae, were interested
in the court constitutional legal reservation as prerequisite of judicial indepen-
dence426 and of the justiciability of subjective rights.427
The plea for the introduction of the constitutional complaint was an obvious
step. For the activists, the next obvious step was to publish this plea in newspapers
and pamphlets. The Württemberg political scientist Robert von Mohl, a member of
the Frankfurt Parliament, argued in the German Newspaper (Deutsche Zeitung) that
the fundamental rights of each citizen should be secured by an independent and
422Paul Johann Anselm von Feuerbach, Kann die Gerichtsverfassung eines constitutionellen
Staates durch bloße Verordnungen rechtsgültig geändert werden? in Feuerbach, Paul Johann
Anselm von (1833), Kleine Schriften vermischten Inhalts, 178–228.
423Feuerbach (1833), Gerichtsverfassung, 185 (for the ‘exterior appearance’), 193 (for the
‘foundation of the legal status in the state’).
424Feuerbach (1833), Gerichtsverfassung, 199.
425Feuerbach (1833), Gerichtsverfassung, 198–200.
426Klüber, Joahnn Ludwig (1840) Öffentliches Recht des Teutschen Bundes,
chap. X (Justizhoheit), § 366, 562–3; § 373, 571–2. Klüber previously discussed judicial inde-
pendence in the third edition of Öffentliches Recht (Erlangen: 1831) at chap. X (Justizhoheit)
§ 373, 521–2. For the court constitutional legal reservation, Klüber cites Feuerbach: Klüber,
Öffentliches Recht (1840), chap. X § 366, 565 (n. k); Öffentliches Recht (1831), chap. X § 366,
515 (n. k). Cf. also Pfeiffer, Burkhard Wilhelm (1831), Practische Ausführungen aus allen Theilen
der Rechtswissenschaft, vol. III, 274–5: ‘As in general the independence of the administration
already requires permanent courts being appointed with an independent authority who may only be
deprived of the once assigned legal matters in general and by statute…Since Cabinet justice
appears especially reprehensible, then with respect to the safety of the administration of justice, the
state legal claim is: that nobody is deprived of his ordinary judge […] It is precisely this funda-
mental principle that excludes all kinds of special courts and commissions.’
427Klüber elaborates on this reservation in a separate point (VIII) at Klüber (1840), chap. X § 366,
562. His definition of the court constitution (Klüber (1840), chap. X § 366, 564) is based on the
one provided by Feuerbach: ‘The court constitution (Court Organisation) is the certain order of the
courts with the goal to influence their composition, the extent of their effect, and their relationship
amongst each other. Its destiny is precisely to give power to the judiciary in its organ, as one of the
first and fundamental parts of every state order, in order to assure the effect of the idea and the rule
of the law in its entirety in the territory’.
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permanent constitutional court.428 Its competences should among others include a
constitutional complaint.429 This frequent liberal demand was combatted by the
state governments,430 also using the newspapers as medium. They proposed that a
query should first be raised in a federal parliament by a sitting member; only if this
failed would the representatives be entitled to appeal to the constitutional court.431
In this version, power would be vested in the political process through the repre-
sentatives in the parliament; no ordinary citizen would ever be allowed to appeal to
the constitutional court personally. Ultimately, though, this obstructive position was
not successful. Instead, the St. Paul’s delegates wrote § 126g and § 126h into the
Imperial Constitution. These sections provided for the constitutional complaint of
citizens to the planned ‘Constitutional Court.’432 § 126g determined that ‘law suits
of German citizens against the infringement of their rights guaranteed by the
constitution’ had to be ruled by the Imperial Court (Reichsgericht).433 The most
important textual template was the provision in Title VII, § 21 of the Bavarian
Constitution of 1818, which granted citizens the right to appeal ‘to the assembly of
estates against the infringement of constitutional rights.’434 However, this did not
allow for a constitutional complaint, rather for a petition in regard to a lawful
administration.435
428Cf. fundamentally Dippel (1994), 24ff. In regard to Robert von Mohl further references at
Stolleis (2001), 172ff.
429“Der Deutsche Reichstag III”, Deutsche Zeitung, No. 88, 28 March 1848: ‘Dann aber zweitens
nicht minder nöthig, daß das Reich eine gesetzliche, wirksame Hilfe gegen die Beeinträchtigungen
dieser Rechte, im einzelnen Staate gewähre; somit in unabhängiges, zahlreiches, beständiges
Bundesgericht, bei welchem Ständeversammlungen die Minister anklagen, die einzelnen Bürger,
welche auch in letzter Instanz im engern Vaterlande Unrecht in staatsrechtlichen Befugnissen zu
erdulden glauben, Gerechtigkeit verlangen können.’ The Deutsche Zeitung was published from 1
July 1847 until 30 December 1850 by Georg Gottfried Gervinus. Its political position was
moderate liberal. It dismissed any radical revolutionary ideas and mostly advocated the hereditary
monarchy. See for example “Die Deutschen Reformen”, Deutsche Zeitung, No. 82, 22 March
1848; “Die Empörung im Seekreis”, Deutsche Zeitung, No. 108, 18 April 1848; “Republikanischer
Jesuitismus”, Deutsche Zeitung, No. 117, 27 April 1848. See also “Die Bundesverfassung”,
Deutsche Zeitung, No. 89, 29 March 1848; “Der Entwurf der Reichsverfassung III”, Deutsche
Zeitung, No. 309, 21 November 1848.
430Deutsche Reform, supplement to No. 172, 5 March 1849.
431Deutsche Reform, supplement to No. 172, 5 March 1849.
432The exact competences of the planned constitutional court were intended to be regulated by
ordinary law.
433Cf. among others Faller (1974), 827–55.
434Bavarian Constitution 1818, Title VII, §21: ‘Jeder einzelne Staatsbürger, so wie jede Gemeinde
kann Beschwerden über Verletzung der constitutionellen Rechte an die Stände-Versammlung, und
zwar an jede der beyden Kammern bringen, welche sie durch den hierüber bestehenden Ausschuß
prüft, und findet dieser sie dazu geeignet, in Berathung nimmt. Erkennt die Kammer durch
Stimmenmehrheit die Beschwerde für gegründet, so theilt sie ihren diesfalls an den König zu
erstattenden Antrag der andern Kammer mit, welcher, wenn diese demselben beystimmt, in einer
gemeinsamen Vorstellung dem Könige übergeben wird.’ Seydel (1885), 30–56. See also Stourzh
(2011), 157–79, especially 168–70.
435Ruppert and Schorkopf (2015), 1411 with further references.
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Even if the reasons for Sieyès’ caution with the choice of the constitutional
jurors were not applicable to the Frankfurt constitutional debates, there was a
particular public interest in the question of how constitutional judges would be
elected. Mohl proposed a court with judges and a jury, both of them consisting of
members of the parliament. He wanted the judges to be elected by the parliament.
The jury of the court should not be elected but rather chosen by lots. For him it was
self-explanatory that the king should have no say in the election of the judges and
the jury.436 Adolph Bach, an otherwise unknown author, preferred the judges to be
elected by other judges of lower courts.437 He also argued that no one should be
able to control them.438 A third voice, a professor of philosophy by the name of
Braniß, voted for the judges to be elected by the courts and faculties of law.439
Despite this vivid discussion around the constituent assembly, the goals of the
debates inside its chamber were rather meagre in this respect. In the final analysis, §
128 of the Imperial Constitution held the organisation of the courts to be a matter of
ordinary and not constitutional law.440
The failure of the Imperial Constitution specifically, and the Frankfurt Assembly
as a whole, often distracts from developments further south. But Frankfurt was not
the only centre of debate, negotiation, and compromise during this period of
European upheaval. In Austria, the so-called ‘Kremsierer Constitutional draft’
(1848–9) held the provision that the highest imperial court should be the only
competent instance for ‘lawsuits for compensation due to the infringement of
constitutional rights by an official act of state employees.’441 This draft was not
present in the analysed public discourse around the St. Paul’s Assembly, and it was
436“Der Deutsche Reichstag IV”, Deutsche Zeitung, No. 89, 29 March 1848: ‘Das eine Ausnahme,
von dem Grundsatze, der Kaiser habe die sämtlichen Reichsbeamten zu ernennen, hinsichtlich der
Mitglieder des Reichstages zu machen ist, bedarf, wohl keiner Ausführung.’
437Bach, Adolph (n.d.), Umriß einer Staatsverfassung für Deutschland, 22l: ‘Es möge […] die
Einladung ergehen, zum Behufe der Bildung des höchsten Reichsgerichts, einen Collegen aus der
Mitte […] ohne alle äußere Einwirkung zu wählen.’
438Bach, Adolph (n.d.), Umriß einer Staatsverfassung für Deutschland, 9: ‘Deutschlands höchstem
Gerichtshofe […] kommt ausschließlich die oberste Aufsticht und Controlle über sämtliche
Gerichte des Reiches zu und darf selbst nicht unter der Bevormundung und Instructions-Befolgung
eines Staatsmannes stehen.’
439Braniß, Christian Julius (1848), Nationalverfassung und preußische Constitution, 32: ‘Den
Wahlact vollziehen in den einzelnen Staaten nicht die Kammern, sondern die Obergerichte und die
Justizfakultäten.’ Christian Julius Braniß was a German philosopher, born in 1792. He worked as a
professor in Breslau, and was influenced by Steffens and Hegel. Drawing from these, he created his
own philosophical system, differentiating between the philosophy of idealism or metaphysics and
‘real’ philosophy. He died in 1873 in Breslau. “Braniß, Christian Julius”, Allgemeine Deutsche
Biographie (1903) 47: 184.
440Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches (28 March 1849), § 128: ‘Über die Einsetzung und
Organisation des Reichsgerichts, über das Verfahren und die Vollziehung der reichsgerichtlichen
Entscheidungen und Verfügungen wird ein besonderes Gesetz ergehen.’ Cited in Willoweit and
Seif (=Müßig) (2003), 579.
441Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze mit Erläuterungen, ed. Bernatzik (1911), 129 ‘§ 140.
Das Oberste Reichsgericht hat als einzige Instanz das Richteramt auszuüben: 1. bei Klagen auf
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not before the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 that an individual consti-
tutional complaint was introduced in Austria. Regarding the establishment of an
imperial court, the Austrian Fundamental Law attributed to this court the compe-
tence for ‘complaints of citizens on the infringement of their political rights guar-
anteed by the constitution’ (after the exhaustion of all legal measures provided by
the administrative law).442 However, the verdicts of this imperial court had no
annulling effect, but instead were only declarative. The detailed drafting of the
Austrian imperial court (excluding the Hungarian territories of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire) was left to the implementing law of 18 April 1869,443
which coincided with the court coming into life. § 17 of the implementing law
regulated the proceedings of the individual constitutional complaint and made the
legal nature of the genuine complaint explicit in § 35, providing for the wording of
the ruling that citizens’ rights were infringed.444
7.3 Revision Matters in the Public Sphere Around
the Constituent St. Paul’s Church Assembly
In regard to constitutional amendments, the St. Paul’s Constitution imposed the
right to amendment proposals to the king and to both houses of the parliament.445
Newspapers or pamphlets did not discuss this topic, as the right to initiate for both
powers had been generally accepted. The constitutional draft presented on 26 April
1848 by the committee of seventeen under Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann also
included the same regulation.446 Rather, the procedure, or the means by which
amendments would be enacted, attracted more interest. For some newspapers, like
the Deutsche constitutionelle Zeitung, juridification by constitution was an
Genugtuung wegen Verletzung konstitutioneller Rechte durch Amtshandlungen der
Staatsbediensteten (§138).’
442Art. 3b, Staatsgrundgesetz über die Einsetzung eines Reichsgerichtes 21 December 1867, in Die
österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze mit Erläuterungen, Vol. II, 428: ‘Artikel 3. Dem
Reichsgerichte steht ferners die endgültige Entscheidung zu: […] b) über Beschwerden der
Staatsbürger wegen Verletzung der ihnen durch die Verfassung gewährten politischen Rechte,
nachdem die Angelegenheit im gesetzlich vorgeschriebenen administrativen Wege ausgetragen
worden ist.’
443“Gesetz von 18. April 1869”, Reichsgesetzblatt für das Kaiserthum Österreich, No. XXII, 1869,
167.
444In this respect, Austria is considered to have had a pioneering role in continental Europe. Hereto
at length: Stourzh (1985, passim).
445Verfassung des deutschen Reiches (28 March 1849), § 80: ‘Der Kaiser hat das Recht des
Gesetzvorschlages. […]/§ 99. Das Recht des Gesetzvorschlages, der Beschwerde, der Adresse und
der Erhebung von Thatsachen, so wie der Anklage der Minister, steht jedem Hause zu.’ Cited in
Willoweit and Seif (=Müßig) (2003), 571.
446Entwurf des deutschen Reichgrundgesetzes (26 April 1848), § 8, 12–13: ‘Dem Kaiser […]. Das
Recht des Vorschlags und der Zustimmung zu den Gesetzen, theilt er mit dem Reichstage.’
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irreversible truth once a constitution had come into force. This was similar to
Sieyès’ concept of constitutionalism; the transformation from pouvoir constituant to
pouvoir constitué was understood as one-way track and, providing that it was
passed in a constitutional way, could not be overturned without risking a revolu-
tion.447 The same could be heard from Heinrich von Gagern, president of the
National Assembly, when he called in April 1849 for an adherence to the
Constitution ‘not because the constitution would be perfect or he would be totally
convinced by all of the provisions, but the constitution itself determines the procedure
for modifications which has to be observed.’448 Such a statement is embedded in the
legal understanding of constitutional precedence; the ratified constitution stood above
all, and even a complete modification could only be done in the way the constitution
describes. It had to be observed, even if it did not fulfil all of its expectations.
In regard to the modifying quora and majorities, the St. Paul’s Constitution
determined in Art. 196 that two-thirds of the members had to be present at the
voting and a majority of two thirds has to be achieved. These requirements had to
be complied with in both chambers.449 Many pamphlets advocated for a two-third
majority as well,450 whereas the constitutional draft of the seventeen demanded a
quorum of three-quarters to modify the constitution.451 The two-thirds quorum and
447“Die Einführung der Grundrechte”, Deutsche constitutionelle Zeitung, No. 9, 11 Januar 1849:
‘Viel schwerer wird man dasjenige antasten, was auf verfassungsmäßigem Wege festgestellt und
zum Gesetz erhoben ist und wird es nicht versuchen, ohne die Revolution aufs Neue und in ihren
letzten Konsequenzen hervorzurufen. Darum betrachten wir es als eine Thatsache von hohem
Werthe, daß die Vertreter des deutschen Volkes die wichtigsten durch die Märzerhebung
gewonnen Grundrechte desselben durch eine in Gesetzform erlassene magna charta verbrieft […]
haben.’
448“Frankfurt a.M. 11. April”, Deutsche Reform, No. 236, 13. April 1849: ‘Gagern: Etwa 80
Mitglieder von der Rechten und dem Centrum der National-Versammlung, unter ihnen auch Mohl
und ich, haben schriftlich erklärt, fest an der Verfassung zu halten, nicht, weil alle Punkte mit
unserer Überzeugung übereinstimmten, sondern, weil jeder einzelne hier Opfer bringen musste,
um in der National-Versammlung etwas zu schaffen. Von der Verfassung darf nichts geändert
werden, als auf dem Wege, den die Verfassung selbst vorzeigt.’
449Verfassung des deutschen Reiches (28 March 1849), § 196: ‘Abänderungen in der
Reichsverfassung können nur durch einen Beschluss beider Häuser und mit Zustimmung des
Reichsoberhauptes erfolgen. Zu einem solchen Beschluss bedarf es in jedem der beiden Häuser: 1.
Die Anwesenheit von mindestens zwei Dritteln der Mitglieder; 2. Zweier Bestimmungen, zwischen
welchen ein Zeitraum von wenigstens acht Tagen liegen muss; 3. Einer Stimmmehrheit von
wenigstens zwei Dritteln der anwesenden Mitglieder bei jeder der beiden Abstimmungen. Der
Zustimmung des Reichsoberhauptes bedarf es nicht, wenn in drei sich unmittelbar folgenden
ordentlichen Sitzungsperioden derselbe Reichstagsbeschluss unverändert gefasst werden.’ Cited
in Willoweit and Seif (=Müßig) (2003), 587–8.
450Achanier (n.d.), Entwurf zu einer deutschen Verfassung, § 10, 7: ‘Es kann an der Verfassung
nur dann eine Abänderung gemacht werden, wenn solche von der Bundeskammer und dem Senat
mit einer Majorität von 2/3 der Stimmen [beschlossen wird].’
451Entwurf des deutschen Reichgrundgesetzes (26 April 1848), § 29, 21–2: ‘Zu Abänderungen des
Reichsgrundgesetzes ist die Übereinstimmung des Reichstags mit dem Reichsoberhaupte, in jedem
Hause die Anwesenheit von wenigstens Dreiviertel der Mitglieder und eine Stimmenmehrheit von
Dreiviertel erforderlich.’
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majority earned some critics. The Deutsche constitutionelle Zeitung viewed quorum
provisions as too complicated at best, and constitutionally dangerous at worst; in
the case of minority parties that could not hope to achieve quorum, the paper
argued, disillusionment with the process could lead to these parties pursuing
extrajudicial means to enact constitutional amendment, including rioting and
revolution.452
Another branch of criticism was followed by David Hansemann, the Prussian
minister of finance, who played a pivotal role in Prussian politics during the rev-
olutionary years of 1848–9. In response to the proposal that the Prussian king
should accept the united German crown and modify the constitution afterwards,
Hansemann declared that this would set a dangerous precedent, because the con-
stitution could be modified later in a more liberal and republican way.453
The royal veto on constitutional amendments was a bastion for royalists. At the
other end of the line one, several municipalities petitioned the National Assembly in
March 1849 that the executive should be excluded from participating in the process
of constitutional revision.454 The non-integration of the crown into the amendment
process was not a position held by the majority, and the Imperial Constitution
included the king’s right to a suspensive veto on constitutional amendments or
modifications. ‘Suspensive’ meant, in this case, that the parliament could overcome
the veto of the king in three successive sessions.455 This was a thorn in David
Hansemann’s side. According to him, it revealed the ‘true’ constituent intention to
establish a republic ‘hiding behind the title of a monarchy.’456 Because of this, the
Prussian government insisted on an absolute veto, which it believed was necessary
in the enacting, abolishing, and amending of law.457
The voices in favour of a suspensive veto met in their assessment for a necessary
balance between parliament and monarch. The issue of a veto had been raised in the
pages of the Deutsches Volksblatt as early as December 1848, in which the author
pointed out that the question of the veto was neither a question of the divine right of
kings nor liberty, but rather a simple question of power. Indeed, the parliamentarian
Friedrich Dahlmann had defended the instrument of the veto in the German
452“Zur Verfassungsfrage Deutschlands XI”, Deutsche constitutionelle Zeitung, No. 45, 22
February 1849.
453Hansemann, David (1849), Die deutsche Verfassung, 63–4.
454“Adressen an die Nationalversammlung in Betreff der Oberhauptsfrage und der Verfassung”,
Deutsche Reichstags-Zeitung, No. 66, 19 March 1849: ‘Veränderungen in der Verfassung des
Reichs wie der Einzelstaaten dagegen der Zustimmung der Exekutivgewalt gänzlich entnommen.’
455Verfassung des deutschen Reiches (28 March 1848), § 196, in Willoweit and Seif (=Müßig)
(2003), 587–8.
456Hansemann, David (1849), Die deutsche Verfassung, 64.
457“Deutschland, Frankfurt am Main”, Deutsche Reform, No. 172, supplement, 5 March 1849: ‘§
18 Es muss darauf bestanden werden, dass das Bundesoberhaupt das Recht des absoluten Veto
habe. Demgemäß würde § 18 etwa wie folgt zu fassen sein: Zur Erlassung, Auslegung, Aufhebung
oder Abänderung von Bundesgesetzen ist die Übereinstimmung des Bundsoberhauptes, des
Staatenhauses und des Volkshauses erforderlich.’
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National Assembly by saying that England’s political situation would be better if
the instrument of the veto would nowadays not be practically impossible. There was
no other option than implementing a veto—the examples of Norway and North
America showed that the alternative would be only a delay of requests.458 The
instrument of the veto was also generally supported by the National-Zeitung. One
correspondent to this newspaper disapproved of an absolute veto, on the grounds
that it would in fact weaken, rather than strengthen, the position of the king. Again,
the English example was pertinent, as the monarchy’s power of absolute veto had
become so impractical that it had fallen into complete disuse. On the other hand, the
example of Norway showed that a suspensive veto provided a reasonable avenue to
deal with overhasty decisions of the parliament. In this argument, though, the
newspaper distinguished between the territorial states and the federal state. In the
territorial states, the king should have the right of a two-times suspensive veto,
while in the federal state the king should just hold the right for a single suspensive
veto. The reason for this lay in the position of the king and the role he played in the
body politic. In the federal state, the king would not be the sovereign; rather, he
would simply be the highest executive organ.459
This opinion was also followed by Johann Gottlieb Kuechler, who also argued
that an absolute veto damaged the venerability of the king. An absolute veto
implied that the dignity and will of the people could be disregarded by the king
using an arbitrary prerogative. In doing so, it therefore alienated the person of the
king from the will of the population, thereby affecting the prestige of his position,
and the love and esteem in which he was held. The absolute veto, in other words,
was not a symbol of the dignity of the king. Kuechler’s solution, like that of the
proprietors of the National-Zeitung, was the suspensive veto, which would confirm
the king’s position as the highest power in the state, while also ensuring that this
power was subject to existing laws that the king has to observe. The examples of
458“Frankfurt 14. Dez”, Deutsches Volksblatt, eine politische Zeitung, No. 206, 17 December
1848: ‘Das Veto ist in England seit der Königin Anna nicht angewendet, allein es würde in
mancher Beziehung besser stehen, wenn dessen Anwendung durch die Verhältnisse nicht praktisch
unmöglich geworden wäre. […] Es ist keine Freiheits- oder Gottes-Gnaden-Frage, sondern eine
Machtfrage.’ The Deutsches Volksblatt was a political newspaper, catering to the Catholic pop-
ulation of the Kingdom of Württemberg. It existed from 1848 until 1935/1965.
459“Die Deutsche Verfassung IV”, National-Zeitung, No. 40, 12 May 1848: ‘Wie Englands
Beispiel beweist […] ist bei dem jetzigen Stand der Dinge das absolute Veto nur ein nominelles, in
der That nicht ausübbares Recht […] Hiergegen sichert das supensive Veto der Krone, welches
bei seiner Ausübung das Volk nicht verletzt, und daher, wie Norwegen zeigt, zum Heile des Landes
angewendet [werden] kann und angewendet wird. […] Ein zweimaliges Veto sichert der Krone
somit eine größere Macht, und erhält vollkommen die organische Verbindung zwischen der
gesetzgebenden und der ausübenden Gewalt. […] Der Kaiser ist nicht der Träger der Rechtsidee,
nicht der Souverain, sondern nur die ausführende höchste Behörde.’
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North America, Norway, and Brazil had amply demonstrated that the suspensive
veto was both useful and reasonable, and made hasty and ill-considered decisions
(both on the part of the legislature and the executive) impossible.460 Thus, as
Kuechler conceived it, the suspensive veto served a dual purpose. Pragmatically, it
offered a reasonable monarchical check and balance to parliamentarianism, much as
the constitution itself was a popular check and balance on monarchical power.
Beyond this, it would help to cement the image of the king as a benevolent but not
omnipotent leader, working in the best interests of his subjects.
The purpose of the ReConFort project has been to investigate European con-
stitutional heritage. However, in this sketch of the German case study, the project
has also opened new avenues of research and inquiry. The American and French
discourses are necessary for understanding the contributions in this volume
regarding the Belgian, Italian, and Polish case studies, but even in the necessarily
brief discussion of the German example presented here, it is clear that there are
heretofore unrecognised patterns of continuity and conformity, as well as adaptation
to local conditions. The American ‘invention’ of the judicial review and the French
reluctance to limit the legislative consent representing the continuous sovereignty of
the people provided European formulations of constitutional precedence with both
positive and negative poles; what Hansemann, Gagern, and their compatriots in the
St. Paul’s Assembly demonstrated was that there was still a spectrum in between
those poles, in which political and judicial actors and constitutional theorists would
attempt to set their own course. The form that this course took, and the influences
upon it, provide us with further insight into the development of Europe’s ‘com-
munity’ of constitutionalism, and it is these elements that promise and afford further
opportunities for research.
8 Conclusion
In 1782, Charles Thomson found inspiration in Virgil’s Eclogue IV, when he
sketched his unfinished pyramid and proclaimed the Novus Ordo Seclorum for the
newly-founded United States of America. Thomson’s choice of expression implied
a clean break from Europe and the birth of a new society unencumbered by
Europe’s old iniquities. Four decades later, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe believed
that America’s ‘new order’ had succeeded, when he lamented Europe’s continued
‘useless remembering and unrewarding strife.’
460Kuechler, J. G. K. E., (1850), Über die Reichsverfassungsfrage und das Reichswahlgesetz, 43:
‘Das Recht des absoluten Veto ist aber zur Erhaltung der Würde des Reichsoberhauptes nicht nur
unnöthig, sondern es kann jenes Recht auch diese Würde und das Ansehen des Reichsoberhauptes
die Liebe und Anhänglichkeit zu demselben, und damit auch dessen Wirksamkeit bis aufs Äußerste
gefährden, während das Suspensivveto in den nordamerikanischen Freistaaten, dem Königreich
Norwegen und dem Kaiserreich Brasilien sich nicht nur als ganz unschädlich gezeigt,
Ueberstürzungen unmöglich gemacht […] als angemessen und nützlich erwiesen hat.’
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As it turns out, neither was entirely correct. The ‘new order’ ushered in an
unprecedented constitutional experiment, but one which borrowed liberally from
the precedent of the Old World. Nor—in spite of Goethe’s pessimism—was Europe
unwilling (or unable) to learn. Remembrance, in this case, was hardly as ‘useless’ as
Goethe imagined, and constitutional theorists and practitioners of
nineteenth-century Europe looked to historical examples for their own inspiration.
This amounted not necessarily to a preoccupation, but more to a desire to avoid the
mistakes of the past by learning from them. Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès and
Antoine-Claire Thibaudeau, for example, were opponents whose clashes in the
French National Convention appear to have been irreconcilable; certainly, they
were never able to resolve these differences before the Revolution was overtaken by
Bonapartism and embarked on a new course. However, though their approaches
differed, fundamentally they were addressing the same questions: who does a
constitution serve? How does it do so? How can the integrity of the constitution be
maintained? Most ambitious of all: what is a constitution in the pantheon of law and
order, politics and society? These were the same questions posed to and by James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and the American constitutionalists at the end of the
nineteenth century, and they were the same questions debated in St. Paul’s Church
in Frankfurt in 1848 and 1849. Though the specific circumstances and contexts
have changed, they are also, at a basic level, the questions facing western liberal
democracy as a whole, and the European Union in particular, as we near the end of
the first fifth of the twenty-first century.
If we return to Virgil’s Eclogue, we find not just an appeal to a ‘new order of
ages’, but also the prophecy of the Cumaean Sibyl:
Now the last age by Cumae’s Sibyl sung
Has come and gone, and the majestic roll
Of circling centuries begins anew:
Justice returns, returns old Saturn’s reign,
With a new breed of men sent down from heaven.
Only do thou, at the boy’s birth in whom
The iron shall cease, the golden age arise.461
Thomson believed Virgil’s words to be an appropriate conception of his new
society; here, too, the Sybil’s prognosis appears prophetic in light of the challenges
facing the European Union today. Thomson’s unfinished pyramid, in its original
iteration, symbolised the absence of the monarch in the new American system, but
it can also be read as an indicator, in the words of Barack Obama, that ‘[t]he
unfinished work of perfecting our union falls to each of us.’462 This sentiment is as
applicable to Europe as it is to the United States.
461Virgil, “Eclogue IV”, in Virgil (2005), 11.
462Obama’s Letter To His Daughters.
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The enduring lesson of ReConFort is not one of ‘useless remembering’, as
Goethe has phrased it in his poem To the United States, but rather that remembering
serves a purpose in opening a window on to the challenges and opportunities faced
by the European Union now and in the future. The individual member states of the
Union have their own, unique contexts and complexities. Yet it is also true that
European constitutionalism shares certain commonalities—even when that defini-
tion of ‘Europe’ extended to settlement away from the Old World, and even when
that constitutionalism was a concerted attempt to break away from Europe. By
acknowledging these commonalities, and by investigating their histories,
ReConFort provides a greater framework for understanding the present day. In this
way, ReConFort is a further stone in the gradual construction of Europe’s own
incomplete pyramid and, it is to be hoped, a contribution to the ‘unfinished work of
perfecting our union.’
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Abstract The first part concentrates on the emergence in England of “fundamental
laws” in the sense of individual rights, the “liberties and properties” of Englishmen.
I also show how notably in the case of the notorious “Septennial Act” of 1716,
criticism that Parliament violated the “constitution” was expressed, and how about
three decades later in the writings of Bolingbroke the word “unconstitutional” was
born, gaining wide currency in the North American polemics against the British
Parliament prior to independence. In the second part I concentrate on one of the most
important aspects of earlymodernwestern constitutional history, the dissociation—in
North America—of the “higher” positive law of constitutions as opposed to the
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inferior “normal” law of legislatures, at the same time also relativising the supreme
character of “law” in the writings of Hobbes and Rousseau, and closely connected to
this development, the upgrading of many individual rights to “constitutional rights”, in
other words, their constitutionalisation. In the third part I concentrate on two judgments
of the U.S. Supreme Court throwing into particularly sharp relief the superiority of
constitutional law vis-à-vis ordinarily legislature-made law: the first, long famous, is
Marbury v.Madison of 1803, and the second one, Obergefell v. Hodges of 2015, is fast
becoming one of the landmark cases of human rights protection, with the Court stating:
“An individual can invoke a right to constitutional protectionwhen he or she is harmed,
even if the broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act.” In the
fourth part I concentrate on the development, in Europe, of the only direct connections
between individual persons and human rights enshrined in the highest law of the land or
even beyond: first, the “Verfassungsbeschwerde” (constitutional complaint) first
developed in Austria, particularly successful in Germany (commenting also on the
different situation in France and in Great Britain); and second, the
“Individualbeschwerde” (individual complaint) before the European Court of Human
Rights, enabling the individual to appeal even against his or her own state for the
protection of rights guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights.
1 Fundamental Laws and Fundamental Rights
in the 17th and 18th Centuries and the Invention
of the Word “Unconstitutional” in England
In early modern Europe, leges fundamentales, fundamental laws, played a signifi-
cant role. The term seems to emerge in France around the 1570s. Innocent Gentillet,
a writer favourable to the Protestants, named three fundamental laws of the French
monarchy: First, the so-called lex salica, meaning the exclusion of female succes-
sion on the throne; second, the inalienability of crown property, and, most
important, the existence of the three estates.1 Several decades later, in 1607, we find
an interesting speech by the first Stuart king in England, James I, at the same time
king James VI of Scotland. Fundamental laws, he said, mean different things in
England and in Scotland. In Scotland, fundamental laws are only those laws,
“whereby confusion is avoided, and their kings’ descent maintained…”—in other
words, the settlement of royal succession. But James I added, addressing both
Houses of the English Parliament, fundamental laws did not mean “as you doe, of
their Common Law, for they have none, but that which is called IUS REGIS”.2
Referring to the Common Law opened up the whole world of Private law, of what
was often said the rights of “meum et tuum”. Indeed we find increasing references
to individual rights, whether property rights or rights pertaining to the safety of the
1Stourzh (1995, p. 17).
2Rede vom 31. März 1607 in: McIlwain (1918, p. 300).
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person such as the famous “habeas corpus” legislation (Magna Carta, Art. 39/29,
Habeas Corpus Act 1679) providing protection against arbitrary arrest as “funda-
mental” in English political writing during the seventeenth century. I refer to two
publications: In 1669, there appeared a booklet called “Angliae Notitia”, widely
known and translated. It said that the Commons of England (the Third Estate, in
other words), were blessed “for hereditary fundamental Liberties and Properties”…
“above and beyond the Subjects of any Monarch in the World.”3 A few years later,
1675, William Penn wrote that he understood by “fundamental laws”“those rights
and privileges which I call English, and which are the proper birthrights of
Englishmen”, in the first place property rights, second voting rights concerning
property rights, and third participation in the judicial power through the system of
trial by jury.4 In 1679, the habeas corpus act was passed, improving (not estab-
lishing!) the protection of free men from arbitrary imprisonment. In 1689, there
followed the “Declaration of Rights”.5
Now in view of these and other documents I have spoken of the process of
“fundamentalising” individual rights in the English legal system, a process which
reached its apogee in 1765 with the publication of William Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England. Blackstone subsumed his treatment of the
supreme powers of the land under the heading “The Rights of Persons”. There were
three principal rights: the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and
the right of private property. Yet now, more surprising, there were beneath these,
several “auxiliary subordinately rights of the subject”, and among these we find in
the first place the “constitution, powers and privileges of parliament.”6 Therefore,
I have spoken of “fundamentalising” individual rights in England (or Britain)
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which I distinguish from the pro-
cess of “constitutionalising” individual rights, which occured in America.7
Inspite of this as it were “fundamental” place of the rights of persons, Blackstone
—or indeed English law in general—has developed no procedural way do undo—
to “unlaw”, as Cromwell once said8—Acts passed by the King or Queen in
Parliament except by new laws. Within the limits of parliamentary sovereignty, the
English Parliament has on several occasions suspended the Habeas Corpus Act of
1679—first in 1688/89,9 and notably during the Wars of the French Revolution and
Napoleon, from 1794 to 1800. No procedural “precedence” for laws deemed
“fundamental” by public opinion existed, though one cannot imagine “Magna
3“Liberties and Properties” from Chamberlayne's book are reprinted from the third edition, also
giving London 1669 as place and time of the printing, and also in a German translation published
in the Diarium europaeum of 1670 in: Stourzh (1989, pp. 34–35), Studien zur Begriffs- und
Institutionengeschichte des liberalen Verfassungsstaats.
4Stourzh (1989, p. 29).
5Stourzh (1995, pp. 17–21).
6Blackstone (1765, pp. 125, 136).
7Stourzh (2007, pp. 292–293).
8Stourzh (1995, p. 17).
9Crawford (1915, pp. 613–630).
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Carta” to have been changed by a law of parliament. There has been one law case in
1610, “Dr. Bonham’s case”, where the deciding judge, the famous Edward Coke,
held that “in many cases the common law will control Acts of Parliament”, and
where he decided against a law privileging the London College of Physicians.10
This decision angered James I, who removed Coke to another court; its interpre-
tation has led to much controversy, and no additional acts of Parliament were
declared void.
There was also, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England the
rise of the notion of “constitution”, describing as it were the whole “package” of
basic institutions holding the state together. During the Glorious Revolution of
1689, the last Stuart King James II was charged having attempted “to subvert the
constitution of the kingdom”. But in the 18th century, Parliament also on occasion
came under attack. In 1701 Daniel Defoe, on the occasion of an incident whose
details I have described elsewhere, regretted that the Revolutionaries of 1689 had
not provided for the Right of the people “to judge of the Infractions made in their
Constitution” either by Parliament or by the Monarch.11 More famous or infamous
is Parliament’s “Septennial Act” of 1716, in later decades strongly to be criticised
by the American Founders. In that year, Parliament, elected for three years
according to existing legislation, prolonged the duration of parliamentary election
from three to seven years. But not, as one would assume, for the next Parliament to
be elected, but prolonging its own duration from three to seven years.12 Opponents
argued, that frequently elected parliaments were part of the “fundamental
constitution” of Britain. It was argued that from the moment where members of
parliament were in office beyond the time for which they had been elected, they
ceased to be “trustees” of the people; from this moment on they acted “by an
assumed power, and erect a new constitution”13. Very modern sounding, for the
year 1716! But the opponents failed, the majority in Parliaments had its way, and
there was no higher instance to appeal to. Nevertheless, the consciousness that there
was such a thing as a “constitution” and that there could be infractions on the
constitution had been developed, and it did not take too long until an astute politician
and political thinker, Lord Bolingbroke, used adjectives like “constitutional” (1730)
and “unconstitutional” (1734). It took another three decades until the word
“unconstitutional” began to spread widely—in America on the occasion of the
so-called “Stamp Act crisis” of 1765, a process that I have described elsewhere,14 but
also by being used in Blackstone‘s Commentaries on the Laws of England, a book
with a very wide reception both in England and in America.15
10Stourzh (1989, p. 49).
11Stourzh (1989, p. 46).
12Stourzh (2007, p. 317).
13Great Britain Parliament (1739, p. 410).
14Stourzh (1989, pp. 52–54).
15Stourzh (2007, pp. 60–79).
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2 The Dissociation of “Constitutional” from Legislative
Power in North America and the “Constitutionalisation”
of Individual Rights (Colonies and States up to 1787/88)
Now I come to the central and most detailed part of my lecture. What I shall discuss
in parts three and four concerns themes much better known in Europe, and there I
will be briefer.
In North America, an important condition separated the colonial settlers from
those having remained in the mother country. They were in need of some basic
political documents laying down rules for new communities. These documents were
of different kinds; royal charters, privileges given to proprietors empowering them to
issue documents regulating the basic framework of a new colony, sometimes
agreements of settlers without any higher authority like the “Fundamental Orders” of
Connecticut of 1639, only later supplanted or amended by a royal Charter. For the
colonial period, I shall concentrate on one most interesting document, “The Charter
or Fundamental Laws, of West New Jersey, Agreed Upon” of 1676. This Charter is
part of a larger document, “Concessions and Agreements of the Proprietors,
Freeholders and Inhabitants of the Province of West New Jersey”. The Charter has
eleven articles designated as “the common law or fundamental Rights” of West New
Jersey. They chiefly embodied rights with reference to criminal procedure, including
habeas corpus. This Charter now establishes—for the first time, as far as I can see—a
definite procedural difference between its own basic character and that of normal
laws which are prohibited from changing the articles of the Charter. These funda-
mental rights were agreed on “to be the foundation of the Government which is not
to be altered by the Legislative Authority or free Assembly hereafter mentioned and
constituted. But that the said Legislative Authority is constituted according to these
fundamentals to make such laws as agree with and maintain the said fundamentals
and to make no laws that in the least contradict, differ, or vary from the said
fundamentals under what pretence or allegation whatsoever.”16
This subordination of ordinary laws to the fundamental rights of the Charter
anticipates in an amazing way the First Amendment to the American Constitution
of 1791, which reads:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press: or the rights of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances”. Here we have in both texts, of 1676 and
of 1791, the most important innovation of American public law: The subordination
and the lower rank of ordinary legislation with respect to the higher law of a
fundamental order, from the late 18th century onwards referred to as constitution.17
If we think not merely of the legislative sovereignty of the British Parliament, if we
16Stourzh (2007, p. 319).
17Stourzh (2007, pp. 314–318).
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think of the basic importance of “the law” or “la loi” in the works of Hobbes or of
Rousseau, the dissociation of “ordinary” law from a higher, yet positive “consti-
tutional” law is all the more remarkable. Among the Americans of the Founding
generation, pride in their possessing a constitution of higher ranking than ordinary
laws also comes to the fore in the contempt for the self-perpetuating powers of the
British Parliament, as evidenced in several critical references to the Septennial Act
of 1716. James Madison in 1788, in the Federalist (No. 53), heavily criticised the
British Parliament‘s power of changing by legislative acts some of the most fun-
damental articles of the government (government meant in the broad sense of
political system). And Thomas Paine, in his “Rights of Man” of 1791, observed that
the Septennial Act was proof that “there is no constitution in England.”
Yet before entering the sphere of federal law in America, we need to stop at the
level of the individual states. Most, though not all of them gave themselves new
“constitutions” between 1776 and 1780, and many of them gave themselves
“Declarations of Rights”, usually called “Bills of Rights”, as part of their constitu-
tion, like notably Pennsylvania or Massachusetts, or added them later on, like New
York or New Hampshire. Two of them, Connecticut and Rhode Island, held on to
their colonial fundamentals. The first and most famous of these Declarations, that of
Virginia, stood as a document apart from the constitution. The rights enumerated in
these Declarations were in part natural rights invoked in the struggle for indepen-
dence, in part former “rights of Englishmen” embodied in numerous colonial doc-
uments. As far as the former are concerned, one has spoken of the “Positivierung des
Naturrechts”, the “positivisation of natural law”, in the words of Jürgen Habermas.18
The enhancement of individual rights as elements of a constitution emerges 1776
in a well-known resolution of the town meeting of Concord, Massachusetts: “[W]e
Conceive that a Constitution in its Proper Idea intends a System of Principles
Established to Secure the Subject in the Possession and Enjoyment of their Rights
and Privileges, against any Encroachments of the Governing Part.”19 By the end of
the period of constitutional debate from 1776 to 1788, one of the most important
constitutional debates in Western history—an American writer writing under the
name of “Federal Farmer” in December 1787, (probably Melancton Smith of New
York), came up with an amazingly nuanced hierarchy of rights:
“Of rights, some are natural and unalienable, of which even the people cannot
deprive individuals. Some are constitutional or fundamental; these cannot be altered
or abolished by the ordinary laws, but the people, by express acts, may alter or
abolish them [a reference to the possibilities of amending constitutions]; These,
such as the trial by jury, the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, &c. Individuals
claim under the solemn compacts of people, as constitutions, or at least under laws
so strengthened by long usage as not to be repealable by the ordinary legislature—
and some are common or mere legal rights, that is, such as individuals claim under
18Habermas (1967, p. 55).
19Stourzh (2007, p. 96).
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laws which the ordinary legislature may alter or abolish at pleasure.”20 This passage
displays an amazing grasp of the hierarchy of legal norms, much later developed by
Adolf Merkl and Hans Kelsen as “Stufenbau”—Theory of legal norms, though of
course Merkl and Kelsen would not have admitted the category of natural rights.
I shall soon quote a second example of this grasp of the hierarchy of legal norms.
The piece just quoted is also a remarkable example of the lowness of rank of
“ordinary laws” of which I have just spoken.
Since the formation of the American state constitutions from 1776 onwards it is
possible to speak of modern constitutions having an “Organisationsteil” and a
“Grundrechtsteil”, an organisational part and a fundamental rights part. There
occurred thus two important processes simultaneously: first, the dissociation of
constitutional from ordinary law, and second, what I have called the “constitu-
tionalisation of individual rights.”21 And a third process, deriving from the first two,
also emerged on the state level prior to the entry into force of the federal consti-
tution: The judicial review of ordinary legislation, measured against the superior
law of the constitution.
I consider two cases, though many more have been noted in the literature, the
case of Trevett v. Weeden in Rhode Island 1786, and the more complete North
Carolina case of Bayard v. Singleton of 1786/87. First to Rhode Island:
A butcher by name of John Weeden accepted from his clients only gold or silver
coins and no paper money—in highly inflationary times. Yet there existed a law of
the legislative assembly of Rhode Island, making the refusal to accept paper money a
punishable offense; also this law expressly excluded the procedure of trial by jury
and thus a case was opened against the butcher. The Court declared its incompe-
tence. Yet it transpired through the press that four of the five judges had voiced the
opinion that the law was void, because it was unconstitutional. The judges were
asked to appear before the legislative assembly, where they were threateningly told
that it had never happened before that a law of “the supreme legislature” had been
declared unconstitutional and void, and that this could lead as far as “to abolish the
legislative authority”. By the end of the year the four judges said to have spoken of
unconstitutionality were not renewed in their office. Yet an interesting accompa-
nying publication has to be mentioned. The lawyer for the butcher Weeden, by name
of James Varnum, published a brochure of about 60 pages on the case. He argued
that the alleged “supremacy” of the legislative assembly was derived from the
constitution (at that time this was still the Royal Charter of 1663 with considerable
possibilities of self-determination), and “subordinated” to it. The author expressly
referred to Emer de Vattel, famous Swiss author on international law, who had
written that the legislature of a nation could not change the constitution since its
competence was derived from the constitution. I quote from the French edition (there
very soon appeared an English translation): “Enfin, c’est de la constitution que ces
législateurs tiennent leur pouvoir, comment pourraient-ils la changer, sans détruire le
20Letters from the Federal Farmer, 1787/88 in: Storing (1981, p. 261).
21Stourzh (2007, pp. 314–320).
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fondemenent de leur autorité.”22 The judicial power, Varnum continued, could not
recognise as law an act of legislation which contradicted the constitution. And trial
by jury was “a fundamental, a constitutional law.”23
Now to North Carolina, the case of Bayard v. Singleton. From the point of view
of constitutional history, I consider this case at least as important as the much better
known federal case of Marbury v. Madison. It also involved the constitutionally
guaranteed right of trial by jury. The legislative assembly of North Carolina had
passed a law which ordered that suits of persons whose property had been confis-
cated during the war with Great Britain—in other words persons who had sided with
Britain against independence, called “loyalists”—that suits of such persons aiming at
the recovery of their property had to be rejected by the courts. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina had great doubts that this law was compatible with the constitutional
guarantee that property cases had to be dealt with by trial by jury in the ordinary
courts. After various attempts for a compromise settlement had failed, the Supreme
Court (three judges) judged unanimously that it could not reject the suit. In the
reasons for its judgment, the Court said that the legislative assembly had no com-
petence to annul that article of the constitution. If the legislative assembly would
ignore the constitution in this case, then it might also ignore it in other cases. Then
they might condemn someone to death without trial by jury, or they could nominate
themselves legislators for lifetime, or they could even make legislative power
hereditary. The Court added that the constitution was “the fundamental law of the
land” and therefore the law in question had to be considered as invalid.24
Now at least as interesting as the judgment of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina is an article written by James Iredell, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, in August
1786. This excellent jurist, born in England, was later appointed by President
Washington a member of the first Supreme Court of the United States. Iredell set to
examine possible remedies against violations of the Constitution by the legislative
assembly. There was the right of petition to the assembly; he ridiculed the appeal of
the electors to the elected, and also referred to the spectre of legislative omnipotence
by pointing to the British Septennial Act of 1716! Another remedy would be the
right of resistance—in other words, violence. Apart from the fact that this was a
dreadful expedient, he argued that the violation of individual rights of single persons
would never provoke the majority to armed resistance. There remained then a third
remedy: the judicial power. It had to be inquired as to whether the judicial power had
“any authority to interfere in such a case”. He affirmed it by a few memorable
sentences, worth to be set alongside the much better known ones of Chief Justice
Marshall 17 years later: He described the duty of the judicial power as follows:
“The duty of that power, I conceive, in all cases, is to decide according to the laws
of the State. It will not be denied, I suppose, that the constitution is a law of the state,
as well as an act of assembly, with this difference only, that it is the fundamental law,
22de Vattel (1863 (1758), p. 168).
23Stourzh (1989, pp. 58–60).
24Stourzh (1989, pp. 60–62).
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and unalterable by the legislature, which derives all its power from it. One act of
Assembly may repeal another act of Assembly. For this reason, the latter act is to be
obeyed, and not the former. An act of Assembly cannot repeal the constitution, or any
part of it. For that reason, an act of Assembly, inconsistent with the constitution, is
void, and cannot be obeyed, without disobeying the superior law to which we were
previously and irrevocably bound. The judges, therefore, must take care at their peril,
that every act of Assembly they presume to enforce is warranted by the constitution,
since if it is not, they act without lawful authority. This is not a usurped or a dis-
cretionary power, but one inevitably resulting from the constitution of their office,
they being judges for the benefit of the whole people, not mere servants of the
Assembly.”25 A year later, 1787, Iredell held the judges’ obligation “to hold void laws
inconsistent with the constitution” for “unavoidable”, “the constitution not being a
merely imaginary thing, about which ten thousand different opinions may be formed,
but a written document to which all may have recourse, and to which therefore the
judges cannot wilfully blind themselves.”26 This logic would have pleased the
architects of the “Stufenbau-Theory” of legal norms, to which I have already referred.
James Iredell of North Carolina is indeed a precursor of Merkl and Kelsen.
3 Fundamental or Paramount Law on the Federal Level
in the United States: Marbury v. Madison 1803
and Obergefell v. Hodges 2015
Discussion of the Federal draft constitution in 1787–1788 brought forth a new word
to designate the higher rank of the constitution with regard do ordinary legislation.
In addition to “fundamental”, the word “paramount” made its appearence. First, it
seems, 1788 James Madison, in article No. 53 of “The Federalist,” spoke of “the
authority of a paramount constitution.”27 “Paramount”—that meant, the highest law
of the land. Now the word “paramount” reemerges in one of the best known cases
of the federal Supreme Court, the case of “Marbury v. Madison” of 1803. It was the
first case in which the federal Supreme Court declared a passage of a federal law
void, because it contradicted the constitution. The details of the case are not really
important. It was no great “political” case. There had been a change of the
Presidency from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson. The outgoing President had
appointed one William Marbury to the office of justice of peace for the District of
Columbia, the outgoing Secretary of State—ironically no one else but John
Marshall, at that time amazingly simultaneously Secretary of State and President of
the Supreme Court!—had out of negligence failed to deliver the appointment to the
appointee, and the new President Jefferson did not wish to have the appointment
25Stourzh (1977, p. 171), emphasis in the original, to be found in: McRee (1858, pp. 147–148).
26Stourzh (1989, p. 317).
27Cooke (1961 (1788), p. 361).
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delivered anymore. So Marbury sued and requested that the Supreme Court issue a
necessary document ordering delivery of the appointment, called “writ of man-
damus”. Now the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that it was not constitu-
tionally empowered to issue such a writ. Famous is the case for the legal reasoning
of the opinion of the Court, written by the Chief Justice Marshall himself. The logic
was not different from the logic displayed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
1786. But now an Act of the Federal Congress and the Federal Constitution were at
stake. I quote what I consider the central part of the argument:
“The Constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it….
Certainly all those who have framed written Constitutions contemplate them as
forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the
theory of every such government must be that an act of the Legislature repugnant to
the Constitution is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written Constitution, and is consequently
to be considered, by this Court as one of the fundamental principles of our society”
(Supreme Court of the United States, 5 U.S. 137 1803, at 177).28
The words “paramount” and “written constitution” have become the key words
characterising the high rank—the highest rank—of “constitution” in the hierarchy
of legal norms.
Now let me jump directly from 1803 to 2015. I do by-pass landmark cases like the
Dred Scott case of 1857, declaring slavery to be valid in the entirety of the United
States—generally considered as the Supreme Court’s “worst” decision ever—or
Loving v. Virginia of 1967, ending the punishment of marital relations between
blacks and whites, or Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 1954 (ending racial
segregation in schools), and go directly to the 2015 case of Obergefell v. Hodges.
This decision of June 26, 2015, decided with the smallest possible majority of five
against a minority of four judges, declared same-sex marriages as constitutional,
thereby making the prohibition of same-sex marriages in 13 American States illegal.
This case, which I am sure is to be considered one of the great civil rights cases of
American constitutional history, has an interesting background. James Obergefell
and his partner John Arthur, the latter with the deadly ALS illness (amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis) and soon to die, decided to get married in the State of Maryland,
because same-sex marriages were prohibited in the State of Ohio, where they lived.
After the death of his partner, James Obergefell requested that on the death certificate
of his partner, his own name be indicated as spouse. This was refused by the State of
Ohio, and the case finally went to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The majority of five, which incidentally included all three women judges sitting
on the Court, came in the lengthy “opinion of the Court” to the conclusion based on
the 14th amendment to the constitution, notably on its clause that no State shall
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”: I quote
28Commager (1963, p. 193).
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from the Court opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy: “An individual can
invoke a right to constitutional protection when he or she is harmed, even if the
broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act.” The opinion
went on to say that “fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend
on the outcome of no elections.”29 Thus the principle formulated by James Iredell
or John Marshall at the turn from the 18th to the 19th century—supremacy of the
constitution, subordination of ordinary legislation—was powerfully reaffirmed in
2015. I should add that the four judges in the minority all wrote quite bitter minority
opinions, suggesting that the majority had gravely disregarded the democratic
principle of majority rule; one judge, Justice Scalia—who recently died—went as
far as charging the majority of a “juridical Putsch.”30
4 Europe, “Constitutional Complaint”
(Verfassungsbeschwerde) and “Individual Complaint”
(Individualbeschwerde): Roots 1848 and 1867,
Beginnings 1919/1920, Breakthrough After
World War II
In this concluding section, I shall concentrate on the development of a direct access
of individuals to the constitution. The stronger separation of public and private law
in (continental) Europe, the growth of separate judicial institutions (unlike the
USA), have made this access perhaps more complicated than in America. The most
important precondition of gaining access—or wishing to gain access—has been
alike in America and Europe the incorporation of basic or fundamental rights
(“Grundrechte”) into constitutional texts—something which I discussed in section
B. As long as declarations of individual rights—(rights of men and of citizens in the
beginnings of the French Revolution, later during the 19th and early 20th centuries
chiefly rights of citizens (rights of Belgians, rights of Germans etc.)—remained
without a procedural “tie” to individuals, these declarations were chiefly appeals to
the legislator, to heed individual rights. But there were attempts to do more. In
France, the Abbé Sieyès proposed in 1795 the creation of a “jury constitutionnaire”
in order to settle conflicts between legislation and constitution. Complaints were to
be directed to the Jury constitutionnaire not merely by both chambers of the
envisaged parliament, (Conseil des Anciens, Conseil des 500), but also, and this is
most interesting, to individual citizens (“citoyens au nom individuel”).31 His plan
was not accepted—too strong were in France the sympathies in favour of “la loi.”32
29U.S. Supreme Court, case of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.— (2015).
30See Footnote 26.
31Pasquino (1998, pp. 93–97), text of Sieyès’ document, ibid. (pp. 193–196).
32Stourzh (2015, p. 114).
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In Germany, we note an interesting early development in Bavaria. According to
the constitution of 1818, citizens were given the right “to bear complaints con-
cerning the violation of constitutional rights” to the parliamentary assembly, called
“Stände-Versammlung”. A different level was reached during the revolution of
1848/49. The German draft constitution of 1848/49 envisaged “suits of German
citizens concerning violation of rights guaranteed by the German constitution.” A
high Court, the Reichsgericht, was to decide about such suits. Similarly, the draft
constitution for the Habsburg Empire of 1849 provided that suits concerning vio-
lation of constitutional rights by civil servants could be addressed directly to the
Supreme Reichsgericht. Both draft constitutions were never put into practice. In
Germany, the idea expressed in the 1849 draft constitution was only to be taken up
after World War II. In Austria, for peculiar reasons the liberal tradition of 1848
brought forth a liberal constitution for the non-Hungarian part of the Empire, the
so-called December-Constitution of 1867. This was a collection of “fundamental
laws”, and one of them, the “Fundamental law on the creation of a Reichsgericht
provided that it was competent to hear “complaints of citizens concerning violations
of their political rights guaranteed by the constitution”. The procedure concerning
the Reichsgericht had, however, a great weakness: the adminstration was not bound
to abide by the judgments of the Reichsgericht. This legal gap was filled after
World War I, when Austria and Czechoslovakia established the first specialised
constitutional courts in the world—as distinguished from the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Austrian Constitutional Court was created with the law of January 25, 1919 and
was incorporated, with slight changes, into the Austrian Constitution of October 1,
1920. The Czechoslovakian Constitutional Court was created by the Constitution of
Czechoslovakia of February 29, 1920. While the Czechoslovakian Court had few
competences, the Austrian Court obtained the competence to decide on complaints,
here rendered in a slightly simplified way, concerning violations of the plaintiff’s
constitutionally guaranteed rights by decrees (Bescheide) of the administrative
agencies of the State, notably based on unconstitutional laws.33
In Germany, the Constitutional Complaint was first embodied in 1951 in the Law
on the Constitutional Court, on the level of an ordinary law. Only in 1969 was it
incorporated into the Grundgesetz (Art. 93, Paragraph 1, Number 4a). The text very
simply states that everyman is entitled to bear complaint—addressed to the
Constitutional Court—of having been violated by public authority in one of his or her
fundamental rights (Grundrechte) or certain other specifically named rights. In the
meantime, constitutional complaints have enormously increased and by now amount
to about 96% of all cases brought before the Constitutional Court.34 Among rights
violated, not merely in Germany, the right to equality before the law has become one
of the most important, if not the most important right whose violation is submitted.
In France, skepticism about the “gouvernement des juges”was widespread among
decades. The Conseil Constitutionnel, established by the de Gaulle constitution of
33Stourzh (2015, pp. 115–116).
34Stourzh (2015, p. 117).
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1958, knew no individual complaint. An attempt by President Mitterand to introduce
it in 1989 failed. Now since the constitutional reform of 2008, a peculiar procedure
has been introduced, entitled “question prioritaire de constitutionnalité”, in force
since 2010. In the course of trials, the question of constitutionality of laws may, after
having been examined by the Conseil d’Etat or the Cour de Cassation, be submitted to
the Conseil Constitutionel. This is the first time in France that the examination a
posteriori of the constitutionality of laws has become possible.35
In conclusion, I would like to point to the evolution of individual complaints
against rights violation beyond the national level. I exclude here the rather limited
possibilities offered by various UN Conventions, and I concentrate on the European
Declaration of Human Rights of 1950, in force since 1953, with its most important
instrument, the European Court of Human Rights, established in 1959. The
admission of complaints by individuals first was at the discretion of individual
member states; Germany had admitted it in 1955, Great Britain in 1966, and France
only in 1981. Since a reform of the Court in 1998, every one of the 47 members of
the Council of Europe including Russia is obligated to admit individual complaints.
Individual complaints are only possible, when all domestic remedies have been
exhausted. The Court became victim of the hopes engendered by the extension of
individual complaints to all member states. In 2011, the high point of more than
160,000 pending applications was reached; since then new procedures have begun
to reduce this enormous backlog. In Austria, the articles of the European declaration
were given the rank of constitutional provisions. In Germany, the articles of the
European Convention have no constitutional standing, yet the German
Constitutional Court has said in 2004 that German courts are under the obligation of
taking into account the judicature of the European Court of Human Rights. In
Norway, since 1999 a law has given the European Convention of Human Rights
and some other international conventions with relevance for human rights a special
rank above other legislation (Law of 21st May 1999 enforcing the status of human
rights in Norwegian law).
Thus the European Convention has assumed, in some countries at least and in
different ways, a status of precedence vis-à-vis ordinary law, not quite dissimilar to
constitutional rights on the national level. With transcending national boundaries,
the special protection of human rights which set in 240 years ago, has now reached,
in Europe at least, a level which has never before existed in human history.
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Abstract Understanding of the principle of constitutional precedence raises
numerous doubts in the Polish case. Although this rule was stated expressis verbis
in the Declaration of the Assembled Estates from 5 May 1791 joining May
Constitution, following studies allow for the ascertainment that its content and
significance for the legal order was perceived differently. In light of experienced
practice, we may not accept without reservations the claim of a general recognition
A. Tarnowska (&)
Nicolaus Copernicus University Toruń, Toruń, Poland
e-mail: atarnowska@tlen.pl; atarn@law.umk.pl
© The Author(s) 2018
U. Müßig (ed.), Reconsidering Constitutional Formation II Decisive Constitutional
Normativity, Studies in the History of Law and Justice 12,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73037-0_3
113
of a superior position of constitution towards other sources of law. We may agree as
to the purpose of introducing the supremacy clause: first and foremost, it was the
desire to guarantee the desired stability of the system against foreign powers’ and
internal conservative opposition threats. The author developed the title issue in the
field of former Polish legal tradition of fundamental law and French influences;
analyzed also the extraordinary procedure of adopting and revision of the 3rd May
Constitution 1791. Furthermore the perception of the analyzed relationship between
the Constitution and acts of ordinary legislation should be regarded as inconsistent.
In the following days and months, the deputies of the Great Sejm made attempts to
introduce regulations into ordinary legislation that were contrary to the May
Constitution, but at the same time the clauses related to the obligation to adjust
legislation to the provisions of the Government Act are a much more progressive
systemic solution than the previous ones. Contemporary acceptance of the
assumption of supremacy of the Constitution leads to the innovative effect of
accepting the concept of unconstitutionality, id est the obligation to eliminate from
the legal order acts which are incompatible with the Constitution. And again, at the
level of the acts comprising the “3 May system” (on the Sejm and the Extraordinary
Sejm), this conception remains implemented to a limited degree even when the
Sejm deputation was entrusted with the power of preventative constitutional control
of draft legislation. It would thus seem that the existing situation can be interpreted
as a sort of intermediate stage, symbolizing the arrival of a substantive and axio-
logical legal understanding of the Constitution’s supremacy. However, we should
objectively assess the innovative Polish steps along the path of encapsulating the
state order in a constitutional act, as well as hierarchization of the legal system,
however imperfect they may have been.
1 Introduction
What is a constitution on the basis of the Stanislawow system of the First Republic?
How did contemporaries understand the concept of a superior act? Can the Polish
Constitution of 3 May be held up as an example of a modern mechanism serving to
enshrine a political system in law? How to avoid the danger of applying present-day
institutions to the political and legal practice of the 18th century?
There is no doubt the elite of the First Republic were aware of the fact that the
events observed and commented upon in political literature were for contemporaries
of an absolutely crucial character. At the same time, all efforts had to be undertaken
with the greatest caution, out of fear of the reaction that may come from neigh-
bouring powers, particularly Russia. Even this caution did not, however, prove
helpful. “Let it be known to whom it concerns. Overturning the Constitution and the
internal Government of the Republic of Poland by illegal revolutions on 3 May
1791. The widespread confusion that continually lasted in this unfortunate epoch in
the whole country, and the alarming spread of the spirit of faction and disorder;
having enslaved His Royal Highness the King of Prussia, and the Empress of All
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the Russia to agreement and the abolition of the Neighbouring Powers…”, was
included later in the draft treaty between Russia and Prussia.1 Similarly, in private
correspondence to “her brother” Stanisław August, Catherine the Great wrote about
the “Revolution of the 3rd of May”,2 whereas the subsequent critical Imperial
Declaration gives the following account: “the overthrow of the entire Government
to its very foundations, on one day of 3 May 1791, under which the Republic has
flourished for centuries”3; the process of enacting the Polish Constitution was
likened to the French Revolution, and similar public disturbances were expected.
Essen, the ambassador of Saxony, wrote to Dresden “in essence, the total system
of governments previously in existence has been overthrown”;4 “I cannot assess
this revolution as anything other than a desperate step, as the nation was convinced
of being in danger. I am also certain that this revolution will result in a great deal of
problems and difficulties for us”.5
As it turned out, even the limited systemic reform and political revolution which
was ultimately carried out, quite mild for the ‘truly patriotic’ Republican camp,
would be too far-reaching of a step. The “revolutionary” argumentation would serve
Polish conservatives, enemies of the Constitution: Dyzma Bończa Tomaszewski
would write “about the terrible freedom of the Polish revolution” and “the most
disastrous revolution”.6 Stanisław Szczęsny Potocki wrote to the king from Vienna
in a similar tone: “If I had not seen the King leading the Revolution, I would have
perceived it as a plot against the Republic and a blow inflicted to the freedom of the
Noble Polish Nation”.7
Polish opinion writing and diplomacy directly countered this. The adoption of
the Constitution and accompanying laws was frequently referred to as a “gentle
revolution”. Hugo Kołłątaj declared “all hope in the gentle revolution, which the
1‘Niech będzie wiadomo komu należy. Wywrócenie Konstytucyi I Rządu wewnętrznego Rzpltey
Polskiey przez nielegalną Rewolucyą 3. Maia 1791. Zamieszanie powszechne, które od tey
nieszczęśliwey Epoki w Kraiu całym nieprzestannie trwało, I zatrważaiące szerzenie się w nim
ducha fakcyi i zaburzenia; zniewoliwszy Nayiaśnieyszego Króla Imci Pruskiego, I Nayiaśnieyszą
Imperatorowę Jeymć Wszech Rossyi do porozumienia się i zniesienia z Sąsiedzkiemi
Mocarstwami…’, ‘Proyekt traktatu Do zawarcia między Nayiaśnieyszym Królem Imcią Pruskim,
a Nayiaśnieyszym Królem Imcią I Rzeczypospolitą Polską’, Archiwum Głowne Akt Dawnych
(Central Archives of Historical Records [further: AGAD]), Archiwum Królestwa Polskiego
[further: AKP], Teka 7, Nr 35, k.289–290 (289).
2Letter of Catherine, 9 Juillet 1792, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 390, k. 67–69.
3AGAD,ArchiwumSejmuCzteroletniego (Four-Years-SeymArchives [further:ASCz]), sygn. 24, k. 81.
4Letter of Franciszek Essen to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Dresden, Johann Loss, of 4 May
1791, No. 21, cited in: Kocój (2000, p. 40).
5Letter of Franciszek Essen to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Dresden, Johann Loss, of 4 May
1791, No. 22, cited in: Kocój (2000, p. 42).
6Dyzmy Bończy Tomaszewskiego Komissarza cywilno-wojskowego województwa Bracławskiego
nad konstytucyą i rewolucyą dnia 3. maja roku 1791 uwagi, n.p., n.d., f.ex. p. 8–9, 24.
7Letter of Stanisław Szczęsny Potocki to Stanisław August, 30 Mai 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów,
sygn. 392, k. 1.
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present Parliament should bring us”8 and the prevalence of the term should be
attributed to him, inspired as he was by the ideas of Gaetano Filangieri and Antonio
Genovesi.9
The term “gentle” was also at the same time to ensure that selecting the path of
revolution would be in nobody’s interest if identified with the violence of the
French Revolution. It is known that in Poland even the organization of the “Black
Procession”, which was an expression of the demands of the bourgeois, and
courageous speeches by representatives of the urban populace, gave rise to an
unjustified panic among the noble political nation. Nobody would directly compare
the events in Paris and Warsaw; quite the contrary, some luminaries would find
numerous differences, ascribing moderation and non-violence to the Polish
activities.10
In the words of Feliks Oraczewski, deputy of Stanisław August in Paris: “An
opinion on freedom has become a Religion, everyone wants to be free but they
cannot find the right path. If they are faced with the smallest obstruction, they will
turn violent against the people”.11 In a letter to an unknown addressee written much
earlier, Oraczewski argued naively that “we do not know what the reception of Our
Revolution was in Vienna, Berlin or St. Petersburg, but it can be inferred from
Bulgakov‘s countenance and demeanour that Moscow will not wage a war on us for
the Revolution, just as it did not wage a war on the King of Sweden 19 years
ago”.12 Already in 1789 after first reform of Great Sejm, as for example military
organisation reform, the Marshal of the Lithuanian Confederation appealed to the
king in these words: “Our revolution is different from that in other Countries, for
there the peace has been broken, and the result was the destruction of all the
impulse to revolution; everything was done here in an undisturbed peace, and in this
Sejm where we make law, its Performance is to be found. The Deputation made to
8Kołłątaj Hugo, Do Stanisława Małachowskiego, referendarza koronnego. O przyszłym sejmie
Anonima listów kilka, cz. 1: O podźwignięciu sił krajowych, List Pierwszy, Biblioteka Polskiej
Akademii Nauk w Krakowie, Rkp. (manuscript) 176, k. (charter) 6.
9Leśnodorski (1975).
10About this “tactical” issue cf. also Salmonowicz (2001).
11‘opinia o wolności stała stała się Religią, wszyscy chcą być wolnemi ale porządnie trafić na tę
drogę nie umieią gdy się naymnieysza pokaże zawada gwałtem prze-ciw ludowi czynią’, letter of
Feliks Oraczewski to Stanisław August, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 418, k. 295.
12‘Jeszcze tu nie wiemy, iak Nasza Rewolucya iest wzięta w Wiedniu, Berlinie y Petersburgu, lecz
po minie i zachowaniu się Bułhakowa można suponować, że Moskwa nam nie wypowie woyny za
Rewolucyę, iak niewypowiedziała przed lat 19 Królowi Szwedzkiemu’, Letter of Feliks
Oraczewski to NN, w Warszawie, dnia 11 Maja 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów (collection of
Popiel family), sygn. 418, k. 571. Jakov Bulgakov was Russian envoy in Warsaw 1790–1792,
successor of Magnus Otto Stackelberg (in Warsaw during 1772–1790).
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compose the form of the Government has crowned the anniversary of the Election
of Your Royal Highness”.13
Even as the Russian declaration14 opening the way to Russian-Polish war was
published, the aforementioned royal deputy deluded himself further with the fol-
lowing words: “I think that the proclamation requires a genuine explanation which
would distinguish our revolution from the French one and prove the proclamation
of St. Petersburg erroneous”.15 After publishing the Russian declaration in Paris,
Oraczewski called for a widespread explanation of how much the Polish reform,
which was curbed by religion and the “simplicity of customs”, was divergent from
the French Revolution.16 He sees the mechanisms that will effectively protect the
Constitution in the very same traits and in the leadership of the king. Besides,
the Constitution “does not need any protection as it will defend itself in the eyes of
the People of Europe”.17
Oraczewski, as well as many others, demonstrated extreme naivety. The Russian
narrative was of a strictly propagandistic character. On the one hand, to satisfy the
demands of international diplomacy it referred to the theoretical danger posed by the
spread of revolutionary ideas; on the other, it sought to protect Polish liberty
“threatened” by the constitution. In response to the charge that this was an odd
argument coming from a state which itself was of a despotic nature, the Russian
ambassador Bulgakov was said to have responded to Marshal Kazimierz Sapieha that
in Russia this had been the case for a long time, but “… your despotism began on
Monday, 16 April (…) You issued a declaration of war against all of Europe, and
specifically against us”. Sapieha responded that “it is entirely something other than
despotism, that which we have done solely in our own defense (…) The entire nation
has verified and consecrated the act of 3 May. And whatever we may do now, we do
13‘Rewolucya [s. 333] Nasza różna iest od rewolucyi innych Kraiów, bo tam zamięszani
spokoyność, i obalone wszystkie sprężyny rewolucyi były skutkiem, u Nas w nienaruszoney
spokoyności wszystko się stało, i w tym Seymie, w którym stanowiemy Prawa, znayduie się ich
Exekucya. Deputacya wyznaczona do układania formy Rządu uwieńczyła rocznicę Elekcyi W.
K. Mci’ Sessya 195, 24th November 1789, Diariusz Sejmu Czteroletniego (sessions 98–198 and
327), from the manuscript preserved in AGAD, http://www.wbc.poznan.pl/dlibra/publication?id=
20152&tab=3 (2016-10-03).
14AGAD, AKP, Teka 1, Deklaracja of 8th/18th May 1792. Comments of the King in his letter to
Deboli, 19th May 1792, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, k. 381–382.
15‘zdaje mi się, że ta proclamacia potrzebowałaby objaśnienia autentycznego które by pokazało
różność celu y przyczyn rewolucyi naszey od Francuskiei y omył-kę proklamacyi Petersburskiej’,
letter of Feliks Oraczewski to the King, 9th March 1792 Paris, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 418,
k. 277.
16Letter of Feliks Oraczewski to the King, 5th March 1792, Paris, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 418, k.
270–273.
17‘nieobrażaiąc nikogo sama się lepiey broni w opinii powszechności całey Europy’, letter of
Feliks Oraczewski to the King, 18th May 1792, Paris, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 418, k. 365.
Cf. also elaboration of the correspondence: Kocój (1988).
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as a free Nation, which desires not to attack, but only to defend itself”.18 His riposte,
however, was in vain. Yet another element of the anti-constitutional narrative con-
sisted in highlighting the fact that the new acts were a breach of the existing law and
the guarantees given under Russian pressure of 1775–177619 (the notes of
Stackelberg, and his successor Bulgakov‘s Declaration). Ambassador of Stanisław
August, Antoni Augustyn Deboli was more aware of these facts and had propheti-
cally wrote to the King, in the beginning of 1792, in relation to the meetings of the
Dietines which were about to be held in February and were supposed to give an
opinion on the Constitution Act: “I always say that Your Majesty and everyone else
has to devote to the success of the meetings of the Dietines and to demonstrate
patriotism, not to overthrow the Constitution. Otherwise, the latter will result in the
partition of Poland, since rumours could already be heard that each of the three
Powers would take a part of Poland, and the rest would be turned into the Duchy to
be given to a few, under obeisance respectivé of these Powers”.20
Jörg K. Hoensch called the Empress’ manifesto of May 1792 “grandiose
Machiavellianism in its political insincerity and unscrupulousness. The woman of
the Enlightenment, a supporter of liberty and natural rights and a correspondent of
Voltaire, Grimm, Falconet, and d’Alembert, denied the Polish nation its freedom to
establish a constitution for itself and took refuge in the state guarantee of 1768. The
autocrat criticized the “despotism” of the new hereditary monarchy and simulta-
neously its democratic elements”.21
This particular issue—awareness of essential reforms, the drive to retain external
sovereignty, and to strengthen structures of the state while permanently in a state of
fear regarding the reaction of Russia—can potentially explain the extreme incon-
sistency in the actions taken by the Constitution’s framers, and perhaps even
understand its essence. As early as in the first months of the Great Sejm, Essen had
already began to operate under the assumption that the fate of Poland would be
decided in Berlin and Petersburg.22 The mere expression “gentle revolution” would
seem to be a symbolic reflection of the paradoxes associated with the preceding.23
18Sapieha: ‘wcale iest różnym od despotyzmu, cośmy tego dnia iedynie dla obrony naszej uczynili
(…) Cały naród potwierdził y poświęcił czyn 3 maja. A cokolwiek teraz czyniemy, czyniemy iako
Naród wolny, który nie atakować, ale tylko bronić Siebie chce’, relation in the letter of the King to
Deboli, No 120, 28 Aprilis 1792, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, pp. 369–370.
19AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich [further: APP], sygn. 97, p. 49.
20„ja zawsze powiadam, że gdy się wszyscy wraz z Waszą Kr. Mością nie przyłożą do sukcesu
tych Sejmików, y do okazania patriotyzmu, nie na wywrocie Konstytucyi skończy się, ale na
dziale Polski, bo iuż znowu daią się słyszeć odgłosy o tym zamyśle, to iest: że każda z trzech
Potencji weźmie część Polski, a resztę obrucą (sic) w udzielne Księstwo dla kilku osób pod
hołdownictwem respectivé tychże Potencyi”. Letter of Antoni Augustyn Deboli to the King, Nr
83, ce 6./ce 17. Janvier 1792, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 415, pp. 8v–9.
21Hoensch (1997, p. 442).
22Kocój (1996, pp. 32, 87).
23Cf. analysis of Pepłowski (1961, pp. 53–59).
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An analysis of the issue presented in the title of the work, that is of the prece-
dence of the constitution on grounds of Polish constitutional activities taken in
1788–1792, should begin with several remarks of a definitional nature, and then be
followed with a brief description of the sources used. The substantive chapters will
be devoted to the extraordinary procedure applied in adopting the Government Act,
the Polish tradition of the Henrician Articles and Pacta Conventa, the issue of the
relation between the Government Act and the Cardinal Laws, and finally the nul-
lification clause and relation of the Government Act’s provisions to the normal
legislation of the Great Sejm.
2 A Note on Terminology
Implementation of the principle of constitutional supremacy in constitutional
practice allows for the possible existence of lower-level laws whose compliance
with the constitution, when controlled, will be called into doubt. However, before it
becomes possible to speak more broadly about the problem of actions contrary to
the Constitution, it should be noted what terminology was used in the era being
discussed. Importantly, it was common in the era of the Great Sejm to be aware that
thorough political and systemic reforms were required, which were to bring a “new
form of government”.
This concept was anchored in opinion journalism: for example, one anonymous
author gave his work the title “Thoughts on Improving the Form of Government”,
and published it in the “Collection of Works Inspired by Observations on the Life of
Zamoyski”.24 Another anonymous author of a comprehensive work entitled “On the
Law and Duties of Citizens” stressed the right of every citizen to demand the
establishment of a “form of government”, which would “bring about common hap-
piness”.25 This term was used also when appointing the confederated Sejm and
stating that its task would be to enact a Form of Government.26 In mid-September
1789 a parliamentary deputation was chosen and tasked with “preparing Drafts for
the Form of the Government”.27 Similarly, the recommendations adopted in
December 1789 bore the title “Principles for Improving the Form of Government”,28
24Zbiór Pism, do których były powodem Uwagi nad życiem Zamoyskiego. Osme pismo. Myśl
względem poprawy Formy Rządu, Roku 1790 (Collection of writings, which were the reason
Observations on the life of Zamoyski. Eight Scripture. A Thought for Improving the Form of
Government, 1790).
25NN, O prawie i powinnościach obywatela, w Warszawie, u p. Dufour Konsyl. Nadwor. JK.Mci
Dyrektora Druk. Korp. Kad. MDCCXCI [1791], p. 21.
26Uniwersał, AGAD, AKP, Teka 7, Nr 10.
27Sessya Seymowa 155, 14 września 1789, electronic version transcribed by Biblioteka Kórnicka:
http://www.wbc.poznan.pl/dlibra/publication?id=20152&tab=3 (2016-10-03).
28Zasady do poprawy formy rządu, Volumina Legum, Wydawnictwo Komisyi Prawniczej
Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie, t. IX, Kraków 1889, pp. 157–159.
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and the comprehensive draft constitutional law of August 1790 was a “Draft for the
Form of Government”. The King wrote in his letters to Deboli about “Government
reform”. We should clarify here that in those times the concept of government
implied a political system, and should not be identified solely with the executive
power but rather the entire model of governments.
In addition, the term “constitution” has been used both in the subject literature
and legislative work. It should be recalled that originally the ordinary legislation
adopted by the Sejm was in the form of acts called constitutions, from the time
“when estates entered into a legislative commune with the king,” i.e. in practice
from 1510.29 The author of the aforementioned Eighth Scripture referred as early as
in 1790 to the “constitution” in the specific sense as “all the rights which univer-
sally constitute the security of liberty, property, honour and life of every citizen in
particular, the change of which rights may only be to the detriment of another, they
are the rights that define estates, sovereignty, gravity, offices, and their compe-
tences, the description of which makes up the fundamental Constitution of the
Government”.30 The concept of the constitution was sometimes thus identified with
the organization, the totality of the political system, as in the case of Franciszek
Salezy Jezierski: “The freedom of the nation thrives in the Constitution of the
Government, and not in the choice of the Ruler, the power of the king set out in
judicious laws, the Rights of Man reserved in their entirety, the law-making power
placed in the hands of the States composing the Nation, the Executive power
entrusted to magistrates by the selected States, the composition is true freedom, the
rest is merely a vacuous conceit that a riotous unitary authority can use to entice,
and attempt to retain others in bondage”.31 Kołłątaj wrote in similar tones of the
“Constitution of the Government”, with such recommendations as “The lawmaker,
29Cf. „konstytucye”, Zbior potrzebnieyszych wiadomości porządkiem alfabetu ułożonych, Vol. II,
Za przywilejem w Warszawie i Lwowie 1781, Nakładem i Drukiem Michała Grölla, Księgarza
Nadwornego J.K. Mci w Marywilu pod Nro 24, p. 473.
30‘te wszystkie prawa, które w powszechności stanowią bezpieczeństwo wolności, majątku,
honoru i życia każdego w szczególności Obywatela, których odmiany nie może zyskać jedna
osoba, tylko z pokrzywdzeniem drugiej; to iest, które opi-suią stany, moc, powagę, urzędy, i onych
władzę, a tym opisem urządzają istotną fundamentalną Konstytucyą Rządu’, Zbiór Pism, do
których były powodem Uwagi nad życiem Zamoyskiego. Osme pismo…, p. 37.
31‘Wolność narodu zasadza się na Konstytucyi Rządu, nie na wyborze Osoby do Panowania, władza
króla rozsądnemi opisana prawami, Prawa Człowieka zawarowane w całej swej zupełności, Władza
prawodawcza złożona w ręku Stanów Naród składających, władza Wykonawcza powierzona
magistratom przez Stany wybranym, składem iest prawdziwey wolności, reszta iest tylko próżnym
ułudzeniem, którym rozchukane (sic) możnowładztwo siebie mamić, a innych w niewoli trzymać
usiłuie’, NN (Jezierski, Franciszek Salezy), O Bez-Królewiach w Polszcze y wybieraniu krolow
począwszy od śmierci Zygmunta Augusta Jagiełły aż do Naszych czasów. Dzieło w teraźnieyszych
okolicznościach do wiadomości przydatne, w Warszawie 1790 Roku (On interregnum times in
Poland and the election of kings from the death of Sigismund Augustus Jagiełło until our times.
A useful work in the present circumstances, in Warsaw, 1790), p. 8.
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I do say, should first determine for itself why this new Constitution is of necessity
for the Nation”.32
One of the deputies wrote about adopting of “Government Law and the
Government itself, because it is not the temporary but the permanent, stable and
non-changeable existence of Constitution and the Government in its comprehensive
meaning what creates the political presence of each Nation, what gives it respect
and puts it in a number of reputable powers”.33
Particular undisclosed revisions of the final phase of draft legislative works bore
the titles “Reform of the Constitution”,34 “Constitutional Rights”35 and “Political
Constitution of the Polish Nation”.36 The very term “constitution” is not included in
the title of the Act of 3 May 1791. It was given the name “Government Act” to
distinguish it from ordinary parliamentary legislation.37 “Government” in this case
means the same as “systemic”.
A certain inconsistency should be noted: the intention of the lawmaker is
“to further the establishment and the perfection of the National Constitution”,
which should be interpreted broadly as a synonym for the totality of political and
legal relations within the political system. In further fragments, however, direct
reference is made to the Constitution and the Act of 3 May. However, in the
introduction it is said that “further acts of the present Sejm … should all adhere to
the Constitution” (this will be discussed in greater detail later); additionally, in the
Declaration of the Assembled Estates of 5 May 1791,38 which is a key legislative
act in this discussion, the term “constitution” was used. In practice, moreover, the
term “Government Act” was not widely accepted (although the parliamentary
32‘Prawodawca, mówię, powinien nayprzód rozebrać sam u siebie, dla to czego nowej Konstytucyi
Narodowi potrzeba?’, NN (Kołłątaj, Hugon), Krotka rada względem napisania dobrey Konstytucyi
Rządu, n.p., Roku 1790 (Some advice on composing a good Constitution of the Government in
1790), p. 6, p. 20. Kołłątaj also uses the phrase “Form of the Government” as an equivalent.
33‘Rządowey Ustawy, i samego Rządu, bo to co polityczną każdego Narodu ustanawia bytność, co
szanownieysze onego czyni znaczenie, co go w rzędzie poważanych umieszcza Mocarstw, iest to
nie czasowa, lecz trwała, pewna i nieodmienna Konstytucyi rządowey exystencya, iest Rząd w
całym słowa tego wzięty znaczeniu’, Głos Michała Odrowąża Strasza posła województwa san-
domierskiego Dnia 20. Marca 1792 R. Na Sessyi Seymowey Miany (Voice of Michał Odrowąż
Strasz, deputy of Sandomierz Voivodship). AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 24, k. 231.
34Draft written by Aleksander Linowski dictated by the king. The draft was translation of „Projet
de réforme de Constitution”, fair copy prepared by Scipione Piattoli. AGAD, APP sygn. 98,
pp. 733–755.
35Text written by Hugo Kołłątaj, based on „Reforma konstytucyjna”.
36Text of Hugo Kołłątaj: „Prawa ostatecznie podane, które mają składać I Rozdział Konstytucji
Politycznej Narodu Polskiego”, dnia 25 marca 1791 r., Ossolineum Zakład Narodowy im.
Ossolińskich we Wrocławiu, rkp. 1778, Zbiór pism rozmaitych z czasów sejmu konstytucyjnego
(Czteroletniego) od roku 1788 do 1792, pp. 201–233.
37Normal, usual acts of the Sejm were referred to using the word constitutio, in the Roman
tradition. Cf. remarks by Grodziski (1983). On catalogue of legal sources in Sejm legislation:
Kucharski (2012, pp. 127–159).
38Deklaracya stanów zgromadzonych, Volumina Legum, Wydawnictwo Komisyi Prawniczej
Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie, Vol. IX, Kraków 1889, pp. 225–226.
Constitutional Precedence of the 3 May System 121
debate saw the use of the phrase “the sacrosanct Act”39); it was basically referred to
as the Constitution, and henceforth ordinary legislation was referred to as the
“law”.40 A “constitutional parliament” was also one of the names invoked. In his
correspondence (such as with Deboli) the king used the phrases “Constitution of 3
May” and “revolution of 3 May” interchangeably.
Subsequent legislative acts of the Polish state already referred directly to the
term “Constitution” (Constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw 1807,41 and the
Constitutional Act of the Polish Kingdom 181542).
3 Characteristic of the Sources
ReConFort employs a particular scope of selection of sources. Of course, in the first
place it goes for traditional juridical materials, id est for the purposes of this work
published diaries of the Sejm were investigated,43 as well as a partially handwritten
manuscript detailing the activities, Minutes of the Sejm.44 They are complimented
by prints of speeches by the king, senators and deputies of the Sejm. That category
of sources also includes products of the Sejm’s lawmaking process, drafts and
adopted acts published as collections of Sejm constitutions, a range of prints based
on oblate (Pol. oblata, registration in borough books), and also edited in 19 ct.
collection of law, called Volumina Legum, Vol. IX.45
ReConFort also makes use of a broad range of media. It can be characterized by
referring to the determinations in ReConFort I,46 as well as the relevant subject
39For example: Sessya Seymowa 83. Dnia 30. Maja 1791, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, k. 367.
40Bardach (2001, pp. 16–17).
41Konstytucja Księstwa Warszawskiego Z 22 lipca 1807 r. (Dziennik Praw [Księstwa
Warszawskiego] 1807 r., t. I, s. II-XLVIII) (French: Statut Constitutionnel du Duché de Varsovie,
Le Moniteur Universel No 214, Dimanche, 2 Aoǔt 1807).
42Polish Constitutional Act of the Kingdom of 15/27 November 1815 (French: Charte
Constitutionelle du Royaume de Pologne). Rumours about the reinstatement of the May
Constitution and such a will signalled by the Dietines in the period after Napoleon’s fall in 1812
should be noted: Rosner (1998, p. 33).
43Dyaryusz seymu ordynaryinego pod związkiem Konfederacyi Generalney Oboyga Narodow w
Warszawie rozpoczętego roku… 1788/[wyd. Jan Paweł Łuszczewski] Diariusz Sejmowy – 1788–
1789 Drukarnia Nadworna, Warszawa w Warszawie: w drukarni Nadwornej J.K.Mci i…
Kommissyi Eduk[acyi] Narodowej [po 3 XI 1788]-1790, Dyaryusz seymu ordynaryjnego pod
związkiem Konfederacyi Generalney Oboyga Narodow w podwoynym posłow składzie zgro-
madzonego w Warszawie od dnia 16 grudnia 1790/[wyd. Antoni Siarczyński], w drukarni…
Michała Grölla… [1791].
44Dziennik Czynności Seymu Głównego Ordynaryinego Warszawskiego pod związkiem
Konfederacji Oboyga Narodów agitującego się, partly printed, partly manuscripts: AGAD, ASCz.
45Volumina Legum, Wydawnictwo Komisyi Prawniczej Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie,
Vol. IX, Kraków 1889.
46Müßig (2016).
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literature.47 However, neither on the pages of “Gazeta Narodowa Y Obca” nor
“Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny Przypadków, Ustaw, Osób, Miejsc i Pism wiek
nasz szczególnie interesujących” will the reader encounter a discussion of the legal
character of the Government Act, which is why this category of sources constitutes
a less important source of material for deliberation.
The category of media under discussion also includes free writings. The phe-
nomenon of their popularity in the 1780s and 1790s has been accented by the author in
ReConFort I. As an aside, mention can also be made of the so-called “militant liter-
ature”,48 serving as a sort of complement to the free printings. Works classifiable as
fiction and theatre pieces played a not insignificant role in transforming public
opinion. The fear felt by conservatives towards this process is illustrated inter alia by
the fact that the Marshals of the confederation were summoned by the deputy
Suchorzewski to convene the Sejm Courts. Before that court Suchorzewski brought
charges against the police for permitting the J.U. Niemcewicz comedy “Return of the
Deputy” to be performed, in which there is mention of introducing succession to the
throne, formally forbidden under Pacta Conventa. While the king described events as
amusing, he did express his disquiet that the obstinacy of Suchorzewski in such
absurdities would lead to amultiplication of “the number of hindrances to thingsmore
helpful”, which should most certainly be understood as concern over a potential shift
in the general mood problematic for the planned reforms.49 The King was forced to
defend the comedy itself and its anti-Petersburg tenor before Bulgakov.50
It is mass literature that played an incontrovertible role in the evolution of political
leanings and worldview in society at large, although the opinion expressed by the King
to Maurice Glayre may be somewhat overblown: “We were a nation of badly raised
children, mouthy and wanton, alternatively timid and courageous through ignorance or
carelessness, and we remained fast in our prejudices. All this has passed.”51
ReConFort also proposes analysing the private correspondence of the protagonists
as sources for recreating the constitutional debate, offering the potential to reach
additional and sometimes unexpected conclusions from the legal history perspective.
In the Polish case, where one of the key actors is the monarch, letters of a
quasi-official status frequently are of greater value, such as correspondence with
Antoni Augustyn Deboli, the ‘plenipotentiary minister’ to Petersburg, or with Feliks
Oraczewski, emissary in Paris. However, analysed correspondence is essentially
private, in which diplomatic considerations are accompanied by expressions of the
king’s sympathies and fears; he describes events from sessions of the Sejm, repeats
rumours about the foreign mistresses of politicians, and relates his conversations with
antagonists. Deboli supposedly did not hesitate to remonstrate with the king and
instruct him in various matters; the King, for his part, only presented the letters to
47Łojek (1960, pp. 49–192).
48Woźnowski (1971).
49Letter to Deboli, January 19th, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, k. 14.
50Letter to Deboli, January 22nd, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, k. 15–16.
51Mottaz (1897, p. 252). Citation translated in Polish: Dembiński (1904, p.3.)
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officials of the Warsaw court after creating censored copies of them, concealing their
overly informal elements.52 Portions of the correspondence of key protagonists were
collected (including editions of Stanisław Dembiński, Bronisław Zaleski, Henryk
Kocój, Maria Rymszyna and Andrzej Zahorski). An in-depth analysis, however,
requires a very extensive query,53 which has so far only been conducted partially. The
author also makes use of valuable subject literature.
4 French Inspirations of Polish Republicans:
Drafts of Mably and Rousseau
A complimentary thread alongside the primary deliberations is the issue of foreign
influences on the political and systemic thought accompanying the reforms of the
Great Sejm. This is an issue which has been raised multiple times and is
well-described in the subject literature, if not somewhat less visible in the Western
literature. It cannot be discussed in great detail here, which is why I would like to
refer only to the republican strand of thought, represented by two theoreticians and
writers in French: Father Gabriel Bonnoit de Mably and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as
those who, somewhat earlier in the 1770s, prepared draft reforms of the Polish state,
on request of the confederates of Bar.54
The primary problem in Western analyses of Polish issues of the time is indirect
access to sources. On the one hand, Polish was not a familiar language; on the
other, there were few willing to engage in the risky journey to the distant east.
Out of necessity Western authors based their writings on stories from governors
employed in Poland or the journals of travelers,55 with the errors and oversights
contained in them. One example is the picture painted of Poland in Diderot’s
Encyclopaedia under the entry “Pologne, histoire et gouvernement de (Histoire et
Droit politique)”, composed by Louis Chevalier de Jaucourt, or “Droit de Pologne”
by Antoine Gaspard Boucher d’Argis. Similar entries by that author were prepared
with far more diligence than those concerning Poland.56 It was not until the 1770–
52This went both ways—the King also hid various facts from Deboli. Łojek (1964, pp. 17–18).
53Especially in AGAD—APP, Zbiór Popielów; also Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich (Czartoryskis
Library, royal correspondence).
54Bar Confederation (konfederacja barska)—an armed association of Polish patriotic-conservative
nobility formed in Bar in Podolia, directed against the Russian-imposed King Stanisław August
and the cardinal laws passed by the guardianship of the Russian Empire in February 1768. The
Confederation, supported by France and Turkey, it summoned the uprising led by, among others,
the young Kazimierz Pułaski. The last flames of revolt flickered out in Summer and Autumn of
1772 (Tyniec, Wawel, Jasna Góra), while the Confederation itself served as one of the pretexts to
the first partition of Poland conducted that year by Russia, Austria and Prussia.
55Zawadzki (1963), Figeac (2014), Jakuboszczak and Sajkowski (2014).
56Wolodkiewicz (1996).
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1779 Livorno printing of the Encyclopaedia that it contained a correction with a
much more accurate description of the legal system in Poland.57
It should be recalled that in the 1760s, a French governor in the Sanguszko
family, César-Félicitas Pyrrhis de Varille, published his work “Compendium poli-
ticum…”,58 which was strongly influenced by Rosseau’s earlier writings while at
the same time containing ideas similar to those which would appear soon thereafter
in “Considerations on the Government of Poland”, and which might have served as
inspiration for the Genevan citizen. Slightly later, in 1769 Pyrrhis de Varille
announced the “Lettres sur la constitution actuelle de la Pologne et la tenue de ses
diétes”,59 in which he also took up the issue of political reforms, drawing attention
to similar elements that Rousseau would soon explore—reorganization of the Sejm
(eliminating the liberum veto in favour of a minority vote in cardinal cases), reform
of the assemblies, criticism of the interregnum and expression of concern over
foreign intervention. In acknowledgement of Pyrrhis de Varille’s writings, in 1764
the Sejm granted him indygenat (naturalization for a foreign nobleman).
Rousseau’s writings quickly made their way to Poland, where they were
employed in public oration without indicating their author.60 “Considerations on
the Polish government”61 came about as a result of a short-lived intimacy with
57Encyclopédie, ou… Troisiéme édition enrichie de plusieurs notes, Dédidée à son Altesse Royale
Monsigneur l’Archiduc Pierre Léopold Prince Royal de Hongrie et de Bohême, Archiduc
d’Austriche, Grand Duc de Toscane etc. etc., Vol. I-17, a Livourne 1770–1778. Note on Polish law
system was published in Vol. 5, pp. 150–151.
58Pyrrhis de Varille, Compendium politicum seu brevis dissertatio de variis Poloni Imperii vicibus
in qua Reipublicae sive Libertatis, necnon in Comitiis Vetandi Juris Origo, Progressus et Status
praesens nova methodo inquiruntur, 1761, Polish translation, “Zebranie polityczne”, published two
years later.
59à Varsovie et se trouve à Paris chez Gaugery, 8o. Letters sent officially to the pupil, Prince Jan
Sanguszko, circulated already in the country in copies Szyjkowski (1913, p. 53).
60Speech of X. Szymon Wyhowski, September 1778. Cf. Szyjkowski (1913, pp. 21–22).
Supposedly, Karol Wyrwicz, rector of the Jesuit college in Warsaw, in his introduction to “A
geography of current times” (1770) and then “A history of ancient states” plagiarized
Montesquieu’s “Spirit of the laws”. He also did not hesitate to present the paper as an original at
‘Thursday dinners’ (meetings of artists, intellectuals, architects and politicians held by Stanisław
August. Smoleński (1927, pp. 64–69). Fragments of the “Social contract” of Rousseau appeared in
Polish in the form of an anonymously-published brochure „O wolności człowieka”. Szyjkowski
(1913, pp. 37–38).
61Considerations sur le gouvernement de la Pologne et sur sa reformation projetée, original in
Biblioteka Czartoryskich, 1st ed. London 1782. For this elaboration has been used: [Rousseau, J.
J.], Uwagi nad rządem polskim oraz nad Odmianą, czyli Reformą onego projektowaną przez
J. Jakuba Russo obywatela genewskiego z Francuzkiego na Oyczysty ięzyk przełożone Miesiąca
Grudnia dnia 20. R. 1799. Część I–Część II, w Warszawie, 1789, Nakładem i Drukiem Michała
Grölla, Księgarza Nadwornego J.K. Mci. The translator in Polish was an apologist of Rousseau,
Maurycy Franciszek Karp.
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Michał Wielhorski and on the basis of his “Picture of the Polish government”.62
In Chapter V, Rousseau called for a reinvigoration of the Polish Government,
“… granting a Constitution to the great Kingdom, a constancy and energy to the
Republic”.63 He felt that his original ideas on decentralization (separation into equal
provinces a “division into two Polands, as well as Lithuainias”, as many “states as
provinces”, each with “its own governments”, strengthening of the authority of
assemblies) were consistent with the “spirit” of the Polish constitution.64
The existing Polish legislation he describes to be “comprised over time out of bits
and pieces”, as all European laws.65 The point of departure is the concept of the
sovereignty based on the knighthood. It was supposed to slowly transform into a true
nation, followed by the emancipation of the non-noble classes, very conservative in
relation to the peasantry (which long supplied arguments to opponents of peasantry
reforms), through their inclusion into a system of a public judiciary, or enfranchise-
ment upon the application of special censor commissions, Comités censoriaux.66
The philosopher appealed for the retention of the binding nature of Sejm instructions
(a Sejm entirely dependent on the assemblies), and even expressed regret that similar
institutional “curbs” available to Sejm deputies were not present in the British
model.67 Deputies (or potentially assemblies, the Dietines) should also elect senators,
yet it should be noted that the arguments presented by the Genevan here were
somewhat inconsistent. He declared the head of state to be a “natural enemy of
liberty”, and in reference to the replacement of the elected monarch with a hereditary
one, he said that Poland could “forever say goodbye to its freedom”.68 In the inter-
regnum he saw the moment when the Nation restored its rights, and legislation
recovered its resilience. In Rousseau’s opinion, weakening of the royal privileges
could make the monarch the “first Citizen”. This alone demonstrates that the Genevan
was provided with biased information about the Polish system, with its ineffective
executive.69 The actual weakness of the state and debauchery associated with the
interregnum was one of the often-raised arguments in favour of a hereditary throne.
Another entirely original idea, and one unacceptable in light of the Polish tradition of
62This picture, according to Szyjkowski, was the work of Wielhorski „O przywróceniu dawnego
rządu według pierwiastkowych Rzplitej ustaw”, 1775. Szyjkowski (1913, p. 71). Jerzy Michalski,
however, later identified it with an entirely different treatise by Wielhorski, written specially for
Rousseau, which he referred to as Tableau. Michalski (1977, pp. 11–12). Work of Michalski has
also been also translated in English: Rousseau and Polish republicanism, Warszawa 2015; http://
rcin.org.pl/Content/58076/WA303_78371_JM_Michalski-eng.pdf.
63„dania Konstytucyi wielkiemu Królestwu, trwałości i rzeźwości małym Rzeczom-pospolitym
własney”, [Rousseau, J.J.], Uwagi…, p. 41.
64[Rousseau, J.J.], Uwagi…, pp. 43–44.
65[Rousseau, J.J.], Uwagi…, p. 51.
66Michalski (1977, pp. 37–44).
67[Rousseau, J.J.], Uwagi…, p. 61. On the Sejm and assemblies see also: Michalski (1977, pp. 45–
58).
68[Rousseau, J.J.], Uwagi…, pp. 82, 87.
69Analysis of recommendations for legislative power: Michalski (1977, pp. 92–106).
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the theoretical equality of the nobility, was the building of a separate class, „membres
actifs de la République”, a sort of elective “aristocratic government”, based on people
with experience holding state office, who would therefore be entitled to campaign for
successive functions. Paradoxically, he was also an opponent of professionalization
of the state apparatus, and the aforementioned careers were supposed to be based on
the trust of fellow citizens, demonstrating a sort of virtue—a similar concept worked
its way into the project Rousseau prepared for Corsica.70
Among divagations on the model of the state there are general indications that
the law should be a collection of simple and clear rules that members of society
should know and respect.71 Rousseau criticised expansive and complex codifica-
tions based on the Roman law—“this was harmonious with opinions firmly rooted
in Polish noble society, wary of the Roman law and professional lawyering, but
practically familiar with the law, respecting the civil model of offices and courts”.72
There is an absence of reflection on the potential specific role of the Constitution,
considering that Rousseau writes of the “act, that is, a Constitution”. He also
essentially calls into question the concept of fundamental laws (“a gaggle of articles
which have been absurdly counted among the fundamental laws, and which are but
a mere collection of legislation…”73). He thus treats the Constitution substantively,
as a collection of key laws regulating the political organization of the state, and also
economic and military matters.74 In the philosopher’s opinion, the nation has the
right to “amend” and “refresh” its constitution,75 yet the deepening anarchy in the
state meant that the solutions offered by Rousseau gave no guarantee of success.76
Already in the 18th century we may encounter the opinion that certain elements
of “Considerations” (Considérations) are incompatible with conceptions of
Rousseau’s in “The Social Contract” (e.g. the relativizing concept of the nation,
or enthusiastic praise for anarchical confederations), and that it was an example of
advice tailored to the specificities of the subject matter. A different opinion is held
by Jerzy Michalski, who does not perceive such contradictions, and even declares
that Considérations complement and extend Rousseau’s doctrine as known from
70Michalski (1977, pp. 99–101).
71In notes of Rousseau, Michalski (1977, p. 101).
72[Rousseau, J.J.], Uwagi…, p. 102.
73‘mnóstwo artykułów, które śmiesznie w liczbę praw fundamentalnych pokładano i które iedynie
zbiór prawodawstwa składają…’, [Rousseau, J.J.], Uwagi…, p. 99.
74In respect of the organization of the armed forces, he wrote: “Poles! You should not look around
and seek to emulate even that which they (neighbouring monarchies) are doing properly. These
remedies applied to constitutions of such disparities would be an evil in their Constitution”
(„Polacy, nie powinniście się zapatrować dokoła siebie, chcąc nawet tego naśladować, co się u
nich [sąsiednich mocarstw] dobrze dzieje. Ta dobroć stosowna do Konstytucyi cale się różniących,
byłaby złem w ich Konstytucyi”), and he encourages the formation of a militia in the Swiss mold.
[Rousseau, J.J.], Uwagi…p. 130.
75[Rousseau, J.J.], Uwagi…, p. 178.
76A broader comparative analysis of Rousseau’s work (based on the French original) i
Wielhorskiego cf. Szyjkowski (1913, pp. 75–101); on Tableau also Michalski (1977, pp. 18–26).
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other works. However, they retain a rather literary-rhetorical form, replete with a
“childish optimism as to the possibility for their implementation”.77 At the same
time, however, Bogusław Leśnodorski opines against an overly hasty disavowal of
the usefulness of Rousseau’s deliberations. “In spite of the excesses of which
[Rousseau] was well-aware, in this country he found an expression of some
imperfect, yet praiseworthy ideal of civic freedom”,78 and this is what is accented in
his writings. In effect, Rousseau invoked both progressives (such as Stanisław
Staszic or Hugo Kołłątaj79), as well as conservatives, supporters of reform in the
republican, classic noble spirit (Adam Wawrzyniec Rzewuski80). Bogusław
Leśnodorski does suggest, however, that it is more appropriate to speak of inspi-
rations rather than borrowings from Rousseau’s treatises.81 Nevertheless, the
remarks remain difficult material for the foreign scholar, owing to their being
anchored in the specificities of the Polish political system.
Fr. Gabriel Bonnot de Mably was also an author of works which quickly attained
recognition in Poland. In London in 1781, his tract “Du gouvernement et des lois de
la Pologne” was published.82 This work, already somewhat outdated at the time of
its publishing, was based on tracts written a decade prior whose roots were in
conversations with Wielhorski, and constituted the presentation of polemics by the
two writers.83 Mably identifies problems similar to those discussed by Rousseau—
weakness of the legislature in Poland (liberum veto and confederations were said to
be a detrimental lawlessness). He does not glorify the local assemblies, the Dietines;
just the opposite, he assumes that it is in them the seeds of anarchy were sown, and
recommends their role be restricted (which Wielhorski could not abide, proposing
only a reduction in ‘abuses’). Mably incorrectly, however, perceived the executive
in Poland. Under the influence of conversations with Wielhorski, as well as an
exchange of opinions in correspondence with Ignacy Bohusz, secretary of the Bar
Confederation, radical critics of StanisławAugust, Mably assigns a tremendous role
to the king and proposes far-reaching curbs on his power in favour of the Senate.
Paradoxically, at the same time he considers it appropriate to put a foreign dynasty
77Michalski (1977, pp. 109–110).
78Leśnodorski (1967, pp. 36–39). Quot. p. 36.
79Szyjkowski (1913, pp. 122–156).
80Szyjkowski (1913, pp. 156–165).
81Leśnodorski (1967, p. 39).
82A.M. le Comte Wielhorski, 8o.
83Initial Conférences and subsequent “Observations de M. l’abbé de Mably sur la Réforme des
Loix de la Pologne adressée àMonsieur le Comte Wielhorski” (1770), “Secondes observations…”,
“Troisièmes observations…”, “Quatrièmes observations…” of Mably; “Observations sur la
premiére conference”, “Observations sur la seconde conférence”, mentioned “Tableau” of
Wielhorski: handwritten copies in AGAD, Zbiór Anny Branickiej, sign. 8 (the user has to pay
attention to the wrong technical information on specification of microfilms: ref. 8 (sign. 8) as
microfilm wrongly marked under 9) and 9 (as microfilm under sign. 10). Cf. also an introduction of
Michalski (1995, pp. 5–12) and further analysis pp. 81–83.
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on the throne, which would allegedly serve to reduce the risk of internal rivalry.84
An interesting idea was that of convening a national assembly (“la nation sera
convoquée extraordinairement”), an extraordinary Sejm convened every 25 years,
as well as after the death of the king an conclusion of a peace in order to examine
abuses of the original, ideal system. Mably writes: “une des fautes principales des
législateures en faisant leurs lois, c’est de ne pas donner la faculté de sa rétablir et
de se reproduire, pour ainsi dire, par ses propres forces. De là une dégradations
journalière et insensible; et enfin des maux extremes auxquels il n’est plus permis
de remédier”.85
Fundamentally, the criticism of the legal system in the letters under analysis was
unspecific. Mably charged Polish law with being ineffective, and that there were no
real means of enforcing it. Although he appreciated that Polish law was conducive
to the practice of civic virtues, he called for reform of the political system: “…rien
ne me paroit important que la Pologne commence par se former une constitution.
L’histoire de tous les peuples et de tous les siècles démontre l’importance de cette
vérité. J’ai remarqué chez toutes Nations qu’un Gouvernement vicieux ou établie
sur des mauvais principes a toujour rendu les citoyens malheureux. Par quell
privilège les Polonois ne seroint-ils pas soumis à cette règle générale? J’ai toujours
remarqué qu’à mesure qu’un Gouvernement se perfectionne en se rapprochant des
bons principes, les citoyens, sans qu’ils s’en apperçoient et pour ainsi dire malgré
eux, prennent peu à peu toutes vertus don’t ils ont besoin.”86
The result of the reform was to be the fundamental laws, a constitution which
would be the source of executive legislation. Mably did not, however, offer details,
considering it too early.87 Although some of his remarks addressing the judiciary,
such as the postulates of openness, permitting the bourgeoisie to participate in the
administration of justice (Mably most likely was unfamiliar with the estate model of
judiciary in Poland) were of a substantive nature, he was not able to provide specific
proposals of institutional reform. He limited himself rather to generalizations about
the necessity of observing “the highest standards of justice” (“régles de la plus
éxacte justice”88 to be applied by the chancellor’s tribunal and which could set a
84Michalski (1995, pp. 90–92, 175, 179–182).
85“Secondes observations de m. l’Abbe de Mably; sur la Reforme des Loix en Pologne à Monsieur
le Comte Wielhorski”, AGAD, Zbiór Anny Branickiej 9 (microfilm marked as 10), k. 267 (old
pagination below: k. 136). Also Michalski (1995, pp. 180–181).
86“Troisiêmes Observations de Monsieur l’Abbe de Mably sur la Reforme des Loix en Pologne à
Monsieurs le Comte Wielhorski”, AGAD, Zbiór Anny Branickiej, sign. 9 (ref. 9 on microfilm
under ref. 10), k. 311 (old pagination below k. 158v).
87Michalski (1995, p. 94). Mably devoted to executive power an elaboration entitled “Seconde
Conférence”, AGAD, Zbiór Anny Branickiej, Archiwalia różnej proweniencji, sign. 8 (ref. 8 on
microfilm under ref. 9), pp. 95–103 (pagination below 51–54v) and later the second chapter: “De
la Puissance Éxécutrice du Roi” of mentioned “Observations de M. l’abbé de Mably sur la
Réforme des Loix de la Pologne adressée à Monsieur le Comte Wielhorski”, sign. 9, pp. 27–54
(pagination below 14r–27r).
88„Troisiême Conference”, AGAD, Zbiór Anny Branickiej, Archiwalia różnej proweniencji, sign.
8 (on microfilm on ref. 9), k. 104 (pagination below 55v).
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relevant example for other courts), “the principals of humanity” (“régles de
l’humanité”89), which was supposed to influence citizens’ trust in the state and the
law.90 Particularly harsh assessment is warranted by Mably’s recommendations
concerning foreign policy—the fiasco of his analysis (e.g. of Prussia’s neutral
attitude towards Poland) demonstrated the circumstances around the first
partition.91
Mably arrived to Poland in 1776; his correspondence from that period betrays a
deep disappointment at the real state of things. He compared the subjective vision
of Polish relations presented to him by confederates with political reality; more pain
came with remarks on the situation of the bourgoisie, peasantry, and the Jewish
population, which we may find in “De la situation de la Pologne en 1776”, pub-
lished after the author’s death.92 Mably’s visit also impacted the shape of the final
version of the previously-mentioned tract.
Both of those treatises remained idealized and moralizing lectures: the thinkers
were viewing things through “two lenses: their own ideas, plus the information and
judgements delivered by Wielhorski”.93 Both of the propositions presented were of
a republican slant, emphasizing reinforcement of the legislative authority at the cost
of what they felt was the most usurpatory, id est the monarchial, which demon-
strates a detachment from Polish reality in which the central executive was in a state
of decomposition, while no local one existed. Mably was no fan of direct
democracy, whose materialization Rousseau perceived in the assemblies. Rousseau,
however, was a supporter of an effective executive, whereas Mably in turn sought to
weaken it through an internal division.
It is a sort of paradox that the conceptions of the two writers were used to
achieve utterly opposite aims—the postulates of the movement to weaken the king
through the actions of the Permanent Council (Rada Nieustająca) following the first
partition, as well as the postulates of the baronial opposition against the Permanent
Council, appealing to “the true nation”, id est the landed provincial gentry. During
the era of the Four-Year Sejm, politicians from the patriotic camp like Ignacy
Potocki and, somewhat later, Kołłątaj, taking their inspiration initially from
Rousseau and Mably, came to adopt a less radical and far more realistic position.94
Anna Grześkowiak-Krwawicz perceives in Polish political thought of the day a
surprising “capacity to interweave theoretical considerations into current political
89„Troisiême Conference”, AGAD, Zbiór Anny Branickiej, Archiwalia różnej proweniencji, sign.
8 (on microfilm on ref. 9), k. 105 (pagination below k. 56).
90Cf. „Troisiême Conference”, AGAD, Zbiór Anny Branickiej, Archiwalia różnej proweniencji,
sign. 8 (on microfilm on ref. 9), k. 103–111 (pagination below 55–59); Michalski (1995, pp. 93–94).
91Michalski (1995, pp. 198–199).
92Michalski (1995, pp. 206–221).




reasoning”, even if it proved impossible to develop an original concept of the social
contract.95 This was also the case with the concepts referred to above.
Above generally outlined drafts did not become a direct basis for legislative
process in Poland. It should be noted that references to Rousseau concept had
already been made during the constitutional debate in the Great Sejm era (after
1788), however they had been of a general character.
5 The Extraordinary Procedure for Enactment
of the Constitution of 3 May: Oath on the Constitution
5.1 First Constitutional Works
The name referred to in preceding chapters attests to the desire to distinguish the
adopted Government Act from “normal” parliamentary legislation. It should be
borne in mind that the procedure for enacting the Constitution deviated significantly
from both parliamentary procedure and custom.
As has been mentioned, the deputies of the Great Sejm (from 16 December 1790
sitting in double composition) were aware of the breakthrough taking place in the
moment. Evidence of this comes from the amazing awakening of the political
nobility, reflected inter alia in the rash of opinion journalism,96 but also activity
during provincial sessions in October 1788.97 On 7 September 1789, the anniver-
sary of the election of Stanisław August, the deputation of parliament was selected
and entrusted with preparing the form of government in these words: members of
the deputation “Cardinal laws, duties of sovereign magistracies, authority and
appropriateness in between, in short the whole form of political government the
States of the Republic shall describe and design: if anyone wishes to submit their
ideas, they will be accepted and considered, and the complete work shall be left to
the Decision of Us, the King and the States of the Republic”.98 Its members were
95Grześkowiak-Krwawicz (2000b, p. 125).
96Grześkowiak-Krwawicz (2000a, Introduction, pp. 15–68).
97Szczygielski (1994a, 2009).
98In text paraphrased translations; in length as followed:
„Wyznaczenie Osób do ułożenia Proiektów do Formy Rządu. Gdy pomyślność Narodu, a w
niey ugruntowana Sława Nas Króla, i beśpieczeństwo Obywatela od trwałości Rządu zawisły.
Pomnożone zaś Woysko, powiększone dochody publiczne bez utworzenia nieodmiennych Ustaw,
urządzenia i rozdziału Władz Magistratur, i ich między sobą związków, szkodliwym stawałyby się
ciężarem, a sama wewnętrzna spokoyność, którą zapewniać za cel troskliwości Naszey mamy,
wzruszoną bydźby mogła; Przeto My Król zawsze z ukochanym Narodem złączeni, chcąc
dwudziestopięcioletnie trudy dla Kraiu czynione przyłożeniem się do iego szczęścia mieć nad-
grodzonemi wraz z Rzeczypospolitey Skonfederowanemi Stanami do takowego Dzieła
naydokładnieyszego rozważenia Osoby następuiące wyznaczamy (…), Którzy Prawa Kardynalne,
Magistratur Zwierzchnich obowiązki, Władzę, i między niemi stosowność, zgoła całą Rządu
Politycznego Państw Rzpltey Formę opiszą, Proiekta, ieżeli kto zechce podawać do tey materyi
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both progressive parliamentarians, such as the Lithuanian vice-chancellor
Chreptowicz, Lithuanian Court Marshal Potocki, and Lithuanian deputy Józef
Weyssenhoff, as well as conservatives such as Krasiński, the Bishop of Kamieniec.
In December 1789, the deputation proposed “Principles to improve the form of
government” (Zasady do poprawy formy rządu), which were significantly revised
during the subsequent debate, and finally passed and entered into the borough
books on December 23.99 The original text by Ignacy Potocki100 was considered
too revolutionary; the final outcome highlighted the role of the nobility. The terms
“nation” and “people” disappeared from the text, and the term “The Republic”
appeared in their place.
Also, the comprehensive “Form of government draft” (681 articles in 11
chapters) did not meet the expectations of the deputies. Initially only a part of the
whole was tabled, i.e. only a draft law on regional councils, but deputies demanded
that the entire draft reforming the state system be submitted, which was effected on
2 August 1790. A special part of the draft accounted for 89 articles under the title
“Constitutional rights and cardinal rights within them”, “the first comprehensive
attempt to formulate the principles of the political system in a single act”.101
The draft, again composed largely by Potocki and strongly republican, empha-
sized the role of councils and parliament with a weak position assigned to a hereditary
monarch, was not adopted by deputies. The issue of the order of succession was
delegated to the councils, and it was their role to consider the possibility of appointing
Frederick Augustus Wettin as Stanisław August’s successor. The debate went on
from September 1790 with consultation on “Cardinal Laws” draft to January 1791, at
which point the deputies decided to suspend their deliberations and return to the law
on regional councils. The king wrote to Deboli: “It is perhaps the task of Marshal
Małachowski to begin the Form of the Government from the Assemblies, and not
from a continuation of the Cardinal Laws, as through those Cardinal Laws we would
quickly arrive to the matter of Succession or Election, which we must most assuredly
delay, insofar as the Saxonian Elector himself wishes for there to be no decision as he
is becoming aware that the Vienna and Moscow courts, which opposed that at once,
are now displaying malevolence (?) towards Him”.102
Ultimately it turned out that only the “Cardinal Laws” came into force, yet they
were cut down to a mere 11 articles, were passed and entered into force, which was
ściągaiące się, przyimą, i rozważą, całkowite zaś Dzieło do Decyzyi Nam Królowi i Stanom
Rzeczypospolitey przyniosą”.
Sessya Seymowa 155, 14th September 1789, cf. transcribed version of Biblioteka Kórnicka:
http://www.wbc.poznan.pl/dlibra/publication?id=20152&tab=3 (2016-10-03). Text also: Volumina
Legum, Vol. IX, p. 107.
99Zasady do poprawy formy rządu, Volumina Legum, Wydawnictwo Komisyi Prawniczej
Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie, t. IX, Kraków 1889, pp. 157–159.
100AGAD, APP, sygn. 98, k. 159 and forthcoming.
101Szcząska (1990, p. 41). Cf. also Leśnodorski (1951, pp. 147–150).
102Letter to Deboli, January 1st, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów sygn. 413, k. 2. Similarly in the
letter of January 5th, k. 4.
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an unstable compromise. They were eventually published in the borough books by
the Speaker of the Sejm, Stanisław Małachowski, on 8 January 1791.103
Following the experience described above, it turned out that the submission of
any controversial issues about the political system to broader parliamentary dis-
cussion led to fruitless deliberations lasting for months. In general the Sejm did not
merely “jaw-jaw”, but in fact produced a river of verbiage; Bogusław Leśnodorski
claims that “there remained a great deal of old-fashioned noble rhetoric in which,
among the Ciceronian moments and bloated patriotic phrases, the fundamental idea
of picking the Fatherland up after its fall is frequently lost in the mountain of
details”.104
From December 1790, the composition of the sitting Sejm was extended—
formally speaking, the authorisation of the body had been renewed, and young,
reform-orientated deputies entered the parliament. The Patriotic camp became
organized and resigned itself to the fact that reform could only take place in
consultation with the king. There was tremendous distrust on both sides; the king’s
tendency to display an excess of sympathy towards Potocki could give rise to the
suspicion that a conspiracy had been conceived; on the other hand, antipathy to-
wards Potocki or Małachowski could lead to “demolition of the entire system”.105
The king also had to deal with a personal grievance: “Now Potocki is the benefi-
ciary of an honest and favourable deed which I am performing. And I always do so
for precisely that reason for which you, Sir, are writing to me, that the downfall of
Małachowski and the Potockis would result in tragedy for our Fatherland. Indeed, I
have the greatest possible occasion to take revenge against the Potockis for their
long years of mischievousness towards me, but I hope that God saves me from
vindictiveness until the end of my days”.106 The breakup of the previous coteries
may also be attested to by the King’s record given to Deboli of the somewhat
idealistic conversation between Potocki and Branicki, in which the former, when
asked about the opinion of his “party” on the subject of events in England,
responded thus: “We know of no party, we only wish for all Poles to think and act
in the best interests of the country”.107 The fracture lines had been diagnosed and
ultimately work in secret began. After the adoption of the Constitution, on 4 May
the king wrote to Deboli that he had been dealing with Potocki and Małachowski
for 8 months, but work accelerated when he became convinced of the sincerity of
his partners.108
103Leśnodorski (1951, pp. 157–160).
104Leśnodorski (1951, p. 382).
105The king describes this peculiar ‘dance’ in his letter of January 5th, 1791 to Deboli, AGAD,
Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, k. 5.
106Letter to Deboli, February, 2nd, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, k. 23.
107Letter to Deboli, April 13th, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, k. 71.
108Letter to Deboli, May 4th, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, k. 82.
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5.2 Enactment of the Government Statute
The fundamental draft of the constitution was ready by the end of March 1791.
Stanisław August, Ignacy Potocki, Scipione Piattoli—a former secretary of Potocki
and then reader of the King who recorded and prepared editorials, Stanisław
Małachowski and Hugo Kołłątaj contributed personally to its drafting, not without
friction and mutual animosity. The first para-constitutional laws, including the Law
on Cities of 18 April 1791, were signs of things to come.109
The text of the constitution was to be presented at a session on 5 May, but in the
face of the anticipated difficulties and shifts in the international situation—alarming
news had come from England110—the decision to speed things up was taken. The
first two weeks by law would have been devoted to examining revenue, tedious for
a number of deputies, and it was hoped that not everyone would be back in Warsaw
immediately after the two-week Easter break. Only those whose support could be
counted on were informed about the plot. The opposition, however, learned of the
planned date of 5 May and also began to conspire, with strong support from
Russian ambassador, Jakov Bulgakov.
The draft text was presented to the public in the afternoon on 2 May in Radziwiłł
Palace on Krakowskie Przedmieście street. The text was welcomed enthusiastically
by the audience, and the reading was followed by both supporters and opponents of
reform scampering away all across the city. Some found themselves drawn to
Stanisław Małachowski’s house, others to Bulgakov’s lounge.
The events of the following day, and primarily the course of the session on 3
May were a sort of theatrum. The application of tried and tested elements of
parliamentary strategy can be discerned.111 As a means of exerting pressure, the
gallery was populated by numerous so-called arbiters, urbanites, and even
109This phase described among others Dihm (1930). Detailed also by Leśnodorski (1951, pp. 177–
204 and 205–210).
110In 1790 an improvement in relations between Poland and England occurred, and there was
likely an attempt at drawing Poland into the Triple Alliance. At the same time, at the beginning of
1791 relations between Russia and coalition members worsened—the Petersburg court was ready
to risk a second war rather than submit to Prussian and English pressure over the peace with
Turkey. Russian diplomacy was also engaged in activity within the United Kingdom, inspiring
Russian-friendly articles in the press and publishing propaganda pamphlets. The Whig opposition
spoke out fiercely against PM Pitt, and there was a split in the government which led to suspension
of the sending of a war ultimatum to Russia. The Polish court followed English and Prussian
preparations for war with significant fear that the country could be engulfed by international
conflict, and—strictly in the practical dimension—fear of the effects of armies marching through
Polish and Lithuanian territory. Ultimately, Russia, having seen off the threat of a two-front war,
forced the Western powers to accept peace with Turkey on Russia’s terms. Poland understood that
the breaking of war plans and sudden shift in British policy towards Russia meant that the window
of opportunity for neutralizing Russia had closed.
111Broader: Stroynowski (2013b).
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aristocratic ladies from society.112 In additional, the reading of carefully-selected—
and even partially falsified—reports from abroad at the beginning of the session
fomented an atmosphere of gravity and fear. In response to Potocki’s question
about what means of rescuing the fatherland are available, the King was to have
responded that there is a draft constitution already accepted by many.113
The text was read in the Sejm on 3 May. This was a further breach of procedural
rules. Enacted in January 1791, the Act entitled “Solemn affirmation of order in the
Chamber of the present parliament”, foresaw the need to print and provide to
deputies a copy of the bill, following which debate could begin three days after the
text had been distributed.114 What is more, the Deputation for the form of gov-
ernments, appointed to the task, had not read the draft. At the same time it should be
noted that instances of Sejm procedures being violated were not at all uncommon. It
was assumed that since the Sejm is authorized to enact its own rules, it also enjoys
the authority to waive them if the necessity arises (in accordance with the principle
of necessitas non habet legem). For example, in a 1 January 1791 letter to Deboli,
the King describes how violations of procedures in several rules occurred imme-
diately “on the first day after the law was made”. In the same letter he expresses the
opinion that adopting “the English manner of parliament” would eliminate both
prolixity and excessive haste (the new regulations required crowning the session
with some sort of concluded “deed”115). When the Marshal of the Sejm was
summoned to adhere to procedures, he was said to have responded “this is not an
ordinary session, but a revolutionary one”.116
The supporters of reform were counting on the forbearance of the public gath-
ered in the galleries of the Sejm.117 They weren’t wrong, the opponents of the
Constitution finally bowed to pressure from the public. The Constitution was
enacted by acclamation en bloc, and votes for and against were not formally
counted. It is estimated that of the 182 representatives present in the hall, 110
senators and deputies were in favour of the Constitution.118 The discussion was
very lively, sometimes dramatic. The conservative deputy Suchorzewski, a client of
the hetmans, attempted as Rejtan to lay down on the ground and shouted “merci-
fulness for freedom”.119 As an aside, during the session following adoption of the
112Their role grew during the times of Stanisław. Andrzej Stroynowski cites a letter of 28
November 1782 from the King to E. Sapieżyna in which the author grumbles about that frequent
presence and “care” exercised by the ladies over the Sejm “exceeding all decency of the sexes and
their situation” („nad wszelką przyzwoitość płci i sytuacji swojej”). Stroynowski (2013b, p. 64).
113Izdebski (1998, p. 14).
114Uroczyste zaręczenie porządku Izby na teraźnieyszym seymie (Solemn Affirmation of the order
of the Chamber at the present Sejm), pos. CCXXXIV, Volumina Legum, Vol. IX, pp. 202–203.
115Letter to Deboli, January 1st, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów sygn. 413, k. 1–3.
116Letter to Deboli, May 4th 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów sygn. 413, k. 84.
117These events visually depicted Wegner (1866, pp. 121–196).
118So Rostworowski (1966, p. 233); cf. also Dihm (1932, pp. 12–20).
119Scene similar by various witnesses’ relations; also the king described it in the letter to Deboli,
May, 4th, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów sygn. 413, k. 83.
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Constitution, Suchorzewski approached Potocki and, attempting to return to him the
royal Order of St. Stanislaus, spoke of his plans to leave for America. Potocki and
the foreign diplomats present attempted to dissuade him from that trip, explaining
that “there he would encounter an executive of greater power than what we have
given the king here. Suchorzewski was surprised and remained in doubt as to
whether to leave Poland for good”.120
The opponents of the Constitution called for remarks at a crucial point of the
debate did not dare to speak. Finally, the question of the Speaker of the Sejm for the
approval of the Chamber to accept the Government’s Bill was answered loudly and,
it seemed, unanimously. As he himself described in a letter to Deboli, when the
King wished to again speak against deputy Zabiełło and raised his hand, the
reformers interpreted this as a “sign of oath”: „They crowded the throne. And I,
seeing that the thing could be done, did it”.121 The King stood on the throne and
took an oath on the Bible before Feliks Turski, the Bishop of Krakow. Giving it a
far more serous dimension the King made later many references to that event, one
of them being: “It is not the first time that I hear the declaration that by swearing on
the Constitution of 3 May I have undertaken never to relent in adhering thereto”.122
The King identified this moment with the creation of an obligation to remain
faithful to the Constitution and to always strive to carry out its provisions. In Art.
VII the Constitution established the duty for each future King acceding to the throne
to submit “an oath to God and the nation that he shall retain this constitution on
Pacta Conventa”.
From the hall of the Sejm deputies went to the church of Saint John, where they
were welcomed by municipal authorities and the fraternity of Warsaw. After a few
speeches, the Constitution was sworn in by speakers given the title of Marshals of
the Confederation, bishops, senators and ministers. After returning to the hall of the
parliament, the Marshals of the Confederation signed the text of the Constitution. In
the evening, members of the parliamentary military commission took an oath to
uphold the Constitution at an extraordinary meeting. The people of Warsaw cheered
“Hail to the King, Hail to the Constitution”.
The next day, 4 May, a group of almost 30 deputies filed an official protest
against the Constitution, which, in accordance with procedure, was entered into the
borough books. Kołłątaj warned of such a possibility, writing the same day to
Marshal Stanisław Małachowski “for the town and the city chancelleries to remain
closed until the Constitution is appointed, and afterwards that none of them would
dare to accept manifests (…) In order to properly confer, and that those who have
120In King’s relations, Suchorzewski was told by Potocki: „zastanie tam moc wykonawczą
większą, niżeśmy ją tu dali królowi. Zdziwił się Suchorzewski y został w wątpliwości, czyli Polskę
ma rzucać na zawsze”, letter to Deboli, May 4th, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, k. 86.
121‘Rzucili się hurmem do tronu. A ja widząc, że rzecz się daie zrobić, zrobiłem’. It was said that
this was, in the King’s opinion, the second miracle after adoption of the bourgeois draft—via the
lips of Suchorzewski—in April 1791. Letter to Deboli, May 4th, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów,
sygn. 413, k. 83.
122Głos JKMsci na Sessyi Seymowey 24 Octobris 1791, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 22, k. 322.
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not taken their oath to that Constitution not to grace our Sejm sessions until they
swear that oath”.123 In the protest entered into the books by the chronicler of
Warsaw, the legality of the Constitution was called into question by indications of
procedural violations and the absence of “pluralitas”, a formal vote which would
give a decision of the majority.
Among them were declared supporters of the Russian option, but also deputies
who had signed the Dietines’ instructions for opposition to the abolition of free
elections and feared of being accused of violating the Dietines’ recommendations.
An open defence of the Constitution also sometimes entailed family conflicts. The
King wrote to Deboli and informed him that after the conclusion of the session he
was approached by Marshal Sapieha, who had been kept in the dark as to the plans
for reform, and who, in a rush of emotion, ultimately swore his oath to the
Constitution; he also declared his regret that “neither with Mother nor with Uncle is
there a place”, he was ruined, and the King was his only hope for rescue.124
5.3 An Oath on the Constitution
Meanwhile, the Marshals of the Confederation continued the process of swearing in
key state officials on the Constitution. Among others, Treasury Commission
members swore an oath, while key opponents of the Constitution, namely Hetman
Franciszek Ksawery Branicki, Seweryn Rzewuski and Stanisław Szczęsny Potocki
left Warsaw for Jassy where they established contacts with the court in Moscow.
The Marshals of the Confederation turned to members of the Sejm
Constitutional Deputation in order to complete formalities and sign the Government
Act. One member of this committee was Bishop Kossakowski, who, despite his
oath, refused to sign, explaining that the Deputation could not sign an act which
was not adopted unanimously or by a majority in a roll-call vote. Finally, it was
decided to entrust the Sejm with the settlement of the dispute between Kossakowski
and other members opting for immediate signing.
Therefore, the session of 5 May began with the awarding by the Chamber of
unanimous consent for the signing of the Constitution by the Constitutional
Deputation, whose members had completed the necessary formalities.125 The
Declaration of the Assembled Estates, enacted on that day, could play several roles:
on the one hand, it was an act remedying the constitution in the words “We
solemnly swear to God and Homeland to obey and defend the Constitution with all
123‘aby kancelarye grodzka i miejske nie były otwarte, aż ta konstytucya oblatowaną będzie, a po
oblacie aby żadna nie ważyła się przyjmować manifestów (…) Aby dobrze się naradzić, żeby i,
którzy nie zaprzysięgli tej konstytucji, nie znajdowali się na sesyach sejmowych, póki nie
zaprzysięgną’. Quotation after Smoleński (1909, p. 278).
124Letter to Deboli, May 4th, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, k. 82.
125About searching an unanimity wrote also Oraczewski in his letter, May 7th, 1791, AGAD,
Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 418, k. 568–570.
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means possible.”126 One of the key regulations concerned the abolition of old and
new laws that were inconsistent with the Constitution. This will be analysed later.
The Declaration also consisted of introductory provisions related to the process of
taking an oath by the officials of government committees and judges without delay,
and within a month for the army, as well as regulations concerning sanctions
imposed on those who would dare to oppose the Constitution (“giving an attentive
eye on insurance of this constitution”). This intricate procedure provides grounds
for the assumption that the Constitution was enacted in two stages. The Declaration
was to allay all anxieties related to procedural violations, e.g. the French version of
the Constitution prepared at the request of the King and published by Peter Dufour
indicates in the title that the Constitution was enacted by acclamation on 3 May and
then unanimously sanctioned at the sitting of 5 May.127 Civil servants and residents
of the Brzeg province gathered in the assemblies (Sejmiki) of 14 February 1792 also
wrote of the “Government Constitution of Third and Fifth May 1791” in reporting
the swearing of an oath of loyalty.128 The title of an English-language publication
emphasized the revolutionary nature of the events.129
Those absent on 3 May swore an oath. The other absent officials, such as
members of the Tax Commission of Lithuania, were ordered to send a Rota and
take the oath in the proper office. After a few solemn speeches the parliament
proceeded to continue normal operations. The matter of the constitution and the
oath returned over the following days, both members who joined and those who had
previously remained silent, now wished to comment as supporters of the
Constitution. A small group of opponents stressed the indisputable fact of parlia-
mentary procedure being violated in the process of adopting the Constitution. The
circumstances of the Constitution’s enactment would soon come to serve as a
pretext for questioning it. On the one hand, Russian diplomacy and propaganda
would emphasise the fact of pressure being put on the deputies: “The castle and the
Sejm Chamber were crowded with the common people of Warsaw, armed men
were brought in, the cannons, an artillery regiment and the Lithuanian Guard were
gathered to support the common people, they were turned against those who were
feared the most, the opposition”.130
On the other hand, strictly legal arguments appeared, i.e. undermining the
Sejm’s legitimacy to enact the Constitution, from the liberal interpretation that the
126Cf. Izdebski (1998, pp. 15–16).
127Forme constitutionnelle décretée par acclamation dans la séance du 3 mai, et sanctionée á
l’unanimité dans la séance suivante du 5 mai 1791, P. Dufour, Warsaw 1791. Cf. Izdebski (1998,
pp. 15–16).
128Czartoryski Library, rkps (manuscript) 929, p. 63.
129New Constitution of the Government of Poland, Established by revolution, The Third of May,
1791, J. Debrett, London 1791.
130‘Zamek y Izba Seymowa napełnione były pospólstwem Warszawy, wprowadzono do niey lud
uzbrojony, wytoczono z Arsenału Armaty, Regiment Artyleryi, y Gwardie Litewskie zgromad-
zono do wsparcia pospólstwa, zapalczywość jego pobudzono przeciwko osobom, których się
lękano opozycyi’, Deklaracyia, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 24, k. 81.
138 A. Tarnowska
parliament had extended its term of office in contravention of the law to the raising
of procedural issues, such as the absence of a fair number of deputies and an actual
lack of unanimity among the deputies present. Unanimity was not a legal condition
as the Sejm was confederated, but the process of formal vote counting was not
carried out. It also must be emphasised that enactment of the Constitution did not
imply a change in the understanding of sovereignty, and neither did the composition
of those wielding power. As far as procedural provisions are concerned, they has
been breached before with the rule holding that the Sejm has the power to adopt
regulations but also to withdraw them when needed (necessitas non habet
legem).131 The Saxon deputy Essen also wrote to Dresden about “strong ferment”
and the presence of 10,000 burghers greeting the king and the elector. However, he
explained in extensive detail that “It is said that many deceptive means were
employed to frighten the Russian partisans in the Sejm, by placing a mob in the
castle courtyard and having them occupy all the seats. Nevertheless (…) I wish to
emphasize with all seriousness that the threat of a new partition has made such a
strong impression that even if various superior considerations prevent the elector
from consenting to the Polish proposals, (…) it would seem that agreement could be
found to turn the throne over to any prince, or even a common nobleman, as long as
the idea of an inherited throne could be instituted and by the same token Poland
could free itself from the influences of Austria and Russia.”132
The Marshals of the Sejm and the Confederation made a solemn proclamation,
informing the public about the adopted Constitution. The text for the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution for deputies and “military persons” stationed overseas
was also drafted. Congratulations poured in from around the country and from
abroad, and there was mention of the Polish Constitution in the British and French
parliaments. The monarch handed out “Constitution rings”, in snuffboxes, and even
buttons and belts were engraved with the commemorative dates.
The King reinforced this mood through his speeches in the Sejm, swearing that
he would only abandon the Constitution “upon his death”.133 Diplomatic corre-
spondence was also employed in his manoeuvring. The King did not hesitate to
make use of extensive manipulations and censorship, for example by editing out of
incoming message troubling fragments about the reticence of the elector and the
Vienna court. The Prussian ambassador, Girolamo Lucchesini, who viewed the
Constitution as a house built on sand, opined against presenting the Prussian King
as a reliable ally of reform in Poland. He criticized the naivety of Polish diplomacy,
correctly pointing out that the Saxon elector did not take the decision on his own,
but only in concert with the neighbouring powers. However, at the same time he
worked to convince the Prussian King that Russian intervention in Poland should
131Uruszczak (2011, p. 25).
132Letter of Franciszek Essen to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Johann Loss, of 7 May 1791,
No. 22, in: Kocój (2000, p. 41).
133„que je n’abandonnerai qu’avec la vie la loi du 3 mai”. Letter of the King to Józef Poniatowski
[Warszawa] 30.IX.1791, Dembiński (1904, p. 45).
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not be expected. Letters to Berlin are replete with negative commentaries on the
Constitution, wild exaggerations of the number of those opposed to it, and criticism
of the French diplomat Descorches, who was said to propagate in Poland (even in
Russia, using Poland as a conduit) dangerous democratic ideas. He was resentful of
the fact that the King portrayed conversations with Lucchesini as ever so promising
for Polish matters, while the attitude of Frederick Wilhelm II was depicted as
exceedingly positive towards the Constitution. In Lucchesini’s opinion, documents
falsified in this way could fool the nobility awaiting the assemblies and convince
them that the Constitution enjoyed a “powerful ally” in the Prussian King. The
ultimate success—support for the Constitution in the assemblies—was, in
Lucchesini’s opinion, to be achieved through lies about the acceptance of the crown
by the Saxon elector, and the close alliance of Poland with Prussia and Austria.134
The independence of the King in this issue was useful in the reorganization the
foreign affairs apparatus which was written into the Constitution. Additionally, the
king also appointed opponents of the Constitution to the Members of the Guard of
the Laws; their presence can be attributed to activities taking place behind the
scenes. The King was rightfully afraid of betrayal by them, although this might
have been a mere excuse in light of the ignorance in which the Guardians—
supporters of the patriotic camp—were kept.
The activities being described here comprise a sort of propaganda campaign,
directed largely at creating a favourable climate for the Constitution outside the
capital. The Act of 3 May was essentially an initiative of Warsaw and, to a smaller
degree, some of the larger cities; greater resistance was expected in the countryside.
On 14 May the King reported to Deboli that “Emissaries for the Revolution have
gone out in great numbers”.135 Meanwhile, the mood in the countryside seemed
favourable: “Several dozen Civilian and Military Commissions from the Crown and
from Lithuania have sent their delegates, while others have forwarded letters
attesting to their support of the work of 3 May”, the King reported to Deboli.136
Undoubtedly a significant role in these “spontaneous” events was played by the
aforementioned trusted deputies—for example, the deputy of Wieluń Mączyński
wrote to the King about his gathering of citizens “of the entire district” who had
sworn their allegiance to the 3 May Constitution and assigned deputies to present
their expressions of gratitude to the monarch.137 In turn, the citizens of Bracław
wrote with regret to the Gazeta Narodowa Y Obca that no oath-taking had been
done in their city, and recalled that the “lover of the Constitution and of the deeds of
the present Sejm”, id est the chamberlain of Bracław, Bogdan Ostrowski, had even
thrown two ceremonial balls and that “the whole of the Bracław populace and that
134Kocój (2006).
135‘Rozesłańców za Rewolucją apostołuiących iuż wyiechało, y wyieżdża dosyć’, letter of the
King to Deboli, 14th May 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, pp. 92–94.
136Letter of the King to Deboli, Varsovie ce 24.7bre 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, k.
194.
137Letter of deputy from Wieluń W. Mączyński to the King, de 28. Junii 1791, Biblioteka
Czartoryskich, rkps. 734, p. 337.
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of the surrounding towns, 600 in all, had gathered” at the parish church on 4
February to declare their loyalty to His Royal Highness of the Republic in defence
of the 3 May Constitution.138
A final referendum on national consent were supposed the Regional Council (the
Dietines) sittings of 14 February 1792 became—out of 78 Councils 70 expressed
their approval of the Constitution by taking an oath, vouching or expressing their
gratitude to the King and the Sejm for the enactment.139 Successive editions of
Gazeta Narodowa Y Obca reported on ceremonies organized in the countryside
where oaths on the Constitution were taken, cannon volleys fired in salute, cere-
monial masses and festivals were held during which toasts for the King, the
Constitution, and even the succession of the throne were offered.140
Some of the deputies who had signed the Dietines’ instructions for opposition to
the abolition of free elections justified their initial objection towards the
Constitution with the fear of being accused of violating the Dietines’ recommen-
dations141 and changed their position during next months. The assemblies selected
their representatives for the anniversary ceremonies held on 3 May 1792. The
celebrations were reported in the “Gazette”, and were accompanied by appeals to
the Nation in conjunction with the outbreak of war in the defence of the
Constitution, as well as reports of Russian military actions taken against Poland.142
The above description of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
Constitution leads to a controversial conclusion—in a certain sense, from the very
beginning the May Constitution was a myth, the embodiment of a tool for pro-
tection against both internal and external threats. No serious constitutional debate
was conducted in parliament, nor among polemicists; decisions as to the wording of
particular provisions were taken in negotiations between the King, Potocki,
Małachowski and Kołłątaj; translations and transpositions of successive versions by
138Excerpt of the letter to Gazeta Narodowa (Wypis listu pisanego do kantoru Gazet Narodowey z
Bracławia dnia 7. Lutego), Suplement do Gazety Narodowey Y Obcey Nro XIV z Warszawy Dnia
18. Lutego Roku 1792, p. 84.
139Letters of the King to Deboli—end of February, March 1792, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn.
413; Szczygielski (1994b).
140Cf. also Gazeta Narodowa Y Obca Nro XV z Warszawy we srzode dnia 22. Lutego 1792, p. 85,
Nro XVIII z Warszawy w sobotę dnia 3. Marca Roku 1792, pp. 103–104, reports from Merecz
county (doniesienia z powiatu mereckiego), Suplement do Nro XXIV z Warszawy dnia 24. Marca
1792.
141Głos Jaśnie Wielmożnego Franciszka Mielżyńskiego Starosty Wałeckiego Posła Poznańskiego
(Voice of the Poznań Deputy Franciszek Mielżyński) Na Sessyi Dnia 19. Marca Roku 1792
Miany, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 24, k. 223–224v, there also similar speeches, a similar description is
provided by Stanisław August to Deboli in his letter of 21 May 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, no.
413, p. 96.
142The ceremonies in Warsaw and the countryside were related by the Gazeta Narodowa Y Obca,
No. XXXVI, z Warszawy w Sobotę Dnia 5. Maia Roku 1792, pp. 213–214, Nro XL z Warszawy w
Sobotę dnia 19. Maia Roku 1792, p. 237, Suplement do Nro XV, p. 240, Suplement do Nro XLI,
p. 246, Nro XLII z Warszawy z 26 maja 1792, p. 250, Suplement do Nro XLII p. 252, Nro XLIII z
30 maja, p. 256. Smoleński also described these events in: Smoleński (1897, pp. 5–18).
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Piattoli and Linowski could also have contributed to editorial changes in the doc-
ument. This came about for obvious reasons—experiences of work on the draft of
“the Form of Government” convinced Potocki not only of the deputation’s con-
servative attitude, but also of the extreme inefficiency of debates. This is not,
therefore, a constitution of lawyers, such as that of 1831 in Belgium. It is a con-
stitution of citizens placing their trust in the slogans of the progressive camp, the
voices of the 3 May session which emphasized the necessity of adopting the
Constitution in the face of international volatility. In a certain sense the Constitution
achieved legitimacy later: during the 5 May session, the submission of the oath by
civil servants in the following days, and ultimately the decision of the assemblies of
14 February 1792. A thorough analysis of its contents was not really conducted
until work was underway on legislation implementing its provisions.
6 The Problem of the Supreme Law in the Time
of the 3 May Debate
6.1 Henrician Articles and Pacta Conventa
Evaluation of the revolutionary 3 May Constitution in the context of its supreme
location in the Polish legal system is not a simple task. A particular difficulty here
lies in determining the relation between the existing sources of law, including the
category of Cardinal Laws, and the new important act “to which all other laws
(should) submit”.
In particular, three categories should be addressed: the Henrician Articles, Pacta
Conventa, and Cardinal Laws. The Polish tradition of recording fundamental rights
is very long. In this context we should mention the tradition of the oath taken by
each newly elected King through the Henrician Articles (1573). These articles may
be referred to as a sort of “estate constitution”. They constituted a compromise
between the nobility and the magnates, but also between Catholics and infidels, and
they constituted a legal barrier against the “absolutum dominium” arbitrary power
of the newly-elected Polish King Henri de Valois.143 Mention should be made of
opinions present in the Polish subject literature that the articles constituted a
“fundamental Act” or “constitutional Act”, although these claims144 are met with
143Szcząska (1990, pp. 19–20). Newest elaboration of Articuli Henriciani issue: Makiłła (2012,
passim).
144Among historians Andrzej Stroynowski: cf. Stroynowski (2013a, pp. 27–28); among legal
historians f.ex. Lewandowska-Malec (2013, p. 93). strongly Makiłła; cf. his summary: Makiłła
(2008, p. 60), Articuli Henriciani as “fundamental constitutional laws”, also Makiłła (2014a,
pp. 155–168).
142 A. Tarnowska
the charge of hyperbole in relation to the significance of the articles.145 The
Henrician Articles survived in their classic form until the second half of the 18th
century, when they were transformed by the instrument that was the Cardinal Laws,
to be discussed in detail below.146
The Pacta Conventa, on the other hand, represented a bilateral agreement
concluded by the King and the nation represented by the nobility. Each successive
elected King took an oath on the Henrician Articles and entered into a contract, a
Pacta Conventa, which could refer to royal grants, marriage, etc. From 1632 the
Pacta begin making greater reference to issues of political organization, replacing
the Henrician Articles (which from thereon are only rarely invoked); to a lesser
degree they refer directly to the personal obligations of the monarch, as they
originally did. This is the source of the opinion present in the subject literature that
the acts taken together form a sort of sui generis constitution.147
The Henrician Articles (Articuli Henriciani) are treated fairly, according to
Polish literature, as a kind of prototype for a “Basic Law”. A particular argument in
favour of the articles’ role in establishing a political system is the fact of the unique
position they enjoyed in the legal culture of the nobility, coupled even with the
conviction of their supremacy, evidenced for example in the slogan “firnamentum
publicae libertatis”. This theory is dismissed by Tomasz Kucharski, who demon-
strates that there is no broader justification for it to be found.148 Although we
should concede that they are acts regulating key issues of the political system, at the
same time Kucharski rightly points out that very few of the principles underlying
the system, and whose existence is not in doubt, were stated expresses verbis in the
wording of the articles.149 The author also questions the supreme power of Pacta
Conventa, mainly emphasizing their strictly political role and their capacity to
amend only “normal” parliamentary constitutions. The author invoked the authority
of such scholars as Gottfried Lengnich, who did not differentiate the legal force of
the Pacta and an ordinary constitution. He understands the ritual of reciting the
pacts at the beginning of deliberations of every Sejm as rather an expression and
exposition of the control function, and by the same token a sort of reminder to the
monarch of his obligations as set out by the structure of the state.150
Such an agreement was also entered into by Stanisław August at the time of his
coronation. Regular invocations to this fact can be found in the parliamentary
debate. “The Pacta Conventa was mentioned here: not for I would like to declare
145This refers to the aforementioned work by Dariusz Makiłła and review by Tomasz Kucharski
and Zbigniew Naworski, cf. Kucharski and Naworski (2013) The author, D. Makiłła, also
responded to this review in a work given the title “On the first Polish fundamental law. In response
to the critics Tomasz Kucharski and Zbigniew Naworski” (2014b). Sceptical voice on constitu-
tional character of Articuli also: Matuszewski (2007, p. 301).
146[A.M.] (2010, p. 25, broader: pp. 18–29).
147Uruszczak (2013a, p. 223).
148Kucharski (2014, pp. 122–129).
149Kucharski (2014, pp. 125–126).
150Kucharski (2014, pp. 129–131).
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against them, as I am most familiar with their sanctity; I would dare not touch them,
for fear of committing sacrilege”, said Ignacy Potocki, the Lithuanian Court
Marshal, during the 9 December 1789 debate over the prerogative of the king to
send deputies to foreign courts.151 In the course of that same debate, the
Czerniechów deputy Czacki referred to the Pacta as a “sacred bond between the
King and Nation”, whilst deputy chancellor Garnysz emphasized that “Pacta
Conventa is an inviolable thing, and the Sejm may not amend it for the Sejm
represents only the Nation, while the Pacta was concluded with the entire
Nation.”152
These circumstances of the pacts’s swearing were invoked by the King on 3 May
for fear of being accused of breaking the Pacta Conventa, which might even result
in repudiation of allegiance to the ruler. The King requested that the Sejm release
him from the corresponding passage of the Pacta which referred to a free elec-
tion,153 and even deputies opposed to the Constitution such as Chomiński from
Oshmiana did not hesitate to remind the King of his oath.154 Stanisław Szczęsny
Potocki made the accusation in a letter sent from Vienna to the king in May 1791:
“crushing of the sacred Pacta Conventa”, “breaking the links that bind with the
Free Nation”.155 It also mentions that even if the Sejm freed the King from the
duties he had sworn to carry out at the election, the Sejm “did not have a mandate
from the nation to such a piece of work”. Potocki asks “which Voivodeship
commissioned its representatives to do so?”156 The King referred to this issue in his
anniversary speech on 3 May 1792, indicating that it was the Sejm that relieved the
monarch of this duty (i.e. Pacta Conventa) and which called for him to swear
allegiance to the Government Act which constitutes the ‘Succession Throne’,
covering the legislative, executive and judiciary in such a way as to do harm to no
person and put no man at a disadvantage (…) The entire nation has come to love the
151‘Wspomniano tu Pakta Konwenta: nie chęcią iakbym miał co rzec przeciw nim, bo aż nad to
znam ich świętość, y tykać ich lękałbym się, żebym w świętokradztwo nie popadł’, Sessya XXXII,
dnia 9 grudnia 1789, Dyariusz Seymu Ordynaryinego pod związkiem Konfederacyi Generalney
Oboyga Narodów w Warszawie rozpoczetego Roku Pańskiego 1788, t. I, cz. II, w Warszawie w
Drukarni Nadworney J.K. Mci Y Przesw. Kommisyi Edukacyi Narodowey, pp. 357, 360.
152‘Pacta Conventa są rzeczy niewzruszone, y od Seymu nawet naruszyć się nie mogące, bo seym
reprezentuie tylko Naród, a Pakta zawierane były z całym Narodem’. Sessya XXXII, dnia 9
grudnia 1789, Dyariusz Seymu Ordynaryinego pod związkiem Konfederacyi Generalney Oboyga
Narodów w Warszawie rozpoczetego Roku Pańskiego 1788, t. I, cz. II, w Warszawie w Drukarni
Nadworney J.K. Mci Y Przesw. Kommisyi Edukacyi Narodowey, p. 360.
153Also in a later accusation of the Targowica Confederation against the King and his fear, cf. the
letter of the King to Deboli, No 153 Varsovie ce 22. Aout 1792, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, no. 413,
k. 452.
154Wegner (1866, p. 181).
155Letter of Stanisław Szczęsny Potocki to Stanisław August, May 30th, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór
Popielów, sygn. 392, k. 1–2.
156‘…które Województwo Reprezentantom swoim takowe dało zlecenie?’ Letter of Stanisław
Szczęsny Potocki to Stanisław August, May 30th, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 392, k. 2.
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Constitution and expresses it through the Deputies gathered here”.157 When, in the
following months of 1791 the Saxon elector was being lobbied, under the consti-
tution of the future king of Poland, to engage in negotiations, the necessity of
appointing a plenipotentiary for matters concerning the Pacta Conventa was indi-
cated. On the other hand, the Saxon elector emphasized those amendments to
articles of the Constitution which he expected from the Polish side, such as the
potential for the acquisition of throne by not only the Saxon infant but also one of
the royal brothers.
6.2 Cardinal Laws in Polish Tradition and Legal System
The Polish concept of a Cardinal Law appears to be related to some degree to the
French model of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that it
seems even more closely linked to the medieval theories of Marsilio da Padova,
“monarchomachs” theories of contracts concerning power and sovereignty of the
people over the ruler. In Poland, the Cardinal Laws particularly helped to reduce the
powers of the King and directly expressed the principle of supremacy of the
nobility.158 Dariusz Makiłła emphasises that the development of the Cardinal Laws
did not mean repealing the Henrician Articles according to the principle of lex
posterior derogat legi anteriori.159 They emerged as a reflection of the evolving
viewpoints expressed in the doctrine, and were partially overlapping with the sub-
jective scope of the Henrician Articles while extending or clarifying them as well.160
The concept itself was derived either from “cardinalis” or from “cardo”, e.g. hinges,
“for as the rotation of a door depends on hinges, the entire machine of the
Lawmaker’s authority and the executive power depend on the Cardinal Laws”.161
The Cardinal Laws adopted in 1768 and completed in 1775 are crucial for
subsequent events and an assessment of history of the eighteenth century. These
were first announced in 1767 in the treaty with Russia and fulfilled in the first part
of so-called separate second act, added to the treaty and limiting the sovereignty of
Poland, emphasizing its position as a Russian protectorate. As announced, the
157‘stanowiącey Tron Successyiny, a tak określaiącey trzy Władze, prawodawczą, Wykonawczą,
Sądowniczą, że wszystko obeymuiąc, nikogo nie krzywdzi, nikomu przewagi nie daie (…) Naród
cały tę Konstytucyę uwielbił, i otym nayuroczyściey zapewnia przez tych zacnych Delegatów.’
Mowa jego Królewskiej Mości Dnia 3go Miesiąca Maia Roku 1792 w Kościele świętego Krzyża
Miana, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 24, k. 161v.
158Radwański (1952, p. 185).
159Makiłła (2012, pp. 490–491).
160Kucharski (2014, pp. 122–129).
161‘iż iako na Zawiasach zależy obrót drzwi, tak na Prawach Kardynalnych zależy cała machina
władzy Prawodawczey y mocy wykonawczey’, Myśli o istocie praw kardynalnych, n.p., n.d.,
[probably: Myśli o istocie praw kardynalnych. (Projekt do prawa na sejmie r. 1790), n.p. 1790].
Biblioteka Uniwersytecka w Toruniu, sygn. Pol 8.III.1945.
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“form of the Polish Government and the freedom of its citizens clearly and
inalienably oblige posterity not to allow any circumstances to bring changes to the
constitution in its fundamental part”.162 This act should have “all the powers of
validity”; also the assumed “lifetime durability” of the arrangements was empha-
sized far and wide. The Cardinal Laws of 1768 guaranteed, among other things,
neminem captivabimus—the privilege of the nobility, lifelong offices and the royal
bestowals, free elections, and the dominant position of the Roman Catholic religion.
They primed the limit of the monarch’s power reaching for the formula “the king in
parliament”.163 This catalogue of rights is theoretically “never likely to change”.
During the Partition Sejm (1773/1775) an amendment was added that a son or a
grandson of an elected king may not himself become king. The Cardinal Laws did
not deprive the Henrician Articles expressis verbis of their binding force; the latter
were mentioned as ‘the fundamental law of 1573’ as religious rights were being
secured.164
The Cardinal Laws of 1768/75 should be legitimately deemed the first act of a
permanent nature (the introduction included its overall objective expressis verbis as
“once and for all, to permanently secure the form of government and freedom”),
and a document in which a more comprehensive attempt was made to regulate
systemic principles. They were beyond a doubt much more complete than the
Henrician Articles or the subsequent editions of Pacta Conventa. However, it does
not appear as if the lawmakers were striving to create a comprehensive set of
regulations, but rather in order to secure the status quo against changes. It would be
an exaggeration to claim that there was a deliberate intention to place the norms at
the peak of the hierarchy of sources of law; however, Tomasz Kucharski makes a
legitimate point that “their essence was not to be formally superior in the legal
system, but boiled down to serving as an additional (…) guarantee of the estab-
lished order”.165
The notion of “Cardinal Laws” was also used in political publications by the
most outstanding protagonists of the era on both sides of the political spectrum—
the Liberals, such as Ignacy Potocki and Hugo Kołłątaj, and the Conservatives,
namely Seweryn Rzewuski. Proposals by Kołłątaj and Potocki for categorizing and
understanding the meaning of the Cardinal Laws were essentially similar as they
related to the content of the political and social system. The possibility of changing
these laws was treated differently and an amendment by a qualified majority of 3/4
162‘forma rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i wolność wolnych jej obywateli wyciągają dla
potomnych czasów wyraźniejszego i w niczym nigdy nie poruszonego postanowienia, żeby nowe
przypadki nie mogły na potym wprowadzać nowe odmiany, które w pospolitym rządzie nie
powinny ściągać się do samej fundamentalnej konstytucji’, Volumina Legum, Przedruk Zbioru
Praw Staraniem XX. Pijarów, w Warszawie od roku 1732 do roku 1782 wydanego, Vol. VII,
Petersburg 1860, pp. 250–256; second act, pp. 276–285; citation, pp. 253–254.
163Leśnodorski (1951, pp. 11–20).
164In the Sejm constitution on the rights of dissidents, Volumina Legum, Vol. VII, p. 259, folio
573.
165Kucharski (2014, p. 133, cf. 131–133).
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of the votes was allowed, while the original version of the Constitution of 3 May
included a provision for unanimous consent.166 The most extensive concept was
that developed by Hugo Kołłątaj, including the first category of the laws of nature
being inherent and inalienable (not to be breached by any consensus), then the
“political general” law, or “the law of the social contract”, not subject to amend-
ment, and finally special political rights forming constitutional law, subject to
alteration with the consent of a 3/4 majority of the assembly and a unanimous Act
of parliament.167
Potocki adequately distinguished “Cardinal Laws” from “constitutional rights”.
In “Principles to improve the form of government” he suggested the introduction of
unanimity in respect of Cardinal Laws, 3/4 in decisions on resolutions of war and
peace, and an absolute majority in making laws about civil law, military and
financial affairs. One of the previous printed versions of the “Rules” envisioned
unanimity in instructions of assemblies concerning changes to the Cardinal Laws, a
3/4 majority of instructions in political matters, 2/3 in tax and revenue matters, and
a simple majority in respect of civil law and criminal law matters (4 to).168 One of
the many opponents of Potocki’s distinct concepts was bishop Ignacy Massalski,
who treasured liberum veto as an expression of freedom and feared that any reforms
made to strengthen the state could become a pretext for yet another partition.169 In
the final edition there is only a general mention that “the will of the Nation as to the
law-making of the Sejm is decided either unanimously or by some sort of majority,
depending on the Material under consideration. Only in the material of the Cardinal
Laws should there be unanimity of the Instructions.”170
The introductory document titled “Thoughts on the essence of the Cardinal
Laws” was likely a supplement to the draft of 1790,171 whose author accepted the
classification of immutable and fixed Cardinal Laws, and also attempted to outline
their essence. He asks where such can exist in a nation “which wishes to have a
Legislative authority accompany it?”, and answers the question by remarking that
“the meaning of words must be agreed upon”. He emphasizes that their
immutability does not mean that the foreigner or usurper “cannot abolish them, but
166Radwański (1952, p. 173).
167Leśnodorski (1951, pp. 368–371).
168Zasady do poprawy rządu (Rules for improvement of the government), 4 to, 1789 (Bibliografia
Estreicher Vol. XX, p. 229). The Rules are signed by the “Presiding over the Deputation” bishop
Krasicki, but this must be one of the earlier versions still referring to the “Nation” (1mo and
successive articles), not “The Republic”, as in the version prepared for oblate.
169Janeczek (2007, p. 212).
170‘wola Narodu co do prawodawstwa władzy Seymowey poruczona, podług gatunku Materyi
jednomyślnością, lub różną większością okazywać się będzie. W Materyach tylko Praw
Kardynalnych powinna być jednomyślność Instrukcyi.’ Zasady do poprawy formy rządu,
Volumina Legum, Vol. IX, Kraków 1889, pp. 157–159.
171Myśli o istocie praw kardynalnych. (Projekt do prawa na sejmie r. 1790), n.p., 1790. The author
used the copy found in a legacy collection of Ignacy Franciszek Stawiarski, Biblioteka
Uniwersytecka w Toruniu, sygn. Pol 8.III.1945.
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that they may not be abolished without the downfall of the freedom of Citizens and
the political freedom of the entire Nation, that they are so bound to the freedom of
the Citizen and the Nation that, were they to be abolished, the Citizen would
become a Slave, and the Nation would, in whole or in part, find itself brought to
heel by the violence of the usurper. Such laws are nothing other than universal
maxims which every free Man feels in his heart; this is why they ought to be written
down, for the Nation to know what must be taken from the grasp of the Usurper or
the violent foreigner by the Law”.172 The Cardinal Laws are to serve as a template
for legislation “as a line which not even the Legislator himself would dare to
attempt crossing”. These rules for the legislator—what extent the law may be
amended, and “what extent the Laws may not be touched insofar as they have not
been sacrificed by natural truth and justice”. In the draft this category was to include
provisions addressing freedom of conscience (on the faith of the ruler, apostasy and
tolerance), provisions on the indivisibility and self-rule of the Republic, the pro-
tection of the law over all people, and civic freedoms protected in three articles: on
freedom of contract, personal safety, and freedom of speech. In the author’s opinion
the immutable Cardinal Laws should include a chapter on fixed Cardinal Laws
which could only be abolished by unanimity of instructions from the assemblies—
regulations concerning the Sejm, the assemblies, congresses of the people and of
the estates, the Republic, and the Executive.173
The draft from September 1790 opened with a chapter entitled simply
“Constitutional and cardinal laws within them.” It was a list of key political
solutions which assigned a special role to “cardinal laws”, in which the change
discussed below would be associated with a rigid mode of introduction. These
cardinal laws constituted key decisions on the organization of the state and its
supreme authorities, Polish-Lithuanian relations, and the powers of the three estates.
The act itself was not constructed properly in terms of legislation; the cardinal
regulations were mixed with the so-called constitutional provisions, which were an
extension of the former (60 to be precise).
During the debate, and in particular during sessions held in Marshal
Małachowski’s house, it was decided—as was indicated in “Thoughts…”
(“Myśli…”)—that among the key regulations “inviolable cardinal laws” and “per-
manent cardinal laws” would be cleaved off. This distinction was close to Kołłątaj’s
division into Cardinal Laws “planted on the law of nature” and “planted on political
172‘wzruszyć nie potrafił, lecz dla tego, że niemogą być wzruszone bez upadku wolności
Obywatelskiey y wolności polityczney całego Narodu, że są tak spoione z wolnością Obywatela y
Narodu, iż gdyby naruszone były, Obywatel stałby się Niewolnikiem, a Naród w części lub całości
zostałby pod przemocą uzurpatora. Takie Prawa nic innego nie są, tylko maxymy powszechne,
które każdy wolny Człowiek w sercu swoim czuie; dlatego zaś przepisanemi być powinny, żeby
Naród wiedział, czego ma strzec od Uzurpatora y przemocy obcey, żeby każdy Obywatel czuł w
sobie, co mu uzurpator lub przemoc obca wydziera, żeby nawet zgnębiony Naród wiedział, co z
rąk Uzurpatora lub przemocy obcey odzyskać ma Prawo’. Myśli o istocie praw kardynalnych.
(Projekt do prawa na sejmie r. 1790), n.p., 1790, as above.
173Myśli o istocie praw kardynalnych. (Projekt do prawa na sejmie r. 1790), n.p., 1790, no
pagination.
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rights”. The cardinal inviolable laws were supposed to be a collection of general
principles, including freedom of conscience, personal freedom, freedom of contract,
the principle of subordination of law, protection of property and indissolubility of
the Republic.174 However, this latter issue sparked a fierce debate, as the draft
absolutely forbade any alienation or even territorial exchange, which probably
resulted from the traumatic experience of the first partition. Potocki, however,
argued that “the integrity of the Republic cannot be insured with cardinal laws, but
with the government, the military, virtue and customs prevailing in the country”.175
Stroynowski, a deputy of Volyn, also approached the concept of the cardinal
principles in the same debate and objected to Suchodolski’s intention of introducing
a ban on foreign candidates to the throne, saying that he knew no other but this
Cardinal Law, which derives from the natural law, or from the divine law, yet these
said additional issues were not such, so they should not be included within Cardinal
Laws.176 Ultimately a portion of the regulations was approved. Work on the final
shape of the Form of the Government was drawn out, in January 1791 the deputies
continued to bury themselves in fruitless discussions, work on the law of the
assemblies, or continue work on the partially finalized discussion of the Cardinal
Laws. In opting for the second solution they emphasized the fundamental role of the
Cardinal Laws, “truly” constituting the Form of the Government, for “it is the
foundation which determines the structure”. The Cardinal Laws were applicable to
Sejms and assemblies, “and therefore are the source from which the stream of
freedom flows, they are the only rule of the Republican Government”. Opponents
claimed that regulations concerning Sejms and assemblies were the priority, as the
“foundation of the freedoms and wellbeing of the Republic”, palladium libertatis.
At the same time, it was perceived that the Cardinal Laws in and of themselves
provided no protection against foreign aggression, something evidenced by the
events of 1773 and the “watchful and bravely active Government.” It was argued
that those adjustments of the Cardinal Laws that had already been made possessed
everything crucial for preserving the liberty of the nation. The others should flow
from the entirety of the political system, id est detailed regulations on the Form of
the Government. Ultimately, on 7 January 1791 the deputies voted to undertake
work on an Act on the assemblies with a vote of 174 to 89. The long session,
completed at 2:00 at night, was concluded with the recommendation to enshrine the
174Szcząska (1990, pp. 41–42).
175‘całość Rzpltey nie Prawami Kardynalnemi, ale Rządem, Woyskiem, Cnotą i zaprowadzonymi
w Kraiu obyczaiami ubezpieczyć tylko można (…)’. Dziennik Czynności Seymu Głównego
Ordynaryinego Warszawskiego, pod związkiem konfederacyi Oboyga Narodów agitującego się
1790, Sessya CCCVI, Dnia 3 Września w Piątek (used version: AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 9, p. 81) Cf.
also Radwański (1952, pp. 162–163).
176‘Ja prawa kardynalnego innego nie znam, tylko to, co wypływa z Prawa Boskiego i z przy-
rodzenia, to jest, co się rodzi w sercu każdego człowieka i w jego naturze i takie prawo
ustanowiliśmy (…) To zaś co (?) w sobie rzeczone dodatki, jak nie wypływa ani z prawa
Boskiego, ani z prawa przyrodzonego (…) tak do praw kardynalnych należyć niepowinno’ (Sessya
30 września 1790, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 9, p. 567v)’.
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Cardinal Laws in the agreed form.177 The progressive camp, as indicated, put off
the acceptance and publication of the cardinal principles, which were finally
adopted on 7 January 1791, fearing the further binding of their hands in the reform
process. During the session of 11 January the dithering Marshal Małachowski was
given his final rebuke concerning the matter of publication of the Cardinal Laws.178
In the adopted text attention is drawn by the particular indication that “by the
Cardinal Laws” the invalidity was assured of “all foreign guarantees of the Polish
government contrary to the independence of the Republic and detrimental to her
self-rule”, “and that, under no pretext and from nobody in the Republic, could any
such be proposed and adopted”.179
Lastly, the 3 May Constitution did not use the term “Cardinal Laws”. This
phrase was associated with the events of 1768 and even there was awareness that
the subjective distinction between “cardinal” and “constitutional” law was arbitrary
and fictitious. It was considered that the mere use of the term “Cardinal Law” did
not give them special durability among other constitutional rights. A proposal to
distinguish between “inviolable constitutional rights” and “permanent constitutional
rights”180 appeared, but this did not explicitly materialize in any of the articles.
Only the privileges of the nobility and the Constitution itself were treated as “in-
violable”, and the separation of powers was introduced “forever”. Each king
ascending to the throne had to swear an oath to God and the nation “to preserve the
Constitution, on the Pacta Conventa (…) which, like the former, shall bind him”.
Bogusław Leśnodorski and, in his footsteps, Zbigniew Radwański, emphasized,
that the mere fact of the enactment of the Constitution had not eliminated the concept
of inviolable laws, which were to be above or somehow within the Constitution.
However, Leśnodorski did write not consistently about the 3May Constitution taking
“the place of previous ‘fundamental’ and ‘cardinal’ laws”, which in the present
author’s opinion did not take place if we invoke the understanding of the Cardinal
Laws in the same manner as the protagonists, not narrowing the definition down to
merely the acts of 1768/75 and encompassing themwith the expressis verbismeaning
of the immutable laws and Pacta Conventa set out in the Act on the Sejms.181
At the end of May 1791, in the course of the debate over the bill on extraor-
dinary Sejms during session 82, the Bracław deputy Seweryn Potocki directly
invoked the inviolability of the Constitution by these words: “I have seen no
expression of immutable laws in this draft. We have only Laws known as Cardinal,
and those are not immutable, as they may be amended by unanimous Instructions.
177Gazeta Narodowa Y Obca, Nro IV, z Warszawy we srzodę dnia 12. Stycznia Roku 1791, p. 13.
178Gazeta Narodowa Y Obca Nro V, z Warszawy w sobotę dnia 15. Stycznia Roku 1791, p. 17.
179Art. VII: ‘Wszelka cudzoziemska gwarancya rządu Polskiego, przeciwna niepodległości
Rzeczypospolitey i uwłaczająca jey samowładności iest i nazawsze będzie nieważną, i aby żadna
podobna pod iakimkolwiek bądź pretekstem od nikogo w rzeczypospolitey proponowaną, i
przyiętą bydź nie mogła, tym prawem kardynalnym waruiemy’. Prawa kardynalne niewzruszone,
Volumina Legum, Vol. IX, Kraków 1889, CCXXXVI, pp. 203–204.
180Radwański (1952, p. 174).
181Leśnodorski (1951, p. 363).
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They tell me that the expression of immutable laws is to be found in the law already
adopted on the Sejms. I would implore that we be granted such a Law, as all
expressions of it cannot be encompassed by the memory. If, in its very essence, the
said expression is contained in that law, I would at least request that we finally
clarify what is meant by immutable laws”.182 In response, Weyssenhoff indicated
that in the draft law on ordinary Sejms “there was a provision that the Ordinary
Sejm shall not enact anything that would infringe the Act of 3 May and the Cardinal
Laws, but it was judged that the expression of immutable laws was preferable to
that of Cardinal Laws, and with this expression the Law of the Sejms was pas-
sed”.183 The Lithuanian Marshal lgnacy Potocki explained that in the works of the
Deputation a deliberate attempt was made to avoid the concept of “cardinal laws”,
to avoid associations with the Sejm of 1768; it was also proposed to use the term
“eternal”, but ultimately the phrase “immutable laws” was applied, to apply to “the
sanctity of Religion, freedom, security of life, ownership of property and the
entirety of the Republic”.184 It was also mentioned during a later session that
although conclusion of the works could be seen on the horizon, “we are
approaching the finish of Our Government [form], and we still do not know what
Laws we desire to be immutable from here on out?”185 It can also be noted that such
elements regularly appeared in discussion of the Sejm—as late as May 1792 the
deputy Siwicki stated that the transfer to the monarch of military rights (under the
May Constitution such a solution was to be found in the draft bill on the military
commission) is “a threat to liberty”, while Marshal Potocki objects, indicating that
the voice of the Sejm and of the nation decided unanimously “of the harmony of our
government act with the will of the nation”.186
Ultimately, two closely related Acts, the Act on the Sejms and the Act on
Extraordinary Sejms, refered to “the fundamental law under the title of the
182‘Praw niezwruszonych wyraz znaiduiący się w proiekcie nie znam. Są tylko u nas Prawa pod
nazwiskiem Kardynalne y te nie są niewzruszone, gdy za iednomyślnością Instrukcji odmienione,
lub poprawione bydź mogą. Mówią mi że ten wyraz niewzruszonych znayduie sę w zapadłym iuż
prawie o Seymach. Upraszałbym o rozdanie nam tego Prawa, gdyż pamięcią wszystkich wyrazów
Yego obiąć niepodobna. Jeżeli w samey istocie rzeczony wyraz zawiera się w tym prawie, proszę
przynaymniey, abyśmy objaśnili w końcu, co to są te prawa niewzruszone’. Sessya 82. Dnia 27.
Maja 1791 R., AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, pp. 360–360v.
183‘była wzmianka, że Seym Ordynaryiny nic stanowić nie będzie coby naruszało Ustawę 3.Maia
y Prawa Kardynalne, ale sądzono, że wyraz praw niewzruszonych zamiast Kardynalnych iest
lepszy y z tym wyrazem zapadło Prawo o Seymach’. Sessya 82. Dnia 27. Maja 1791 R., AGAD,
ASCz, sygn. 19, p. 361.
184‘Świętość Religii, wolność, bezpieczeństwo życia, własność majątku y całość Rzpltey’. Sessya
82. Dnia 27. Maja 1791 R., AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, p. 361.
185‘zbliżamy się do ukończenia Rządu Naszego a niewiemy dotąd iakie będą Prawa, które za
niewzruszone mieć chcemy?’ Deputy of Kijów voivodeship, Jan Rybiński, Sejm session 83,
AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, s. 369v.
186‘o zgodności ustawy naszey rządowey z wolnością narodową’, Gazeta Narodowa Y Obca
Nro XL z Warszawy w sobotę dnia 19. Maia roku 1792, p. 235.
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Government Act and on immutable laws”.187 The constitutional provisions which
should be included in the latter category include the principle of separation of
powers, which was mentioned earlier to have been adopted “forever”, and the
“inviolable” privileges of the nobility.
Thus, as Radwański correctly states, the Cardinal Laws in the post-may sense
should not be associated with the assumptions published in January 1791.188 It
should be noted that the Sejm taken place in Grodno 1793, in abolishing the 3 May
legal system, in a formal sense restored the law to its previous state. Its further
determinations—the Cardinal Laws of the Grodno Sejm189—were themselves
derogated in turn by the Kościuszko rebellion of 1794, which invoked the 3 May
laws in respect of those norms they could be applied to in practice.190
In the debate of Great Sejm the theories of natural laws of the individual and the
community, as well as the Cardinal Laws of the nobility converged. Leśnodorski
writes that “the tendencies mixed and intersected”.191 He also emphasises an
essential difference: while in the West the state does not “issue” laws but “declares”
them, in Poland the inviolable rights of the nobility are based on legal ‘privileges’
and on the authority of the law.192 Although e.g. Kołłątaj was a supporter of the first
of those ideas, it would seem that the political scene was dominated by the second,
with its narrative based not so much in the innate nature of the laws, but rather in
the presumption of the binding force of once-granted privileges, the impossibility of
their legal negation in light of the principle of sovereignty of the law.
In summary, it is practically self-evident that actors on the political stage intu-
itively felt that certain determinations by the legislator were of a special nature.
There was thus a general conviction as to the existence of immutable Cardinal Laws
—anchored in both tradition and in a unique conception of natural law—which no
legislative act could amend or abolish. Furthermore, there was a group of legal
solutions qualified as fixed or constitutive Cardinal Laws—in respect of which it
was held possible to revise by way of unanimous instructions from the assemblies
or a qualified majority of them. We can therefore perceive an awareness of the need
to institute a hierarchy of sources of law; the protagonists attempted to achieve this,
offering various conceptions. These views were not rendered inoperative by the 3
May legislation. As the debate taking place after 3 May has proven, it was rather
held that the Government Act was a sort of additional and unclear addition to the
existing doctrine, but did not annul it as such. In Poland, fundamental laws did not
187Volumina Legum, Vol. IX, p. 258.
188Radwański (1952, p. 173), Leśnodorski (1951, pp. 364–366).
189Volumina Legum, Vol. X. Konstytucje Sejmu Grodzieńskiego z 1793 roku, wyd.
Z. Kaczmarek, przy współudziale J. Matuszewskiego, M. Szczanieckiego i J. Wąsickiego, Poznań,
nakładem Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk z zasiłkiem Ministerstwa Szkolnictwa
Wyższego i Polskiej Akademii Nauk 1952, pp. 110–113.
190Makiłła (2012, pp. 492–493).
191Leśnodorski (1951, p. 367). Broader cf. Salmonowicz (1991).
192Leśnodorski (1951, p. 372).
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serve to mutually undermine one another, and their content intersected like the links
of a chain, creating an unbroken continuum.
This fact would seem to negate the contemporary understanding of the consti-
tution as the creation of a “new order”, radically overturning existing reality. This is
not a characteristic of the May Constitution. However, it is also obvious that, for
many reasons, the authors of the Constitution were required to behave tactically and
hide their intention of revolutionizing the political order. Fears of accusations that
they were engaged in destabilization, the export of French slogans, and the threat of
revolution—this constituted an excellent pretext for the intervention of Russian
diplomacy and, ultimately, of Russian troops; on the other hand, fears of support for
the May law by the conservative nobility in the countryside meant that the con-
stitutional change had to be explained as a delicate revolution, a transformation and
modernization of the existing system, id est essentially to smuggle a new regime in
under the guise of the existing one.
7 Relation Between the Constitution and the Ordinary
Legislation: Nullification of the Law Contravening
to the Constitution
In undertaking this difficult topic, several issues must be addressed. One is verifi-
cation of the theory of constitutional regulation and discussion contained in its
entirety the principle of supremacy of the 3 May act over other laws adopted by the
Sejm. A consequence of this is the creation of a nullification clause regarding law
that contradicts the Constitution. It should also be judged whether the practice
associated with the May constitution allows us to state that such a clause was, in
fact, unequivocally understood in this manner.
The rule of nullifying law contravening the Constitution appears on the basis of
Piattoli’s version of “Projet de réforme de Constitution in 1791” in Art. 15.193 This
was yet another edit from the end of January/beginning of February, later translated
by Linowski into Polish. This version, just as before, was so marked up that
following consultations with Potocki, Marshall Małachowski sent it to Kołłątaj to
prepare a new version, which, at the end of March 1791, assumed the form of a text
known as “Constitutional Laws”.194 This was the fundamental reference point for
preparing the final version of the text.195 The principle of supremacy is also present
here, but according to Kołłątaj it should concern the acts of “the present Sejm”;
however, following the principles of linguistic interpretation, it would not apply to
the law-making of future Sejms.
193Leśnodorski (1951, pp. 199–200).
194Been described in detail by Rostworowski Emanuel (1963, pp. 266–462).
195The newest work has been written by Mroziuk (2017).
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The Constitution itself in the final draft referred to the title of the problem in two
parts, the preamble and the subsequent Declaration of the Assembled Estates. The
preamble contained the intention of the legislator, stated as “we adopt this con-
stitution and this entirely sacred and inviolable pledge until that nation at the time
prescribed by law, clearly has not recognized a need to alter any of its articles”.
According to another passage the supremacy of the Constitution was guaranteed in
the following words: “To which constitution the further statutes of the present Sejm
have to adhere to in all”. To quote Feliks Oraczewski, “It was recommended at the
session of the Constitutional Deputation the day before yesterday that all the
subsequent draft legislation submitted by the government referred to this funda-
mental act”.196
A particular summation was built into the Declaration in the words “All rights
past and present opposed to this Constitution or to any of its articles we abolish, and
descriptions specific to articles and any matter in this Constitution confined needed,
as specifically detailing the duties and system of government for honour consisting
of a Constitution, we declare (…) Having granted universal joy, we place an urgent
eye on ensuring the Constitution, stipulating that whoever dared to be opposed to
this Constitution or hustle on its corruption, or moved by the peacefulness of good,
happy to be starting the nation by implanting distrust, perverse translation of the
Constitution… as an enemy country, behind her a traitor, a rebel recognized, the
most severe penalties immediately they will be punished by the Sejm court.”197 The
Declaration thus assumed the punishability of actions against the Constitution. The
deputies themselves also perceived a problem with guaranteeing the performance of
its regulations, fearing that the lawmaker would be more focused on the creation of
law rather than its execution. This was the source of the deputies’ postulate to
quickly appoint the Sejm Courts, which were to ensure the Constitution was fol-
lowed, and finally fulfilled during session 82 of 27 May 1791.198
These concerns can also be interpreted as an expression of the conviction that
not all deputies considered the Constitution to be an exceptional, superior act.
Indeed, the lawmaker itself displayed a certain inconsistency, treating the Law on
196‘Zalecono iest także na Sesyi Zawczorayszey Deputacyi Konstytucyiney stosować wszystkie
przepisy dalszych projektów Rządówych do tegoż aktu fundamentalnego’, letter of Oraczewski to
NN, 7th May 1791, Warszawa, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 418k. 569.
197‘Wszystkie prawa dawne i teraźniejsze przeciwne niniejszej Konstytucji lub któremukolwiek jej
artykułowi znosimy, a opisy szczególne do artykułów i każdej materii w niniejszej Konstytucji
zamkniętych potrzebne, jako dokładniej wyszczególniające obowiązki i układ rządu, za cześć
składającą też Konstytucję deklarujemy (…) Uczyniwszy zadosyć radości powszechnej, dajemy
pilne oko na ubezpieczenie tej Konstytucji, stanowiąc, iż ktobykolwiek śmiał być przeciwnym
niniejszej Konstytucji lub targać się na jej zepsucie, albo wzruszał spokojność dobrego i
szczęśliwym być zaczynającego narodu przez zasiewanie nieufności, przewrotne tłumaczenie
Konstytucji… ten za nieprzyjaciela ojczyzny, za jej zdrajcę, za buntownika uznany, naj-
surowszymi karami natychmiast przez sąd sejmowy ukarany będzie’. Deklaracya stanów zgro-
madzonych, Volumina Legum, Wydawnictwo Komisyi Prawniczej Akademii Umiejętności w
Krakowie, Vol. IX, Kraków 1889, pp. 225–226.
198Sessya 82, 27 Maia 1791, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, pp. 353–354v.
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the royal free Cities as an integral portion of the Constitution (Art. III), and in that
manner determining constitutionally the entire issue of the burgher movement. This
is the shortest of the articles addressing social classes, with the nobility and the
peasantry given far more attention. At the same time, the Act on cities, constituting
part of the “3 May system”, was adopted following the same legislative procedure
as later acts on the Sejm and Extraordinary Sejm, and they were also referred to
directly in the wording of the Constitution. Should the entire Act on cities therefore
be considered somehow superior to other acts, was this the intention of the law-
maker? Zbigniew Szcząska would seem to make a distinction: he feels that the Act
on cities is a component of the Constitution, after which he distinguishes a group of
acts “tightly coupled” with the Constitution (the Law on assemblies, “solemnly
secured” in Art. VI of the Constitution “as the most important principle of civil
liberty”), the Declaration of the Assembled Estates and the Mutual Betrothal of the
Two Nations, and finally the executive acts (the Law on the Sejm, the Law on Sejm
Courts, the Laws on amnesty, the Guard, the police commission, the military
commission, and further laws on cities).199 This classification is, however, devoid
of any deeper procedural or substantive grounds; it is a presumption grounded in
the relationship of the lawmaker expressed in the Constitution to particular content,
and is both highly ambiguous and inconsistent. The Act on Sejms clearly sets out
two categories of acts adopted by the Sejm: “drafts of the Sejm” (“political, civil,
criminal and taxation laws”) and Sejm resolutions (one-off acts, acts of contraction,
ratification of international treaties).
As results from the deliberations already undertaken, the nullification clause did
not imply direct and automatic revocation of the previous fundamental laws. The
question must be asked of whether it thus functioned as an instrument of hierar-
chical control in respect of common legislation, and thus was the mechanism
mentioned by Oraczewski in fact applied in practice.
During further legislative work following the adoption of the Government Act, it
was indicated that constitutional provisions are contravening to adopted before Law
on Guard of the Laws (ustawa o Straży Praw),200 because both acts regulated the
sphere of executive powers and mutual relations between the king and Members of
the Guard in the other way.201
The work on Description of the Sejm (Opisanie Sejmu) deserves mention, and its
enactment on 12 and 16 May was in its own way an attempt to overcome some of the
provisions of the Government Act. As reported by Oraczewski, the changes sug-
gested during the 12 May session were to pertain to the future principles of elections
of the senators. The defence against the charge of violating the Constitution consisted
in invoking the provision on the royal nomination of senators, and the new provisions
199Szcząska (1990, p. 47).
200Volumina Legum, Vol. IX, Kraków 1889, pp. 266–270.
201Voice of the Deputy (lack of the first page with the name of the author), w Drukarni
Uprzywileiowaney Michała Grölla, Księgarza Nadwornego J.K. Mości, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 24,
k. 177.
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were only to indicate that future kings may nominate only from among two candi-
dates indicated by the each Dietine (Sejmik); this constituted a very creative piece of
legislative trickery and was in blatant contradiction with the sense of the constitu-
tion’s provisions.202 The right of clemency was also significantly restricted by
excluding “all murders, especially those in ambush and treacherous”, pointing to the
fact that the king could commission a murder and then pardon the perpetrator.203
During this and the following session the provisions of the Sejm resolution were
amended to the ‘Act of Revolution’ and adopted via secret ballot with a vote of 100 to
20.204 It was precisely the examples of the aforementioned restrictions in the scope of
ius aggratiandi and the appointment of senators that was invoked by the Saxon
ambassador Essen in his letter to minister Loss,205 expressing his doubts as to the
declared and sworn sanctity and immutability of the Constitution. Essen emphasized
that these changes came into effect within 6 days of the adoption of the Constitution.
In the opinion of the author of a key monograph on the Great Sejm, Bogusław
Leśnodorski, legislation following 3 May caused a real shift in the constitutional
model towards traditional republicanism.206
At the same time, however, the Act on Sejms analysed above contains an
extremely interesting decision in Art. XV on the Duties of the Sejm Deputation.
Namely, it places the expressis verbis obligation on members of that commission to
control submitted drafts with the fundamental law, id est the Government Act
(literally: “so that no draft aims at violating and altering the fundamental law given
the name Government Act and the immutable laws”207). In the next paragraph this
obligation is repeated: according to its wording, drafts are categorized as legislative
projects and as Sejm resolutions. The former are broken down into categories such
as political, id est “whatever aims at refinement in changing or improving particular
descriptions of the Form of the Government, yet always without violating the
fundamental law known as the Government Act”.208 Thus arose a specific obligation
of an internal nature to engage in preventative control. To date, the author has been
unable to determine whether it was applied in practice, and if so, in what scope.
202Letter of Oraczewski to NN, in Warsaw May 14th, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 418, k.
574.
203King to Deboli in the letter from 1st June 1791: “Our session of two days previous turned to
dividing and diminishing the iuris aggratiandi concentrated in my hands. I allowed this, as I
perceived a great but unnecessary shyness in the public” (‘Sesya nasza zawczoraysza zeszła na
dysceptacyach y umniejszeniu Iuris aggratiandi w moim Ręku. Jam na to zezwolił, bo widziałem
wielką lubo niesłuszną o to trwożliwość w publiczności’), AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, 413, k. 112.
204AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, 413, k. 574.
205Letter of Franciszek Essen to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Dresden, Johann Loss, of 21
May 1791, No. 26, in: Kocój (2000, pp. 54–55).
206Leśnodorski (1951, pp. 164–165). About more examples of contravening provisions cf.
Kądziela (2011, pp. 26–27).
207‘aby żaden projekt nie dążył do naruszenia i odmiany prawa fundamentalnego pod nazwą
Ustawa Rządowa i praw niewzruszonych’. Seymy (Law on Sejms), Art. XV, Volumina Legum,
Vol. IX, Kraków 1889, p. 258.
208Seymy (Law on Sejms), Volumina Legum, Vol. IX, Kraków 1889, pp. 250–266.
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The sequence of the 81 meeting of 26 May might be taken as an example, however
not certainly representative: ‘There has been a lot of inadmissible opinions that the
draft [regarding Senate] should not be taken under consideration and debate because
of its contradiction with the Government Statute’. The King declared that he himself,
along with the Deputies, had sworn the Constitution in order to protect its integrity,
and anything that could violate it would not be accepted. The Chamber admitted the
King’s words and called to restrain from such violating drafts which ‘are time
consuming and propagate unfavourable opinion of Legislators, since they have no
respect for the sacred laws’.209 Marshal of the Sejm obliged himself not to allow the
Secretary to read such drafts.210 Work on the most important laws of the May system
was associated with analysis of constitutional content, which, contradictory to the
above-mentioned example, seemed however not to constitute an absolute obstacle.
The King quite clearly stated his position on the possibility of complementing
the Constitution’s provisions by way of normal legislation. Describing the course of
the dispute during the last May session over the position of the Church in the light
of constitutional regulation, in a letter of 1 June to Deboli he wrote the following:
“Whatever is in the law of 3 May, whatever you Gentlemen swore, whatever I have
sworn upon your summons, this law cannot be changed nor violated. Yet since we
are now engaged in the details proceeding from this general Law of 3 May, if it
occurs among you that there is need to dispel any doubts which none of us could
expect when writing the law of 3 May, I shall not object to you in the moment using
such words as will best preserve what is my intention until my death that we Poles
remain in eternal unity with the Catholic Church under the Papal authority (…)”.211
Two elements stand out in this statement: on the one hand, the King highlights the
impermissibility of violating a provision of the Constitution by normal legislation,
and on the other he takes account of the framework character of the Constitution,
whose provisions are a point of departure for normal legislation of a particular
executive nature. Similar convictions were expressed by the deputy Skarszewski:
“It is your duty, most magnificent Estates, to explain and detail this Constitution
of the Third of May, in which the Republic of Poland is to be reborn”.212
209Sesja 81 z 26 maja 1791, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, p. 352.
210Sesja 81 z 26 maja 1791, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, p. 352od.
211‘Cokolwiek iest w prawie 3. Maja, coście WPanowie zaprzysięgli, com Ja za Waszym
powołaniem zaprzysiągł, to odmienionym ani ruszonym z tegoż prawa być nie może. Ale że teraz
zatrudniamy się szczegółami wypływaiącemi z tego ogulnego [sic] Prawa 3. Maja, więc ieżeli się
WPanom ukazuie potrzeba obiaśnienia tych wątpliwości, których zaiste nikt się nie spodziewał
przy pisaniu prawa 3. Maja niesprzeciwię się temu, abyście WPanowie w tych szczegółach
teraźnieyszych wpisali takie wyrazy, które naywybitniey ubeśpieczyć mogą to co iest intencją
moią do śmierci, abyśmy Polacy zostali w wieczney iedności Kościoła Katolickiego pod iedyną
głową Papieską (…)’, letter of the King to Deboli, June 1st, 1791, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn.
413, k. 113.
212‘Do Was należy, prześwietne Stany, abyście Konstytucyą trzeciego Maia, w której ma się
odrodzić Rzplita Polska, objaśnili w ciągu opisów iey szczególnych’, Głos JW. Imci X. posła
Skarszewskiego, Biskupa Hełmskiego i Lubelskiego (Voice of deputy Skarszewski, Bishop of
Chełm and Lublin), Na Sessyi Seymowej Dnia 26 Maia Roku 1791, pp. 339–340.
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Deputy Korsak several months later spoke of “stewardship of the Republic with the
immortal King and the Government Act, as if on a foundation stone” founded.213
It would seem vital to inquire as to the extent of which the nullification clause is,
in fact, proof of a legal distinction among the sources of law previously developed,
and of their subjugation to the constitution. There is no evidence allowing for a
definitive answer to the question of how much the deputies themselves distin-
guished various ranks of key laws and the Constitution. One clue as to the divergent
convictions among deputies is a statement made on 31 May by the deputy of
Podolian Voivodeship Rzewuski, who concludes “I also agree to other improve-
ments, but in the place where it is written that the successor to the Throne must
swear an oath on the Constitution, please add a description of the Constitution
intended, for one may suspect that it is only the Constitution which came about on 3
May”.214 A riposte was provided by the Kraków deputy Linowski: “from hence not
all laws are the Government Constitution, firstly, not all laws are of the range of the
Constitution, secondly, if the successor were to take his oath on the whole of the
Constitution and its elaborations, he would thereby block the route to making later
changes as need arises”.215 Opponents of constitutional provisions expanding the
privileges of the monarch invoked the argument that executive acts extend beyond
constitutional regulation.216
There was a group of deputies, particularly the Constitution’s direct authors,
whose obvious intention was to create a superior legal act. The Constitution was
understood as a framework for normal legislation. In turn, for a portion of the
conservative deputies, the May Constitution did not constitute a superior act, and
was rather regarded as another variation of the rules improving “the form of gov-
ernment”. This was the source of the real attempts at verification of its provisions
through normal legislation. Ambassador Essen wrote to Dresden the following
213Głos J.W.J: Pana Tadeusza Korsaka Seymowego i Ziem. Sędziego Posła Woiewództwa
Wileńskiego Na Sessyi Seymowey Dnia 15 marca 1792 Roku (Voice of Deputy of Vilnius
Voivodeship Tadeusz Korsak), AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 24, k. 200.
214‘Na inne poprawy równie się zgadzam, ale w tym miejscu, gdzie iest napisano, że następca
Tronu na Konstytucyą ma przysięgać proszę dodać na Konstytucyą z iey opisaniem, bo możnaby
mniemać, że to tylko iest Konstytucyą, co dnia 3 Maia stanęło’. Sessya 84. Dnia 31 Maja 1791,
AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, p. 387v.
215‘nayprzód nie wszystkie prawa są Konstytucyą Rządową, y powtóre, gdy następca przysięgał
na całość Konstytucyi z iey opisami, iużby tym samym zagrodziła się droga czynienia odmian w
szczególnościach podług uznania potrzeby’. Sessya 84. Dnia 31 Maja 1791, AGAD, ASCz, sygn.
19, pp. 388–388v.
216(„P. Siwicki Trocki… Wnosi nakoniec, że gdy koniecznie utrzymać się podoba w proiekcie ten
wyraz, którego w całey ustawie rządowey nie czyta: że komisja wojskowa chociażby przeciwną
prawu decyzyą króla w Straży, jednak provisorie uskutecznić powinna, domagając się zwołania
seymu: aby te provisorie nie rozciągało się do dyslokacyi, i ruszenia woyska bez woli seymu
gotowego”). Gazeta Narodowa Y Obca z Warszawy w Sobotę Dnia 19. Maia Roku 1792.
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words: “The final text of all articles of the new Constitution will be the subject of
debate during future sessions of the Sejm”.217
The events of 3 May should be perceived as a significant acceleration down the
path of reform of the political and administrative system, the creation of a frame-
work for more detailed work. Indeed, as experience had shown that earlier sessions
lasting countless hours, which were the subject of complaints particularly after the
doubling of the Sejm, did not bring any measurable effects. The method of pro-
ceeding on the Draft to the form of government was an utter failure, as the deputies
and senators were capable of fighting interminably over the mere shape of the
agenda, return to discussing the issue of the assemblies, or engage in work on the
Cardinal Laws. After passing the Constitution, legislative work undertaken on the
basis of improved procedures accelerated significantly, but violations of it still
occurred at times.
The circumstances described would seem to prove that there was still no com-
mon, shared conviction as to the particular precedence of the Government Act in
the legal system; this view is shared by some contemporary scholars.218 The
position of parliamentarians as to the supremacy of the Constitution was not, as has
been described, consistent. Insofar as the provisions of the Law on Sejms establish
an obligation to control drafts against the fundamental law, id est the Government
Act, the detailed regulations in the same act concerning the scope of royal authority
would doubtlessly be adjudicated from a modern perspective as unconstitutional. In
turn, the manner in which the Constitution was celebrated by local assemblies in
later months demonstrated that the nobility was aware of how extraordinary the
events were, and of the particular nature of the law adopted on 3 May. Acts of
celebration, widespread oaths sworn by citizens who did not even hold official
offices, celebrations of the anniversary on 3 May 1792 all come together and form a
sort of visual dimension.219 It cannot be denied that the supremacy of the
217Letter of Franciszek Essen to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Dresden, Johann Loss, of 7th
May 1791, No. 22, in: Kocój (2000, p. 43).
218Matuszewski (2007, p. 301). Totally opposing position by Wacław Uruszczak who regrets that,
as the saying “you praise the foreign, but don’t know your own” goes, contemporary researchers
(P. Tuleja) overlook the legislative achievements of the Grand Sejm in respect of the
Constitution’s supremacy. Cf. Uruszczak (2013b, p. 252, annot. 23).
219Bishop Kossakowski appealed to make 8 May, the day of the patron saint of the King, a holiday
for the Constitution. The Sejm adopted a resolution on raising the Temple of the Highest
Providence as an expression of gratitude for passing the Government Act. This was written in the
Declaration of the Assembled Estates: “For the children of ages to feel all the stronger, that a work
so desired, in spite of the greatest difficulties and obstacles, with the aid of the Highest Steward of
the fate of nations leading us to our aim, we have not forfeited this joyous moment for the salvation
of the nation, we resolve that a church ex voto of all estates be erected in commemoration and
consecrated to the highest Providence”. The first architectural competition in Poland was
announced for a design of the church. A year later, during the anniversary celebrations, a
cornerstone was laid; yet by the outbreak of war with Russia, only a chapel was built. Another
competition was planned for the twenty years of the inter-war period, after the restoration of
independence, but it was initially inconclusive. Ultimately there was an attempt at merging the
winning design with an estate planned as a memorial to Józef Piłsudski, who died in 1935.
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Constitution crystalized through something other than strictly juridical practice. The
theoretical recommendations of the lawmaker about revisions of the Constitution
were, for obvious reasons, not implemented.
8 The Procedure of Constitutional Revision
Although the preamble to the Constitution consisted of statements declaring the
Constitution “sacred and inviolable”, this did not mean the intention not to change it
in a legal sense, but rather referred to the process of implementing and observing it.220
Already on the basis of the “Form of government draft” the first regulations on
an amendment of special rights appeared. Modifying the cardinal principles could
be done only by unanimity of the Dietines’ instruction, whereas ordinary consti-
tutional law and tax law by a majority of 3/4 of instructions, and civil and criminal
law—by an absolute majority of instructions. Only for military, education and
police affairs was the possibility of amendments with a majority of votes allowed
(simple or qualified) without recourse to the instructions of the Dietines.
There were already regulations for revisions in the first draft text of the
Constitution itself. Scipione Piattoli’s text “Projet de réforme de Constitution”
refers to an improvement of the Constitution which can be made through changes
based on a 2/3 majority of Dietines’ instructions. This, however, does not concern
the most important regulations, but only complementary regulation, referred to as
the detailed portion (partie réglamentaire) dedicated to the organizational and
procedural matters of parliament, and Guard. Suitable “réglements are still adopted
by this Sejm and then they shall become part of the Constitution”.221
In his analysis of the revision of the 3 May Constitution, Marian Kallas cites the
introduction to the Constitution’s draft written by Alexander Linowski. In contrast
to the final wording of the Constitution, Linowski’s draft represented the “unani-
mous” rather than the later “clear” (Pol.‘wyraźna’) will of the people to “recognize
the need to alter an article in it [the Constitution]”. The later version is an
expression of a different, more liberal concept of amending the Constitution.222
The Piattoli drafts include plans to amend the Constitution every 20 years unless
4/5 of the Chamber request the convention of an extraordinary meeting, the
Constituent Assembly. Another version involved the request to convene the
“Convention” by 4/5 of the provinces and when 2/3 of its members opt for change.
However, before the outbreak of World War II no serious work was done. After the collapse of the
Polish People’s Republic the parliament was reminded of the unfulfilled obligation, and both
chambers adopted the appropriate resolution in 1998. A cornerstone was laid in 2002. Recently the
temple was consecrated, and it is home to the Pantheon of Great Poles and the John Paul II
Museum-Institute.
220Szmyt (2006, p. 22).
221„Projet...”, AGAD, APP, sygn. 197, p. 663; Leśnodorski (1951, p. 199).
222Kallas (2001, p. 524).
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The original drafts also included concepts such as validity of the constitution
(directly associated with Stanisław August) during the reign of only one King (as
Pacta Conventa), or amending the Constitution only at the request of the entirety of
the nation.223
Finally, the 3 May Constitution contains detailed provisions on this issue. It can
be assumed that its findings were perceived in advance as requiring clarification and
adjustment to changing circumstances, and the constitution on 3 May “was not
closed or constant. It was more of a process than a structure.”224 The text of the
Constitution contained an announcement of the adoption of further laws, in par-
ticular civil and criminal codification. Kołłątaj declared that in addition to the
adopted “political constitution” there would come other, economic and moral
ones.225
The preamble to the 3 May Constitution, as mentioned, refers to the possible
need “to alter” the articles of the Constitution. The issue was further developed in
Art. VI, which proclaimed “on the one hand preventing abrupt and frequent
changes of the national constitution, and on the other, recognizing the need of
perfection thereof after experiencing its consequences for the welfare of the public,
we establish a twenty-five-year period at the termination of which the revision and
improvement of the Constitution should be effected. With a desire to have an
extraordinary constitutional Sejm based on a separate description of the law… ”.226
The term “revision” should be understood as a significant change, while
“improvement” is less of a legal definition; rather, we are talking about a process of
improvement and refinement. Thus a number of expressions such as variety, cor-
rection and revision were used by legislative power inconsistently.
Revision should thus be effected by an extraordinary constitutional Sejm, held
every 25 years, and the law on the extraordinary Sejm, the act under discussion,227
was a part of the 3 May system.
Debate over the details of the procedure took place inter alia during the 82nd
session on 27 May 1791.228 The debate included discussion of the potential to
extend sessions beyond the 15 days assumed in the draft, indicating the significance
223Łaszewski (1973, pp. 90, 146–147).
224Leśnodorski (1971, p. 422).
225Mowa Hugona Kołłątaja na sesji sejmowej 28 VI 1791 R. In: Borowski (1938). Cf. broader on
Kołłątaj: Lis (2015, pp. 189–257); also: Dihm (1959), passim, and the discussion around this
work, esp. articles of Rostworowski and Dihm’s polemics. Finally: Rostworowski (1985).
226‘zapobiegając z jednej strony gwałtownym i częstym odmianom konstytucji narodowej, z
drugiej uznając potrzebę wydoskonalenia onej po doświadczeniu jej skutków co do pomyślności
publicznej, porę i czas rewizyi i poprawy Konstytucji co lat dwadzieścia pięć naznaczamy. Chcąc
mieć takowy sejm konstytucyjny ekstraordynaryjny podług osobnego o nim opisu prawa…’
Ustawa rządowa, Volumina Legum, Vol. IX, Kraków 1889, CCLXVII, p. 222.
227Seym konstytucyiny extra-ordynaryiny (Law on constitutional extraordinary Sejm), Volumina
Legum, Vol. IX, Kraków 1889, CCXCVI, pp. 241–243.
228Sessya 82. Dnia 27. Maja 1791 R., AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19v, pp. 353–366.
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of matters discussed during the sessions, as well as the issue of a potential collision
between an ordinary Sejm and extraordinary one.
The regulation ultimately adopted made extensive use of references to provisions
in the Law on Sejms. The same procedure would be akin to the one applicable in an
ordinary Sejm, with some exceptions. After the selection of Sejm judges, the
“reading of legislative drafts” was supposed to begin. Priority was given to the
proposals “given from the throne to local councils”, the first “draft of political
constitutional rights” (the determinant here is Art. VI, consisting of rights
“astringent to the rights contained in the law under the title of Government Act”),
followed by “projects to ordinary political rights” (art. 4). The project of amend-
ment, as results from the foregoing, should be already known in advance and
discussed during Dietines’ sessions, which would give Members a special mandate
for reform.229 Those would be the carriers of legislative initiatives (Art. 4(2)).
The revision should not impact “immutable laws” nor the Pacta Conventa (Art.
VI)—thus, a category of laws with precedence over the Government Act exists! Yet
it was not indicated which laws were being referred to—we may presume that one
determinant can be the wording of the Constitution itself (the division of powers to
be in effect “for all time”, the privileges of the nobles to remain “inviolate”, per-
sonal safety and property “we wish to remain inviolate”).230 Control over this was
entrusted to the Constitutional Deputation, which could “declare the need” of
withdrawing or amending a draft. If the author of the draft did not intend to comply,
as under the normal legislative procedure the Deputation should make note of this
in its opinion for the Sejm.
The chamber, in the absence of unanimity, was supposed to decide by a simple
majority first in an open vote, or if any objections were noted then by secret vote,
even if no such motion was tabled. After the reading of the draft and opinion of the
constitutional deputation, the Marshal was to ask for the acceptance of the entire
draft, or consent to its amendment. In the event of an objection he should ask if it
was the deputies’ opinion to reject the draft in its entirety, or to amend it; his
proposal led only to an affirmative/negative vote. In the event of a majority voting
to jettison the draft, it could not again be submitted for voting to that Sejm. If the
option to amend the project passed, the Marshal was supposed to allow interested
deputies to speak and their remarks were to be presented to the constitutional
deputation. This fact could not disrupt the agenda, and the Sejm was to work on the
next drafts on the schedule.
The revised draft returned to the chamber, and there was another vote if una-
nimity as to its adoption in toto could not be reached. Ultimately, drafts on political
constitutional laws or political ordinal laws were to proceed to the Senate. Here the
King was to speak. Next, the Marshal was to ask the Senate for its opinion, which
decided whether the draft should be adopted, which completed the legislative
229Leśnodorski (1951, p. 283). Szmyt (2006, p. 29).
230As Szcząska (1990, p. 61), cited: Leśnodorski (1951, p. 365), and Radwański (1952, pp. 175–
176).
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process, or whether to return it to the other chamber for the deputies to decide again.
In the latter case the Senate could only present its “remarks on the desired law, with
counsel as to what ought be amended or altered (Art. VII)”. The lower house then
took steps analogous to those in the first stage, but its decision served to conclude
proceedings. The Marshal of the Sejm and members of the constitutional deputation
then affixed their signatures to the adopted law, and the secretary sent it for oblation
not later than three days. Beyond “constitutional” law, the Extraordinary Sejm
would also deal with executive law. Sessions should conclude three months prior to
the next ordinary Sejm.
Constitutional reform would constitute a legal obligation, not an optionality, and
Andrzej Szmyt rightly cites in this regard the literal interpretation of the
Constitution.231 The first Extraordinary Sejm was to be convened in 1816 (the date
was set for exactly 1 October), so in a time when the Polish lands had already been
given another occupational constitution.
9 Summary
Understanding of the principle of constitutional precedence raises numerous doubts
in the Polish case. Although this rule was stated expressis verbis in the Declaration
of the Assembled Estates, previous studies allow for the ascertainment that its
content and significance for the legal order was perceived differently. The con-
clusions that the researcher may arrive are paradoxical, and in their own way even
slightly schizophrenic.
The inclusion in the Constitution of assumptions about the special role of the
Government Act is a fact. The implementation of a nullification clause in the
Declaration of the Assembled Estates is a fact. This was an exceptional invention, a
Polish product, and one which would seem an epoch ahead of its time. At the same
time, however, in light of experienced practice, we may not accept without reser-
vations the claim of a general recognition of a superior position of constitution
towards other sources of law. The Government Act was not a constitutional
breakthrough like the acts of revolution in North America and France; it did not
overturn an existing social system, but merely reformed a political one without
disrupting the evolutionary continuity with the Henrician Articles and the Cardinal
Laws. Invoking the words of Leśnodorski: the “fundamental norm” of the previous
ancien regime was not subjected to any sort of radical transformation in the
reformed political system of the noble Republic.232
We may agree as to the purpose of introducing the supremacy clause: first and
foremost, it was the desire to guarantee the desired stability of the system, while at
231Szmyt (2006, pp. 26–27).
232Leśnodorski (1951, p. 374).
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the same time being aware that the Constitutional Act itself was an act against inter
alia the legal state established in the Cardinal Laws (1768/75).
A ‘legalistic’ narrative turned against the Constitution may be viewed in the acts
that were issued from the imperial office in Russia. The most essential accusation
made towards the constitution refers to the breach of laws that had previously been
taken for permanent and inviolable. This assumed to be unintentionally comical for
the contemporary researcher when the authoritarian empress rebukes the reformers
for violating freedoms and age-old prerogatives through the fact that the “Throne of
Poland was converted from elective to hereditary, and the law dictated by the
wisdom of their ancestors, which now forbids to prepare the king’s successor while
he is still alive, was boldly violated, just as all the other laws which had ensured the
sustainability of the Republic”.233 The other accusation was aimed at the legality of
the enactment of the Constitution, i.e. the legitimacy of the Sejm (whose office was
extended) and the procedures. The Empress also undermined the process of con-
firmation of the Constitution by the assemblies (swearing of an oath or sending a
congratulatory message in conjunction with its adoption), declaring that “the
assemblies were insincere, as they were under threat of arms”.234
It is difficult to judge how much of an advancement the Constitution was
compared to the cardinal laws in the precedence question. The perception of the
relationship between the Constitution and acts should be regarded as inconsistent.
The key acts, especially the Law on Cities, were straightforwardly regarded as
components of the Constitution. One should agree that together they constituted a
peculiar “3 May system”, yet attributing binding force to them on par with the
provisions of the Government Act would be too far-reaching. Last but not least, in
the following days and months, the deputies made attempts to introduce regulations
into ordinary legislation that were contrary to the Constitution.
However, at the same time the clauses related to the obligation to adjust legis-
lation to the provisions of the Government Act are a much more progressive sys-
temic solution than the vouching of the ‘inviolability’ of the Cardinal Laws 1768/75
in which, as indicated, they did not result in being ascribed a superior role, and first
and foremost they were to serve as inviolable protection against changes in the
keystones of the state system. The latter included the privileges of the nobility at
once constituting certain components of the political system, such as the free
election and liberum veto, which were but derivatives of privileges. As shown by
earlier remarks, the adoption of the Constitution did not entail the automatic
rejection of the category of inviolable rights, but, quite the contrary, the act of
‘system of 3 May’ enigmatically invokes this category. It may be understood as an
expression of respect for the past in the dimension of social and legal traditions.
233‘Tron Polski z Elekcyinego w dziedziczny przemienion, y to Prawo, które mądrość ich
przodków dyktowała, y które zabrania za życia króla, zamyślać o obraniu iego Następcy, było
równie zuchwale zgwałcone iak wszystkie inne, które zapewniały trwałość nieustaiącą
Rzeczypospolitey’, Deklaracyia, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 24, k. 81.
234Letter of the King to Deboli, March 21st, 1792, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413, k. 336.
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Contemporary acceptance of the assumption of supremacy of the Constitution
leads to the innovative effect of accepting the concept of unconstitutionality, id est
the obligation to eliminate from the legal order acts which are incompatible with the
Constitution. And again, at the level of the acts comprising the “3 May system” (on
the Sejm and the Extraordinary Sejm), this conception remains implemented to a
limited degree. The Sejm deputation was entrusted with the power of preventative
constitutional control of draft legislation. However, this was an internal body of the
Sejm, whereby it could be subjected to pressure and did not have at its disposal
mechanisms that could definitively block an unconstitutional draft. Constitutional
practice, which would undoubtedly teem with disagreements over the compliance
of acts with the Constitution and which would have to handle the issue of the lack
of institutionalised control and of an organ appointed to settle constitutional dis-
putes, was thus never experienced. It should be acknowledged that only an inde-
pendent judicial organ is capable of imposing a shape on clauses concerning the
supreme character of the Constitution. European countries came to this conclusion
much, much later. The clause is therefore an unprecedented phenomenon, far ahead
of its time.
It would thus seem that the existing situation can be interpreted as a sort of
intermediate stage, symbolizing the arrival of a substantive and axiological legal
understanding of the Constitution’s supremacy. However, had the formal legal stage
been reached? Any answer to this question must take into account an ever-present
contradiction, a dissonance: although the Constitution was given an exceptionally
modern nullification clause, well ahead of its time, in the awareness of many the
Government Act constituted only a modernization and dressing-up of the old sys-
tem. The Constitution was not written in opposition to the old laws, like other acts of
modern constitutionalism—and even if this was the intention of the reformers, they
were exceptionally circumspect in expressing it—but in response to the interna-
tional situation, as a means of strengthening the state and countering a potential
external threat (per the preamble “for the establishment of freedom, for the salvation
of our Fatherland and its borders, with the greatest constancy of spirit”). For this
reason the supremacy written into the Constitution should in the first place be
associated with the clear effort in many speeches by deputies to create and maintain
a lasting system, resistant to sudden change. And most likely this “traditional”
perception allowed it to achieve the success of being adopted in May 1791. At the
same time, we should objectively assess—and appreciate—the innovative Polish
steps along the path of encapsulating the state order in a constitutional act, as well as
hierarchization of the legal system, however imperfect they may have been.
Although just one year later the anniversary of the Constitution was celebrated, it
was soon followed by Russian intervention and a war in defence of the
Constitution. After the defeat, the last Sejm of the Republic of Poland convened in
Grodno which, under the pressure of the Russian army, intimidation and abductions
of wayward deputies, led to the formal overthrow of the Constitution. Calls for a
return to its presumptions in later decades were essentially unrealistic. The
Government Act had evolved into the most precious myth accompanying Poles
during times of partition and celebrated in the era of freedom.
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10 Summary (Polish)
Drugi tom ustaleń projektu badawczego ReConFort poświęcony został zagadnieniu
nadrzędności konstytucji. Tymczasem kwestia rozumienia zasady prymatu kon-
stytucji budzi w przypadku polskiej Ustawy Rządowej z 1791 r. rozmaite
wątpliwości. Choć zasada ta zostaje wyrażona expressis verbis w towarzyszącej
konstytucji Deklaracji Stanów Zgromadzonych, to jednak dotychczasowe badania
pozwalają na konstatację, iż jej treści i znaczenie dla porządku prawnego post-
rzegano w różny sposób. Wnioski, do jakich dochodzi badacz, są na swój sposób
paradoksalne.
Faktem jest zawarcie w konstytucji założenia o szczególnej roli ustawy
rządowej. Faktem jest wprowadzenie do Deklaracji Stanów Zgromadzonych
klauzuli nullifikacyjnej. Był to zupełnie niezwykły wynalazek, powstały na rodz-
imym gruncie, i zdający się wyprzedzać całą kolejną epokę. Zarazem jednak wobec
doświadczonej praktyki - tzn. działań Sejmu Wielkiego w kolejnych tygodniach
obrad po uchwaleniu Ustawy Rządowej - nie można bez zastrzeżeń przyjąć tezy o
powszechnym uznaniu nadrzędnego charakteru wobec pozostałych źródeł prawa.
Ustawa rządowa nie stanowiła konstytucyjnego przełomu, jak akty rewolucji w
Ameryce Północnej i Francji, nie zburzyła istniejącego systemu społecznego,
zreformowała jedynie polityczny, nie zrywając ciągłości ewolucyjnej z artykułami
henrykowskimi i prawami kardynalnymi. Odwołując się do słów Bogusława
Leśnodorskiego: „Norma podstawowa” dotychczasowego starego ustroju nie uległa
też w gruncie rzeczy jakiejś zasadniczej przemianie w reformowanym ustroju
Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej”.235
Zgodzić się należy co do celu wprowadzenia klauzuli nadrzędności: było nim
przede wszystkim dążenie do zagwarantowania upragnionej stabilności ustroju przy
świadomości, że sam akt konstytucyjny zwrócił się przeciwko stanowi prawnemu
utrwalonemu choćby w prawach kardynalnych 1768/75.
Narrację „legalistyczną” skierowaną przeciwko konstytucji prześledzić można w
aktach wychodzących z kancelarii imperatorowej rosyjskiej. Podstawowy zarzut
stawiany konstytucji odnosi się do złamania praw uchodzących do tej pory za stałe i
niezmienne. Przyjęło to niezamierzenie komiczny dla dzisiejszego badacza wyraz,
gdy autorytarna imperatorowa gani reformatorów za naruszenie wolności i wie-
kowych prerogatyw, choćby poprzez fakt, że „Tron Polski z Elekcyinego w
dziedziczny przemienion, y to Prawo, które mądrość ich przodków dyktowała, y
które zabrania za życia króla, zamyślać o obraniu iego Następcy, było równie
zuchwale zgwałcone iak wszystkie inne, które zapewniały trwałość nieustaiącą
Rzeczypospolitey”.236 Drugi z zarzutów, podejmowany przez rodzimych krytyków
a następnie dyplomację rosyjską, uderzał w legalność procesu uchwalenia kon-
stytucji, tj. samą legitymację sejmu (którego kadencję przedłużano) a następnie
procedury. Imperatorowa podważała także proces swoistego zatwierdzenia
235Leśnodorski (1951, p. 374).
236Deklaracyia, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 24, k. 81.
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konstytucji przez sejmiki (złożenie przysięgi lub przesyłanie gratulacji z powodu
uchwalenia), twierdząc, że „sejmiki udały się, bo pod bronią”.237
Niełatwo odpowiedzieć na pytanie, na ile konstytucja stanowiła krok do przodu
w drodze do nadrzędności systemowej wobec praw kardynalnych 1768/75. Jako
niezbyt konsekwentne należy ocenić postrzeganie relacji między konstytucją a
ustawami. Kluczowe ustawy, w szczególności prawo o miastach królewskich,
wprost uznano za części składowe konstytucji. Zgodzić się należy, że stanowiły one
wespół swoisty system 3 Maja, ale przypisanie im wszystkim identycznej mocy
obowiązującej, jak przepisom Ustawy Rządowej, należy uznać za nadużycie.
Wreszcie, posłowie już w kolejnych dniach i miesiącach sejmu podjęli próby
przeprowadzenia w ustawodawstwie zwykłym regulacji sprzecznych z konstytucją,
choćby w zakresie królewskiego prawa powoływania senatorów czy ius
aggratiandi.
Zarazem jednak bezpośrednie klauzule dotyczące obowiązku dostosowania
ustawodawstwa do przepisów Ustawy Rządowej są rozwiązaniem systemowym
dużo dalej idącym niż zaręczenia „nienaruszalności” praw kardynalnych, w
których, jak wskazano, nie skutkowały one przypisaniem im nadrzędnej roli, a
przede wszystkim stanowić miały uroczyste zabezpieczenie przed zmianami w
zakresie zworników systemu państwa. Tymi ostatnimi były przywileje szlacheckie
stanowiące zarazem pewne komponenty systemu politycznego, jak wolna elekcja i
liberum veto. Przyjęcie konstytucji nie oznaczało automatycznego odrzucenia
kategorii praw nienaruszalnych, a wręcz odwrotnie, ustawy „systemu 3 Maja” dość
enigmatycznie przywołują tę kategorię. Można to zjawisko rozumieć również jako
swoisty wyraz poszanowania przeszłości w wymiarze tradycji społecznych i
prawnych.
Współcześnie przyjęcie założenia nadrzędności konstytucji jest powiązane z
nowoczesnym skutkiem, akceptacją koncepcji niekonstytucyjności, tj. obowiązku
eliminacji z porządku prawnego ustaw pozbawionych waloru zgodności z
konstytucją. I znów, na poziomie ustaw „systemu 3 Maja” (o Sejmie i Sejmie
Ekstra-Ordynaryjnym) ta koncepcja zostaje w ograniczonym stopniu zrealizowana.
Deputacji sejmowej powierzono kompetencję prewencyjnej kontroli
konstytucyjności projektów ustaw. Był to jednak organ wewnętrzny sejmu, mógł
pozostawać zatem podatny na naciski, zarazem nie dysponował mechanizmami
trwale blokującymi niekonstytucyjny projekt. Nie dane było zaznać konstytucji
praktyki, w której niewątpliwie doszłoby do sporów o zgodność ustaw z
konstytucją. Należy zgodzić się, że dopiero niezawisły organ sądowniczy jest w
stanie nadać realny kształt klauzulom o nadrzędnym charakterze konstytucji. O tym
kraje europejskie przekonały się znacznie, znacznie później. Klauzula jest zatem
zjawiskiem niebywałym, wyprzedzającym całą epokę.
Wydaje się zatem, że można interpretować istniejącą sytuację jako swoisty stan
pośredni, symbolizujący raczej osiągnięcie fazy prawno-materialnego, aksjolog-
icznego rozumienia nadrzędności konstytucji. Czy jednak osiągnięto już fazę
237Letter of the King to Deboli, March 21st, 1792, AGAD, Zbiór Popielów, sygn. 413 k. 336.
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formalno-prawną? Odpowiedź na to pytanie uwzględniać musi tę nieusuwalną
sprzeczność, dysonans: choć do konstytucji wprowadzono niezwykle nowoczesną,
wyprzedzającą epokę klauzulę nullifikacyjną, to jednak w świadomości wielu
ustawa rządowa stanowiła ona jedynie nową, zmodernizowaną szatę starego sys-
temu. Konstytucji nie napisano w otwartej kontrze do starych praw, jak innych
aktów nowoczesnego konstytucjonalizmu—a nawet jeśli taka była intencja
reformatorów, to wyrażano ją niezwykle oględnie - lecz w kontrze do sytuacji
międzynarodowej, jako środek wzmocnienia państwa i przeciwdziałania potenc-
jalnemu zagrożeniu zewnętrznemu (w preambule dosłownie: „dla ugruntowania
wolności, dla ocalenia Ojczyzny naszej i jej granic z największą stałością ducha”).
Stąd zapisaną w konstytucji nadrzędność należy w pierwszej kolejności kojarzyć z
wyrażanym w wielu mowach poselskich dążeniem do utworzenia i zachowania
trwałego, odpornego na gwałtowne zmiany systemu. I najprawdopodobniej takie jej
„tradycyjne” pojmowanie w ogóle pozwoliło na sukces, na uchwalenie Ustawy
Rządowej w maju 1791 r. Jednocześnie należy obiektywnie ocenić - i docenić –
nowatorskie polskie kroki na drodze do zamknięcia porządku państwowego w
akcie konstytucyjnym oraz hierarchizacji systemu prawa, jakiekolwiek chybotliwe
by one nie były.
Choć jeszcze rok później uroczyście obchodzono rocznicę uchwalenia konsty-
tucji, to niebawem doszło do interwencji rosyjskiej i wojny w obronie konstytucji.
Po przegranej zebrał się w Grodnie ostatni sejm Rzeczypospolitej, który pod
naciskiem wojsk rosyjskich, w atmosferze zastraszania i porwań niepokornych
posłów doprowadził do formalnego obalenia konstytucji. Nawoływania do powrotu
do jej założeń w późniejszych dziesięcioleciach były już w zasadzie nierealne.
Ustawa rządowa przekształciła się w najcenniejszy mit, towarzyszący Polakom w
dobie zaborów i czczony w epoce wolności.
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Abstract This article is devoted to the question of the precedence of the 1815
Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland. The paper has been divided into three
major parts.
In the first, introductory part the origins of the 1815 Constitution are discussed. This
part of the article presents the current state of the art of the polish legal history concerning
the genesis of this highest normative act of the 1815–1830 Polish Kingdom. Following
the explanations provided by of S. Askenazy, H. Izdebski, D. Nawrot and S. Smolka, it
has been expounded that the idea of a Constitution for a semi-independent Polish
Kingdom was conceptualised as a propaganda instrument in the intellectual tug of war
between France and Russia over the Polish society during the Napoleonic Wars. The
Constitution itself had been being elaborated since 1811 with the participation of various
polish politicians of the pro-Russian party, including F. K. Drucki-Lubecki, M. K.
Ogiński, L. Plater and prince A. Czartoryski. After the ground-breaking victory of the
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sixth coalition spearheaded by Alexander I Romanov over the French forces, it became a
founding stone of the newly re-established Polish Kingdom.
In the next part of the this short study, the main regulations of the Polish 1815
Constitution have been outlined, with the special focus on those regulations which
pertain to the precedence of Constitution and to the criminal law.
The third main part of the article discusses the issue of the supremacy of the 1815
Constitution with reference to its relationship with the ordinary legislation adopted in
the Polish Kingdom. It has been illustrated with an analysis of legislative process of the
only (apart from the Civil Code of the Kingdom of Poland 1825, which de facto was a
very slight modification of the Napoleonic Civil Code) fully-fledged codification of the
entire branch of law which succeeded in being adopted by the Parliament (“Sejm”) of
the Kingdom of Poland: the Criminal Code of 1818. Those parliamentary debates have
so far not been analysed more extensively (the valuable, yet short reference made by
J. Śliwowski—to whom I am very indebted for his great and inspiring study on this
piece of legislation—in his monograph almost 60 years ago can hardly be considered
to be exhausting in this respect) in the literature of the subject. The speeches held by the
polish deputies to Sejm of the year 1818 explicitly corroborate that a rhetorical argu-
ment of a possible unconstitutionality or conversely, congruence with the 1815
Constitution, was widely invoked by both the supporters and opponents of the project.
This striving for coherence of the to-be-legislated normative act with the Constitution
was also reflected in the adopted legal text of the Code itself, which was to a great
extent compatible with the stipulations of the 1815 Constitution. Thus, this short
investigation leads to the conclusion that at this point of the development of the Polish
constitutional discourse it can be stated that ground-breaking idea of the supremacy of
the Constitution was already clearly recognised.
1 Introduction
The importance of understanding Constitutions not merely as legal texts, but also
taking into account “societal context, political practice and respective constitu-
tional interpretation”1 calls for detailed studies how the constitutional principles
were incorporated and developed in the ordinary legislation. This approach will be
applied in the following paper to investigate into the relationship between the
notoriously liberal Constitution of the Polish Kingdom of 1815 and one of the very
few examples of a more comprehensive legislation which succeeded in being
adopted in this Russian protectorate before the beginning of its annihilation after
the fall of the November Uprising in 1831—Criminal Code of 1818.2 Therefore
the paper—in line with the main principles of the ReConFort research
1Müßig (2014, 27, p. 122).
2It would be very difficult to call the Polish Civil Code of 1825 (Kodex Cywilny Królestwa
Polskiego z 1825 r.) as an independent codification since it as A. Dziadzio rightly states (cf.
Dziadzio 2008, p. 229) it: “in fact was a slight novelization of those regulations of Napoleon’s
Code which did not find social approval”.
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program3 focuses not on “an abstract perception of the political history of
ideas” but on “the political polemics in concrete situations of conflict”.4
2 The Origins of the 1815 Constitution of the Kingdom
of Poland
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland belongs to the rather less researched into
among all of the European Constitutions of the XIX century; especially any kind of
more extensive literature in the English language is missing. For this reason it appears
crucial to make a brief introductory presentation of this legal act, aimed not only at
characterising its textual content,5 but much more importantly, at expounding the
intricacies of its creation and implementation in the Kingdom of Poland.
In the following part I will be relaying on the findings of the polish secondary
literature of the subject, especially on the fundamental works of S. Askenazy,6
H. Izdebski,7 Dariusz Nawrot8 and S. Smolka9 whose contributions provided us with
almost everything that we currently know about the genesis of this highest normative
act of the Polish Kingdom 1815–1830. Therefore, this part of the article, itself not
adding to the state of the art but rather and mostly narrating the already established
conclusions in the polish legal history, will serve as an introduction10 to the pre-
sentation of the debate on the Sejm in 1818 in the subsequent part of this paper.
At the very beginning of this sketch it has to be stressed that due to the
incompleteness of the preserved sources from the period of creation of the 1815
Constitution it is impossible to state with certainty what were the origins of this
3As it has been stressed by principal investigator of the ReConFort ERC Advanced Grant, Müßig
(s.a., p. 3) the research within this scientific enterprise is directed not merely at analysing the legal
texts of the past Constitutions, but includes a much broader perspective where “the constitution is
understood as an evolutionary achievement of the interplay of the constitutional text with its
contemporary societal context”.
4Müßig (s.a., p. 6).
5Which to the necessary extent will be discussed later in this article. All the quotations of the
regulations of the Constitution of Poland 1815 will be made according to the English translation of
this legal act published as: Constitutional charter of the Kingdom of Poland in the year 1815,
London 1831.
6Askenazy (1907). The contribution of Szymon Askenazy is particularly valuable since this author
did have access to the sources which subsequently, during the upheaval of the war were lost and
subsequent authors have to rely on him, cf. e.g. Izdebski (1990, pp. 194).
7Izdebski (1972). This explanation of the genesis of the polish Constitution has also been repeated
by Izdebski (1990, pp. 185–198).
8Nawrot (2008).
9Smolka (1907).
10I considered such a prolonged introduction especially necessary for the international reader who
may not be able to access the relevant literature in the polish language and bearing in mind that the
facts concerning the origins of the Polish 1815 Constitution are little known outside Poland.
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normative act.11 Nonetheless there can be no doubts that after the fall of the Polish
Commonwealth in the year 1795 the Polish and Lithuanian nobility living in the
regions incorporated into the tsar’s Empire adopted a somewhat ambiguous
approach towards the Russian authorities.12 Praising them for providing stability
and security13 was simultaneously intertwined with conceptualising plans and
requests to obtain more autonomy under the Russian protectorate14 and subse-
quently (approximately since May 1810) with attempts to decrease taxation burdens
imposed by the Russian authorities.15 Such a situation is to be explained by the fact
that the great Polish noblemen (“magnateria”), after the fall of the Polish
Commonwealth did not obtain independence or more autonomy, but, due to their
weakness—were rather forced to seek accommodation with the partitioning pow-
ers.16 Moreover, there was a profound conviction that the fate of Polish
11The most comprehensive explanation, which is also shared by the author of this article, has been
provided by H. Izdebski, who (similarly as S. Smolka already did in the year 1907) pinpointed to
the fact that the first drafts of this Constitution go back to the period of the years 1811–1812, when
Alexander I attempted to create a counterbalance for the Duchy of Warsaw by reviving the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania and equipping it with a semi-independent position, founded on a granted
Constitution. Cf. Izdebski (1972, p. 109). This explanation of the genesis of the polish Constitution
has also been repeated by Izdebski (1990, pp. 185–198). Those findings of H. Izdebski, being in
the authors’ opinion the most convincing and also coherent with the views of the earlier
researchers, at many places have been inspiration for the narration ensuing here. I am also very
indebted to Izdebski for his lavish footnotes, which proved to be very valuable when beginning to
seek for the relevant sources for the ReConFort project.
12It is also worth mentioning that this refers also to the attitude of Polish nobility towards two
others countries which took part in the partition of the Polish territories, cf. in this respect general
remarks of Lelewel (1961, p. 476).
13Szoper (2004, p. 244) and Izdebski (1972, pp. 96–97). This last author, noting this accommo-
dating positions of the polish nobility quotes here Kajetan Koźmian, a prominent polish nobleman,
who in his memoirs (1858, p. 296) supposedly wrote: “In some respect we have it better than
during the polish times, we have a bigger part of that, what our home country gave us, but we do
not have burden and danger of a massacre of Uman [the massacre of ca. 2000 Polish and Jewish
inhabitants of the town Uman during the Ukrainian haidamack rebellion in 1768—information by
the author], and be it without Poland, we are in Poland and we are Polish”. Yet it has to be
stressed that the copy of those memoirs available to the author does not contain such a statement
on the mentioned page. Furthermore, as it has been established in the detailed research into the
economic situation in Lithuania, it did deteriorate sharply after the year 1805, with the loss of more
than 20% of population and significant increase in taxes levied by the Russian authorities (for the
meticulous overview of the economic situation of the Grand Duchy after the fall of
Polish-Lithuania cf. Nawrot (2008, 65–69) and the literature quoted there). Therefore the view of
Szoper (2004, p. 244), who speaks about merely “negligible fiscal burdens collected for Imperial
treasury” appears to be wrong.
14Such attempts were already undertaken in 1805 by Prince Adam Czartoryski [cf. in this respect
Skowronek (1969, pp. 201–236)] and were aimed at re-establishing semi-autonomous Poland
under the Russian protectorate.
15Nawrot (2008, pp. 68–69).
16Kowalski (2013). Therefore, as the cited author rightly points out (p. 256), their political situ-
ation was entirely different from that of the position of the German princes, who following the fall
of Sacrum Imperium Romanum frequently obtained territorial sovereignty.
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Commonwealth ended definitely.17 As it has been established so far in relevant the
literature of the subject,18 those attempts for more autonomy for former polish
territories remained grossly futile and did not amount to demands for granting a
separate constitution.
The situation changed dramatically after the Napoleon’s war with the fifth
coalition in the year 1809, which brought a stunning victory of the Duchy of Warsaw
over the Austrian Empire and enabled it to expand its borders as to incorporate some
of the recently partitioned Polish territories.19 It simultaneously instilled apprehension
in the Russian authorities of an imminent danger of reviving an independent and
potent Polish state,20 what would annihilate the endeavours of the Russian foreign
policy of at least the last 50 years and could provoke unrest in the remaining,
incorporated territories belonging previously to Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.21
Consequently, tsar Alexander I Romanov, following a memorandum elaborated
by M. Speranski on 11 March 181122 commenced to canvass for support among the
Polish-Lithuanian nobility by beguiling it with a perspective of more autonomy as
well as political and economic liberties. For this reason during the stay of
M. K. Ogiński in Petersburg starting in April 1811, this Polish mighty nobleman
(“magnat”), since 1810 also a Russian senator, was invited by the Russian tsar to
present him propositions apt for satisfying the political expectations and demands
of the polish population (what of course was meant here was practically solely the
nobility) in the western provinces (“gubernii”) of the Russian Empire.23 Answering
17Adam Czartoryski wrote about those times: “After the joys of 3rd May, deep sorrow, black and
paralysing distress took over Poland”, cf. Czartoryski (1860, p. 117).
18For the general presentation of those attempts cf. Izdebski (1972, pp. 96–97) and the literature
quoted there.
19Including several major cities such as Cracow or Lviv. Cf. in this respect Czubaty (2011,
pp. 198–234) or Thaden (1984, p. 64 et seq.)
20Very significant is a remark made by M. Speranski that Poland is “a week point in all our
political considerations”, cf. N. F. Dubrovin, Zapiska MM Speranskogo o veroatnostah wojny s
Franciej, Russkaa starina 1900, vol. 101, pp. 58–65, quoted after Nawrot (2008, p. 63).
21Nawrot (2008, p. 64).
22Russkaa starina 1902, vol. 108, pp. 257, quoted after Nawrot (2008, pp. 64–65).
23According to the memoirs of Ogiński (1872, vol. III, p. 19) from the meeting with tsar in May
1811: “What concerns the current moment, said the tsar, I should limit myself to a wish that polish
citizens living under my rule were happy and content, and if you can purvey to me certain projects
in this respect I will occupy myself with them with pleasure”. Very informative appear the comments
written down by M. K. Ogiński during the subsequent meeting with Alexander I in November 1811
(according to the Gregorian calendar), where supposedly the tsar said: “One of the two should
ensue: in case of war I will create a Polish Kingdom, which will be united with the Russian Empire
like Hungary and Czech with Austria or when there will be no war, I will introduce our great plan
in respect to Lithuania”, cf. Ogiński (1872, vol. III, p. 43). For a more profound discussion of this
political game of the Russian authorities cf. Nawrot (2008, pp. 69–83), Izdebski (1972, pp. 96–99)
and Wilham L. Backwell, Alexander I and Poland. The foundations of his Polish Policy and its
repercussions on Russia, 1801–1825, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Princeton 1959, a possibly inter-
esting dissertation I was made attentive to by Thaden (1984, p. 64, Footnote 1).
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this invitation, during one of the following meetings of M. K. Ogiński (which has
the date of 22 October 1811 in the memoirs24) with Alexander I, the polish
nobleman attached to a letter to the tsar a project of ukaz on creation of Duchy of
Lithuania,25 highlighting the need for guarantying due respect for the old polish
law, polish language and the monopoly of the public offices for “citizens living and
having property in the Grand Duchy”.26 This ukaz was so much more far-reaching
than earlier similar propositions that in the contemporary secondary literature it has
been labelled as “project of the Constitution of Grand Duchy of Lithuania”.27
It appears to be relevant in this context to stress that M. K. Ogiński in this very
correspondence with Alexander I mentioned “certain explications which [he has]
gathered in respect to the administration of Finland”.28 This very fact hints at a
possibility that he already had entered in closer relationships with the Russian and
pro-Russian agents occupying themselves with the issue of the newly conquered
Finland, which is the more probable, as the members of the so-called Committee for
the Finnish issues were meeting in Sankt Petersburg since 1811.29
Approximately at the same time, possibly starting from December 1811, a first
project of what was proposed to become the highest normative act of the reborn,
autonomous Lithuania was elaborated, and its authorship is tentatively attributed to
two important finish politician of the pro-Russian orientation: G. A. Rosenkampff
24Ogiński (1872, vol. III, pp. 46–48).
25As Ogiński (1872, vol. III, p. 46) stated, he considered that it was “the fastest and easiest way to
manifest from which stance I see the organisation of Lithuania” It is interesting to note that
according to S. Smolka M. K. Ogiński was not an author of this text himself, but rather
F. K. Drucki-Lubecki and Kazimierz Plater, who was to have been inspired to work upon the
question of autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania by M. Speranski, cf. Smolka (1907, vol. II,
pp. 495–498).
26Ogiński (1872, vol. III, pp. 46–48). This project amounted to 11 articles.
27Izdebski (1972, p. 97); identical statment is made by Nawrot (2008, p. 73), who speaks about
„striving to grant to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania a charakter of a state and national”. This
opinion seems to be exaggerated since the project in its Art. VI clearly stated that the organisation
of the Duchy is to be developed by a “general law” which was to be elaborated by a special
committee. This ukaz could hardly be anything else than a prologue for future constitutional
works. It is to be noted that H. Izdebski mentions that some of the prominent polish noblemen of
the pro-Russian orientation in Lithuania, namely L. Plater and F. K. Drucki-Lubecki claimed to be
involved in the preparation of the project of this proclamation, referring himself in this respect the
correspondence between L. Plater and A. Czartoryski from November 1811—Izdebski (1972,
p. 99), footnote numbers 20–22. In the correspondence between L. Plater and A. Czartoryski
recovered by the author of his text and scanned for the purposes of the ReConFort project—
namely in The Princes Czartoryski Library’s source number: 5511 V, 81–92, which appears to be
closest to the source meant by H. Izdebski, there are indeed some confirmations of this thesis,
especially the mentions of “Drucki de Lithuanie”, cf. The Princes Czartoryski Library source
number: 5511 V, p. 82).
28Ogiński (1872, vol. III, p. 44).
29It was established in 1811 by Gustav Mauritz Armfelt, cf. Thaden (1984, p. 201).
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and G. M. Armfelt.30 It is also surmised that then responsible for both polish and
finish issues, the mighty close advisor of tsar Alexander I, M. Speranski was
personally involved in shaping some of the stipulations of this draft.31 This doc-
ument appears to have been lost irretrievably,32 yet it in the part of the Polish
historic studies it is claimed that the preserved draft entitled Projet de Constitution
du Royaume de Pologne (highly probably, if not certainly elaborated in the year
1812) is nothing else than its (slightly?) amended version.33
The further important step in the genesis of the Polish 1815 Constitution was the
presentation of the project called “The governmental law of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania” (“Ustawa rządowa Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego”).34 This document,
which had 266 articles and was developed35 jointly by Prince F. K. Drucki-Lubecki
and M. K. Ogiński, who is thought to have corrected the first draft elaborated by
L. Plater,36 was presented to tsar Alexander I after he expressed his disappointment
30Izdebski (1972, pp. 105, 114–117), who refers to the memoirs of Ogiński (1872, t. III, p. 52),
where the latter states that in December 1811 he found out “that the tsar ordered general Armfelt
and baron Rosenkampff to elaborate a law for the inhabitants of Lithuania”. Here especially the
figure of Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt appears to be of key importance and merits a closer characteristic.
Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt born in 1757 was one of the most prominent politician of the
pro-Gustavian orientation at the end of XVIII century/beginning of XIX century. He distinguished
himself in the service for King Gustav III, for whom he served between 1780 and 1792. After the
death of Gustav, he plotted with Catherine II for a military intervention in Sweden in favour of the
Gustavian-party. Barely surviving an attempt at his life in Naples, he fled to Russia where he
stayed until 1797. Rehabilitated by Gustav IV of Sweden, he once again entered the Kingʼs service
until the latter was deposed of the crown by the revolution of 1809. After the revolution Armfelt
embarked once again on service for Russian Empire and became one of the closest advisors of
Alexander I, canvassing for a plan of autonomous Finland, whose General Governor he became in
the year 1813. For more information about Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt cf. Stig Ramel, Gustaf Mauritz
Armfelt, fondateur de la Finlande, Paris 1999.
31Such a thesis was proposed by Izdebski (1972, p. 113), who founds it on attempts of the project
to preserve to the highest possible extend local customs and laws, an approach supposedly typical
for the policies of M. Speranski. An opposing view, attributing this draft to Michał Kleofas
Ogiński was put forward by Iwaszkiewicz (1912, pp. 44–47), who based it on the fact that the
project had “strong mark of the oligarchical tendencies of the Lithuanian magnetaria” (cf. p. 46);
it has been also discussed extensively by Izdebski (1972, p. 116).
32This claim could be finally falsified after the queries Russian archives were made, but this so far
has not been accomplished.
33Izdebski (1972, pp. 117–119). Such a view had already been expressed by Smolka (1907, vol. II,
p. 505), who wrote: “Maybe this second preserved [project] in the papers by Lubecki was a polish
modification of the creation of Armfelt and Rosenkampf. Yet we do not have any explicit indi-
cations in this respect”, yet the authors disagree on who was responsible for those modifications.
Its (possibly only) copy is available in the Drucki-Lubecki collection within the The Princes
Czartoryski Library in Cracow, source number 13078 A5 and has been retrieved by the author and
enclosed to this book as Appendix C, translated by the PI Ulrike Müßig.
34Cf. Smolka (1907, vol. II, pp. 128–129).
35Smolka (1907, vol. II, pp. 131, 497–498 and 505–508), cf. also Izdebski (1972, p. 99). This
source is available in the The Princes Czartoryski Library in Cracow, source number 13078 A5 and
has been made available in the Internet database of the project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/.
36Nawrot (2008, p. 74) and the literature quoted there.
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with another, earlier project, probably that elaborated by G. A. Rosenkampff and G.
M. Armfelt.37 The meticulous comparison of its content with the subsequent
Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland of 1815 reveals some semblances between
the two documents, especially in the structuring of its main editorial subdivisions.38
The both aforementioned drafts were sent—with a letter from 13th April
181239—to Prince Adam Czartoryski, the most prominent polish politician of the
pro-Russian orientation of the time for counselling, who advised elaborating
another, compromising project.40 Yet, before this could become reality, the war
with Napoleon broke out.
Following the spectacular victory over the Grand Army in the year 1812 and
during the ensuing military occupation of the Duchy of Warsaw by the Russian
military forces,41 the idea of creating dependent states with formally stipulated
autonomy, founded on a Constitution, became politically viable.42 It finally led to
37Ogiński (1872), Oddział III, p. 74 wrote in his memoirs that during his meeting with Alexander I
on 27th of January 1812 (8th February according to the Georgian calendar) the tsar stated that: “he
does not like the project that was submitted to him and that he intends to order me creating a
different one” and upon this statement the Ogiński asserted that: “he occupied himself for months
with this work with the prince Lubecki and duke Kazimierz Plater, that they divided all the
materials for this work between themselves and that they have been laid down in such a way that
can it be anytime presented to the tsar”, cf. Ogiński (1872), Oddział III, p. 74. However it is only a
presumption, yet be the more probable as it necessarily must have flattered the Polish-Lithuanian
nobility and can be perceived as nothing but a skilful political gesture by the Russian tsar. It also
may hint at a fact that the works upon the project of the Governmental Law… might have had
begun earlier.
38Such a detailed comparision has already been conducted: cf. Izdebski (1972, p. 125). Cf. also
considerations below (Fn 60).
39Smolka (1907, pp. 162–165).
40Cf. letter of Adam Czartoryski to tsar Alexander I from 04.06.1812 and an addition to it from
13.6.1812, quoted extensively and discussed by Smolka (1907, pp. 165–168). Some of this rel-
evant correspondence between Prince Adam Czartoryski and tsar Alexander I. was reprinted in:
Czartoryski (1888, pp. 213–237), which has been scanned within the ReConFort project and has
been made available in the Internet database of the project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/. For
those proceedings cf. Izdebski (1972, p. 118) and Nawrot (2008, p. 82).
41Beginning in February 1813.
42Izdebski (1972, p. 121). It is also interesting to note that prince Adam Czartorski in his corre-
spondence with Alexander I Romanov (cf. letter of Adam Czartoryski to tsar Alexander I from
04.05.1813, reprinted in: Czartoryski (1888, pp. 237–238) wrote: “The King of Prussia is not at all
opposed to the existence of Poland. He feels the necessity of satisfying the wishes of the Polish
nation and considers them just and reasonable”. On the other hand tough Prince Adam
Czartoryski urged: “The tsar Alexander wants the Poles to make a step towards him, he needs
evidences of theirsʼ sympathy which he could place in front of the allied and the Russian” (cf.
Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, Memoriał w sprawie odbudowy państwa polskiego, source retrieved by
the author and made available on the internet platform of the project under: http://sources.
reconfort.eu/, The Princes Czartoryski Library, source number: 5242 V, 96). At the same time
however there can be encountered voices demanding a closer alliance with Austria (cf. s.n., Co
nam dziś czynić przystaje, source retrieved by the author and made available on the internet
platform of the project, The Princes Czartoryski Library, source number: 5242 V, 67–80, espe-
cially pp. 76–77).
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granting Constitution to the Kingdom of Poland in November 1815 by the Russian
tsar.43 This stage had been preceded by the elaboration of the Principles of the
Constitution Kingdom of Poland (“Zasady Konstytucji Królestwa Polskiego z dn.
25 maja 1815 r.”),44 proclaimed by Alexander I a few weeks after the ratification of
treaties of Vienna 1815, i.e. on 25 May 1815.45
The principles themselves already laid down two most significant rules which
found their expression in the future text of the Constitution 1815: the eternal union
with the Russian Empire46 and the monarchical principle, i.e. the assumption that
the entire power stems from the person of the ruler.47 They also stipulated
numerous liberties, which were to be subsequently incorporated into the text of the
future Constitution, such as habeas corpus,48 freedom of the press,49 protection of
property50 or religious freedom.51 Yet the principles could not substitute a veritable
constitution and had only temporary significance.52
43It had the signing date of 27th November 1815 but formally entered into force on 24th of
December 1815.
44Cf. Zasady konstytucji Królestwa Polskiego (Principles of Constitution of the Polish Kingdom),
printed Polish source available in Handelsman (1915, pp. 34–40). This document, consisting of 37
articles—was in fact a stub of a future constitutional regulation. Its roots go at least to a meeting
which took place on 21st of September 1814 in Puławy (residence of Prince Adam Czartoryski)
where the draft of those principles had been discussed with the participation of i.a. tsar
Alexander I, Adam Czartoryski, Nikolay Novossiltzoff and Tadeusz Matuszewicz. For the copy of
protocol from this meeting in French, written by A. Skałkowski cf. Askenazy (1937, pp. 369–373),
cf. also: Mycielski (2010, p. 55).
45It is worth stressing that art. 3 of the Vienna treaty between Russia and Prussia as well as art. 5 of
the Vienna treaty between Russia and Austria guaranteed creating a Kingdom of Poland which
shall be connected with Russian Empire by the means of its Constitution. Both those treaties are
available in English i.e. in Journals of the House of Commons, vol. 71, s.l., 1816, pp. 747–750.
46Art. 1 of the Principles of the Constitution of Kingdom of Poland.
47Cf. art. 3 of the Principles of the Constitution of Kingdom of Poland, which stated that “the
executive competence and the government are fully placed in the person of a ruler; all the
executing and administrative power can only stem from him”.
48Cf. art. 4 of the Principles of the Constitution Kingdom of Poland and art. 19 of the Polish 1815
Constitution.
49Cf. art. 10 of the Principles of the Constitution Kingdom of Poland and art. 16 of the Polish 1815
Constitution.
50Cf. art. 6 of the Principles of the Constitution Kingdom of Poland and art. 26 of the Polish 1815
Constitution.
51Cf. art. 2 of the Principles of the Constitution Kingdom of Poland and art. 11 of the Polish 1815
Constitution.
52It was already recognised by the contemporaries: in the source retrieved by the author and made
available on the internet platform of the project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/, i.e. Ludwik
Plater, Myśli wzgledem Rozwiniecia Zasad Konstytucyynych, The Princes Czartoryski Library,
source number: 5261 IV, 295–299 (295) this author, working upon the Constitutional drafts stated:
“It is impossible though to commence working on the details without having principles, which
make out the generality. Such principles are partially the Constitutional Principles”.
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The widespread view in the Polish legal history53 states that the fervent half-year
period54 between the acceptance of the Principles of the Constitution of the Kingdom of
Poland from 25th May 1815 and its final signing on 27th November 1815 abounded in
constitutional drafts.55 The need for such drafting was further exacerbated by the fact
that part of the polish society56 was against restoring the Constitution of 3rd May 1791,
a postulate which had been formulated by the conservative circles of the Duchy of
Warsaw57 and which even had been alluded to in Art. 1 of the Principles of the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland from 25th May 1815.58
The most significant of those projects is a 438-articles long document, attributed
solely to L. Plater and submitted to the provisional government of the Kingdom in a
letter dated on 26 August 1815.59 It is highly probable that due to the similarities
between Plater‘s project and “The governmental law of the Grand Duchy of
53Askenazy (1907, pp. 66–72), Bartoszewicz (1916, pp. 213–216) and Izdebski (1990, pp. 193–
198). This has been confirmed in the light of the sources retrieved by the author for the database of
the ReConFort project.
54According to the source retrieved by the author and made available in the Internet database of the
project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/: Kajetan Koźmian (?), Notatki o pracach nad konstytucją
Królestwa Polskiego, The Princes Czartoryski Library, source number: 5242 V, 343–344, (344):
“Only after returning back from the Congress did we start to think seriously about the text of the
Constitution”.
55There were at least three such projects: of A. Horodyski, The Princes Czartoryski Library, source
number: 5261 V, 219–292, cf. in this respect Kallas (1969, pp. 105–116), an anonymous project
supposedly available in Muzem Narodowe w Krakowie, source number according to H. Izdebski:
1025/22, which was based on the idea of joining the former Duchy of Warsaw with the territories
of former Duchy of Lithuania, cf. for the discussion of those ideas and promises starting from 1815
Mościcki (1924, pp. 84–96) and the project of L. Plater, The Princes Czartoryski Library, source
number: 5261 IV, 3–110. The first and the last of the aforementioned projects have already been
retrieved for the purposes of the project, scanned and has been made available in the Internet
database of the project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/.
56Cf. especially a source quoted extensively by Mycielski (2010, p. 53), namely: Józef Kalasanty
Szaniawski, Ogólniejsze myśli względem projektowanej konstytucji Królestwa Polskiego,
manuscript, which according to M. Mycielski is to be available in Zielińskich Library in Płock
under the source number 511. Cf. also Stanisław Węgrzycki, Przestrogi do utworzenia Królestwa
Polskiego, 1813; The Princes Czartoryski Library, sources number: 5242 V, 125 who in the year
1813 in this source retrieved by the author and made available in the Internet database of the
project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/. stated: “It is necessary to give a Constitution, but not to
go back to the Constitution of 3rd May 1791 since this one was at that time good, but nowadays
the Constitution granted to the Duchy [of Warsaw—M. Byczyk] following the Tylżycki treaty in
the year 1807 is better for all”.
57Cf. in this respect e.g. Józef Wielhorski, Reflexions sur le Royaume de Pologne en 1815,
reprinted in: Szymon Askenazy, Ministerium Wielhorskiego in: idem, Dwa stulecia. XVIII i XIX.
Badania i przyczynki, vol. II, Warszawa 1910, pp. 519–522, who discussing such views wrote
(p. 520): “La constitution de 1791 prouve un progres incroyablemais il est imposible de ne pas
s’apercevoi que’ l’on a regarde la Pologone comme un malade”.
58Where it had been stated that “new Constitution, which was to be granted to the Kingdom of
Poland, could be even more national and became close to the law of 3rd May 1791 to the extent to
which the difference in circumstances and times enables it”.
59Cf. Izdebski (1972, pp. 123–124).
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Lithuania” (“Ustawa rządowaWielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego”) this last paper must
have had been an important source of inspiration for L. Plater.60 Due to the supposed
criticism issued at this draft by numerous prominent figures of the then polish public
life, including A. Czartoryski, A. Linecki61 as well as by I. Sobolewski62 and J.K.
Szaniawski63 it was profoundly reshaped and shortened, possibly by a wider com-
mission of the polish politicians of the time, probably including F.K.Drucki-Lubecki,
T. Wawrzecki and A. Czartoryski,64 flavouring it with a distinctively liberal spirit.
According to S. Akenazy it resulted in creating a new, concise project of 162 articles
which was then submitted to the monarch during his stance in Warsaw in November
1815, who after annotating it, referred it to Ignacy Sobolewski for further revision.65
The final touch nonetheless belonged to the hand of the absolute tsar Alexander I, who
once again comprehensively reviewed the draft before ratifying it.66
60Those similarities concerned numerous issues such like the relationship between the Kingdom of
Poland and the Russian Empire, the organisation of the territorial administration, the Senate, or the
procedures of amending the Constitution. For the detailed analysis of the similarities and diver-
gences cf. Izdebski (1972, pp. 125–131).
61The claim about such a criticism have been formulated by Izdebski (1972, p. 126) who referred
himself to a letter of A. Linowski to Adam Czartoryski from 10th April 1812 (The Princes
Czartoryski Library, source number: 5259 IV, 167) and to a letter of A. Linowski to A. Czartoryski
from 25th March 1812 (The Princes Czartoryski Library, source number: 5259 IV, 163). Yet an
attempt to recover those letters made by the author of this article proved that they are not available
under the mentioned location. It has to be stressed however that also Askenazy (1907, p. 67)
referred to: “critical remarks made on this project by Czartoryski, Szaniawski, and particularly by
the enlighted Ignacy Sobolewski”.
62Ignacy Sobolewski in his memorandum, recovered by the author and inserted into the database
of the project, criticised the draft i.a. for being all too similar to the regulations of Constitution of
3rd May, e.g. by introducing in its regulations (in the title X) upon the periodical revival of
Constitution every 25 years, whereas Sobolewski deemed it sufficient to require here a qualified
majority of 4/5 of the representatives to Sejm and Senate, cf. source retrieved by the author and
made available in the Internet database of the project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/: Ignacy,
Sobolewski, Uwagi na projektem ustawy konstytucyjnej z 438 artykułów złożonym, The Princes
Czartoryski Library, source number: 5222 V, 163–184, especially pp. 182–183.
63Józef Kalasanty Szaniawski in his written opinion, recovered by the author, criticised the draft i.
a. for introducing regulations that were in his view superfluous, such as regulations upon the
viceroy or the States’ Council, since: “The State’s Council is a thing entirely dependent from the
monarch and the Constitution does not have much to say here”, cf. source retrieved by the author
and made available on the internet platform of the project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/: Józef
Kalasanty Szaniawski, Uwagi nad projektem ustawy konstytucyjnej, The Princes Czartoryski
Library, source number 5222 V, 389–411, (397–398).
64Izdebski (1972, p. 131), who also mentions the following persons: A. Linowski, F. Grabowski,
S.K. Zamoyski, T. Matuszewicz as possible participants of such a committee. Bartoszewicz (1916,
p. 213) also mentions N. Novossiltzoff, who was supposed to participate in the works of that
Commission “at the end”.
65Such is the outline of the last stages of drafting 1815 Constitution made by Askenazy (1907,
pp. 67–68). It is a narration very difficult to falsify since this author did have access to the sources
which are considered to be lost and have also not been found by the author of this text.
66Unfortunately and as already mentioned above, any more detailed information about the pro-
ceedings on the Constitution has been lost. The only preserved secondary source which gives an
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As soon as this work has been accomplished, any plans aimed at unifying
Lithuania with the Kingdom of Poland were postponed indefinitely.67 This, together
with the fact of instrumental treatment of drafts of the Constitution for the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania, which appear to have been merely an instrument for winning
over the support of Polish nobility68 and possibly providing military support for the
incoming war with Napoleon reveal a true meaning of Russian policy.69
3 General Characteristics of the Constitution of 1815
It is not an objective of this paper to offer a meticulous overview of the regulations
of the Constitution of 1815, yet owing to the shortage of the relevant English
literature of the subject before more specific regulations of this normative act
concerning the criminal law will be presented in depth, it appears reasonable to
outline its main framework and regulatory content in general.
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland from the year 1815 is considerably
longer then the two previous Polish Constitutions, namely the ground-braking
overview of those works is contained within the publication of Askenazy (1907, pp. 66–68), whom
I followed in this part of the article. Szymon Askenazy had had access to the original documents
and drafts that subsequently appear to have been lost and were also not recovered by the author of
this text. The conclusions of this author are also referred to in the contemporary literature of the
subject, cf. e.g. Izdebski (1990, pp. 193–198). It is worth pointing out here that as it has been
observed in the literature of the subject (cf. Kozłowski 1907, p. 127) the Polish 1815 Constitution
did influence the draft of the Greek Constitution of 1827.
67Very interesting is a source quoted by Szoper (2004, p. 245), namely: Ostrowski, Żywot
Tomasza Ostrowskiego, Ministra Rzeczypospolitej; później Prezesa Senatu Księstwa
Warszawskiego i Królestwa Polskiego oraz Rys Wypadków Krajowych od 1763 r. do 1817, vol.
II, Paryż 1840, p. 632, according to which during a meeting of the representatives of the
Polish-Lithuanian nobility with the tsar Alexander I Romanov on 25th November 1815 in Warsaw,
the tsar supposedly stated: “I will not allow that you demanded to join your provinces to Poland,
then it does not fit that it would be understood that I do it following your request”, cf. also
Mościcki (1924, pp. 84–96).
68However, Alexander I Romanov was careful enough to sustain the mistake of the Polish nobility:
According to the Sobolewski brothers, during an audience in the year 1816: “The tsar seems to be
more and more attached to our national existence as to his creation. He mentioned me with
pleasure our Constitution, for which he has received i.a. congratulations from Ms. Staël”, Cf.
source retrieved by the author and made available on the internet platform of the project under:
http://sources.reconfort.eu/: Correspondence between A. Czartoryski and Jozef, Ignacy and
Ludwik Sobolewski, letter from 19.04.1816, The Princes Czartoryski Library, source number:
5515, 9–15, (11).
69It is interesting to refer to the J. Iwaszkiewicz, who describes the attempts of tsar Alexander I
Romanov to encourage M. K. Ogiński to contact Armfelt in order to find out the best ways of
organizing military forces “as soon as possible”, cf. Iwaszkiewicz (1912). Therefore the author can
hardly agree with the view that “Alexander treated them [drafts of the Constitution of Grand
Duchy of Lithuania] all the time seriously”, cf. Izdebski (1972, p. 119). Rather, it was part and
parcel of the instrumental Russian policy, aimed at securing its interests in central Europe.
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Constitution of 3 May 1791 and the Constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw 1807: it
comprises 4453 words70 and is divided into 7 main editorial parts—titles.71 Two
most extensive titles, namely third—“Government” and forth—“Of the national
representation” are additionally subdivided into respectively 5 and 6 chapters.72
Quantitatively speaking, the most significant number of the legal norms has been
devoted to the regulation of the division of powers,73 with the structure of titles
number 3–5 apparently referring to the idea of trias politica whose elaboration is
commonly attributed to Baron de Montesquieu.
Among those regulations upon the diverse branches of government two legal norms
appear to possess towering importance for recreating the balance of power in the
Kingdom, namely Art. 35, stating that: “The government resides in the person of the
King. He exercises in all their plenitude the functions of executive power. All executive
and administrative authority must emanate from him”, supplemented by the provision
of Art. 86: “The legislative power resides in the person of the King and in the two
chambers of the Sejm, conformably with the regulations of the article thirty-one”.
Highlighting the position of the king here is not purely coincidental. It possibly stems
from the final stage of the drafting of the Constitution, personally conducted by
Alexander I which was aimed at securing the unalloyed supremacy of the Russian tsar
in the Polish Kingdom.74 According to the 1815 Constitution such a central position of
the king did not curb the freedom of the judiciary: in art. 138 there is a solemn
proclamation that: “The judicial order is constitutionally independent”, what is sup-
plemented by the guarantee that “the judges nominated by the King are for life and
cannot be removed”.75 There are also provisions for the highest tribunal in Warsaw,
which “shall finally determine all civil and criminal cases, state crimes excepted”,76
leaving the king no other competence than to grant pardon to the offenders.77
For the purpose of a general presentation of the system of legislative and
executive powers as moulded in the Constitution of 1815 it shall be underscored
that the Polish Parliament—Sejm, following the Polish tradition going back at least
70The Polish Constitution of 3rd May 1791 had 3728 words divided into 11 main articles preceded
with a preamble and ended with a declaration of the representatives of the Parliament, whereas the
Constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw consisted of merely 2622 words in 89 articles, ordered into
12 titles.
71They have respectively the following names: Of political relations of the kingdom (art. 1-10)
General Guarantees (art. 11-34), Government (art. 35-84), Of the national representation (art.
85-137), The judicial order (art. 138-152), The armed force (art. 153-156) and General regulations
(art. 157-165).
72Altogether the content of this normative act was therefore organised into 16 autonomous entities
within a two-level structural division.
73In terms of words it had 3147 words, i.e. 70,6% of the total bulk of the Constitution.
74Cf. Handelsman (1915, p. 19) and Izdebski (1990, pp. 200–201).
75See art. 141 sentence 1 of the Constitution. All the following numbers of the articles in this
subchapter refer to the 1815 Constitution of Kingdom of Poland.
76Cf. art. 151.
77Art. 43.
Precedence of the 1815 Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland 185
to the XV century, was divided into two chambers: Deputies’ Chamber (Izba
Poselska)78 and Senate (Senat).79 However what was a veritable breakthrough for
the entire Polish constitutional history was the regulation of art. 130. It enabled
anyone who was: “paying any amount of contribution upon his estate” to partici-
pate with suffrage rights in communal assemblies, which were responsible for
choosing 51 out of 126 members of the Deputies’ Chamber (Izba Poselska).80
Those two chambers of the Parliament did not have a right to initiate legislation
though, but were voting on the projects of laws submitted upon the King’s order, be
it previously elaborated by State’s Council (Rada Stanu) or not.81
It was this State’s Council (Rada Stanu), consisting of a smaller Administrative
Council (Rada Administracyjna) and of General Assembly (Zgromadzenie Ogólne)
as plenary body82 which together with the king’s representative was to “administer
the affairs of the kingdom in the King’s name, during his absence.”83—what
obviously due to the presence of the tsar in St. Petersburg was a normal situation.
State’s Council (Rada Stanu) was subordinated to Parliament by the obligation to
present general report on its activities,84 which used to be heavily debated in
Deputies’ Chamber (Izba Poselska), creating a suitable opportunity for the parlia-
mentary opposition to severely criticise the government of the Kingdom. Another
example of a formal subordination of State’s Council (Rada Stanu) under the
Sejm’s scrutiny was the juridical cognition of Parliament’s Court (Sąd Sejmowy)
over the infrigments of the Constitution and ordinary laws by the Ministers of
State’s Council (Rada Stanu) and other executive clerks.85
Those backbone regulations are preceded by the critical for the position of the
Polish state first title of the 1815 Constitution. It formally stipulated a dependent
position of the Kingdom, which was to be “for ever united to the Empire of
Russia”.86 The nature of this unification appeared according to art. 3 to be limited to
the personal union, with the Russian tsar being simultaneously the king of Poland.87
78Art. 118, i.e. 40, 47% of the deputies.
79Art. 108.
80From this period there are known examples of Polish peasants who were elected for public
functions, such as assessors, cf. Mencel (1968, p. 651), yet there were no peasants among the
representatives to Sejm and this political breakthrough associated with granting political rights to
peasants was not appreciated in broader circles, cf. Mencel (1968, p. 657).
81Art. 96, 102.
82I.e. Council of administration—cf. art. 65: “The council of state shall be divided into a council of
administration and a general assembly”. Council of administration was itself composed of “the






87Art. 3 stated that: “The crown of Poland is hereditary in our person and that of our descendants,
heirs and successors according to the order of succession established for the Imperial throne in
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In case of his absence in the Kingdom of Poland, the tsar shall nominate his
representative (“Namiestnik”), being either a Russian Prince of the Blood or a
Polish citizen,88 laying down at the same time the extent of his prerogatives.89
Nonetheless, it was also regulated that the foreign policy is common for both
countries,90 yet the tsar could allow the Kingdom to be party to the international
treaties.91
Following those stipulations of the opening title of the Polish 1815 Constitution,
it is a very controversial issue to what extend the Kingdom of Poland could be
considered to have been an independent subject of international law. It appears right
to state that the historical examples of the treaties signed by the Kingdom of
Poland92 are a vital indication that it was not merely an intrinsic part of the Russian
Empire, but was at least partially recognised internationally.93
Another highly significant part of the stipulations was a combination of indi-
vidual and collective human rights incorporated into title II of the Polish 1815
Constitution. They encompassed i.a. religious freedom and prohibition of civil and
political discrimination on religious grounds,94 freedom of print,95 freedom from
unsubstantiated persecution and illegal imprisonment,96 personal freedom,97 pro-
tection of property,98 guarantee of the usage of Polish language in public affairs99
and sole access of the Poles to the public, be it civil or military, functions.100 There
was a guarantee of the responsibility of the civil servants for professional activities
as public functionaries as well as a vague proclamation that “The law shall protect
every class of citizens alike, without regard to their rank or condition”.101 Those
Russia”. It is worth noting that tsar Nicholas I Romanov undertook his separate coronation in
Warsaw on 24th May 1829, which, formally speaking, was the last coronation on the polish soil.
88Art. 5 and 6.
89Art. 7.
90Art. 8. For Mażewski (2014, p. 63) it is a clear testimony that between those two countries there
existed a real union. Some earlier authors claimed that it precluded the Kingdom of Poland from
attaining a position of a subject of international law: e.g. Dembski (1974, p. 172), see in this
respect considerations below.
91Art. 9.
92As for instance a convention between Russian Empire, Polish Kingdom and Prussia upon the
regulation of relationships of mutual trade and navigation, signed in Berlin on 11th March 1825,
cf. Mażewski (2014, pp. 66–69).
93Mażewski (2014, p. 70) rightly concludes that it also cannot be considered to have been a
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rights and liberties were not restricted to polish citizens since: “Every legitimated
foreigner shall enjoy the protection of the laws and the advantages which they
secure on the same footing as the other inhabitants”.102
Finally, the closing title of the 1815 Constitution contains some transitional and
organisational regulations, of which two as being highly important merit closer
attention: art. 160, which preserved certain polish civil and military awards and art.
165 which, read a contrario, kept in force all the previous statues which were not
contrary to the adopted Constitution.103 Therefore it is right in my view to speak
about the legal continuity between the Duchy of Warsaw and the Polish
Kingdom.104
It is important to note that from the formal point of view this Constitution has to
be perceived as being one of the most liberal in post-congress Europe,105 giving
suffrage rights to more than 100,000 people, including peasants106 and numerous
civil freedoms.107 However, it was perennially infringed by the Russian authorities,
being reduced to nothing more than an instrument of propaganda, attesting to the
alleged liberal approach of the Russian tsar in respect to the Polish Kingdom.108
A blatant example of such infringements was the notorious curbing of the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, especially by not-appointing judges and replacing them
with dependent deputy-judges,109 eradicating the freedom of the press110 or even
102Art. 32 sentence 1.
103Due to this regulation some of the most vital French regulations, introduced in the Duchy of
Warsaw, such as Napoleon’s Civil Code could be maintained. This legislation in some respect still
influences the polish legal system (cf. in this respect e.g. a judgment of Polish Supreme Court from
27th June 2013 in case III CZP 29/13 upon the applicability of art. 713 of French Civil Code for
current legal obligations) what could not be possible, had it not been for the aforementioned art.
165.
104Roztworowski, (1915, pp. 34–35) who even goes so far as to state (p. 35) that: “The
Constitution of Duchy of Warsaw and decrees from the previous period are not canceled, but to
the contrary, expressis verbis upheld”. It has to be added that it was a situation which apparently
Alexander I Romanov strived to achieve at least since 1811, once again taking over the central
territories of former Poland-Lithuania.
105Kutrzeba (1916, p. 24), where he speaks about “the most liberal Constitution which any
European country had at this time”.
106This estimation is given according to a detailed overview of the scale of the political activity of
the society of the Kingdom of Poland presented by Mencel (1968, p. 646).
107Cf. considerations above.
108Bardach et al. (1979, p. 186). As a very accurate appears the statement made by Fryderyk
Skarbek, Królestwo Polskie do rewolucyi listopadowej, vol. I, Poznań 1877, p. 46 that tsar
Alexander I was “mistaken, when he understood, that he can win over Poles by merely stipulating
freedoms without any guarantees of its respecting”, cf. Szymaniec (2014, pp. 286–292).
109Witkowski (1988).
110By the decisions issued on 22th May and 16th June 1819 the representative of the tsar, general
Józef Zajączek introduced a preventive censorship of the press in a blatant infringement of art.
16 of the Constitution, cf. Gąsiorowska (1916, pp. 53–73).
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more outright by not convoking Sejm within the time limits specified in the
Constitution111 or making confidential its proceedings.112
That instrumental treatment of the Polish 1815 Constitution as merely a pro-
paganda tool, which contradicted the stipulations of the Vienna Congress in respect
to Poland, became quickly known.113 Moreover, it has been recognized that the
1815 Constitution was used as fake instrument to appease the Polish society114 and
was nothing more than a good will of the Russian tsar,115 who one-sidedly granted
it to the Polish Kingdom.116 This approach is fully consistent with the view of the
Russian politicians who constantly feared the polish striving for independence.117
Interestingly, the Polish Constitution of 1815 was not—unlike some other
XIX-century Constitutions118—subject to any more extensive legal, philosophical
111According to art. 87 the ordinary Sejm “shall meet once in every two years at Warsaw” whereas
the Sejms were convoked only in the years 1818, 1820, 1825 and 1830.
112What was introduced due to the one-sided amendment of the 1815 Constitution by Alexander I
Romanov on 13th February 1825.
113An anonymous French author commenting the outbreak of an uprising of the Polish 1830
November Uprising wrote: “Lʼempereur de Russie nʼa pas voulu comprender lʼesprit des dis-
positions du congrès de Vienne lʼégard des Polonais; il nʼa pas même respecté la lettre de la loi”,
cf. s.n., La Pologne et le Congress de Vienne, Paris 1831, p. 8, source retrieved by the author from
Bibliothèque Polonaise de Paris (source number: BPP FA 30137 II) and made available on the
internet platform of the project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/. The same anonymous author of
the text goes on as to say that: “(…) mais les empereurs russes en se jouant continuellement de ces
obligations, en violant sans cesse la constitution quʼils avaient juré de respecter, lʼont tout-à-fait
anéantie.” (s.n., La Pologne et le Congress de Vienne, Paris 1831, p. 9), even though “les
puissances européennes ont reconnu le droit quʼavaient les Polonais à former une nation séparée”
(s.n., La Pologne et le Congress de Vienne, Paris 1831, p. 10).
114D’Herbelot (1830, p. 31) source retrieved by the author from Bibliothèque Polonaise de Paris
(source number: BPP FA 30138) and made available on the internet platform of the project under:
http://sources.reconfort.eu/: “La Russie, voulant avoir des vassaux, nʼa donné à lʼamour-propre
national quʼune satisfaction dérisoire; elle a mesuré sordidement ce quʼelle concéderait de liberté
à la Pologne, et elle a fait la dose si petite quʼautant aurait valu la supprimier tout-à-fait”.
115D’Herbelot (1830, p. 31): “La Pologne ne peutrester telle que 1815 l a constituée: car, dans cet
état, elle nʼexiste que sous le bon plaisir de lʼempereur, et nʼest dʼaucune utilité pour lʼEurope”.
116D’Herbelot (1830, p. 27), where the 1815 Constitution is referred to as: „la charte octroyée par
Alexandre.” It starkly contrasts i.e. with the case of the Belgian Constitution 1831 which was of
popular origin and imposed far-reaching limitations on the power of the monarch, who, upon
accepting the crown, had to concede to them—cf. in this respect: Deseure (s.a., pp. 119–120).
117Very ilustrative appears the formulation of Karamzin (1818, p. 10) “Les Polonais légalement
constitués en un people distinct et souverain, seraient plus dangereux pour nous que ne le peuvent
être les Polonais sujets russes” (retrieved by the author from Bibliothèque Polonaise de Paris
(source number: BPP 344, pos. 6) and made available on the internet platform of the project under:
http://sources.reconfort.eu/.
118As was for instance the case with i.e. with Statuto Albertino, where “The need to discuss public
matters created a real ‘community of the word’ and of print media”, cf. Mecca (s.a., pp. 177–183).
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or journalistic commenting by the contemporaries. There can hardly be found any
study books or monographs devoted to the legal analysis of this normative act
stemming from the 1815–1830 period.119 This situation renders it necessary to seek
the legal positions towards this Constitution in dispersed stances made by the
participants of the public life of the Polish Kingdom 1815–1830.
In this public life of the Kingdom it is important however and for the purpose of
this article also sufficient to discern two major currents. The first one perceived the
1815 Constitution as a magnanimous gesture of the Russian tsar who kindly granted
it to the Kingdom and is free to revoke it anytime he pleases.120 Consequently, the
inhabitants of the Polish Kingdom shall strive to peacefully cooperate with the
Russian authorities, utilising the methods available to them within the existing
political situation.121 The second major current treated the Constitution as a mutual
contract between the tsar (being simultaneously the polish king) and the polish
society.122 Based on those premises the representatives of this approach voiced
their disapproval at every infringement of the highest normative act of the
Kingdom.123 After a fierce battle between those two attitudes on the Sejm in the
year 1820124 this liberal, opposing current started gaining momentum and became a
catalyst for the military November uprising in 1830/1831.
119Just before closing the editorial works upon this paper the author did encounter in the Central
Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw (source number: fonds 391, number 1252a) a manu-
script of the treaty written by Tadeusz (?) Ostrowski, Konstytucja Krolestwa Polskiego z r. 1815 in
October 1823, being an attempt of the legal commenting upon this normative act. It is to be made
available on the internet database of the project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/ and possibly
referred to in subsequent publications.
120Cf. e.g. Skarbek (1821), especially p. 121 (with a statement: “the reincarnated, dear name of
the homeland, returned due to the liberties of the grateful king” a source retrieved and made
available on the internet platform of the project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/.
121Such as parliamentary election in order to choose the best possible representatives to Sejm with
the purpose of creating good laws, cf. Skarbek (1820), a source retrieved and made available on
the internet platform of the project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/. It is worth stressing that
such an approach was radically different than the one prevailing during the Polish Commonwealth,
when, as A. Tarnowska observed: “no thesis of the exclusive sovereignty of the monarch was ever
raised in Poland, because this would have never been approved”, cf. Tarnowska (s.a., p. 249).
122Niemojowski (1818, p. 5), who admonished: “Our government shall, following the fatherly
inspiration of our blessed king, our beloved Lord, following strictly the granted to us
Constitutional Charter, strive to increase the number of inhabitants of our country, it shall remove
the obstacles (…) which are various arbitrary and unconstitutional burdens (…)”, cf. also
Dyaryusz Seymu Królestwa Polskiego 1818, vol. III, Warszawa 1818, p. 51.
123Cf. Dziennik posiedzeń izby poselskiej w czasie Sejmu Królestwa Polskiego w roku 1820
odbytego, Warszawa 1820.
124Skowronek (1995) and his source: Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz, Pamiętniki, volume I, which
according to J. Skowronek it is to be available in the Princes Czartoryski Library, the source
number: 3514 IV.
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4 Regulations in the 1815 Constitution Concerning
the Criminal Law
The decisive constitutional normativity of the Constitutions as developed in the end
of the 18th century expressed itself i.a. as the requirement that statutory law should
be congruent with the hierarchically higher placed text of a written Constitution.125
This idea—of a legal system as a system combining various levels of normativity
where regulations on each level have to be in conformity with that placed above—
has persevered, be it significantly more sophisticated,126 until nowadays.
Consequently, the particular laws, such as regulations in the field of private or
criminal law can be perceived as an extension, development or concretisation of the
constitutional principles.
Yet there is another important aspect of this hierarchical structuring of the legal
system, namely that a written Constitution shall lie down the basic principles for all
branches of law in order to enable to verify their “constitutionality”, since otherwise
this verification process could not effectively take place. Correspondingly, in order
to comprehend the development of this decisive constitutional normativity in the
field relevant for this paper it is necessary to outline those regulations of the 1815
Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland which pertain to the criminal law.
Careful perusal of this normative act gives little reason to expect that any more
detailed regulations concerning the criminal law could be encountered here, since
already in the Art. 4 its narrow regulatory scope appears to be laid down very
precisely: “The Constitutional Charter determines the manner, the principle, and
the exercise of the sovereign authority”. Yet no later than in Chapter II of the
Constitution, labelled “General Guarantees” lying down—as it has already been
mentioned above—the basic rights in the Kingdom of Poland there are incorporated
numerous regulations concerning both the criminal procedure as well as the sub-
stantive criminal law itself. Above all there is a towering proclamation of the Art.
17: “The law shall protect every class of citizens, alike, without regard to their rank
or condition.ˮ More specifically for the field of criminal law, the Art. 23 states that:
“No man shall be punished except in conformity with the existing laws and by the
decree of the competent Magistrate.ˮ Further, Art. 26 in its third sentence declares
that: “Any person attempting to appropriate the property of another shall be held to
be a disturber of the public peace and punished accordingly.ˮ
125Müßig (2016, p. 1), who also conceptualised and explained there the term of “Decisive
Constitutional Normativity” (DCN) as well as Ulrike Müßig, Preface, p. 2, where she observes that
with the American Revolution: “constitutional law and other kinds of law were conceptually
differentiated”.
126Encompassing nowadays not only the vertical relationship between the written statutes and the
Constitution, but also between the statutes and the executive acts or the Constitution itself and the
acts of international law—cf. Olechowski (in print), cf. this book, pp. 238 and Footnote 14 who
discusses the views of Alfred Verdross as the supporter of the monistic theory of national and
international law.
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Apart from those provisions, there can also be found some regulations con-
cerning the legislative process in the field of the criminal law. Art. 90 expressly
highlights the competence of Sejm (understood as the gathering of the two
chambers of the polish Parliament) to consider the projects i.a. in the field of the
penal legislation,127 for which, according to art. 98 of the Constitution, separate
Commissions should be established.128
More importantly for the very question of the precedence of the Constitution, the
already discussed Art. 165 stated that: “All anterior laws and institutions which
maybe Contrary to the present charter are hereby abrogatedˮ. This stipulation,
combined with the regulation of Art. 55 and 82129 which introduced personal
responsibility of the members of regency and ministers for every act infringing the
Constitution, were the most far-fetched regulations concerning the supremacy of
this legal act, even though they were not explicit in their formulations.130
Analysing the Polish 1815 Constitution in a historical perspective, it has to be
highlighted that its regulations in the matters of criminal laws were significantly
more far-reaching than both the Polish Constitution of 3 May 1791 as well as the
Constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw. The first one did not even stipulate formal
equality before the law and was oblivious to such rudimentary principles of
127According to this statute: “The diet [i.e. Sejm—M. Byczyk] shall take into consideration all
proposed civil, criminal, or administrative laws; referred to it by the King, through the council of
State [Rada Stanu—M. Byczyk]. It shall deliberate on all’ proposed modifications or alterations
of the duties of public offices and constitutional powers, such as those of the diet, the council of
State, the judicial order, and the government commissions; such change or modification being
referred to its consideration by the royal authority”.
128Cf. art. 98: “For the discussion of these drafts, each chamber appoints three commissions of
examination, which are composed in the senate of three members, and in the chamber of nuncios
of five, to wit:
Commission of finances.
Commission of civil and criminal legislation (…)ˮ.
129Cf. art. 55: “The members of the regency of the kingdom shall be responsible in their persons
and in their property for whatever they may have done contrary to the Constitutional Charter, or
to the lawsˮ.
Art. 82: “The heads of departments and the members of government commissions are
answerable to the Sąd Sejmowy for every infraction of the Constitutional Charter and the royal
decrees of which they may have been guilty”.
130This ambiguity found its echo in the secondary literature, especially as Roztworowski (1915,
pp. 34–35) spoke about “new polish king Alexander, who from his own will granted to it a
octroyed Constitution, and even, properly speaking, two constitutions: one, a provisional one, laid
down already in Vienna, with the date 25th May 1815 under the name “Bases de la Constitution”,
second, final, with the date of 27th November 1815 in Warsaw, which entered into force on 24th
December of that year.” A final clarification of this issue took place with the resolution of the
General Assemby State’s Council (Zgromadzenie Ogólne Rady Stanu) on 18 March 1816, which
stated that due to the promulgation of the 1815 Constitution the Principles of the Constitution lost
their normative force.
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criminal law as nullum crimen sine lege,131 already explicitly recognised in the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.132 The second one was
limited to formalising the political order of this newly established, Napoleonic state
and did go little beyond founding formal equality before the law,133 stating the
openness for the public of the judicial cases in criminal matters and reserving the
competence to enact new criminal legislation for the Main Sejm (Sejm Główny),
the Polish Parliament of that time.134 Furthermore, it has to be stated that in the
1815 Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland the regulations concerning the
criminal law were noticeably more comprehensive and detailed than in the
paradigmatic for the entire post-congress Europe French Constitutional Charter of
1814.135 This strengthens the thesis that it had not been inspired by this
post-revolutionary piece of legislation.136
5 The Enactment of the Polish Criminal Code of 1818
The idea to create a modern codification in the field of the criminal law in Poland
can be traced back at least to the Constitution of 3 May 1791, which in its VIII
Sect. 6 in fine promised to codify both criminal and civil laws of the country.137 It
was revived on the Sejm of Grand Duchy of Warsaw of 1809, where in the reso-
lution taken on 18 March 1809138 the application of the old Polish laws, and—on a
131Cf. Marcin Byczyk, Constituting the Polish Criminal Judiciary in the light of the Polish
Constitutional debate of the late XVIII Centaury, speech held during the ReConFort Mid-term
Conference on 20th September 2016.
132Cf. articles VII-IX of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.
133Cf. art. 4 of the Constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw: “The slavery is abolished. All citizens are
equal in front of the law. The estate of the people remains under the protection of the tribunals”.
134Cf. art. 21 of the Constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw: “To it belongs the proper conferring in
respect to the tax law, also the law upon the fiscal income, in respect to the amendments which are
to be made in the civil or criminal legislation or in the monetary system”.
135Which itself was very limited on the questions related to the field of criminal law, stating merely
the principle of the public criminal trials (cf. art. 64) and freedom from an arbitrary prosecution (cf.
art. 4).
136Similarly: Bardach et al. (1979, p. 368), opposite view was presented by Izdebski (1972, p. 132)
who wrote that the Constituiton: „cleraly patterned itself upon the Constitutional Charter of
Ludwig XVIII”.
137Ustawa Rządowa, czyli nowa Konstytucya Polski, Volumina Legum, vol. IX, p. 224: “We
command that a new code of civil and criminal laws be drawn up by persons designated by the
Sejm.” There however had been earlier requests to change and codify both the substantial as well
as procedural criminal law in the Kingdom of Poland starting from 1740 and subsequently clearly
expressed in the resolution of the Sejm from the year 1776 (Volumina Legum, vol. VIII, p. 543)—
cf. Michalski (1958, p. 287) et seq, Borkowska-Bagieńska (1986) and Szafrański (2007).
138Cf. the Diary of the Sejm 1809 to be available in the Central Archives of Historical Records in
Warsaw, source number: Fonds 182—Sejm Księstwa Warszawskiego i Królestwa Polskiego; see
on this matter: Śliwowski (1958, p. 14), on whose book—where possible—I have essentially relied
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subsidiary basis—of the Prussian legislation was stipulated: “as long as a proper
for the Duchy of Warsaw Criminal Code cannot be elaborated”.139
In the dramatically changed political situation, with the establishment of the
Kingdom of Poland after the Vienna Congress in the year 1815, tied by a real union to
the Russian Empire, the works on a new Criminal Code were seriously commenced
only after the Russian tsar via the minister or secretary of state of the Polish Kingdom
made a formal request to the government of the Kingdom to prepare such an act in the
year 1817.140 One of the possible cardinal reasons for such a decision was the disparity
existing between different laws which were in force in the Kingdom, encompassing
Prussian and Austrian criminal statutes, what in turn significantly hampered the effi-
cacious functioning of the criminal judiciary,141 another: the long standing yearning of
the Polish society for a modern codification of criminal law.142
It is certain however that the idea of elaborating an original Polish Criminal
Code was abandoned due to the explicit decision of the governor of the Kingdom of
Poland, Józef Zajączek, from 29 December 1817 and replaced with the subsequent
endeavours to adopt the Austrian Criminal Code of 1803, after modifying it as to fit
into the Polish social, legal and intellectual background.143 The ensuing, hastily
works led to preparing—within less than 3 months—a complete project of a
criminal codification which was submitted to the Polish Sejm in a printed version
on 30 March 1818, after its final acceptance by State’s Council (Rada Stanu)
(particularly for the descriptive sections) in this and the next fragments of the paper, being also
very indebted to J. Śliwowski for his valuable footnotes, which proved very helpful when inves-
tigating into the topic of this paper and the publication of some of the sources related with the
codification process of the year 1818.
139Cited according to Śliwowski (1958, p. 14). Such an attempt of enacting a Criminal Code was
undertaken in the year 1811, where a translation of the French Criminal Code, with absolutely
slight changes (cf. Kodeks przestępstw i kar przetłumaczony z francuskiego z zlecenia JW.
Jasińskiego, Warszawa 1811) was proposed and rejected as the Criminal Code for the Duchy of
Warsaw. See in depth on this issue: Handelsman (1914).
140Barzykowski (1883, vol. I, p. 130) gives the date when those works were began, namely: 17th
of September 1817, writing that on this day: “the minister secretary of state for the first time
convened the council of the ministers so that it shall prepare the projects of the laws”, yet without
giving sources for this claim. Cf. also Hoffmann (1831, pp. 179–180) and Śliwowski (1958,
pp. 39–40).
141Cf. Hube (1863, pp. 5–6).
142Cf. Michalski (1958).
143The exact reasons for such a decision remain unknown. While Śliwowski (1958, p. 40), writing
in the times of communist regime speculated about the comfort of using foreign legislation which
“protected the class interests of the ruling estate”, it is much more probable that due to the lack of
qualified polish lawyers there was no intellectual capacity to realise such a work within a rea-
sonable period of time. This decision was also criticised subsequently by the polish lawyers since
“book I and II of the Code 1818 was in its greater part transformed into a simple translation of its
original”, cf. Hube (1863, pp. 20–21). It indeed was to a great extend merely a translation of the
Austrian original.
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17 days earlier.144 During the meeting of State’s Council (Rada Stanu) on the 30
March it was also decided that the discussion on the project in Sejm shall not
exceed 6 days.145 Such a mode of proceedings significantly limited the possibility
of any broader public debate and it renders it necessary to seek echoes of the
discussions on respecting the constitutional principles in the to-be-enacted Criminal
Code in the speeches of the members of the Deputies’ Chamber and of Senate.
Consequently, it is necessary to analyse the parliamentary works of the Sejm in
the year 1818. In the gathering of the Parliament of Kingdom of Poland in the year
1818 the project itself was worked upon in two separate stages. During the first
stage it was analysed by the joint legislative Commissions of the Sejm; only later, at
the second stage, it was debated on the general forum of the Sejm.146 During this
first phase there had been formulated altogether 58 propositions of amendments to
the project, submitted to State’s Council (Rada Stanu) for acceptance, out of which
some are directly related with the questions of the precedence of Constitution and
the division of powers.147
First of such amendments pertained to the proposition to change the wording of
article 98 of the project of the Criminal Code in order to treat as a crime of abuse of
power cases where a minister countersigns a decree of the king or of the governor
which is “against Constitution and the laws” as well as to treat as such crimes the
cases of issuing ordnances “against the regulations of the Constitution, organic
statutes, laws or the resolutions of the king or king’s representative”148 by the
ministers or members of the governmental commissions. The second proposed
amendment concerned adding formulation in the aforementioned article that judges
were to become culpable of the abuse of power if they neglected to act correctly and
diligently, but at the same time did not curb the “protected in the article 138 and 139
of the Constitution independence of the judiciary”.149 Third likewise interesting
amendment of the joint legislative Commissions was related with the open wording
of the statute on robbery, which after mentioning different ways of acquiring
144According to Śliwowski (1958, p. 47) this project can be found in Central Archives of
Historical Records in Warsaw, source number (according to current numeration): I Rada Stanu
Królestwa Polskiego, microfilm A-22892.
145I.e. 3 days on the forum of the Sejm and 3 days in the joint legislative Commissions, cf.
Protocol of the meeting of Stateʼ Council (Rada Stanu) on 30th March 1818, cited according to
Śliwowski (1958, p. 463). It is symbolic for the role and the position of the Sejm in the Kingdom
of Poland.
146Śliwowski (1958, pp. 157–161).
147Out of which 7 were rejected, cf. Protocols of the meetings of State’s Council (Rada Stanu) on
16th and 17th April 1818, cited according to Śliwowski (1958, 465–473). The plenary discussions
in Sejm concerned only this amended version of the project since it could not introduce any
amendments to the project itself.
148Cited according to Śliwowski (1958, 466).
149Even though the speaker invokes the independence of the judiciary, the real sense of this change
is unclear; maybe the proposed amendment was written down with a spelling error and in fact the
intention of the joint Commissions was to propose: “curbing” instead of “not curbing”. Cited
according to Śliwowski (1958, p. 466).
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possession of the goods ended with “etc”. Such an open-ended statute was rejected
by the Commission which wanted to prevent “arbitrariness of the judges” and
demanded that the addition “etc.” shall be dropped.150 This last proposed amendment
appears to be very significant since it testifies to the awareness of the representatives
to the Parliament (“Sejm”) of the high value of strict interpretation of the legality
principle, an attitude that was even going beyond the regulations of the Constitution
of 1815, being itself still far from explicitly acknowledging the nullum crimen sine
lege certa doctrine. Yet it was, together with the second amendment presented above,
rejected by State’s Council (Rada Stanu) and did not become binding law.151
This aspect of the judiciary as the constituted power, with the endeavours to bind
the judges to the greatest possible extend by the formulations of the codified statutes
was raised once again during the second phase of the legislative process, namely in
the discussions on the forum by the representatives in the Deputy Chamber of the
Sejm.152 Closer scrutiny of this plenary debate, which took place on 18, 20 and 21
April 1818 reveals the fact that this was a recurrent leitmotif in the speeches of the
deputies, starting from the very first discourse opening the debate on the project of
Criminal Code pronounced by the Sejm Marshall, who highlighted the fact that: “In
the constitutional countries the law should be clear and enlightened, leaving no
freedom for a judge, since otherwise he will govern according to it and not
according to the law and therefore he will become omnipotent”.153
But the discussions were not limited to that problem. In fact, while fiercely
debating upon the project of the Criminal Code, the representatives to the Parliament
(“Sejm”) were quite frequently resorting in their speeches to the Constitution. Those
references were made in several contexts and in different manners.
First argumentative strategy154 is used to clearly manifest that the project of the
Criminal Code is consistent with the 1815 Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland.
Representatives to the Parliament (“Sejm”) bring it forward in form of general
150Protocol of the meetings of Rada Stanu on 16th April 1818, cited according to Śliwowski
(1958, p. 467).
151Protocol of the meetings of Rada Stanu on 16th April 1818, cited according to Śliwowski
(1958, pp. 468–470). Only the first amendment was accepted into the enacted version of the
Codex, cf. The Criminal Code of 1818 was published i.a. as Kodex karzący dla Królestwa
Polskiego: z dodaniem praw kryminalnych późniey uchwalonych, reiestru porządkowego i alfa-
betycznego, przypisków wskazuiących artykuły związek z sobą maiące, Warszawa 1830, p. 22;
this issue is also freely available in the Internet under: http://ebuw.uw.edu.pl/dlibra/docmetadata?
id=210, last accessed: 25.10.2017.
152Those discussions have not been so far analysed in the literature apart from a very brief chapter
in the book of Śliwowski (1958, pp. 210–213), who essentially limited himself to the presentation
of voices of five deputies, discussing mainly the questions of punishibility for crimes against
religion in the light of the Polish 1815 Constitution.
153Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 49.
154I understand “argumentative strategies” in line with the very perception of argumentation
typical for non-English languages as formulated by van Eemeren (2010, p. 26), i.e. as: “deliberate
efforts to resolve a (real or projected) difference of opinion by convincing the addressee(s) in a
reasonable way of the acceptability of the standpoints at issue”.
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remarks: Wincenty Krasiński stresses the fact that the project “not only aims at
securing the constitutional laws, but also will supply us with national laws,
appropriate for our existence”.155 For Ksawery Potocki the project is “inspired by
the old and the new laws which we are familiar with (…) [and is] tailored to the
Constitution”156 and there is no punishment in form of “an expulsion from the
country since Art. 25 [of the Constitution] states clearly that a sentenced person
will serve his sentence in the Kingdom”.157 Similarly Ksawery Potocki during
session held on 20 April 1818 underlines: “Confiscation as contrary to the
Constitution is at no place prevalent in the Codex.”158 For Mr. Hakenszmidt the
project is “completely tailored to the Constitution, encompassing protection from
the arbitrariness of the clerks”,159 an argument repeated by Duke Komorowski 160
and in a more general manner by Mr. Jasiński.161
The Constitution is also invoked for more specific issues, particularly in order to
justify the punishment for certain crimes.162 Consequently, for Mr. Obniski “the
religion of our ancestors is protected according to the Constitutional Charter (…)
suicide is not forgotten and the polygamy and the perjury is counted as a fel-
ony”.163 The division introduced in the project between the felonies, offences and
misdemeanours is said to be coherent with Art. 146 and 149 of the Constitution.164
155Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 49.
156Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 50. Similarly Mr. Faltz stresses that: “It is
necessary that there would be an equal criminal law in the entire country, it is necessary that
punishing laws were consistent with the constitutional charter”, see Diary of the Sejm of the year
1818, Volume II, p. 109. It also is consistent with our “liberal Constitution” for Mr. Nowakowski,
see Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 106 and is “at no point contrary to the
constitution”, see the speech of Mr. Grabowski, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II,
p. 121.
157Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 55.
158It is very interesting to note the semantics used by the representatives to the Polish Sejm in the
year 1818. As it has been excellently observed by U. Müßig, one of the key issues for the
development of the precedence of the Constitution in XVIII century was the fact the development
of a new language, with different meanings of “constitutionality” and “legality”, cf. Ulrike Müßig,
Preface, p. 2, Footnote 23. This new constitutional semantics, which was a product of revolu-
tionary upheaval in the second part of the XVIII centuries (cf. in this respect i.a. quotations from
James Iredell Ulrike Müßig, Preface, p. 2, Footnote 12 and from Lord Bolingbroke, Stourzh
(2017), cf. this book, p. 252, Footnote 11) testifies that a new era in the Polish constitutional
discourse had already begun.
159Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 67.
160Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 82.
161Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, pp. 105–106.
162Such as for the crime of art. 91, which rendered it a prohibited act to help—without the
knowledge of the state’s administration—the local inhabitants of the Kingdom of Poland to leave
the country in order to settle abroad, see speech of Mr. Oebschelwitz, Diary of the Sejm of the year
1818, Volume II, p. 129.
163Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 59.
164Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 54. However both those articles refer only to
the general questions of organisations of the judiciary: According to art. 146: “There shall be civil
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Another specific issue is raised by those speakers who point to the fact that this
project strengthens the constitutional freedoms. Among this group of speeches Mr.
Chmielewski praises the project for “being support for the constitutional free-
doms”.165 Further still: “it is a new honour for the project that it so clearly protects
our Constitution”.166 The interesting issue concerning the constitutionally guaranteed
equality before the law has been brought forward by Mr. Oebschelwitz, who pointing
to the different criminal laws in force in Kingdom of Poland in the year 1818
(principally Austrian and Prussian) reaches the conclusion about the violation of the
constitutional principle of the equality as laid down in Art. 17 of the Constitution,167
what urges to adopt a new, uniform Criminal Code. The same speaker stroke down
the argumentation that a Criminal Code cannot be adopted unless a Code of Criminal
Procedure has been elaborated by highlighting the necessity to develop the organi-
sation of the judiciary as outlined in the constitutional order in the first place.168
All of that presented stances corroborate the fact that the vision of the
Constitution as a primary and preceding normative act with which the Criminal
Code should be coherent is clearly respected. Further still, there can be found a
view that the Code shall also be interpreted and applied consistently with the
Constitution: it is deputy Hakenszmidt who during the last day of the discussion on
the project in the lower Chamber of the Sejm stresses the fact that the punishments
which are projected in the Codex shall be meted out equally since “The constitu-
tional statue does not distinguish between the estates”.169
The same argumentative strategies centring on the Constitution were also
implemented by the adversaries of the project. Here it can also be distinguished
between the general references to the Constitution, sometimes verging on purely
rhetorical figures, and references made in very particular constitutional questions.
As for the case of the first approach, it was raised that the project, being inspired
by the Austrian laws: “is contradictory to this spirit, which exists in our entire
tribunals and tribunals of the police, in every commune and in every town, to take adjudicate
transactions not exceeding five hundred florins” and according to Article 149: “For criminal
causes, and affairs of correctional police, there shall be several criminal tribunals in each
palatinate”.
165Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 69.
166Speech of Mr. Linde, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 67.
167Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 129.
168Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 129. This argumentation is very interesting,
since already in the year 1814 Antoni Bieńkowski in his memorandum stated: “The change in the
jurisprudence and its new organisation brings with it new propositions of the procedure. (…) the
laws would not serve anyone for nothing if (…) their defence did not have a pointed way”, (cf. the
source retrieved by the author and made available on the internet platform of the project under:
http://sources.reconfort.eu/: Antoni Bieńkowski, Uwagi Bieńkowskiego złożone na piśmie prze-
ciwko zaprowadzeniu teraz nowej procedury i organizacji sądownictwa, 16.10.1814, The Princes
Czartoryski Library source number: 5236 IV, 246–247.
169Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 115.
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Constitution”170 or simply “possibly less consistent with the Constitution then the
laws in force at the moment”.171 Clear illustration of the second type of the
argumentation is provided by the speech of Mr. Biernacki, who advocates that there
“can be no punishments for the persecutors as well as for the clerks, since the
persecutors are judicial magistrates and the independence of the judiciary is the
most beautiful characteristics of the Constitution”.172 It is also rather the Code of
the Criminal Procedure where “most clearly the blessed results for the Constitution
can manifest themselves”173 than the Criminal Code itself. However, there can be
found even more radical voices, which implicitly charge the government with
working in detriment to the country, in breach of the Constitution and attempting to
vilify the project as insufficient to protect the constitutional interest of the Kingdom,
since according to Mr. Krysiński “the offences are quite often a result of the activity
of the government itself”.174 There are also fears whether the crimes which consist
in breaching the Constitution will be unveiled at all.175
Other main argumentative strategy is based on underlining the fact that the
project is congruent with the principles already recognised in the Polish
Constitutionalism176. In this sense Mr. Obniski refers to the fact that: “the arbi-
trariness of the judge has been limited since the law clearly prescribes him what
penalty for any kind of felony should be meted out, it can be neither a more severe
nor a milder one than the one that the law prescribes”.177 It is also the attitude of
another representative in the Deputies’ Chamber, Mr. Chmielewski, who calls for
considering whether the project “will not serve the judges [as pretext] for arbi-
trariness”.178 Even more surprising, according to yet another speaker179 the
170Speech of Mr. Krysiński, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 111, being a
possible allusion to the fact that the Austrian Empire at that time was not a constitutional
monarchy.
171Speech of Mr. Krysiński, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 114.
172Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 63.
173Speech of Mr. Krysiński, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 65.
174Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 63. He continues as to say that the Criminal
Code was to be enacted without investigating the reasons of the criminality, what had been
“neglected by the Rada Administracyjna [Administrative Council]”.
175Speech of Mr. Łabędzki, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 87, similarly Mr.
Godlewski, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 126.
176To avoid all the misunderstandings, I would like to clarify that I understand the term “Polish
Constitutionalism” as referring to the set of ideas upon the basic regulations upon the division and
organization of powers, sovereignty and political accountability as developed by the Polish
politicians and intellectuals since the year 1764.
177Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 59.
178Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 69.
179In the available sources from the both Digital library of the Jagiellonian University (http://jbc.bj.
uj.edu.pl/dlibra/docmetadata?id=275449&from=publication, last access 18.11.2016) as well as the
Wrocław Digial Library the pp. 90–99 of the Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818 are missing, what
makes it at this moment impossible to find out who that speaker was.
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acceptance of the project will lead to developing the principle of periodical revival
of the Constitution, as established by the Constitution of 3rd May.180 For those
speakers who are more positive towards the existing political state of the Kingdom
of Poland the elaboration of the draft of Criminal Code can be seen as a further
development of the Constitution, just as the reform of the courts’ organisation.181
By the same token, the references to the inheritance of Polish Constitutionalism
are also exploited by the adversaries of the project, who stress that it shall be rejected
since it is “contrary to our way of thinking, our liberal Constitution”.182 The large
scope of the punishments that can be chosen from by the judges is criticised as being
catalyst for their arbitrariness whereas in a “constitutional nation [it is the] law
[which] should judge the misdemeanours and the crimes of a man”.183
The semblance of those diverse argumentative strategies can be easily found in
the discussion devoted to the project of Criminal Code in Senate. Yet here the
number of the presented views was limited significantly owing to the simple fact
that the discussion was taking place solely during one day, i.e. on 23 April 1818.184
Support for the project was manifested by pointing to the Constitution as its
foundation185 or praising leaving the apostasy of the catholic religion besides the
scope of the criminalisation,186 while the scepticism towards the proposed codifi-
cation was manifested by emphasising that the Code infringes the constitutional
principle of equality before the law187 or the principle of the constitutional pro-
tection of the Christians religions188 or even highlighting the incongruity of the
corporal punishments with “the nature of the constitutional government”.189
180Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 100. It is not entirely clear what is meant here,
however this reference to the Constitution of 1791 shows the continuity in the Polish
Constitutionalism and awareness of its significance for the ordinary legislation.
181Speech of Mr. Wolicki, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 118.
182Speech of Mr. Szpietowski, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 89.
183Speech of Mr. Przyłuski, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume II, p. 102.
184Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume III, p. 24.
185Speech of Mr. Wyszkowski, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume III, p. 25.
186Speech of Mr. Matuszewicz, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume III, p. 34.
187Speech of Mr. Gliszczyński, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume III, p. 30. His
argumentation is based on a profound understanding of the project, since he points to the fact that
the only way for poor people to avoid imprisonment was the corporal punishment of flogging,
which, according to art. 219, 224 of the Criminal Code could shorten the sentence for up to
4 months for men and 8 months for women, whereas the richer perpetrators could make use of
regulations of its art. 227, which will be discussed in detail below (cf. Fn 200).
188Speech of Mr. Gliszczyński, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume III, p. 31. Little later
the same speaker invokes the incongruity of the particular regulations of the project with “the spirit
of our Constitution”.
189Speech of Mr. Gliszczyński, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume III, p. 32. Similarly it
was pointed out that punishment in a form of a deportation, even though prevalent in the Austrian
Code, was not incorporated into the project since it would be in breach of the art. 25 of the
Constitution cf. speech of Mr. Gliszczyński, Diary of the Sejm of the year 1818, Volume III, p. 35.
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The above presented voices of the representatives in the gathering of the Polish
Parliament in 1818 provide explicit evidence that 1815 Constitution was perceived
as a supreme law which ordinary legislation has to respect and be consistent with. It
also manifests the growth of the Constitutionalism perceived here as the legalist
position demanding that the Constitution of the Polish Kingdom shall be respected
any time and under any circumstances,190 the position which will be bolstered in the
subsequent years by liberal opposition on the Sejm under the lead of the
Niemojowscy brothers. For the purposes of this brief study it remains to be verified
how this constitutional approach was reflected in the text of the enacted Criminal
Code itself.
However before this question will be approached, is worth stressing that the
Criminal Code of 1818 was not the only example of the Polish criminal legislation
in the Kingdom of Poland. The important case of other regulation in this field is
provided by the military criminal law. The statues which were in force here
included the Criminal Code for the Polish Army of the Kingdom191 as well as the
official translations of several French military statues, which were continued to be
applied, irrespectively of the fall of the Duchy of Warsaw.192
The most characteristic feature of this part of the criminal legislation was the fact
that it had been introduced without any formal legislative procedure and gave
powers to an army’s general in charge to enact further criminal statues for the
soldiers under his command.193 Therefore, it constituted a grave violation of the
constitutional principles, especially of the principle of the legality. It was also
illustrative for both the political and the legal situation of the Kingdom of Poland
where the military, under the leadership of the brother of Russian tsar Alexander I,
Duke Konstantin Pavlovich had a special status, clearly violating the stipulated and
proclaimed constitutional order.
190Equally well a term “legalism” could be applied, but due to the special context of the 1818
parliamentary debate, so much centered about verifying the compatibility of the to-be-enacted
Criminal Code with the Polish Constitution 1815, this name appears to be more appropriate.
191Kodex kryminalny dla woyska polskiego or Artykuły do czytania woysku przed wykonaniem
przysięgi. Instrukcya dla J.P.P. Oficerów Artylleryi, pełniących obowiązki audytorów, iako też dla
officerów wszelkiéy broni, mogących bydź w potrzebie zastąpienia audytorów, Warsaw 1826.
192Prawa Karzące Woyskowe wypisane z Księgi Praw pod tytułem: Le Guide des Juges Militaires
przez Xawerego Krysińskiego Audytora Generalnego Woysk Polskich przełożone z dołączeniem
wzorów: skarg, inkwizycyi, wotowań i wyroków. w Warszawie w Drukarni Woyskowey 1824.
Formally speaking, it was a selection and translation of the French laws prepared by a military
official, de facto applied in the polish army of the Kingdom.
193Czyżak (2012, p. 5).
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6 The Evaluation of the Congruity of the Criminal Code
of 1818 with the 1815 Constitution of the Kingdom
of Poland
Having made the preceding considerations, it shall be analysed now to which
extend the enacted criminal law194 was consistent with the presented regulations of
the 1815 Constitution. Such an analysis appears to be particularly interesting
bearing in mind the fact that it was almost a unique example of a codification of an
entire branch of law in the Kingdom of Poland,195 and so far it has not been
analysed more closely in this respect.196
The 1818 Code of Criminal Law generally accepted197 the principle of equality
before the law, but it did encounter some minor exceptions. Most notably,
according to the Art. 156, 160a-b of the Code, theft, nominally a misdemeanour,
shall be considered as felony when it was committed through the servants to the
detriment of their masters or by the apprentices to the detriment of their crafts’
masters.
This regulation had been criticised both in the legal literature contemporary to
the enactment of the 1818 Code198 as well as in the only XX-century monographic
study on the Code, being classified as a remnant of feudalism, infringing the formal
equality before the law.199 Nevertheless, it has to be noticed that this particular
mode of committing a theft stands out for abusing a special relationship of trust that
should exist between a master and a servant and is getting close to embezzlement,
what enables to understand treating it more severely. Similarly, it would be hard to
consider the regulation of Art. 227 of the 1818 Criminal Code, which stated that:
“If the fortune of a sentenced person is sufficient, the punishment of an arrest in a
public house can be converted to a pecuniary punishment, but only there, where the
194The Criminal Code of 1818 was published i.a. as Kodex karzący dla Królestwa Polskiego: z
dodaniem praw kryminalnych późniey uchwalonych, reiestru porządkowego i alfabetycznego,
przypisków wskazuiących artykuły związek z sobą maiące, Warszawa 1830.
195It has been praised in the literature as being “besides the introduction of the Napoleon’s Code
the greatest event of the legal life on the polish soil in the first half of the XIX centaury”, cf.
Śliwowski (1958, p. 390).
196There can be found some valuable remarks upon the regulations of the 1818 Criminal Code
which will be discussed below, such like art. 156 and 160, in Śliwowski (1958)—cf. pp. 281, 286–
288, 366–368, 377 but they were made from an entirely different perspective, i.e. in the light of the
marxist perception of legal history as the fight between the estates.
197One of its very clear examples was delivered by art. 44, which stressed that consequences of the
punishments in form of civil death or loss of political rights did not reach the “innocent wife or
husband”.
198Dzierożyński (1830b, pp. 269–391) (partially wrong page numeration in the article), where (cf.
pp. 374–378) the author directly refers to collision of the criminal law with general morality for the
justification of his stance. This source has been obtained and scanned by the author and made
available on the internet platform of the ReConFort project under: http://sources.reconfort.eu/.
199Śliwowski (1958, p. 281).
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law explicitly enables for such a change”200 as such a type of an infringement, since
even in the contemporary criminal law the delivered sentence can be commuted on
numerous reasons and in very different manners.201
The Code of Criminal Law of 1818 respects the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege poenali,202 expressed in its Art. 6: “As a felony, offence or misdemeanour only
such a deed can be considered and punished, which according to this law has been
found to be a felony, offence or misdemeanour”. This rule was further supplemented
by Art. 48-49, 60 and 225 which guaranteed that no other punishment can be meted
out as that which had been explicitly mentioned in the Criminal Code.203
However there were notable exceptions to this approach: firstly, the rule was not
respected in case of the misdemeanours, since art. 588 of the Code stated that “all
the police misdemeanours which are not encompassed in this book shall be,
according to their nature, considered to be belonging to one of the three chapters of
this book und punished according to the punishments specified there.”204 In case of
the misdemeanours the 1818 Code also did not specify the required mental
requirement of the perpetrator, but it hardly can be considered to be a breach of the
legality principle.205 Nonetheless, to some degree this principle was infringed by
two other statues, Art. 362 and 382 which stated that: “All other acts or omissions
in respect to the security of human life, which endanger the natural and common
duties of every man or which had been committed contrary to the explicit regu-
lations of the law, which due to the number of their cases cannot be specified (…)
shall be punished”.206 Very similar approach can be found in the art. 186, which
stated that: “Even though the cases of fraud and falsification due to their great
200Quite interestingly, among the lawyers of that time it was a contentious issue whether the
perpetrator himself could choose what kind of penalty (i.e. between a public house and a pecuniary
punishment) he will be serving [that was the view advocated by Brzeziński (1830)] while rejected
by Hube (1829).
201In the contemporary European continental legal systems for every modification of a legally
binding sentence a decision of judge is necessary and it is impossible to avoid serving a prison
sentence by paying a given sum of money, cf. e.g. art. 60 or 155 of the contemporary Polish
Kodeks karny wykonawczy (Dz. U. z 1997 r. Nr 90, poz. 557 z późn. zm.).
202Declared in the article 23 of the Constitution 1815, cf. above part II of the article.
203A further development of those regulations could be found in the specific provisions concerning
the particular additional penalties, where, like in the case of a whipping post, it could be pro-
nounced only when expressly stipulated by the law (cf. art. 36 of the Criminal Code 1818 in fine).
204Already the contemporary lawyers pointed to the fact that this regulation is contradictory to art.
1, 2 and 6 of the Criminal Code 1818, cf. Dzierożyński (1830a, p. 24), who wrote there about:
“new doubts that sometimes grant almost unalloyed arbitriness to a judge”.
205Jerzy Śliwowski considers that due to this omission it had to be assumed that negligence was
sufficient as the minimal threshold of the mental attitude of the perpetrator, cf. Śliwowski (1958,
p. 308), what appears to be a correct view.
206The wording of Article 382 was almost identic, yet aimed at offences against human body or
health: “All other acts or omissions in respect to the security of human life, which infringe the
natural and common duties of every man or which had been committed contrary to the explicit
regulations of the law, which due to the number of their cases cannot be specified (…) shall be
punished”.
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number cannot be enumerated, the crime of falsification is committed when: (…)”
giving only an exemplary and not complete list of the cases of frauds and
falsifications.
Further, the 1818 Code did contain numerous provisions which elaborated the
constitutional principle of the protection of the property, as specified in Art. 26 of
the 1815 Constitution. This was guaranteed by a hoist of different offences specified
in Chapter XI of the II Book of the Criminal Code.207
Interestingly, the Criminal Code of 1818 did contain a very specific provision
about the criminal activity against the Constitution itself, namely Art. 247, according
to which: “Who maliciously, by the means of scoffing writings or prints gives rise
among the inhabitants of the country to disdain of the Constitution or attempts to give
rise to such a disdain, shall be punished with arrest in a public house between
3 months and one yearˮ. This regulation clearly testifies how highly valued this legal
act was, but also corroborates the persevering existence of an illusion that within the
framework of the constitutional order of the Kingdom of Poland certain reasonable
modus vivendi with the Russian Empire could be achieved.
Finally, it is worth stressing the fact that the Code already did adhere to several
modern principles of the criminal law, such as cognitationis nemo patitur,208 going
even beyond the text of the Constitution itself and possibly paving the way for the
development of future Polish Constitutionalism and human rights.209
Briefly summarising the above presented implementation of the principles of the
1815 Constitution of Kingdom of Poland into the Criminal Code of 1818, it has to
be stated that they did not amount to seriously contradicting the provisions of the
adopted codification und could be easily revoked by a means of a simple subse-
quent amendment of this codification, being the more probable as the science of the
Criminal law in Poland was starting to germinate at this time.210 Yet the changing
political circumstances rendered the further development of the legislation in line
with the established constitutional principles simply impossible.
207Art. 383-429. They were characterised by a very casuistic regulation, becoming the second
longest chapter in the entire Criminal Code.
208Art. 26 stated explicitly that: “For bad thoughts, that is for a bad intention without any external
acts or without intentional omission of what is prescribed by the law nobody can face criminal
responsibility (…)”.
209Especially, it could provide material for the development of the interpretation of the article 23 of
the 1815 Constitution, which, as it has been stated above, provided that: “No man shall be
punished except in conformity with the existing laws and by the decree of the competent
Magistrate.” so as to encompass the requirement of punishibility solely for external human acts
which have at least an abstract potential to generate some harm to the legally protected interests, cf.
in this respect the recent decision of the Polish Constitutional Court from 17th July 2014, SK
35/12 going in this direction (printed in: OTK ZU 7A/2014, poz. 74).
210A fact to which the establishing of the University of Warsaw on the 19th November 1816 with a
separate Faculty of Law and Administrative Sciences following the decree of Alexander I (cf.:
Postanowienie naznaczające założenie Szkoły Głównej pod imieniem Królewskiego




The above analysed proceedings concerning the elaboration and implementation of
the Criminal Code of 1818, outstanding for being the first example of the Polish
modern codification of substantial criminal law, did reveal profound respect for and
importance of the regulations Polish 1815 Constitution. It manifested itself in the
only available expression of the public debate in the given political circumstances,
namely on the Parliaments’ forum.
Even though there can be hardly found any printed essays or newspapers articles
considering the issue of the congruence of the 1818 Criminal Code with the
Constitution, undoubtedly among the representatives of the Polish voters in the
Parliament (“Sejm”) of 1818, irrespectively whether they were in favour of the
codification—voters being proportionally the most numerous in that time in con-
tinental Europe—the idea that a Criminal Code should implement and develop the
principles of this fundamental law was wholeheartedly accepted. Even though for
the Russian authorities, including the tsar Alexander I Romanov, the Constitution
was merely a pretence meant to appease the Polish society in its longing for
independence, an utterly instrumental subterfuge, which could be one-sidedly
amended211 and disrespected when convenient, for the Polish society and especially
for the elected representatives to Sejm it was perceived as veritable supreme law in
the country, which shall be respected and implemented by the ordinary legislation.
This striking contrast between the legalist position of the Polish society and arbi-
trariness of the growing Russian despotism eventually incited the people of
Kingdom to resort to the last possible means in defence of the 1815 Constitution—
to a military uprising.212
It clearly shows the strength of the Polish Constitutionalism, not subdued by the
difficult political circumstances and can be an inspiring example for our times.
211The best illustration of such a one-sided amendment is the addition to the Constitution by the
Russian tsar Alexander I Romanov in a form of an “additional article to the constitutional law
from 13 February 1825” („Arykuł dodatkowy do ustawy konstytucyjnej królestwa Polskiego z dn.
13 lutego 1825 r.”) which made the debates of the Sejm secret, cf. Handelsman (1915, pp. 58–59).
212The most solemn expression of this attitude is the Manifesto of the Polish People, proclaimed
on the Sejms session of 20.12.1830, i.e. 21 days after the outbreak of the November Uprising,
specifying the reasons for this military resistance: cf. Sejm Królestwa Polskiego, Manifest Narodu
Polskiego, p. 9: “Après tant d’affronts, a prés une violation si manifeste des guaranties jurées,
violation qu’aucun gouvernement légitime, dans aucun pays civilise, ne se serait permise
impunément, et qui, à plus forte raison, peut justifier notre soulèvement contre une autorité impose
par la force, qui ne pensera que cette autorité a rompu toute alliance avec la nation, qu’elle lui a
donné le droit de romper à chaque instant ses chaînes et d’en forger des armes?”, which in
paraphrased translation reads: “After so many violence, after the trampling of all the guarantees,
which could justify not only an uprising against the power imposed by force, but which no rightful
government in any civilised country could accept without punishment, who will not judge that the
entire contract between the power and the nation has not been ruptured, that this nation became a
slave, which any time could throw off the chains and convert them into weapons?”.
Precedence of the 1815 Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland 205
8 Summary (Polish)
Studium poświęcone jest zagadnieniu hierarchicznej nadrzędności Konstytucji
Królestwa Polskiego z roku 1815. Artykuł podzielony został na trzy zasadnicze
części.
W pierwszej, wprowadzającej części omówiona została geneza Konstytucji roku
1815. W opracowaniu objaśniono zagranicznemu czytelnikowi w oparciu o ustal-
enia polskiej literatury sekundarnej, opierając się na ustaleniach takich autorów jak
S. Smólka, S. Askenazy, H. Izdebski (w zasadniczej mierze), D. Nawrot, że
Konstytucja Królestwa Polskiego z roku 1815 została wykoncypowana jako
narzędzie propagandowe w zabiegach o poparcie polskiego i litewskiego
społeczeństwa w trakcie wojen napoleońskich. Omówiono bliżej jej genezę,
wskazując, iż była ona opracowywana począwszy od roku 1811 z udziałem pols-
kich polityków orientacji pro-rosyjskiej, takich jak A Czartoryski, książę F. K.
Drucki-Lubecki, M. K. Ogiński, czy L. Plater. Po przełomowym zwycięstwie
szóstej koalicji z udziałem Alexandra I nad wojskami francuskimi, stała się
kamieniem węgielnym odrodzonego na Kongresie Wiedeńskim, wieczyście
połączonego z Cesarstwem Rosyjskim Królestwa Polskiego.
W kolejnej partii opracowania dokonano dla czytelnika zagranicznego naszki-
cowania zasadniczych postanowień Konstytucji z roku 1815 ze szczególnym
uwzględnieniem tych regulacji, które odnoszą się do kwestii nadrzędności
Konstytucji oraz prawa karnego.
Trzecia, właściwa cześć opracowania omawia zagadnienie nadrzędności
Konstytucji 1815 rokuna przykładzie procesu legislacyjnego jedynej pełnej kody-
fikacji całej gałęzi prawa (obok Kodexu Cywilnego Królestwa Polskiego z 1825 r.,
stanwiącego, jak wiadomo, w istocie drobną nowelizację Kodeksu Napoleona) jaka
została przyjęta w Królestwie Polskim: Kodeksu Karzącego z roku 1818. Analiza
stanowisk posłów i senatorów na Sejmie roku 1818 wprost potwierdziła, iż zarzut
niekonstytucyjności tudzież argument o zgodności z Konstytucja był szeroko
powoływany zarówno przez zwolenników jak i przez przeciwników projektu tej
ustawy. Zgłoszone przez posłów poprawki dowodzą dążności posłów do możliwie
dalekiego związania władzy sadowniczej normą prawnokarna w myśl rygorysty-
cznie pojmowanej zasady nullum crimen sine lege certa i oświeceniowego
ograniczania roli sędziego w sferze wykładni przepisów prawno-karnych.
Stad też skonstatować należy, iż zrodzona w Oświeceniu koncepcja hierar-
chicznej nadrzędności Konstytucji była już wtedy—przynajmniej wśród przed-
stawicieli polskiego Sejmu—rozpowszechniona. Uwidacznia to semantyka
występująca w wypowiedziach posłów, którzy nierzadko odwołują się do
„konstytucyjności” (zgodności z Konstytucją) proponowanego projektu, sematyka
mająca przecież czytelną, późnooświeceniową prowenieniecję. Co więcej, analiza
samego tekstu uchwalonego Kodeksu Karzącego dowodzi, iż stanowił on akt
normatywny dostosowany do postanowień obowiązującej Konstytucji, a normy
prawne, które mogłyby budzić wątpliwości jako sprzeczne z tym nadrzędnym
aktem normatywnym występują absolutnie wyjątkowo.
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Abstract Constitutional precedence constitutes a defining element of modern con-
stitutionalism. This chapter aims to elucidate the way in which this idea was
embedded in the Belgian Constitution of 1831. It does so by combining a
historical-genealogical approach with a legal one. The chapter begins with a dis-
cussion of the genesis of the Belgian Constitution in relation to the Fundamental Law
of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. It shows how the Belgian opposition’s
constitutional resistance to government policy created a debate over the interpretation
of the Fundamental Law, which in turn provided the conceptual building blocks for
the understanding of constitutional precedence in the 1831 Constitution. After
examining the concept of legal order, the chapter explains how, in the eyes of the
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Belgian revolutionaries, the Belgian Constitution could be a legitimate replacement
for the Fundamental Law as the foundational document of the state. The concern for
constitutional precedence was expressed furthermore by recurring debates within the
National Congress and the press over the constitutionality of the acts of both the
constituting and constituted powers. The chapter then turns to the constitutional text
and analyzes the way the precedence of the Constitution was legally anchored into the
Belgian state system. Constitutional precedence was expressed by a combination of
measures concerning (a) the special status and the endurance of constitutional law as
compared to ordinary law and (b) the Constitution’s status as the legally binding
ground rule for the constituted powers. Finally, the precedence of the Constitution
was symbolically expressed by a discourse of respect for the Constitution as the
ultimate guarantee of the wellbeing of the state.
1 Introduction
In 1852 a lavishly illustrated edition of the Belgian Constitution was published at
the behest of Prime Minister Charles Rogier.1 It was only one of many
government-sponsored initiatives to harness popular support for the Constitution in
the years following the eventful year 1848.2 In stark contrast to its neighboring
countries, the revolutionary wave failed to stir up any serious unrest in Belgium.3
The Constitution, the fruit of the Belgian Revolution of 1830, was credited for the
young state’s remarkable institutional stability. Its liberal character was supposed to
have prevented the outburst of a popular revolt. The Constitution was thus cele-
brated in various forms, including the erection of the Congress Column in Brussel
and the publication of the ornate illustrated edition of 1852.
The 1852 volume opens with an allegory depicting Belgium as a maiden. She
wears a city crown and is accompanied by the Belgian lion, which rests its paw on
the broken chains of slavery.4 Above her head she holds the biblical Tables of the
Law inscribed with the words “Constitution de la Belgique 1831”. The shield on
which she sits is supported by Belgians of various professional classes: a farmer, a
soldier, a judge, a militia member and an artisan. Iconological analysis has shown
that Belgian and constitutional imagery are inextricably linked in this image,
making it hard to separate the one from the other.5 And that was undoubtedly the
message intended by its creators: indeed the Belgian state and its Constitution were
linked to each other to such degree as to make the existence of the one directly
dependent on the other. As the reference to the broken chains makes clear, the
1Brown and Lagye (1852). On Rogier: Discailles (1907).
2Huygebaert (2015) and Janssens (2001, p. 52).
3Witte (2010).
4On the political imagery of the young Belgian state see: Dubois (2005a) and Janssens (2005).
5Huygebaert (2015).
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Constitution consolidated the achievements of the Belgian Revolution of 1830,
which was itself the founding event of the Belgian state. The Constitution thus
incarnated the principles on which Belgian independence hinged, and guaranteed
their endurance. The maintenance and the defense of the conceptual pair country
and Constitution was a task entrusted to the Belgian people, depicted in the lower
level.6 The image thus expresses both sacred respect for the Constitution and
popular support by the Belgian people.
The exceptional position of the Constitution in the Belgian state system was not
merely rhetorical. As this chapter aims to show, the symbolic precedence of the
Constitution reflected the real, legal precedence it enjoyed in practice. The
Constitution in Belgium was not like ordinary law: it was the founding document of
the new state, legally anchoring the unalterable rights of the citizens and the
division and exercise of power. Thus it constituted the ultimate juridical basis for
both the legal and political order of the new state. The members of the National
Congress, Belgium’s constituent assembly, were acutely aware of the foundational
character of the nascent constitutional document, calling it “an arch of alliance” on
which the future wellbeing of the state would rest for generations to come.7
Precedence of constitution is here defined as the concept of establishing the
political and legal order in a positive and uniform legal text which constitutes a
prior and binding legal norm. The idea of constitutional precedence, a defining
feature of modern constitutionalism, was still relatively new at the time of the
Belgian Constitution’s genesis. Its main historical competitor and conceptual
antithesis, monarchical sovereignty, was ubiquitous in Restoration Europe.8 The
Belgian Constitution was proclaimed on 7 February 1831 in the name of the
Belgian people and in the absence of a ruling monarch.9 As this chapter will show,
the triumph of the concept of constitutional precedence resulted from the power
vacuum created by the Belgian Revolution against Dutch rule. Moreover,
the Belgian opposition’s resistance against government policy, based on the
Fundamental Law of 1815, provided the conceptual building blocks for the
understanding of constitutional precedence in the 1831 Constitution.
This chapter will use a genealogical approach to explain the emergence of con-
stitutional precedence in Belgium in 1831. It will first turn to the Fundamental Law of
1815 and the debate over its interpretation, which gave rise to the Belgian constitu-
tional opposition.10 After looking at the concept of “legal order”, it will explain how
the Belgian Constitution could, in the eyes of the Belgian revolutionaries, legiti-
mately replace the Fundamental Law as the foundational document of the state.
6Cf. Footnote 151.
7Huyttens (1844–1845), vol 3, p. 369, 01/07/1831.
8Kirsch (1999), Mirkine-Guetzévitch (1831), Mübig (2013) and Prutsch (2013).
9Deseure (2016a, p. 12).
10See Delbecke’s argument in De lange schaduw van de grondwetgever: perswetgeving en
persmisdrijven in België (1831–1914), p. 93 that the press legislation in the Belgian Constitution
cannot be understood without taking into account the Belgian opposition to the press policy of the
Dutch minister Van Maanen.
Constitutional Precedence in Belgium 213
Secondly, the chapter will turn to the constitutional text, analyzing the way in which
the precedence of the Constitution was legally anchored into the Belgian state system.
2 From Fundamental Law to Belgian Constitution
2.1 The Fundamental Law and the Question of Royal
Sovereignty
On 12 October 1830 the Constitutional Commission convened for the first time in
Brussels to draw up a Constitution for the new country.11 The Provisional
Government had created the Commission a few days after declaring Belgian
independence from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands.12 In just two weeks the
Commission produced a draft Constitution which went on to serve as the guiding
document for the constituent debates in the National Congress. Most of the basic
principles of the final Constitution were already present in this draft.13 Knowing
that only a few months earlier the idea of Belgian independence was wholly alien to
most participants in the political debate, this short span of time may be surprising.14
With the exception of the republican journalist Louis de Potter, even the most
radical members of the Belgian opposition had not seriously suggested the option of
a Belgian secession from the Kingdom of the Netherlands.15 Neither did the
commissioners have previous experience with constituent work. Nevertheless, they
managed to produce a balanced constitutional document containing a clear and
consistent vision on the functioning of constitutional monarchy.
This result was only possible because the Commission started its activities after a
period in which such issues had been widely discussed. During the fifteen years of
its existence, the United Kingdom had seen much political debate on the basic
features of the state. Especially in the years 1814–1817 and 1827–1830, the
institutions and the Constitution of the Kingdom had been the object of intense
discussion. Profound theoretical reflection on the nature and the architecture of
constitutional monarchy had been produced. The members of the Constitutional
Commission and the National Congress could draw on excellent political treatises
such as the ones written on constitutional monarchy and ministerial responsibility
by Joseph Lebeau, Jean-François Tielemans and Charles-Hippolyte Vilain XIIII,
among others.16 In short, both ideological camps within the Belgian opposition,
11Van den Steene (1963).
12Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique (1830), no. 5, p. 13,
decree of 6 October 1830.
13Gilissen (1967, p. 60). The most fundamental difference with the final Constitution concerned
the presence of an aristocratic Senate, which gave it a more conservative character.
14Aerts (2006) and Witte (2006, p. 59).
15Juste (1874).
16Lebeau (1830), Tielemans (1829) and Vilain (1830).
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Catholics and Liberals, had ample time to develop their political-theoretical views
by the time the convention started.
The question of the interpretation of the Constitution had indeed been at the core
of the conflict between government and opposition that eventually led to the ad hoc
separation of the Kingdom. The experience of debating the Constitution in the face
of an ever more autocratic government had provided the Belgian elites with training
in political and constitutional matters.17 In his opening speech for the National
Congress, Louis de Potter spoke of “the arbitrariness of the ministers, which has
forced us to advance every day more into a career of constitutional opposition”.18
Etienne de Gerlache, president of the Congress and member of the Constitutional
Commission, called the experience useful for the political education of the Belgians:
(…) despite its exclusive and obtrusive character, the fifteen years of this semi-liberal,
semi-absolutist regime proved to be useful for our political education.19
When the Belgian Revolution broke out, the ideas developed in the previous
years could be put into practice.20 One must therefore look to the Fundamental Law
and the debates it engendered when trying to understand the genesis of the modern
concept of the Constitution in Belgium and its defining characteristic, namely
constitutional precedence.
At first sight a constitutional document entitled Fundamental Law seems to relate
more to the Ancien Régime than to Restoration constitutionalism. From the six-
teenth century on, the leges fundamenales, which could be either written or
unwritten, came about as the successors to the medieval state treaties
(Herrschaftsverträge).21 Although they did constitute general rules of sorts for the
government of the early modern kingdoms, these fundamental laws cannot be
compared to modern constitutions. Far from constituting a prior set of unified and
legally binding rules reflecting an underlying political theory, they were the prag-
matic and changeable outcome of politically and historically informed negotiations
between monarchs and their subjects.
The name given to the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is
deceptive however. In the constitutional construction devised by Gijsbert Karel Van
Hogendorp (1762–1834), deliberate allusions to continuity with the prerevolu-
tionary past were manifold. Van Hogendorp was the architect of the new Dutch
state established after Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig.22 His constitutional draft,
17Witte (2016, p. 43).
18“(…) des progrès que l’arbitraire ministériel nous forçait chaque jour à faire dans la carrière de
l’opposition constitutionnelle”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 1, p. 100, 10/11/1830.
19“(…) ce régime de quinze années, semi-libéral, semi-absolu, malgré sa tendance exclusive et
envahissante, ne laissa pas d’être utile à notre éducation politique”. De Gerlache (1859), vol. 2,
p. XXIII.
20Marteel (2009, p. 411), Van Sas (1992, p. 434) and Witte (2016, p. 16).
21Stourzh (1977, p. 61).
22Breukelman (1912) and Slijkerman (2013, pp. 123–192).
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written in 1812, served as the blueprint for the Fundamental Law.23
His ‘Burgundian vision’ was based upon an idealized view of the time when the
Netherlands had been united under a single sovereign monarch.24 The names he
introduced for the new institutions reflected that vision: Estates General (for the
Parliament), Provincial Estates (for regional assemblies), knighthoods (for the rep-
resentation of the nobility within the Provincial Estates). The Republic of the
United Netherlands’ venerable constitutional document, The Union of Utrecht, was
not resurrected however. For Van Hogendorp, restoring the ‘natural order’ of the
Burgundian Netherlands entailed bypassing the republican past.25
Van Hogendorp’s invention of traditions is indicative of his conservatism and of
his nostalgia for the prerevolutionary national past. At the same time the references
to an idealized past served to conceal what was a modern conception of the
Constitution.26 The successive constitutional experiments of the Batavian Republic
and the Kingdom of Holland, followed by the annexation to the French Empire, had
all left their traces on the post-revolutionary constitutional order.27 Van Hogendorp
intended the Constitution to be a binding basic rule for the state’s institutions and
the exercise of power.28 When Prince William Frederick of Orange-Nassau, the son
of the last stadtholder, was invited to take power in Holland in 1813 as ‘Sovereign
Prince’, it was made clear to him that the conditions for his rule were to be laid
down in a binding Constitution.29 When making his entry into Amsterdam, William
himself made his acceptance of the throne conditional on “the guarantees provided
by a wise constitution”.30 The Constitution was debated by a Constitutional
Commission presided over by Van Hogendorp, and was adopted by an assembly of
notables convened in Amsterdam on 29 March 1814. William was inaugurated as
Sovereign Prince only after swearing an oath on the Constitution, the next day. At
this time there was a clear awareness that the Fundamental Law constituted a
binding contract between the monarch and the Nation, which rested on an implicit
agreement between both parties.31
Sovereignty was not explicitly defined in the Fundamental Law. Van
Hogendorp’s vision of the Constitution relied, not on abstract theory or universal
23Colenbrander (1908), vol. 1, pp. 1–14.
24Aerts (2006, p. 25), Marteel (2012, p. 38), Slijkerman (2013, p. 157), Tamse and Witte (1992,
p. 10), Van Sas (2004a, p. 462), Van Velzen (2005, p. 23), Van Zanten (2004, p. 26), and Worst
(1992, p. 58).
25Van Velzen (2005, p. 23).
26Marteel (2009, p. 27) and Slijkerman (2013, p. 138).
27Aerts (2016, p. 47) and Velema (1998).
28Slijkerman (2013, pp. 195–196).
29Van Sas (1992, p. 179), Van Velzen (2005, p. 57). For a different opinion, see: Bos (2009, p. 86).
30Proclamation of the Sovereign Prince, 2 December 1813. Colenbrander (1908), vol. 1, p. 26.
See: Koch (2013, p. 233) and Van Sas (2004b).
31Van Velzen (2005, p. 422). Koch argues that William considered the Constitution as a mere
façade for monarchical government from the very beginning. His influence on the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission has moreover been considerable. Koch (2013, p. 247).
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principles, but on the organic order of government based on history and national
traditions.32 In his view, explicit reflection on political theory could only serve to
obscure the right ideas on the exercise of power. It is no coincidence that Van
Hogendorp was an admirer of the Enlish model of constitutional monarchy, the
principles of which he tried to introduce in the Dutch context.33 The result was a
model of mixed monarchy. Whereas the monarch was sovereign, his power was
limited by an aristocratic and a (very moderately) democratic element. Royal power
was not absolute since it was subject to the Constitution, which defined the pre-
liminary rules of the political game for all actors including the King.
The uncertainties of the domestic political situation hardly permitted the mon-
arch to make a bid for absolute sovereignty. When the Dutch regained national
independence by shaking off French rule, a new form of state needed to be
improvised on the spot. William could not know what was awaiting him on the
other side of the Channel when he accepted the Dutch throne.34 The domestic
situation and the international political context were uncertain. William’s inaugu-
ration on 30 March 1814 preceded both Waterloo and the Congress of Vienna,
marking the final defeat of Napoleonic France and the establishment of a
Restoration order based on the monarchical principle respectively.
The consolidation of the Restoration order, from 1815 onward, allowedWilliam to
wield monarchical power in a more self-confident manner.35 The London Protocol of
21 June 1814 decided on the unification ofBelgiumand theNetherlands. On 16March
1815, anticipating the final act of the Vienna Congress, William assumed the title of
King of the Netherlands.36 When Van Hogendorp lost his place as the King’s privi-
leged counselor to Cornelis Felix Van Maanen (1769–1846), a gradual theoretical
shift began.37 VanMaanen, former Minister of Justice under the Kingdom of Holland
and president of the Imperial Court in The Hague, had been a faithful servant of the
centralist imperial regime.38 His unshakeable belief in the principle of absolute royal
authority induced him to develop a concept of monarchical sovereignty that preceded
the Constitution. Peter Van Velzen has termed this innovative concept ‘preliminary
sovereignty’.39 According to VanMaanen, the King had already been fully sovereign
before the introduction of the Constitution. He had, in fact, freely consented to con-
stitutional limitations on his royal power.40 VanMaanen did not go so far as to call the
32Aerts (2016, 48).
33Slijkerman (2013, p. 140) and Van Velzen (2005, p. 17).
34Koch (2013, p. 226), Lok (2011) and Van Sas (1992, p. 179).
35Van Sas (1992, p. 179) and Van Velzen (2005, p. 151).
36Colenbrander (1908), vol. 2, pp. 64–65. William had already supplied for the temporary gov-
ernment of Belgium since 1 August 1814 at the request of the allied powers. Rotteveel Mansveld
and Velle (2016, p. 9).
37Van Velzen (2005, p. 53).
38Blok (1914, pp. 803–805).
39Van Velzen (2005, pp. 151–173).
40Aerts (2016, 52).
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Constitution a charte octroyée which could be withdrawn at will, since the King had
sworn an oath to uphold it.41 Nevertheless, he considered the King to be the only
source of sovereignty and interpreted the Fundamental Law accordingly.
An increasing tendency towards autocratic and authoritarian government
accompanied this theoretical shift.42 William did not consider the Nation as a
contracting party, but as a passive receiver of royal benefactions. This meant that he
systematically increased the royal competences in government using the argument
that all the residual powers—those powers not explicitly attributed by the
Constitution—were the exclusive competence of the King.43 In addition to inter-
preting the Constitution in a way that allowed for a maximum development of royal
power, the government also took legislative initiatives to undermine the checks on
royal power prescribed by the Fundamental Law. Parliamentary control over the
budget was hollowed out, while the ‘Blanket law’ of 1818 and the ‘Conflict law’ of
1822 allowed the King to settle a major part of the decision-making by royal
decree.44 Indeed, after 1822, the government rarely consulted Parliament.
The monarchical interpretation of the Fundamental Law defended by Van
Maanen relied on a literal reading. Van Hogendorp, who no longer played a role in
government, gradually came to contest this reading.45 He argued that it did not
conform to the intentions of the Constitutional Commission. He conceded that the
absolutist interpretation was facilitated by the lacunas and ambiguous formulations
of the constitutional text itself.46 Indeed, these weaknesses enhanced the
Fundamental Law’s failure to effectively limit monarchical power.47
The most prominent issue which had not been convincingly resolved was that of
ministerial responsibility. The issue touched the very nature of constitutional
monarchy, since it was all about the degree to which the government could be held
accountable by the representatives of the Nation. Art. 177 of the Fundamental Law
of 1815 specified the juridical responsibility of ministers for crimes committed
during the exercise of their functions.48 The accusation was put forward by the
Public Prosecutor (whose appointment was a royal prerogative) before the High
Court. Parliament needed to consent to the prosecution of a minister but it could not
take the initiative. Peter Van Velzen has shown that both Van Hogendorp and the
Belgian members of the Constitutional Commission of 1815 were confused on the
exact implications of the article.49
41Van Velzen (2005, p. 157; 267).
42Koch (2015).
43Worst (1992, p. 71).
44Breukelman (1912), Van Velzen (2005, p. 248; 423), Marteel (2009, p. 207) and Van Zanten
(2004, p. 104).
45Breukelman (1912) and Van Velzen (2005, p. 232).
46Van Velzen (2005, p. 233).
47Aerts (2016, p. 52).
48I.e. article 104 of the Fundamental Law of 1814.
49Van Velzen (2005, pp. 36–53).
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Van Hogendorp had intended the article to allow for parliamentary initiative, so
that the juridical responsibility of ministers would automatically result in (indi-
vidual) political responsibility to Parliament. He also expected the ministers to be
liable to prosecution for violating the Constitution. In his view, this was the ideal
system of constitutional monarchy, as it had existed in England in the second half of
the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth century.50 It guaranteed strong
royal power tempered by respect for the Constitution and a certain degree of
parliamentary control. He rejected the principle of royal inviolability however,
since that combination threatened to result in parliamentary government and merely
symbolic royal power in the long run. On the other hand, he did assume that royal
inviolability would develop in practice.51
Discussion on these issues was rekindled by the presence of Belgian members in
the Constitutional Commission of 1815, which was convened to adapt the
Fundamental Law to the new reality of the integration of the Belgian territories. The
liberals among them were strongly inspired by the political theory of Benjamin
Constant. Objections were raised against the absence of a number of stipulations
which they considered essential for a constitutional monarchy, including royal
inviolability, ministerial responsibility to Parliament for violations of the
Constitution and parliamentary confidence for ministers.52 These questions laid
bare a fundamental division of opinions between the Northern and Southern
members of the Commission. In the ensuing discussions, the Belgians were pla-
cated and led to believe that their demands were implied by Art. 177, without
explicitly being mentioned in the constitutional text.
The curious confusion over the real implications of Art. 177 had grave conse-
quences for the future of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands.53 It set the stage
for the fundamental constitutional discussions of the following years, which shook
the Kingdom to its foundations. The constitutional uncertainty would contribute to
the Belgian opposition against the Dutch government and, eventually, set the
agenda for the Belgian constituent debates in 1830. Central to these debates were
the issues of the position of the Constitution as prior legal norm for governmental
action and, following from it, the accountability of the King’s government to
Parliament.
50Van Velzen (2005, pp. 7–19).
51Van Velzen (2015, p. 121).
52Van Velzen (2005, pp. 36–53).
53In 1817 King William tried to come to terms with the opposition by offering to include the
parliamentary initiative for the prosecution of ministers in the Constitution. For strategic reasons
the opposition refused the offer, and argued that the parliamentary initiative was presupposed by
the Constitution. Marteel (2009, p. 209) and Van Velzen (2005, pp. 99–130). For the development
of ministerial responsibility in the Netherlands after 1848: Slijkerman (2011).
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2.2 ‘Constitutionals’ Versus ‘Ministerials’: Belgian
Constitutional Opposition
The introduction of the Fundamental Law in the Belgian part of the Kingdom was
controversial from the start. The unification of Belgium and Holland had been
decided under the condition of establishing an “intimate and complete amalgam”
between both territories.54 As mentioned above, the 1814 Fundamental Law was
adjusted to the new territorial situation by a Constitutional Commission made up of
Dutch and Belgian members. Among the most prominent changes introduced at the
behest of the Belgian members was bicameralism. In order to obtain legitimacy for
the new Constitution among the Belgians, King William decided to submit it to an
assembly of notables, in the absence of a regular body representing the Nation in
the Belgian territories. 796 of the 1323 notables who cast their vote rejected the
Fundamental Law.55 The main reason for the rejection—and of the unpopularity of
the Constitution with the Belgian population at large—was religious.56 Unification
with the predominantly Protestant North was an unwelcome prospect to many
Belgian Catholics. The Belgian bishops, headed by the intransigent archbishop of
Mechelen, had openly campaigned against it because of its introduction of the
freedom of worship.57 The King reacted by changing the outcome of the vote. He
decided that abstentions should be counted as approvals, and that protest against the
freedom of worship was an invalid reason for rejection, since that principle was one
of the conditions imposed by the London Protocol.58 Thus, the Fundamental Law
was introduced against the opinion of the conservative Belgian elites. The overtly
Machiavellian manipulation of the plebiscite led large parts of Belgian public
opinion to question the legitimacy of the new Constitution. Even those who agreed
with it in principle were critical of the King’s actions.
During this period, conservative Catholic thinking was strongly
anti-constitutionalist, and harked back to prerevolutionary ancient constitutional-
ism and Gallicanism.59 However, a modern, liberal point of view developed
alongside it. This strand of thinking embraced constitutional monarchy and
welcomed the prospect of unification. The most important constitutionalist thinker
in those years was Pierre-François Van Meenen, editor of the journal
L’Observateur politique, administratif, historique et littéraire de la Belgique.60
Van Meenen’s thorough theoretical analyses of constitutional monarchy influ-
enced a whole generation of Belgian liberals, many of whom would later take
54Colenbrander (1908), vol. 2, p. 27.
55Colenbrander (1908), vol. 2, p. 617.
56Gilissen (1958, p. 59) and Marteel (2009, p. 98).
57Demoulin (1989) and Marteel (2006, p. 46).
58The Protocol had in fact been drawn up by William himself and his Secretary of State Anton
Falck. Koch (2013, p. 268).
59Marteel (2009, pp. 95–110).
60Le Roy (1897), Marteel (2006, p. 49), Van den Steene (1963, pp. 17–19).
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part in the Belgian Revolution.61 The writings of Benjamin Constant were
obviously an inspiration to this group.
Van Meenen and his followers were shocked to find that the Fundamental Law
did not allow Parliament to hold the government accountable for its actions—
especially given the absence of parliamentary initiative for the prosecution of
ministers.62 L’Observateur began a campaign of systematic opposition to the
government, lobbying for ministerial responsibility and freedom of the press. In the
face of the increasingly autocratic government of William I, this initiative failed to
achieve practical results, but it did succeed in laying the theoretical groundwork for
the large-scale Belgian opposition of later years.
L’Observateur’s last issue appeared in 1820. In the same year the Estates
General approved the decennial budget, their only real check on government policy.
The opposition did not manage to take a stand in the following years, despite its
protest against the Conflict Law of 1822 and the continued postponement of the
creation of a High Court for the judgment of ministers. The Estates General were
too divided along North-South lines to allow for organized opposition against the
government.63 Moreover, economic prosperity in the South took away much of the
oppositional drive.
The middle of the 1820s marked a turnabout. In 1815, political consciousness in
Belgium had been relatively limited, a majority of the population remaining indif-
ferent towards politics, but around the middle of the next decade, a new generation of
liberal intellectuals entered the scene. These men were mostly born and educated
under French or Dutch rule and had no active memories of the Old Regime.64 The
first sign of the growing political awareness of this group was the foundation of the
newspaperMathieu Laensberg in Liège, which commented critically on political and
constitutional issues.65 These younger liberals remained strongly under the influence
of the older generation who had already embraced modern constitutional theory,
especially as formulated by Benjamin Constant.66 Around the same time, a funda-
mental shift, triggered by recent political events, occurred within the Catholic
intelligentsia and the Catholic opposition embraced a liberal-constitutional dis-
course.67 Both oppositional movements joined forces in 1827.
From 1828 on, debate between the Belgian opposition and the government flared
up, both in the Estates General and in the press. The question of accountability of
government was central to the controversy. This issue came to the fore in debates
61Marteel (2009, p. 49).
62Van Velzen (2005, p. 99).
63Fear for Belgian domination in the United Kingdom led most Northern members to support the
government and to swallow their criticism on governmental and constitutional policy. Van Velzen
(2005, p. 200).
64Marteel (2009, p. 326).
65Harsin (1930, p. 37). For the separate developments in Brussels and Liège: Marteel (2009,
p. 281; 328).
66Marteel (2009, p. 327), Marteel (2012, p. 59) and Van Velzen (2015).
67Marteel (2009, pp. 265–310).
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over ministerial responsibility to Parliament and the freedom of the press, which
were strongly related.68 The press trials instigated by Minister Van Maanen were a
major point of contention. Journals taking a critical stance towards the governments
were increasingly being prosecuted for sedition and lese-majesty. The government
argued that attacking the government equated to attacking the King, since the King
was not inviolable and the minsters were responsible only to him. The newspapers
on the other hand argued that the Fundamental Law implied ministerial responsi-
bility to Parliament, much as Van Hogendorp has initially intended.69 As a con-
sequence, they considered it legitimate to attack the ministers without harming the
King.
These controversies and argumentations have been extensively described else-
where. What counts for the present chapter is the ubiquitousness of the
Fundamental Law in the debates.70 Both camps based their arguments on the
Constitution, but they interpreted it in a fundamentally different way. By arguing
that all their major demands were guaranteed by the Fundamental Law, the
opposition tried to show that the King and the government behaved unconstitu-
tionally. Real or supposed provisions of the Fundamental Law were therefore cited
time and again, both in Parliament and in the press.71 The government reacted by
refuting these arguments and promoting an alternative reading of the Constitution.
Whereas the government had previously been reluctant to make explicit state-
ments on constitutional principles, it now actively engaged in the debate.72 In the
session of the Estates General of 20 December 1827, Minister Van Gobbelschroy
defended the gradual increase in royal power by stating that all competences that
were not mentioned in the Constitution, were the domain of the King.73
In 1828, the oppositional newspaper Courrier des Pays-Bas published a vehe-
ment critique on the address from the throne.74 It accused the ministers of com-
promising the monarch by turning him into the mouthpiece for their own faulty
interpretation of the Fundamental Law. Instead of recognizing the role of the press
as the watchdog of constitutional government, they took all kinds of measures to
curb public debate. The newspaper feared for the maintenance of the constitutional
liberties, and argued that the address from the throne clearly illustrated “the pro-
found ignorance of the ministerial writers in matters of our constitutional laws and
the historical principles from which they emanate”.75
68Delbecke (2012, p. 44).
69Harsin rejects this interpretation: Harsin (1937, p. 167).
70Harsin (1937, p. 174), Van Velzen (2005, p. 422) and Witte (2016, p. 43). This was also true for
the political press in the North: Van Sas (2004b, p. 467).
71Harsin (1930) and Marteel (2006, p. 46).
72Worst (1992, p. 63).
73Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1827–1828, pp. 117–119. Van Velzen (2005, p. 270).
74Courrier des Pays-Bas, no. 302 (29/10/1828), Marteel (2009, p. 365).
75“la profonde ignorance des écrivains ministériels en ce qui a rapport à nos lois constitutionnelles
et aux principes historiques dont elles émanent”.
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The debate on press freedom was reopened during the parliamentary session of
28 November 1828 when the Belgian MP De Brouckère argued for the abolishment
of the much-hated press laws. In the ensuing debate, other Belgian members
expanded the discussion into an inquiry on the nature of constitutional government
itself. De Gerlache stated that he could not conceive of “a tempered monarchy
without the separation of powers, or an inviolable King without a responsible
minister”.76
He refuted the government’s argument that the public law of the United
Kingdom exclusively allowed those principles that were explicitly inscribed in the
Fundamental Law:
They say that the separation of powers exists in England because it is formally inscribed in
the Constitution, whereas this is not the case in our country. The opposite is true, however.
There, the separation is considered a necessary condition for constitutional government. It
has been introduced by the power of circumstance, since nowhere will you find it in
writing.77
In his view, constitutional government presupposed a set of principles without
which it could not exist, regardless of the exact wording of the Constitution.
In the session of 2 December 1828, Minister Van Maanen denied the existence
of ministerial responsibility, by relying on a literal reading of the Fundamental Law:
The Fundamental Law of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is the only compass which
should guide us in these matters. Many orators have powerfully defended the principle of
ministerial responsibility, but none of them has been able to demonstrate that this
responsibility is based on our Fundamental Law.78
By confirming the primacy of the Fundamental Law, Van Maanen accused the
opposition of violating the Constitution by positing principles that were not
explicitly mentioned in it. Indeed, he condemned the opposition’s invocation of
so-called absolute principles of constitutional government. Constitutional govern-
ment was a relative concept, he contended, and exclusively related to the pre-
scriptions of each Constitution individually:
(…) the concept of constitutional government is not undetermined and vague, but relative
and dependent on the fundamental laws, constitutions or charters of each nation in
76“J’avoue franchement qu’il m’est impossible de concevoir la monarchie tempérée sans la dis-
tinction des pouvoirs, de concevoir un Roi inviolable sans un ministre responsable”. Handelingen
Tweede Kamer 1828–1829, p. 63.
77“En Anglerre, dit-on, la séparation des pouvoirs existe, parce qu’elle est formellement consacrée
par la constitution; et il n’en est pas ainsi chez nous. C’est tout le contraire qui est vrai: cette
séparation y est regardée comme une condition nécessaire du gouvernement constitutionnel. Elle
s’y est introduite par la force des choses, car vous ne la trouvez écrite nulle part”. Handelingen
Tweede Kamer 1828–1829, p. 64.
78“La loi fondamentale du royaume des Pays-Bas seule doit nous servir de boussole dans cette
matière; aussi est-il vrai que de tous les orateurs qui se sont si fortement prononcés pour le principe
de la responsabilité ministérielle, aucun n’a démontré ni n’a pu démontrer que cette responsabilité
est basée sur notre loi fondamentale”. Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1828–1829, p. 114. Van
Velzen (2005, p. 289).
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particular. These fundamental laws constitute our only measure to determine what is
constitutional and what is unconstitutional for this or that people.79
Jean-François Tielemans published an open letter to Van Maanen in reaction to
the latter’s speech.80 He started by citing Van Maanen’s words on the position of
the Fundamental Law as the sole guiding document for establishing the principles
of state. He further developed this thought by underlining the inviolability of the
Constitution, “the supreme law of all”. Since it constituted a binding legal rule for
all subjects, any violation of the Fundamental Law automatically implied criminal
liability, whether or not the infraction was specified in the Criminal Code:
She must be inviolable, and so she is. He who violates her, be he a King, a Minister, a
Magistrate or a private individual, is guilty towards society. The culpability exists, whether
or not the act which constitutes the violation is foreseen by the penal code. It exists by the
mere fact of the violation of the Fundamental Law, and the culprit henceforward falls under
the jurisdiction of the tribunals and of the decent citizens.81
He also referred to stipulations in the Criminal Code that made every servant of
the state punishable for violations of the Constitution, and to a regulation for the
Council of Ministers which prescribed constitutional review for all laws, regulations
and administrative measures.82
An additional guarantee for the observance of the Fundamental Law had been
provided in the form of the oath on the Constitution sworn by every civil servant,
from the King down to the humblest clerk. The oath explicitly made the mandate of
the servants of the State, including the ministers, juridical. It was intended to make
the Fundamental Law even more inviolable:
To be sure, this oath is useless, because in principle it is enough for a law to exist in order
for it to entail the obedience of all. But the Fundamental Law of the Netherlands has been
placed under the safeguard of the oath so as to make its execution even surer and the rights
it consecrated even more inviolable. We must therefore admit that our country possesses a
79“(…) l’idée d’un gouvernement constitutionnel n’est pas indéterminée et vague, mais relative et
basée sur les lois fondamentales, constitutions ou chartes de chaque nation en particulier, parce que
ces lois fondamentales seules nous donnent la mesure pour déterminer ce qui est constitutionnel ou
inconstitutionnel pour tel ou tel peuple”. Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1828–1829, p. 113.
80On Tielemans: Freson (1932) and Van den Steene (1963, pp. 18–19).
81“Elle doit être, elle est inviolable; et celui qui la viole, Roi, Ministre, Magistrat ou particulier, est
coupable envers la Société. Pour que la culpabilité existe, il n’est pas nécessaire que l’acte, qui
constitue la violation, soit prévu par un code pénal; elle existe par cela même que la loi fonda-
mentale a été violée, et le coupable tombe dès lors sous la jurisdiction des tribunaux ou des
honnêtes gens”. Tielemans (1829, p. 5).
82Tielemans (1829, p. 17).
224 B. Deseure
supreme law, which is sacred, common and superior to both those who govern and those
who are governed. He who violates it is responsible towards society, the base of which he
undermines, and towards the individuals whose interests and rights he injures.83
It followed that the mere fact that the Constitution existed meant that ministers
were accountable for any violation of it. The oath simply made this responsibility
explicit and legally binding. Tielemans implicitly suggested that, by arguing to the
contrary, Van Maanen had in fact denied the Fundamental Law’s authority. He
insisted that both ministerial responsibility and royal inviolability were inherent in
constitutional government.84 The alternative was non-responsible government, or in
other words, despotism.
The radical politician Adelson Castiau made a similar argument in two pam-
phlets on ministerial responsibility.85 Putting the development of constitutional
monarchy in a historical perspective, he emphasized the conceptual unity of royal
inviolability and ministerial responsibility as a guarantee for responsible govern-
ment and a bulwark against despotism. The monarch had received his hereditary
mandate and his extensive powers from the Nation, and in return the Nation desired
responsible government.86 Castiau, too, contented that these principles, although
not being prescribed by the letter of the Fundamental Law, were clearly present in
its spirit. Ministerial responsibility to Parliament was automatically implied by the
idea of representative government, he argued:
Let us never forget that representative government means the government of the opinion,
and that as long as it will boldly and resolutely follow the constitutional ways opened up to
its expression, the reign of unpopular ministers will be short.87
Castiau called the theory of “ministerial irresponsibility” defended by the min-
istry “a doctrine which is destructive of representative government and undermines
all monarchical stability”.88 He accused those who argued for it of being “blinded
by a Judaic respect for the text of our fundamental law, the spirit of which they fail
83“Ce serment, à la vérité, était inutile, puisqu’en principe il suffit qu’une loi existe pour qu’elle
entraine forcément l’obéissance de tous; mais en plaçant la loi fondamentale des Pays-Bas sous la
sauve-garde du serment, on a pensé que l’exécution n’en serait que plus sûre, et les droits qu’elle
consacre plus inviolables. Nous devons donc le reconnaître: notre pays possède une loi suprême,
sacrée, commune et supérieure aux gouvernans comme aux gouvernés. Quiconque la viole est
responsable envers la société dont il ébranle la base, et envers les individus dont il blesse les
intérêts et les droits”. Tielemans (1829, p. 5).
84Tielemans (1829, p. 10).
85On Castiau: Philippart (1984).
86Castiau (1829a, p. 2).
87“N’oublions jamais que le gouvernement représentatif est le gouvernement par l’opinion, et
qu’aussi longtemps qu’elle suivra, avec fermeté et hardiesse, les voies constitutionnelles ouvertes à
son expression, le règne d’un ministre impopulaire sera de courte durée”. Castiau (1829a, p. 28).
88“une doctrine destructive du gouvernement représentatif et subversive de toute stabilité
monarchique”. Castiau (1829a, p. 10).
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to understand”.89 Castiau emphasized the legally binding character of the
Fundamental Law on which these principles were based. Those officials who denied
their existence made themselves guilty of perjury, legitimizing revolt and anarchy.
Indeed, he reminded the ministers that the Nation automatically had the right to
resist the government in case the latter violated the legal order:
(…) they know, as we do, that on the day when power abandons legality, legality moves
over to the side of the resistance.90
With this last quote, Castiau anticipated the arguments that would later serve as
the legitimation for the Belgian Revolution.
For Tielemans, Castiau and their sympathisers, the Fundamental Law implied all
the principles of modern constitutional monarchy. This meant, according to them,
that it should be read in the spirit of Benjamin Constant. Not doing so, they
contended, automatically resulted in paradoxes and absurdities. The principles in
question therefore did not need to be spelled out in the Constitution in order to be
logically presupposed. Many in the opposition called for an explicit mentioning of
ministerial responsibility in the laws, in order to prevent the ministers from further
exploiting the ambiguities of the existing formulation. Castiau rejected this proposal
though, stating that the Constitution already contained sufficient guarantees.91 In his
view, it was an illusion to think that a more explicit formulation would stop min-
isters from abusing their powers. An admirer of Constant, he counted on the active
surveillance of an independent national representation and a well-informed public
opinion as the only effective means to control the government.
In their defense of the government, the ministerial pamphleteers targeted this
supposed spirit of the Constitution. By appealing to a minimalistic interpretation,
they succeeded in keeping its status as legally binding basic rule intact, while at the
same time restricting its impact radius to a minimum.92 The ministerial point of
view was expounded in a range of pamphlets, all of which explicitly referred to the
Fundamental Law. In his speech of 2 December 1828, Van Maanen set the tone by
disclaiming any constitutional principle that did not literally figure in the
Constitution. Ministerial authors developed this argument, accusing the opposition
of intentionally misinterpreting the Constitution for their own particular interest.
89“aveuglés pas un respect judaïque pour le texte de notre loi fondamentale, dont ils
méconnaîtraient l’esprit”. Castiau (1829a, p. 10).
90“(…) ils savent, comme nous, que le jour où le pouvoir abandonne la légalité, cette dernière
passe du côté de la résistance”. Castiau (1829a, p. 12).
91Castiau (1829a, pp. 24–39). He made an exception for the ministerial countersign, judging that
the silence of the Constitution on this issue was deplorable. However, since neither the English nor
the French Constitutions contained provisions on this point, he denied that it could be used as an
argument against the existence of ministerial responsibility. Castiau (1829b, pp. 17–18).
92Marteel (2009, p. 365) and Van Zanten (2005, p. 290).
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Such was the reasoning of C. Asser, in his anonymously published pamphlet De
la responsabilité ministérielle d’après le droit public du Royaume des Pays-Bas.93
He started with a worried remark on the newspapers’ perversion of the most pre-
cious constitutional prerogatives:
Every Belgian who loves his country and who attentively examines the spirit and the
tendency of some of our newspapers, must be troubled by the deplorable abuse made of our
most precious constitutional prerogatives.94
Such exaggerated claims as those made by the oppositional newspapers could
only be the work of foreign troublemakers
who, being indifferent to the prosperity of our fatherland, and having no knowledge at all of
our customs and of our laws, apply principles which our Fundamental Law refutes to our
public law.95
Since the Constitution did not contain any article in support of their claims, these
people invoked the constitutions of England and France instead. By doing so
however, they seemed to forget that the Fundamental Law constituted the sole legal
ground of public law in the United Kingdom:
(…) the rights of the Belgian subjects, as well as the rights of the government, are deter-
mined only by the pact concluded between the head of state and the Nation. These rights
are mutually sealed under the oath.96 We must rely only on the principles of OUR public
law, and exclusively invoke the dispositions of our Fundamental Law.97
The principles of the Fundamental Law could be deduced exclusively from the
articles and dispositions it contained. It could not be induced from any theory of
constitutional monarchy outside of the constitutional text. For Asser, claiming that
constitutional government by definition implied ministerial responsibility was the
same as pretending that:
93Van Kuyck (1914). Asser was a public servant at the Council of State and a personal friend of
Van Maanen. The brochure was published on the latter’s initiative to support Van Maanen’s denial
of ministerial responsibility in the Estates General on 2 December 1828. Van Velzen (2005,
p. 290).
94“Tout Belge, ami de sa patrie, qui examine d’un œil attentif l’esprit et la tendance de
quelques-uns de nos journaux, s’afflige sans doute de l’abus déplorable que l’on fait d’une de nos
prérogatives constitutionnelles les plus précieuses”. Asser (1828, p. 1).
95“qui sont indifférent à la prospérité de notre pays et qui, sans aucune connaissance de nos mœurs
et de nos lois, viennent appliquer à notre droit public des principes repoussés par notre Loi
Fondamentale”. Asser (1828, p. 1).
96“(…) les droits des sujets belges, aussi bien que ceux du gouvernement, sont uniquement
déterminés par le pacte conclu entre le chef de l’Etat et la nation, et réciproquement scellé sous la
foi du serment”. Asser (1828, p. 2).
97“(…) nous ne devons nous appuyer que sur les principes de NOTRE droit public, et n’invoquer
que les dispositions de notre Loi Fondamentale”. Asser (1828, p. 3).
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the words Fundamental Law, Charte, Constitution, are not undetermined expressions when
taken individually, and that it is possible to understand their meaning, their nature and their
extent by other means than by the principles and dispositions which they contain.98
The King himself had insisted on limiting his power by introducing a liberal
Constitution, but he was completely free to act within the circle of his constitutional
competences.
The government reacted to the Courrier des Pays-Bas’ criticism in a anony-
mously published pamphlet entitled Quelques observations fondées sur les termes
exprès de la Loi Fondamentale.99 The title perfectly illustrates the way in which the
ministerial writers turned the opposition’s constitutional logic to their advantage.
The author, Tielman Olivier Schilperoort, repeated Van Maanen’s state theory by
stating that sovereignty emanated from the King only. The latter had granted a
Constitution of his free will.100 The opposition’s mistake was to confuse consti-
tutional government with representative government. Sovereignty consisted of both
the legislative and executive powers and was entirely in the hand of the monarch:
The great goal of a Fundamental Law in a constitutional state is to prevent those shocks and
revolutions, by expressly determining the exercise of sovereignty (…), not by the separa-
tion of powers but by their union.101
It followed that the Fundamental Law did not allow for ministerial responsibility
to Parliament. Having sworn to maintain the Constitutional in all its aspects, it was
the King’s duty to refute the unfounded and unconstitutional demands of the
opposition:
In his inaugural oath, the King swears, among other things, that he will not tolerate any
deviation from the Fundamental Law, on whatever occasion and on whatever pretext. Thus,
the King has personally engaged himself to maintain the fundamental pact against every
aggression, even those instigated by ignorant or exaggerating writers.102
Baron Goubau d’Hovorst defended the ministerial point of view in his speech for
the First Chamber on 16 May 1829.103 The goal of his intervention was to
98“les mots de Loi Fondamentale, Charte, Constitution, n’étaient pas des expressions
indéterminées lorsqu’on les prend isolément, et comme s’il était possible de connaître leur sens,
leur nature et leur étendue, autrement que par les principes et les dispositions dont elles sont
composées”. Asser (1828, p. 14).
99Olivier Schilperoort (1828), Some observations founded on the express terms of the
Fundamental Law. Zuidema (1921) and Van Velzen (2005, p. 289).
100Olivier Schilperoort (1828, p. 12).
101“Le grand but d’une Loi fondamentale d’un état constitutionnel est de prévenir ces chocs et ces
révolutions, en déterminant d’une manière expresse l’exercice de la souveraineté, non (…) par la
séparation des pouvoirs, mais par leur union”. Olivier Schilperoort (1828, p. 10).
102“Le Roi (…), par le serment inaugural, (…) jure entr’autres qu’il ne souffrira pas qu’on s’écarte
de la Loi Fondamentale, en aucune occasion, ni sous aucun prétexte. C’est ainsi que le Roi a pris
l’engagement personnel de maintenir le pacte fondamental contre toutes agressions, voire même
celles de l’ignorance ou de l’exagération des écrivains”. Olivier Schilperoort (1828, p. 5).
103Varenbergh (1884–1885) and Van Velzen (2005, p. 315).
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investigate whether the oppositional demands, expressed in the recent petitioning
campaign, were admissible.104 Not surprisingly, he systematically rejected the
demands, grounding his refutation on articles of the Fundamental Law. On the
subject of the role of the government in the organization of public education, he
disclaimed the opposition’s demand by pointing out that it harmed the constitu-
tional order:
This reverses the order instated by Art. 226 of the Fundamental Law, and it evidently harms
both the ancient and the modern rights of the Sovereign of the Netherlands.105
On the same grounds he argued against ministerial responsibility:
Those who demand ministerial responsibility are blinded: given the organization of our
Kingdom and the way in which things are being done here, introducing it would require
changing the Fundamental Law.106
Such a system was not admissible without a change of Constitution.
Goubau-d’Hovorst, also refuted the idea that a constitutional government was
impossible without ministerial responsibility:
Our government will be a constitutional government of a special kind (…). As long as it
exists, one must march with it just as it is, and religiously adhere to the prescriptions of the
Fundamental Law on which it is founded.107
He concluded by warning against the dangers of the petition movement, which
aroused passions and effervescence in the people. All this militant invocation of
constitutional rights reminded him of the Brabant Revolution, which he had wit-
nessed himself, and its Northern counterpart, the Patriot uprising against stadtholder
William V:
What we are witnessing today is taking the same turn as in those times when one spoke of
nothing else but the Joyeuse Entrée, just like today one speaks of nothing else but the
Fundamental Law.108
104On the petition campaigns: Harsin (1930, p. 53), Tamse and Witte (1992, p. 36), Wils (2009,
p. 50) and Witte (2006, p. 79).
105“C’est renverser l’ordre établi par l’art. 226 de la Loi Fondamentale, et porter évidemment
atteinte aux droits tant anciens que modernes du Souverain des Pays-Bas”. Goubau-d’Hovorst
(1829, p. 18).
106“Ceux qui demandent cette responsabilité parlent en aveugles: d’après la manière que notre
Royaume est organisé et que les affaires s’y traitent, pour l’introduire, il faudrait changer la Loi
Fondamentale”. Goubau-d’Hovorst (1829, p. 23).
107“Notre gouvernement sera un gouvernement constitutionnel d’un genre particulier (…). Tant
qu’il existe, il faut marcher avec lui tel qu’il est, et se tenir religieusement à ce que prescrit la Loi
Fondamentale sur laquelle il est basé”. Goubau-d’Hovorst (1829, p. 25).
108“Ce que nous voyons aujourd’hui prend la même marche que dans ces temps-là, on n’avait à la
bouche que la Joyeuse Entrée, comme aujourd’hui on n’a à la bouche que la Loi Fondamentale”.
Goubau-d’Hovorst (1829, p. 50). The Joyous Entry was the inaugural charter of the Dukes of
Brabant, on which the Brabant revolutionaries based their claims.
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To allow the petition movement to continue would be to expose the state to the
danger of another disorderly uprising based on a faulty reading of the Constitution.
Time and again the ministerial apologists denied the opposition’s claim that
constitutional government implied a fixed set of unalterable principles, and that the
Fundamental Law consecrated these principles by necessity. Only the letter of the
Constitution defined the state system of the United Kingdom. Appeals to any other
source, text or theory than the Constitution itself were ipse facto irrelevant. Indeed,
every Constitution needed to be understood and analyzed individually, and not on
the basis of a set of presupposed common principles:
Let us conclude from what precedes that, since every constitution must be judged after its
own tenor and its own spirit, we can never invoke the institutions of other nations when
commenting on our Fundamental Law and determining the nature and the implications of
its dispositions. These nations share with us only the fact of being ruled by constitutional
laws. Apart from that, they are far from finding in these laws the same guarantees as we do
in ours.109
In his Royal Message of 11 December 1829, the King himself confirmed the
views on sovereignty propagated by his government, and formally denied the
existence of ministerial responsibility to Parliament.110
2.3 Towards a New Legal Order
As we have seen, respect for the existing legal order based on the Fundamental Law
was central to the argumentation of both the government and the opposition. Over
time, both Liberals and Catholics within the Belgian opposition turned to modern
constitutionalism as the surest way to realize their respective programs. Liberal
campaigning for modern constitutionalism in the spirit of Benjamin Constant
already began in 1814, with Van Meenen’s publication on the topic.111 The next
generation of Liberals built upon his ideas and further developed them in news-
papers such as Le Politique, Le Courrier des Pays-Bas and L’Emancipation.112
Catholic thinking underwent a more fundamental transformation over time, as
109“Tirons de ce qui précède la conséquence que, toute constitution devant être jugée d’après sa
teneur et son esprit, nous ne pouvons jamais, lorsqu’il s’agit de commenter notre Loi
Fondamentale et de déterminer la nature et l’étendue de ses dispositions, invoquer les institutions
d’autres nations qui n’ont de commun avec nous que d’être également régies par des lois con-
stitutionnelles, mais qui, au reste, sont loin de trouver dans ces lois les garanties qui nous ont été
assurées par les nôtres”. Asser (1828, p. 20).
110Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1829–1830, pp. 741–743. Marteel (2012, p. 54), Van
Velzen (2005, p. 329) and Worst (1992, p. 72).
111Le Roy (1897), Marteel (2009, p. 49), Van den Steene (1963, pp. 17–19).
112Harsin (1930), Vermeersch (1992), Witte (1979) and Wouters (1958).
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Stefaan Marteel showed in his meticulous reconstruction of the development of
Catholic thought under the United Kingdom.113 The Old Regime ideal of a Catholic
state Church dwindled as Belgian Catholics were confronted with a Protestant King
intent on closely supervising the spheres of religion and education.114 The idea that
the autonomy of the Church would be better guaranteed by a separation of Church
and State and the proclamation of absolute religious freedom, gained popularity.
Despite their radically different outlooks on society, the oppositional groups
came to agree on the central importance of the constitutional text. When both
groups joined forces in 1827, their key demand was the exact implementation of the
Fundamental Law in all its points.115 This implied not only recognition of the
liberties and the division of powers enshrined by it, but also of its binding legal
force. The issue of ministerial responsibility, which raised the most controversy
between the two parties, went to the core of this idea. It implied making the
Constitution’s role as the normative rule for the actions of the executive power
legally enforceable. As mentioned before, Art. 177 of the Fundamental Law fore-
saw the creation of a High Court for the judgement of ministers accused of violating
the Constitution. The article remained a fiction however, since the government
postponed the creation of the Court indefinitely.116 The opposition in turn accused
it of causing legal insecurity. Likewise, the opposition opposed the absence of legal
means to dispute the introduction of unconstitutional laws, such as the ones against
the freedom of the press.
The course of events suggests that the government only explicitly adopted a
constitutional discourse in reaction to the opposition’s incessant claims based on the
Fundamental Law. It succeeded in turning these claims to its advantage by
developing its own, minimalist interpretation of the Constitution and using it to
denounce the oppositional demands as illegal. The logic of legal order turned to the
opposition’s disadvantage at the moment when events took a revolutionary turn.
Riots broke out in Brussels against the Dutch government during the night of the 25
August 1830.117 In the succeeding weeks new power structures emerged on the
local level which gradually replaced the official ones. The government tried to
appease the rioters by giving in to many of the opposition’s demands, including the
dismissal of the unpopular minister Van Maanen.118
113Marteel (2009).
114Marteel (2009, pp. 265–320).
115Marteel (2009, p. 347).
116Van Velzen (2005, p. 175). Marteel, on the other hand, argues that the debate on the High Court
had no bearing on the Southern opposition’s demand for ministerial responsibility. Marteel (2009,
p. 242).
117Witte (2006, p. 51).
118Van Velzen (2015, p. 58), Witte (2006, p. 57), Witte (2016, p. 16). Although William I went as
far as to dismiss Van Maanen, conceding on the point of ministerial responsibility was impossible
for him. It would have changed the very nature of his rule, which he saw as the ultimate guarantee
for the country’s stability. The opposition continued to press this point, as a fundamental trans-
formation in the exercise of power was exactly what it aimed for.
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In the meantime, the opposition was confronted with the paradox of on the one
hand invoking the Fundamental Law and on the other hand, waging armed—and
thus illegal—protest. The oppositional press continued to refer to the Fundamental
Law to legitimatize their demands. The newspaper Courrier des Pays-Bas
encouraged the Belgian delegates to the Estates General to persist in their “legal
resistance” against “the violations of the Fundamental Law” and against the
“anti-constitutional projects of the ministers”. It confirmed that what the opposition
desired was respect for the will of the Fundamental Law, and added: “We repeat
that we are neither waging a revolution nor an insurrection”.119 The Courrier de la
Sambre called on the Fundamental Law to protest against the convocation of the
Estates General in The Hague instead of Brussels even though it was the latter city’s
turn to serve as the capital:
The convocation of the Estates General in The Hague is a formal violation of the
Fundamental Law. In the present circumstances, this violation may produce fatal results
unless it is legally resisted.120
The French newspaper Le Constitutionnel commented: “The insurrection is
definitely national and constitutional”.121 Radical newspapers on the other hand
accused the Belgian members of the Estates General attending the meeting of the
Estates in The Hague of being in league with a government that repressed the rights
of the Belgian Nation.
The legitimacy of the opposition was at stake. Thus far, the Fundamental Law
had provided the ultimate legal basis for its claims. By opting for open rebellion, the
opposition risked invalidating its whole enterprise, as well as alienating those cit-
izens who wished to remain within the legal order. King William put the finger on
the sore spot when, in his proclamation of 5 September 1830, he denounced the
insurgents’ revolt against the legal order. William called the opposition’s “return
into the legal order” a precondition for opening negotiations over the Belgian
demands.122 The proclamation caused a change in tone in the oppositional news-
papers, who took offense at the King’s minimisation of the conflict and his use of
the term insurgents. As the government seemed to refuse to take the Belgian
grievances seriously, the legality of the existing order itself was increasingly called
into question. The Courrier des Pays-Bas commented:
We are no longer under the legal order organized by the Minister Van Maanen, because
that legal order was tyrannical for us. Since it is nothing but organized oppression
119“Nous le répétons, nous ne sommes ni en révolution, ni en insurrection”. Courrier des Pays-Bas
no. 244, 01/09/1830.
120“La convocation des états-généraux à La Haye est une violation formelle de la loi fondamentale,
violation qui pourrait dans l’état des choses avoir les plus funestes résultats, sil l’on ne s’y opposait
légalement”. Courrier de la Sambre no. 134, 6/09/1830.
121“L’insurrection est décidemment nationale et constitutionnelle”. Quoted in: Courrier de la
Sambre no. 140, 13/09/1830.
122Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 252, 09/09/1830.
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covered with a varnish of legality, this supposed legal order must be modified and
changed.123
We must return into the legal order. The legal order! It is easier said than done. This order,
which Mr. Van Maanen had organized so well, and which is the fruit of fifteen years of
oppression, is exactly the object of our complaints.124
The newspaper contested the legality of the existing order on account of its tyran-
nical character and of the harm it caused to the Belgian Nation.125 Le Vrai Patriote
maintained that a people was free to choose a new leader when the social contract was
violated.126 As the opposition left the legal order behind, the rights of the nation were
cited as the only legitimate source of authority. The Courrier de la Sambre wrote:
Do not tell us that we need the consent of the Estates General. We are now outside of the
legal order. Every measure is legal at present, as soon as it is founded on the approval of the
nation.127
The bloody September Days in Brussels brought about the final turnabout. The
killing of Belgian citizens by the Dutch troops was presented as a final attack on the
Belgian Nation by which the Dutch government forfeited its remaining claims to
legitimate authority. The Provisional Government of Belgium was created in the
wake of the events. The Courrier des Pays-Bas proclaimed that the only legitimate
source of authority in the contemporary world was the people’s right to
self-determination.128 From that moment on, respect for the old legal order need not
concern the Belgians any more, the newspapers agreed:
123“Nous ne sommes plus dans l’ordre légal tel que le ministère Van Maanen l’avait organisé,
parce que cet ordre légal était tyrannique pour nous, et ce prétendu ordre légal n’étant autre chose
que l’oppression organisée et couverte d’un vernis de légalité, c’est lui qu’il faut modifier et
corriger”. Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 256, 13/09/1830.
124“Il faut rentrer dans l’ordre. L’ordre! C’est chose aisée à dire, mais cet ordre que M. Van
Maanen a si bien arrangé et qui est le fruit de quinze ans d’oppression, c’est précisément l’objet de
nos plaintes”. Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 260, 17/09/1830.
125“Cet ordre, c’est l’oppression de le Belgique systématiquement organisée avec un faux semblant
de légalité”. Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 260, 17/09/1830.
126Le Vrai Patriote no. 29, 10/11/1830.
127“Et qu’on ne dise pas qu’il faut le consentement des états-généraux; nous sommes aujourd’hui
en dehors de l’ordre légal; toute mesure est légale en ce moment dès qu’elle a pour base
l’assentiment de la nation”. Courrier de la Sambre no. 137, 09/09/1830.
128“Aujourd’hui ce n’est pas le fait antérieur, ni les convenances de tel souverain qui peuvent
autoriser sans leur consentement respectif la réunion de deux peuples en une seule famille politique.
Le principe qui a triomphé en septembre est l’association consentie. (…) Le principe de l’association
consentie, est aujourd’hui tellement inhérent au principe du gouvernement populaire, que le règne de
la liberté ne pourra pas autrement s’établir en Europe, qu’en laissant à chaque peuple la faculté de
s’unir à l’association politique qui est le plus conforme à ses vœux”. “Nowadays neither prior facts
nor the liking of such or such sovereign can authorise, without their respective consents, the reunion
of two peoples into one political family. The principle which has triumphed in September is that of
consented association. (…) The principle of consented association is today so inherent to popular
government that the reign of liberty cannot establish itself in Europe but by leaving each people the
faculty to unite with the political association most conforming to its wishes”.
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(…) this question has been answered during the days of 23, 24, 25 and 26 September; this
solution had to be solemnly announced; it is the only title of the Provisional Government; it
is the source of its legitimacy.129
The opposition overcame the revolutionary paradox by basing its legitimacy on a
natural law norm that transcended the legal order: the rights of the Nation. Since the
existing legal order, enshrined by the Fundamental Law, seemed only harmful to its
interests, the Nation legitimately demanded the establishment of a new one.
Henceforward, the despotism of the Dutch government was invoked as the legal
ground for Belgian independence.130 On 4 October 1830, the Provisional
Government declared Belgian independence in the name of the revolutionary
Belgian people.131 Two days later, it decreed elections for a National Congress and
the creation of a Constitutional Commission to draw up a draft Constitution.132 It
was stressed that the present situation was a provisional one, aimed at establishing a
legal order consecrated by a new Constitution drawn up by the representatives of
the Nation.
Although the Fundamental Law was discarded in the process, the discourse of
constitutional legitimation remained intact. The constituent debates received pri-
ority in the National Congress even though the young state was faced with pressing
political, economic and military needs. Despite the fact that many were critical of
both the draft Constitution’s conservative slant and the “excessive” time spent on
debating it, protests against prioritizing the constitutional issue were few and far
between.133 Newspapers articulated high expectations for the new Constitution,
while many private individuals published their own constitutional drafts or
addressed them to the Congress.134 The Belgian Constitution was clearly expected
to become what the Fundamental Law had failed to be: an immutable basic rule (a
“law of laws” according to the Journal d’Anvers) which, by guaranteeing the
liberties of the citizens and clearly defining the division of powers, assured the
future wellbeing of the state.135
129“(…) cette question a été résolue dans les journées de 23, 24, 25 et 26 septembre; c’est cette
solution qu’il fallait solennellement faire connaître; c’est le seul titre du gouvernement provisoire;
il y puise sa légitimité”. Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 278, 05/10/1830.
130See the opening speech of Louis de Potter for the National Congress on 10 November 1830,
Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 1, p. 100. E.g. the speech by Etienne de Gerlache as president of the
Congress at the occasion of the inauguration of the Regent on 25 February 1831: “Il est arrivé
qu’un prince, plein de préjugés et d’entêtement, s’est imaginé qu’une nation lui appartenait parce
qu’on la lui avait cédée par traités; il a cru pouvoir la tromper toujours, avec un système de
constitution qu’il tournait et violait à son gré, lui imposer sa langue, sa religion, ses créatures: cette
nation fait une révolution, et le prince est renversé et puni”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 595.
131Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique (1830), no. 4, p. 3,
decree of 4 October 1830.
132Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique (1830), no. 5, p. 13,
decree of 6 October 1830.
133Magits (1977), vol. 1, p. 391.
134Magits (1977), vol. 1, pp. 333–379.
135Journal d’Anvers, 18–19 October 1830.
234 B. Deseure
The discourse of the Belgian newspapers on the Fundamental Law underwent a
drastic transformation in the meantime. Independence, and the prospect of a new
Constitution, left the Fundamental Law bereft of the support it had formerly
enjoyed in Belgium. Not only had it been introduced against the will of the Nation,
as the newspapers were keen to remember, it had also failed to protect the Nation
against royal despotism. It came to be considered the tool of a Machiavellian
regime. On the eve of the proclamation of the Belgian Constitution, the radical
newspaper Courrier de la Sambre wrote:
This work of iniquity called the Fundamental Law, was destined to be the straightjacket of
two peoples (…). There was no other option than to bow to this Machiavellism for fifteen
long years, and even, in the last years, to invoke it as the anchor of salvation.136
The newspaper considered it ironic that the Belgians had been reduced to calling
on the Fundamental Law as their last resort against royal despotism, when it had
served as the support of that very regime in the first place.
Only one year earlier, on 22 January 1830, the same newspaper had written
about the Fundamental Law in strikingly different terms:
All demand the pure and simple execution of the Fundamental Law, and should the gov-
ernment dare to boldly lay violent hands on this sacred arch, and venture to commit a coup
by suspending and annulling the Constitution….137
In his history of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, Etienne de Gerlache
later commented that the extreme disdain with which the Belgian founding fathers
treated the Fundamental Law was unwarranted, since the problem was not the
charter itself but its interpretation.138 De Gerlache’s analysis is confirmed by the
fact that no less than 40% of the articles of the Belgian Constitution were copied
from the Dutch Fundamental Law.139 Indeed, what had been at stake for the
Belgian opposition was not the exact wording of the Fundamental Law but the
recognition of the principles of modern constitutionalism which it considered to lay
at its base. Because of the government’s refusal to recognize these principles, the
136“Cette œuvre d’iniquité, qui, sous le nom de loi fondamentale, devait être la camisole de force
de deux peuples. (…) Force fut donc de ce soumettre pendant 15 longues années à ce machi-
avelisme; force même fut, dans les dernières, de l’invoquer comme ancre de salut”. Courrier de la
Sambre, 6/02/1831.
137“(…) tous réclament l’exécution pure et simple de la Loi fondamentale: et si le pouvoir avisait
de porter une main téméraire sur cette arche sainte et se permettait de frapper un coup d’état en
suspendant la constitution et en la déclarant anéantie (…)”. Courrier de la Sambre, 22/01/1830.
138“La loi fondamentale de 1815, amalgame des vieilles idées belges et hollandaises, et des
nouvelles idées françaises, ne méritait peut-être pas le dédain extrême avec lequel la traitèrent nos
constituans de 1831. Ce ne fut point tant cette charte qui engendra les griefs, que le mauvais esprit
qui l’interprétait”. De Gerlache (1859), vol. 2, p. XXIII. Louis de Potter started his opening speech
for the National Congress by calling to mind the despotic way in which the Fundamental Law had
been “forced by Holland” upon the Belgians. However, he conceded that its failure to secure
liberty in Belgium was not so much due to its inherent character as to the fact of its incomplete
execution. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 1, p. 100.
139Gilissen (1967, p. 60).
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Fundamental Law had not succeeded in creating the immutable legal and political
order of which it was supposed to be the guardian.
2.4 Constituent Power
The new Constitution was debated and adopted in a relatively short span of time.
After being accepted on 7 February 1831, it was solemnly promulgated on 11
February. The completion of the Constitution raised questions about the mandate of
the Congress, and about the question of whether or not it should retain its con-
stituent power. There was a general desire that the Constitution should enter into
force and become the single legal norm for the new country. However, the political
situation was not yet settled: a candidate for the throne still needed to be found, and
the international situation remained unclear. Some members argued that now that
the constituent work was done, the Congress no longer had a reason to exist.
However, most objected to this view and insisted that order should return before
elections for a regular Parliament could be called. In the meantime the Congress
would continue to legislate.140
The provisional state of affairs was hard to reconcile with the desire for an
immutable basic rule. It had originally been decided that the Constitution would
come into force on the eleventh day after its proclamation, just like ordinary
decrees.141 At several points in time, questions arose over the constituent mandate
of the Congress. For as long as it retained its constituent power, the Constitution
was susceptible to change. Van Meenen therefore proposed to immediately pro-
mulgate the Constitution, but to make it obligatory only from the moment when the
Congress proclaimed its own dissolution. He rejected the idea, favored by some,
that only the monarch’s acceptance of the Constitution could render it binding.
Although he conceded that the Constitution established a contract between the
monarch and that Nation, he denied that the former should be allowed to have any
influence on its content. His accession to the throne depended on his prior accep-
tance of the Constitution in all its points:
It has been suggested that the Constitution will only become definite upon its acceptance by
the head of state. It is true that a contract is being established between him and the Nation,
but the Constitution is not the subject matter of that contract; it is the acceptance of the
mandate conferred to him by the Nation. The mandator in this case is the collective being
that is the constituted Nation. The [King’s] acceptance cannot call into question parts of the
contract. Otherwise, every employee, when entering into function, could simply refuse to
accept the laws he was called upon to execute unless modifications were made.142
140Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 501, 11/02/1831.
141Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 1, 27/11/1830.
142“On a dit qu’elle [la Constitution] ne serait arrêtée définitivement que par l’acceptation du chef
de l’État. Il est vrai qu’il se forme un contrat entre lui et la nation, mais la constitution ne forme pas
la matière de ce contrat, c’est l’acceptation du mandat que lui confère la nation. Le mandant est ici
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Destouvelles made a similar comparison in order to stress the monarch’s sub-
ordination to the Constitution, and to insist that he had no other choice than to
accept its terms: “a Constitution is only the specification of that acceptance”.143 The
Congress confirmed this reasoning by deciding for the Constitution’s immediate
promulgation, but making it obligatory only ten days after the dissolution of the
Congress. There could be no doubt that the future monarch derived his powers
exclusively from the Constitution as a prior legal norm, and not from any
extra-constitutional source of sovereignty (as in the case of William I’s ‘preliminary
sovereignty’).
The decision entailed a new debate on the question of whether or not pro-
claiming the Constitution meant that the Congress would abandon its constituent
powers. Van Meenen maintained that the Congress should not be allowed to make
any further changes to the Constitution after its proclamation, except for filling the
gaps it inevitably contained. He was supported by, among others, Lebeau, who said
that this was the best way to prevent external powers (namely the London
Conference and/or the future monarch), from pressuring the Congress into adapting
the Constitution to its wishes. The republican members Van Snick and De Robaulx
objected to this measure, maintaining that a Congress vested with constituent
powers would always be able to retract previous decisions, including those per-
taining to the text of the constitution. The reason for their protest was clear enough.
Since the Constitution specified that Belgium was a “representative, constitutional
monarchy”, a binding proclamation would stand in the way of the introduction of
the republican form of government. Anticipating the Duc de Nemours’ refusal of
the Belgian Crown, De Robaulx brought forward a bill in favor of the immediate
proclamation of the republic. He pointed out that the Congress was not a normal
legislative assembly but a sovereign constituent assembly. Since it was omnipotent,
its powers could not be bound even by its own decisions:
If I were to make a proposal contrary to a constitutional decree in a legislative assembly, I
could imagine that one moves to the previous question; but in a constituent assembly, this is
inadmissible, since we are sovereign judges, and have the power to reform ourselves.144
The proposal was not taken into consideration.
The Duc de Nemours’s refusal, which De Robaulx had predicted, meant that the
preconceived timing could not be followed. The search for a candidate for the
un être collectif de la nation constituée. L’acceptation ne peut mettre en question toutes les parties
du contrat. S’il en était autrement, chaque employé n’aurait qu’à dire, en entrant en fonctions, qu’il
n’accepte que sauf des modifications à faire aux lois qu’il est appelé à exécuter”. Huyttens (1844–
1845), vol. 2, p. 492, 08/02/1831.
143“une constitution n’est que le cahier des charges de cette acceptation”. Huyttens (1844–1845),
vol. 2, p. 492, 08/02/1831.
144“Si, dans une assemblée législative, je faisais une proposition contraire à un décret constitu-
tionnel, je concevrais que l’on pût invoquer la question préalable; mais dans une assemblée
constituante, elle est inadmissible parce que nous sommes juges souverains, et en possession du
pouvoir de nous réformer nous-mêmes”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 512, 14/02/1831.
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throne needed to be reopened, and the Congress would continue to convene.
However, the Congressmen wished more than anything to leave the provisional
order behind and put the Constitution into force. The credibility of the new state
depended on it, both domestically and towards its neighbors. Van de Weyer stated:
“it will signal the coming into force of our institutions. It will signal the organi-
zation of a regulated and truly constitutional power”.145
On the proposal of Lebeau, and in concordance with Art. 85 of the Constitution,
it was decided that a Regent should be appointed.146 Since the Constitution would
enter into force from the moment the Regent took the oath, this would put an end to
the provisional state of affairs. The Congress nevertheless retained constituent
power until a King was inaugurated, at which moment it would adjourn and
elections for a regular Parliament would be called. The Congress would only be
dissolved definitively when the new Parliament was installed.
2.5 The Question of Constitutionality
The temporary state of affairs created another complication with regard to the
precedence of Constitution, namely the issue of constitutionality. Even before the
Constitution was promulgated, the question arose whether or not the constituent
Congress should act in accordance with it. For a start, a debate emerged on the issue
of whether or not the proposed regency needed to be organized along the lines of
article 85 of the Constitution. The constituent Congress did not really match the
prescriptions of the article, which had been drawn up with a normal legislative
assembly in mind. Nothomb argued that the Congress was entirely free to instate a
regency according to its own wishes:
The regency we wish to install does not figure in the fundamental law; the existence of the
Congress vested with constituent powers makes our situation totally exceptional. In this
regard, the Congress is not bound by any Constitution. We can neither abdicate the con-
stituent power, nor delegate part of it. We are bound by our mandate.147
Since the Congress was an omnipotent constituent power, it acted outside of any
Constitution, even the one it had itself created. Alexandre Gendebien objected that,
since the Constitution provided for the possibility of a regency, the Congress was
bound to abide by its prescriptions:
145“(…) ce sera le signal de la mise en pratique de nos institutions, ce sera le signal de l’organ-
isation d’un pouvoir réglé et vraiment constitutionnel”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 580,
23/02/1831.
146Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 580, 23/02/1831.
147“La régence que nous voulons instituer n’est pas dans la loi fondamentale; l’existence du
congrès investi du pouvoir constituant rend notre situation tout à fait exceptionnelle; le congrès est
à cet égard en dehors de toute constitution. Nous ne pouvons abdiquer le pouvoir constituant, ni le
déléguer en partie. Nous sommes liés par notre mandat”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 581,
23/02/1831.
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Your Constitution is ready, now it must be put into action. You are short of a King though.
Article 85 of the constitution prescribes that, when the throne is vacant, the administration
of the realm is provided for by a regency.148
Not to do so would be to violate the Constitution even before it came into force:
To allow for the proposals which have been brought before you would be unconstitutional,
and I do not think you wish to violate the fundamental pact even before it is put into
action.149
The Congress finally followed Nothomb’s reasoning. It instated a regency of its
own design, with a Regent who did not possess all the constitutional powers of the
head of state. Thus, the Congress’s predominance over the executive power
remained assured until the moment when a King would be found. The decision
implied that the constituent power of the Congress was, by definition, unbounded.
The debates illustrate how the Constitution immediately acquired a position of
prominence that was both legal and symbolic: it became the one standard against
which the legality of all actions of the constituted powers could be measured and it
even served as a rule for the constituting powers. As a consequence, the categories
‘constitutional’ versus ‘unconstitutional’ gained importance in political debate. The
question of constitutionality was especially important in the period between the
Constitution’s promulgation in February and the inauguration of King Leopold in
July 1831. The competencies of the Congress and the government respectively were
debated in terms of their constitutionality. Accusing political opponents of making
unconstitutional proposals became an efficient tactic for delegitimizing these
proposals.
The maintenance of the new Constitution was jealously guarded by public
opinion and the press as well. For example, on 11 March 1831, the Courrier de la
Sambre published an article entitled “A violation of the Constitution”. The article
signaled that a few days earlier a decision of the government had been counter-
signed, not by the responsible minister, but by a high-placed functionary. This did
not conform to the constitutional rules on ministerial responsibility:
The Regent be warned that the most profound respect for our new fundamental law and a
strict observation of this law are required of his position, and the position of the country.
Every transgression will be fatal, and must immediately be signaled and repressed.150
148“Votre constitution est prête, il faut la mettre en vigueur. Pour cela, il vous manque un roi. Aux
termes de l’article 85 de la constitution, quand le trône est vacant, on pourvoit à l’administration du
royaume par une régence”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 567, 22/02/1831.
149“Admettre les propositions qui vous sont soumises serait inconstitutionnel, et je pense que vous
ne voulez pas violer le pacte fondamental avant qu’il ne soit en vigueur”. Huyttens (1844–1845),
vol. 2, p. 567, 22/02/1831.
150“Que M. le Régent y prenne garde, le respect le plus profond pour notre nouvelle loi fonda-
mentale, une observation stricte de cette loi, lui sont commandés par sa position et celle du pays;
toute transgression serait fatale, et doit être instantanément signalée et réprimée”. Courrier de la
Sambre no. 291, 11/03/1831.
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Equally instructive is the debate over the acceptance of the peace treaty with the
Netherlands on 1 July 1831, which was an essential condition for the consolidation
of Belgian independence. The competency of the ministers with regard to this
question was discussed in terms of their constitutional mandate. Drawing on a
religious vocabulary, De Robaulx warned against what he called “constitutional
heresies”:
I hurry to respond to the observation of M. Duval, which is a constitutional heresy. (…)
This matter involves touching the Constitution. Be warned that the Constitution is an arch
of alliance; touch it and you will be struck death. Yes, you will be struck death by public
opinion.151
In the session of 12 April 1831, the question of whether legislative elections
should be called was debated. It was argued that the Congress had reached the term
of its mandate: since a Constitution had been drawn up and all the conditions for
giving it its full execution were fulfilled, the constituent assembly should be dis-
solved.152 Isidore Fallon defended this argument, saying that the Congress’s orig-
inal mandate was limited to drawing up and promulgating a Constitution. After that
it was obliged to resign. Otherwise, it committed an act of unconstitutionality and
abuse of power:
In the present state of affairs, let us be careful. Because by reserving this competence for the
Congress any longer (…), it may later be accused of unconstitutionality or usurpation of
power.153
151“Je me hâte de répondre à l’observation de M. Duval, qui est une hérésie constitutionnelle. (…)
C’est qu’il s’agit maintenant de toucher à la constitution. Prenez-y garde, la constitution, c’est une
arche d’alliance; si vous y touchez, vous serez frappé de mort. Oui, vous serez frappé de mort par
l’opinion”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 3, p. 369, 01/07/1831. This remark reflects the idea of the
article 123 of the draft Constitution. Although it was finally not adopted, its spirit clearly remained:
“The maintenance of the constitution and all the rights it consecrates are entrusted to the patriotism
and the courage of the militia, the army, the magistrates and of all Belgians”. Cf. Footnote 6.
152The Provisional Government decided to create the National Congress in its decree of 4 October
1830: “Un congrès national, où seront représentés tous les intérêts des provinces, sera convoqué. Il
examinera le projet de constitution belge, le modifiera en ce qu’il jugera convenable, et le rendra,
comme constitution définitive, exécutoire dans toute la Belgique”. Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du
Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique (1830), no. 4, p. 3. In the decree on the elections for the
Congress of 10 October 1830, its task was defined as follows: “Considérant que le congrès appelé
à décider des intérêts de la Belgique (…)”. Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement
Provisoire de la Belgique (1830), no. 7, p. 5.
153“Dans un pareil état de choses, prenons garde, en réservant plus longtemps au congrès cet acte
important à la consolidation de notre indépendance et à l’affermissement de nos institutions, qu’on
puisse un jour l’attaquer d’inconstitutionnalité ou d’usurpation de pouvoir”. Huyttens (1844–
1845), vol. 3, p. 87, 12/04/1831.
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Fallon further insisted that the Regent should be able to exercise his functions in
the way provided for by the Constitution, instead of being subjected to the will of
the omnipotent Congress: “He must finally be able to govern by virtue of the
Constitution and not by the will of the Congress alone”.154
Nothomb protested that dissolving the Congress at that point in time would be
the exact opposite of completing the mission with which it had been entrusted by
the Nation. The great task of the Congress was to safeguard the gains of the Belgian
Revolution and to consolidate them by establishing a stable state upon their base:
Our fellow citizens have invested us with complete social powers; they have consigned
constituent power to us, they have charged us with the foundation of Belgian nationality; in
short, they have entrusted the entire September Revolution to us.155
Given the pressing military, political and economic needs, these circumstances
could not be said to have been attained: “Is Belgium’s fate fixed because we have
added one more Constitution to the long list of constitutions which the XIXth
century has produced?”.156
Unless the necessary conditions for the survival of the Constitution were ful-
filled, all the Congress’s efforts would have been in vain.
On 20 July 1831, one day before the inauguration of the King, the different
modalities for the dissolution of the Congress were discussed one last time. Fallon
proposed to definitely dissolve the Congress directly after the King’s inaugural
oath. Other members argued that the King should not be left in charge without a
legislative assembly. Therefore they proposed to let Congress retain the legislative
power until the election of the first regular Parliament, but to adjourn it in the
meantime. Its constituent powers on the other hand would cease after the inaugural
oath. Devaux and Nothomb proposed the latter option, but added that the Congress
could only be convened on the King’s initiative.157 Fallon objected that the King
was exclusively bound by his oath on the Constitution, and that therefore the
Congress was obliged to surrender its powers:
154“Il faut enfin qu’il puisse gouverner en vertu de la constitution, et non par la volonté seule du
congrès”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 3, p. 88, 12/04/1831.
155“Nos concitoyens nous ont investis de la plénitude des pouvoirs sociaux; ils nous ont revêtus de la
puissance constituante, ils nous ont dit de fonder la nationalité de la Belgique; ils nous ont, en unmot,
confié la révolution tout entière de septembre”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 3, p. 87, 12/04/1831.
156“Le sort de la Belgique est-il fixé parce que nous avons ajouté une constitution à la longue liste
des constitutions qu’a engendrées le XIXe siècle?”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 3, p. 87,
12/04/1831.
157“Le congrès national s’ajournera immédiatement après la prestation de serment du roi; il sera
dissous de plein droit le jour de la réunion des chambres. Jusqu’à l’époque de cette dissolution, le
roi seul aura le droit de convoquer le congrès, qui ne pourra plus exercer désormais que la partie du
pouvoir législatif que la constitution attribue aux chambres”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 3, p. 612,
20/07/1831.
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The only condition imposed on the King is the oath on the Constitution. Neither our
constituent power nor our legislative power can subsist. The power of the Congress is a
constitutional power.158
Beyts, in favor of dissolution, argued that it was unconstitutional to let a single
Chamber exercise the legislative power. In the absence of an elected Parliament, a
constitutional legislative power could not exist: “The King has no sanction in the
presence of a single Chamber. He has sworn loyalty to the Constitution; let us also
be loyal and leave”.159 Forgeur likewise maintained that Nothomb and Devaux’s
proposal, which was finally approved by the assembly, was unconstitutional.
3 Precedence in the Belgian Constitution
We have seen how the idea of precedence in the Belgian Constitution was informed
by the political opposition against the Dutch King in the years preceding the
Belgian Revolution. The Belgian opposition called upon the Fundamental Law in
an effort to legitimize its resistance to royal authoritarianism. When this tactic
failed, it established a new legal order with a new Constitution at its base. The next
question then, is how this precedence was laid out in the Constitution itself. The
Belgian Constitution is exceptional in that it does not have a preamble, which
would be the most logical place for statements on the status of the constitutional
text in relation to ordinary law.160 Instead of being explicitly proclaimed, the
precedence of the Constitution is expressed by several articles within the
158“La seule condition imposée au roi, c’est le serment à la constitution: notre pouvoir constituant
ni législatif ne peut subsister. Le pouvoir du congrès est un pouvoir constitutionnel”. Huyttens
(1844–1845), vol. 3, p. 611, 20/07/1831.
159“Le roi n’a pas de sanction avec une chambre unique. Il jure fidélité à la constitution; soyons-y
également fidèles et allons-nous-en”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 3, p. 611, 20/07/1831.
160In the session of 18 November 1830, Boucqueau de Villeraie proposed to draw up a manifesto
that would serve as a preamble to the Constitution. The manifesto was to contain a legitimation of
the Belgian Revolution, as well as the decrees on Belgian independence and the deposition of
William I. The proposal was adopted and a commission, composed of Trentesaux, Théophile
Fallon, Charles-Hippolyte Vilain XIIII, Forgeur, Van Crombrugghe, Lecocq, De Ryckere, Count
Vilain XIIII, De Gerlache and Boucqueau de Villerain was charged with the task. The commission
never convened however. In the session of 13 April, the National Congress renewed its intention to
draw up a manifesto containing “the grievances of the Belgian people”. The commission was
reshuffled but again failed to produce results. In the meantime, during the session of 24 February
1831, Devaux proposed to include the decrees of 18 and 24 November (on national independence
and the exclusion of the Nassau dynasty from succession to the Belgian throne) in the Constitution.
On Beyts’s proposal, and with a view to preventing their later modification by constitutional
revision, the decrees were not included into the Constitution however, but were granted consti-
tutional status: “nous les rendons irrévocables; ils ne feront pas partie de la constitution, mais ils
seront comme la base sur laquelle elle repose”. The decision was published in the Bulletin Officiel
on 24 February. A preamble was never drawn up. Bulletin Officiel des décrets du Congrès national
de la Belgique et des arrêtés du pouvoir exécutif (1830–1831), vol. 3, no. XVI, p. 187, decree of
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constitutional text. Their tendency and formulation often bespeaks the influence of
British constitutional law, as reformulated by Constant. We will list these articles
and explain them by looking at the constituent debates and at constitutional
manuals.
3.1 Differentiation from Normal Legislation
• The Constitution cannot be suspended.
Art. 130: The Constitution cannot be wholly or partially suspended.161
This article was not included in the draft of the Constitutional Commission. It
was added during the Congress debate of 5 February 1831 upon the suggestion of
Van Snick. Van Snick first proposed the following article, borrowed from Benjamin
Constant:
The constitutional powers only exist by virtue of the Constitution. They cannot, in
whichever case or under whichever pretext, suspend its action.162
He supported his suggestion by referring to the political and institutional
instability of France, where every regime violated and suspended the constitutions
of its predecessors, under the motto Salus populi suprema lex esto. Instead, Van
Snick argued that the wellbeing of the people was “always attached to the inflexible
execution of the laws, especially of the fundamental law”.163 His proposal was
meant precisely “to prevent such infractions, such suspensions and coups”.164
The proposal was approved, but a discussion developed over its formulation. De
Robaulx considered prohibitive measures illusory, since constitutions could ipse
facto only be violated by illegal means.165 The article was thereupon reformulated
so as to better express its intention to prevent the constituted powers from
24 February 1831; Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 1, pp. 180–182, 18/11/1830; p. 261 (23 November
1830); p. 388 (11 December 1830) and vol. 2, p. 586, 24/02/1831; pp. 94–97 (13 April 1831).
161“La constitution ne peut être suspendue en tout ni en partie”. See: Ergec (1987), Errera (1918,
pp. 17–19), Huberlant (1982, pp. 337–338) and Van Drooghenbroeck (2006).
162“Les pouvoirs constitutionnels n’existant que par la constitution, ils ne peuvent dans aucun cas,
ni sous aucun prétexte, en suspendre l’action”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 464, 05/02/1831.
163“toujours attaché à l’inflexible exécution des lois, et surtout de la loi fondamentale”.
164“de prévenir ces infractions, ces suspensions et ces coups d’État”.
165“Une constitution ne peut être violée que par un coup d’État ou une révolution. Toute dispo-
sition prohibitive me paraît illusoire” (A constitution can only be violated by a coup or by a
revolution. Prohibitive measures seem illusory to me). Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 464,
05/02/1831.
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suspending the Constitution. Lebeau agreed, arguing that even the possibility of a
violation needed to be precluded.166
• Constitutional revision is impossible during a regency.
Art. 84: No constitutional revision is admitted during a regency.167
The article was based on Art. 233 of the Fundamental Law.168 It was passed
without discussion, with the clear intention of preventing constitutional change in
times of crisis.169
• Special revision procedure.
Art. 131: The legislative power has the right to declare that there are reasons to
revise such constitutional provision as it determines.
Following such a declaration, the two Houses are automatically dissolved.
Two new Houses are then convened, in accordance with Article 71.
These Houses make decisions, in common agreement with the King, on the
points submitted for revision.
In this case, the Houses can only debate provided that at least two thirds of the
members who make up each House are present; and no change is adopted unless it
is supported by at least two thirds of the votes.170
The procedure for constitutional revision was rather rigid.171 New elections and
a special majority were obligatory. Discussion on this article was limited and it was
accepted without change. The only debate concerned the measure of flexibility of
the procedure. Lebeau objected to the separate vote in both chambers, which would
allow one chamber to block the revision wished for by the other. This he considered
dangerous for the stability of the institutions.172
166“Si la charte française avait contenu un semblable article, jamais les ministres de Charles X
n’auraient pu trouver un prétexte pour suspendre la charte” (If the French Charte had contained a
similar article, the ministers of Charles X would not have found a pretext for suspending the
charter). Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 465, 05/02/1831.
167“Aucun changement à la Constitution ne peut être fait pendant une régence”.
168Descamps (1981, p. 45).
169Errera (1918, p. 22) and Thonissen (1879, p. 227).
170“Le pouvoir législatif a le droit de déclarer qu’il y a lieu à la révision de telle disposition
constitutionnelle qu’il désigne. Après cette déclaration, les deux chambres sont dissoutes de plein
droit. Il en sera convoqué deux nouvelles, conformément à l’article 71. Ces chambres statuent,
d’un commun accord avec le Roi, sur les points soumis à la révision. Dans ce cas, les chambres ne
pourront délibérer si deux tiers au moins des membres qui composent chacune d’elles ne sont
présents; et nul changement ne sera adopté s’il ne réunit au moins les deux tiers des suffrages”.
171Errera (1918, pp. 20–22) and Thonissen (1879, pp. 338–340).
172“S’il n’y a pas de moyen de faire des changements à la constitution, dès que l’opinion se sera
prononcée contre elle, elle sera ou enfreinte, ou méprisée” (If there is no way to make changes to
the Constitution, she will either be violated or despised, as soon as public opinion pronounces
against her). Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 461, 4 February 1831.
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• Abolishment of all contrary previous legislation.
Art. 137: The Fundamental Law of 24 August 1815 and all the provincial and
local statutes are abolished.173
Art. 138: From the day when the Constitution enters into force, all the laws,
decrees, decisions, resolutions and other acts that contravene it, are abrogated.174
The second part of Art. 137 was based on the Fundamental Law of 1815,
whereas Art. 138 was based on Art. 70 of the French Charter of 1830.175 Both were
approved without motivation or debate. They are logical measures to establish
precedence of the Constitution over all previous or contradictory legislation.176
3.2 The Oath on the Constitution
Art. 80: The King attains his majority upon his eighteenth birthday.
The King only accedes to the throne after having sworn the following oath
before the united Houses: “I swear to observe the Constitution and the laws of the
Belgian people, to preserve the country’s national independence and its territorial
integrity”.177
The article was based on Art. 38, 52 and 53 of the Fundamental Law.178 The
oath on the Constitution was the prerequisite for the King to ascend to the throne.
Between the death of the King and the inauguration of his successor, the powers of
the head of state were exercised by the council of ministers in the name of the
Belgian People and on their responsibility. The draft Constitution did not contain
the oath: it followed that the royal power was directly inherited by his successor.
This was changed by the National Congress. The Congressmen who insisted on the
introduction of the oath and the public inauguration stressed the fact that the oath
constituted a legal ground for deposing the monarch in case he violated the
Constitution.179 This rule had existed under the Old Regime, as several members
observed. References were made to the Old Regime clause of the ancient
173“La loi fondamentale du 24 août 1815 est abolie, ainsi que les statuts provinciaux et locaux.
Cependant les autorités provinciales et locales conservent leurs attributions jusqu’à ce que la loi y
ait autrement pourvu”.
174“A compter du jour où la Constitution sera exécutoire, toutes les lois, décrets, arrêtés,
règlements et autres actes qui y sont contraires, sont abrogés”.
175Descamps (1981, p. 41; 46).
176Errera (1918, p. 270) and Thonissen (1879, pp. 343–344).
177“Le Roi est majeur à l’âge de dix-huit ans accomplis. Il ne prend possession du trône qu’après
avoir solennellement prêté, dans le sein des chambres réunies, le serment suivant: ‘Je jure d’ob-
server la Constitution et les lois du peuple belge, de maintenir l’indépendance nationale et
l’intégrité du territoire’”.
178Descamps (1989, 44–45).
179Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, pp. 67–68, 09/01/1831; p. 487, 07/02/1831.
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constitution of the Duchy of Brabant which freed subjects of their loyalty to the
prince when he did not respect his constitutional oath.
The discussion came about at the subject of the inviolability of the head of state.
The formulation proposed by the Constitutional Commission seemed to suggest that
the King could not in any way be deposed. The formulation of Art. 39 on the
inviolability of the head of state was therefore adapted into “The King’s person is
inviolable; his ministers are accountable”, which included the possibility of depo-
sition.180 Destouvelles proposed copying the oath of the ancient constitution of
Brabant which released the subjects of their fidelity to the prince in case he violated
the Constitution.181 Beyts followed the same reasoning when proclaiming that he
did not want “a king without a contract”: “I can hardly agree to the principle
allowed in France: the King is dead, long live the King! I will not cry ‘Long live the
King’ if he has not sworn the oath”.182
In other words, the oath turned the Constitution into the measure for the legality
of the king’s every action. Apart from the oath, the Old Regime inauguration
ceremony in the presence of the assembled people was revived.183 The goal was to
make the oath on the Constitution “more sacramental”. In addition, the Congress
introduced an oath to the Constitution for all members of Parliament, magistrates,
army officers and civil servants.184 These oaths were prescribed by decree however
and not included in the Constitution.185 Interestingly, the members of Parliament
only swore to the Constitution, whereas the others also needed to swear loyalty to
the laws and the King. This resulted from the fact that the Constitution was the only
limit on the legislative power of Parliament, which neither the laws nor the King
could bind.
3.3 Judicial Review
There is no mention of judicial review in the Constitution, nor in the debates of the
National Congress. However, Art. 28 and 107 offer indications as to the opinion of
the Congress in this matter. Art. 28 states that only the legislative power may decide
the interpretation of the law, or in other words the référé législatif: “Only the
180“La personne du chef de l’État est inviolable; ses ministres sont responsables”. Huyttens (1844–
1845), vol. 2, 09/01/1831.
181Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, pp. 67–68, 09/01/1831.
182“Je n’admets guère (…) le principe admis en France: Le roi est mort, vive le roi! Je ne crie pas,
Vive le roi, s’il n’a pas juré”. Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 487, 07/02/1831. On the absence of
this principle in the Belgian Constitution: Errera (1918, p. 199).
183On these references, see: Deseure (2016b), Dubois (2005b, pp. 238–241), Dumont (1981) and
De Lichtervelde (1930, p. 13).
184Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 3, pp. 608–609, 20/07/1831.
185Errera (1918, p. 323).
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legislative power can give an authoritative interpretation of the laws”.186 The
context of this stipulation is the following:
The law can only have been intended in one sense by the legislator; the other senses that
one wishes to attribute to it are by necessity wrong.
When the Court of Cassation and the other courts and tribunals are divided about the sense
of the law, the intervention of the legislative power is necessary187
Art. 107 states that the tribunals may only apply decisions of the executive power
when they conform to the law. However, they do not have the power to annul or
invalidate these decisions: “The courts and tribunals only apply the general, provincial
and local decisions and rulings to the extent that they conform to the law”.188
These articles do not refer to the question of the conformity of the law to the
Constitution but they do make clear that the judicial power is not entitled to
interfere in the spheres of action of the legislative and executive powers. It has been
supposed by analogy that tribunals do not have the competence of judicial
review.189 This is a logical outcome of the importance attached to the separation of
powers in the Belgian Constitution.190 Judicial review would contradict Art.
26 which states that the legislative power is exercised by the Chambers and the
King collectively. This is a classical argument against the establishment of
Constitutional Courts (cf. debates on the American Supreme Court). In the Belgian
context the lawgiver is protected against interference of the judiciary.
Given that Parliament cannot be forced to respect the Constitution, it has
unrestricted legislative power.191 In other words, it has the power to make
unconstitutional law. However, the Congress clearly expected future parliaments to
act in accordance with the Constitution. The Congressmen believed that the respect
of succeeding assemblies for the Constitution would be too great to ever allow the
introduction of unconstitutional laws.192 In addition, the oath for members of
Parliament on the Constitution, as well as part 2 of Art. 25 (“All the powers
186“L’interprétation des lois par voie d’autorité n’appartient qu’au pouvoir législatif”. For a dis-
cussion of this article: Neut (1842, p. 161).
187“La loi ne peut avoir qu’un seul sens dans l’intention du législateur; les autres sens qu’on veut
lui attribuer sont nécessairement faux”; “Lorsque la cour de cassation et les autres cours et
tribunaux sont divisés sur le sens de la loi, l’intervention du pouvoir législatif est nécessaire”.
Report of the Central Section, by Jean-Joseph Raikem, on the judicial power. Huyttens (1844–
1845), vol. 4, p. 96.
188“Les cours et tribunaux n’appliqueront les arrêtés et règlements généraux, provinciaux et
locaux, qu’autant qu’ils seront conformes aux lois”. Le Jeune (1857) and Van den Steene (1963,
p. 55) and Warlomont (1929).
189Thonissen (1879, p. 133).
190See De Maeyer (1994, p. 51), for the discussion between Eugène Verhaegen and Charles Faider
on the question of unconstitutional laws.
191Errera (1918, p. 270) and Stengers (1949, p. 681).
192For the same reason, Charles Faider, one of the most prominent Belgian lawyers of the nine-
teenth century, thought the introduction of judicial review was useless. Stengers (1949, p. 692).
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emanate from the nation. They are exercised in the manner established by the
Constitution”) did constitute a legal restraint of sorts on the power of the legislative
branch.193 As we have seen, as soon as the Constitution was promulgated, ‘con-
stitutionality’ became an important argument in the debates over new legislation.
4 Epilogue: Constitutional Discourse After 1831
The history of the Constitution after 1831 illustrates that it effectively functioned as
the single, fundamental law binding the legal and political order. Only in 1914–
83 years after its promulgation—was the first unconstitutional law passed by the
Belgian lawgiver.194 Moreover, the Constitution proved to be stable: only twice in
the nineteenth century was the procedure for constitutional revision used, both
times mainly in order to adapt the suffrage conditions to social reality.195 Revisions
affecting the foundations of the state only followed after WWII.
The resilience of the Constitution can at least partly be explained by the sym-
bolic prestige it enjoyed. Both in the Congress and in the press the new Constitution
was heralded as Belgium’s ultimate guarantee of liberty. It was presented as the
foundation of the new state and the guarantor of the wellbeing of its inhabitants.
A typical example appeared in the newspaper Courrier de la Sambre:
Our beautiful Constitution, masterpiece of our worthy representatives, will be respected, it
will be the sacred arch that will remain as an eternal monument to our courage and to the
energy with which we have shaken off a degrading yoke.196
Constitutionality (as opposed to unconstitutionality) and respect for the
Constitution remained important legitimizing categories in Belgian political dis-
course throughout the nineteenth century.
The ruling classes actively promoted respect for the Constitution by the estab-
lishment of a popular cult, including monuments and hymns. In the words of
Congressman Beyts, the Constitution was in effect sacralized.197 Although this
quasi-sacred reverence for the Constitution existed from the very beginning, it
gained strength especially after the revolutionary wave of 1848. During the first two
decades after the Revolution, public state celebrations focused more on the martial
side of the revolutionary events, with the memory of the fallen heroes of the
‘September Days’ of 1830 as the centerpiece.198 In the year 1848 the focus shifted.
193Errera (1918, p. 270).
194Stengers (1949, p. 694).
195Gilissen (1958, p. 18).
196“Notre belle constitution, chef-d’œuvre de nos dignes représentans, sera respectée, ce sera
l’arche sainte qui restera comme un monument éternel de notre courage et de l’énergie avec
laquelle nous avons su secouer un joug avilissant”. Courrier de la Sambre no. 406, 24/07/1831.
197Huyttens (1844–1845), vol. 2, p. 487, 07/02/1831.
198Huygebaert (2013, p. 154) and Janssens (2001, p. 52).
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The introduction of a few liberal measures prevented an outbreak of revolution: the
franchise was widened by lowering the suffrage requirements to the constitutional
minimum, and public service was made incompatible with a parliamentary mandate
so that the Parliament grew more independent from the government. The measures
succeeded in quelling the modest revolutionary unrest in Belgium.199 As a result—
and partly under the influence of better relations with Holland—the government
turned to celebrating the stability of the country’s institutions rather than the rev-
olutionary feats of 1830.
The Constitution was hailed as the unshakeable foundation of the state, which,
due to its liberal character and just repartition of power, had averted the danger of
insurrection.200 The Constitution thus grew into the symbolic alpha and omega of
the Belgian state system. The culmination of the constitutional cult was the creation
of the Congress Column monument in 1850. The Column, a grandiose monument
designed by the architect Joseph Poelaert, commemorated the founding of the
Belgian state and the creation of the Belgian Constitution by the National Congress
in 1831. The major dates of the Belgian Revolution, the names of the members of
the Congress and the Provisional Government, and key passages from the Belgian
Constitution were inscribed on its pedestal. On the four corners of the pedestal sat
gigantic bronze statues of the four ‘cardinal liberties’ proclaimed in the second title
of the Constitution.201
This chapter has shown that constitutional precedence was not projected on the
Constitution post factum. The idea was tightly bound up with the genesis of the
Belgian Constitution itself, and at least partly resulted from the political theory
developed by the Belgian opposition against the rule of the Dutch King. The
debates over sovereignty and accountability of the government were waged in
constitutional terms by both the opposition and the government, but resulted in
completely opposite interpretations. The Belgian Constitutional Assembly was
careful to prevent a repetition of this debate by combining the idea of constitutional
precedence with a desire for clarity: royal inviolability and ministerial responsibility
were spelled out in the Constitution, while sovereignty was safely vested in the
Nation.202 Above all, they ensured that the Constitution acted as the basic rule of
the legal and political order. As the expression of the will of the sovereign Nation, it
excluded every other claim to power. Thus, the ambiguity, typical of Restoration
199The population stayed calm, while the only attempt at armed attack on the system—the inva-
sions of the country from France by an improvised battalion of a few hundred revolutionaries—
gloriously failed. Witte (2006).
200Huygebaert (2015).
201The 47 m high column was originally to be crowned by a representation of the Constitution,
until Parliament decided upon a statue of King Leopold instead.
202Remarkably, the political responsibility of ministers to Parliament (as opposed to the juridical
responsibility) was not made explicit in the Constitution, despite being clearly intended by the
National Congress. The political responsibility only developed as a result of political practice in
the first years after independence. Deseure (2016a, p. 125), Ganshof Van der Meersch (1950,
p. 183), Harsin (1937, p. 166) and Mübig (2011, p. 499).
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constitutionalism, between national sovereignty on the one hand and monarchical
sovereignty on the other, was overcome. This idea was expressed by the inaugural
oath, which unequivocally sealed the terms of the social contract, as well as by a
series of measures aimed at guaranteeing both the precedence and the endurance of
the Constitution.
5 Summary (Dutch): Grondwettelijke Voorrang en het
Ontstaan van de Belgische Grondwet van 1831
Het idee van grondwettelijke voorrang is een kernidee van het moderne
grondwetsbegrip. Het wordt hier gedefinieerd als het vastleggen van de politieke en
wettelijke orde in een uniforme, positiefrechtelijke tekst die het karakter heeft van
een wettelijke bindende, voorafgaande rechtsnorm. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt de
manier waarop het concept van grondwettelijke voorrang werd verankerd in de
Belgische grondwet van 1831. Het doet dit vanuit het standpunt van de genese van
de grondwet in de context van de Belgische Revolutie. Een
historisch-genealogische benadering wordt daarbij gecombineerd met een
juridische.
Het eerste deel gaat in op het ontstaan van de Belgische grondwet in oppositie
met de Fundamentele Wet, de grondwet van het Koninkrijk der Verenigde
Nederlanden. Het laat zien dat het verzet van de Belgische oppositie tegen het
beleid van de regering van koning Willem I tot een debat leidde over de inter-
pretatie en het karakter van de Fundamentele Wet. Zowel de overheid als de
oppositie beriepen zich op de grondwet om hun respectievelijke claims te legit-
imeren, maar ontwikkelden daarbij een volstrekt tegengestelde interpretatie ervan.
De overheid onderstreepte de rol van het monarchale macht in het staatsbestel via
een letterlijke lezing van de grondwet, in combinatie met het idee van voorafgaande
monarchale soevereiniteit. De oppositie daarentegen, geïnspireerd door de consti-
tutionele theorie van Benjamin Constant, beriep zich op de geest van de grondwet
in een poging om de koninklijke macht aan banden te leggen. Deze tweestrijd
beïnvloedde vervolgens de opvatting van grondwettelijke voorrang zoals die tot
uiting kwam in de debatten van de Belgische constituante.
Het discours van de Belgische oppositie over de Fundamentele Wet onderging
een transformatie op het moment dat het verzet tegen de Nederlandse overheid
uitmondde in revolutie. De revolutionairen legitimeerden het breken met de wet-
telijke orde door een beroep op de rechten van de Belgische Natie, die de
Fundamentele Wet in haar ogen niet voldoende wist te garanderen tegen koninklijk
despotisme. Het idee van grondwettelijke voorrang bleef evenwel intact en vond
vervolgens zijn neerslag in de nieuwe Belgische grondwet. Dit blijkt uit de debatten
in het Nationaal Congres en in de pers. Grondwettelijkheid werd, vanaf de goed-
keuring van de grondwet op 7 februari 1831, een belangrijke categorie om het
optreden van de constituerende en geconstitueerde machten mee te beoordelen.
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Het tweede deel onderzoekt de manier waarop grondwettelijke voorrang werd
verankerd in de grondwetstekst zelf. Bij gebrek aan preambule wordt het speciale
karakter van de gronwetstekst niet explicitiet uitgedrukt. Wel komt het idee tot
uiting in een reeks grondwetsartikelen die betrekking hebben op (a) de bijzondere
status van het grondwettelijk recht ten opzichte van gewone wetgeving (onder meer
in de modaliteiten voor grondwetswijziging) en (b) de status van de grondwet als
wettelijk bindende norm voor het optreden van de geconstitueerde machten (onder
meer via de grondwettelijke eed van de monarch).
Tot slot werd de grondwettelijke voorrang ook symbolisch uitgedrukt door
middel van een semi-religieus discours waarin de grondwet werd voorgesteld als de
stichtingsakte van de staat en de ultieme garantie voor haar toekomstige welzijn. Na
1848 culmineerde dit discours zelfs in een volwaardige grondwetscultus.
6 Summary (French): La Primauté de La Constitution et
La Genèse de La Constitution Belge de 1831
La conception moderne de Constitution est fondée sur sa primauté. La primauté de
la Constitution est ici définie comme l’établissement d’un ordre politique et légal au
moyen d’un texte uniforme de droit positif véhiculant une norme prioritaire et
juridiquement contraignante. Ce chapitre étudie la manière dont le concept de la
primauté de la Constitution a été ancré dans la Constitution belge de 1831. Pour ce
faire, il suivre une approche tant historique et «généalogique» que juridique.
La première partie est consacrée à la genèse de la Constitution belge en oppo-
sition avec la Loi Fondamentale du Royaume des Pays-Bas Unis. Elle montre
comment l’opposition belge, en résistance envers le gouvernement du Roi
Guillaume Ier, a ouvert un débat sur l’interprétation et le caractère de cette Loi
Fondamentale. Tant le gouvernement que l’opposition se référaient à la
Constitution pour légitimer leurs points de vue respectifs, mais en l’interprétant de
manière contradictoire. Le gouvernement soulignait le rôle du Roi dans le fonc-
tionnement de l’Etat, en appelant à une lecture littérale de la Constitution et à l’idée
d’une souveraineté monarchique préalable. L’opposition, quant à elle, inspirée par
la théorie constitutionnelle de Benjamin Constant, se référait au contraire à l’esprit
de la Constitution dans le but de limiter le pouvoir royal. Ce conflit a eu une
profonde influence sur la manière dont l’idée de la primauté de Constitution a été
envisagée au sein de la constituante belge.
Le discours de l’opposition belge sur la Loi Fondamentale s’est fortement
transformé au moment où la résistance contre le gouvernement néerlandais a pris le
caractère d’une révolution. La rupture des révolutionnaires avec l’ordre légal se
légitimait par la nécessité de protéger les droits de la Nation belge, que la Loi
Fondamentale ne parvenait pas, à leurs yeux, à protéger suffisamment contre le
despotisme royal. L’idée de la primauté de la Constitution restait néanmoins intacte
et se retrouvait dans la toute nouvelle Constitution belge. Les débats menés au
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Congrès National et dans la presse en témoignent. À partir de l’approbation de la
Constitution le 7 février 1831, le concept de ‘constitutionalité’ devient un élément
important d’appréciation du comportement des pouvoirs constituants et constitués.
La deuxième partie est dédiée à la manière dont la primauté de la Constitution
est inscrite dans le texte lui-même. En l’absence de préambule, le caractère spécial
de la Constitution n’est pas exprimé de manière explicite. Par contre, il est mis en
avant dans une série d’articles qui traitent (a) de la particularité du droit constitu-
tionnel par rapport à la législation ordinaire (entre autres via les modalités de la
révision de la Constitution) et (b) du statut de la Constitution comme norme
emportant une contrainte juridique pour l’action des pouvoirs constitués (entre autre
via le serment constitutionnel du monarque).
Enfin, la primauté de la Constitution est exprimée de manière symbolique au
moyen d’un discours semi-religieux représentant la Constitution comme le docu-
ment fondateur de l’Etat belge et comme la garantie ultime de son bien-être futur.
Discours qui, après 1848, culmine dans un culte constitutionnel à part entière.
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Abstract The 1815 constitution of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands estab-
lished a deferential control on the sovereign power to declare war and conclude
treaties. Following articles 57 and 58, international agreements could be concluded
and ratified by the monarch, save for peacetime cessions of territory. The consti-
tutional committee’s debates treat the matter rather hastily. William I (1772–1843)’s
role at the establishment of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands had been so
decisive, that the advent of a less qualified successor seemed inconceivable. The
monarch personified the common interest. Foreign policy, the privileged terrain of
princes and diplomats, was judged unsuitable for domestic political bickering.
Finally, the Estates Generals’ budgetary powers were seen as an indirect brake on
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potential royal martial ardours. The incidental objections formulated by Jan Jozef
Raepsaet, a Southern conservative publicist, show the more structural deficiencies of
the constitution as a pact between the monarch and the nation. Leaning both on
feudal law and law of nations doctrine, Raepsaet demonstrated how William I had
been dressed in Napoleon’s clothes. The King had a nearly unchecked competence
in foreign affairs, beyond the usual Old Regime safeguards, contrary to
Enlightenment criticism of autocratic rule. John Gilissen aptly labeled William I as a
“monocrat”. Vattel or Pufendorf’s opinion on the ruler as a mere usufructuary
seemed to have evaporated. Raepsaet’s arguments on the inconsistent nature of Art.
57 and 58 are echoed in the 1831 Belgian constitution’s Art. 67—subjecting most
treaties to parliamentary consent—as well in Thorbecke’s criticism of the document.
1 Introduction
The Constitution of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1815 ranks as one of
the restoration constitutions of post-Napoleonic Europe. Looked at from a distance,
the text is the product of a creative moment of European statecraft. The Congress of
Vienna (1814–1815) crafted a new state as the cornerstone of its system of col-
lective security. The Catholic Belgian provinces united with the mostly Protestant
Dutch, under the wings of a newly-created sovereign King, descendent from a
German dynasty, the house of Nassau. The restoration had to incorporate some
acquis of the French Revolution.1 Even before the beheading of Louis XVI in 1793,
the French monarch had agreed to the constitutionalization of the monarchy of
Divine Right. If the monarchy could return after Napoleon, it would have to accept
the presence of the nation.
The story of the 1815 constitution is at the crossroads of two theories on the
limitation of monarchical power. On the one hand, Old Regime thinking on col-
lective government, divided between the monarch and his loyal elites, as exem-
plified in Montesquieu’s De l’Esprit des Lois, or in Fénelon’s criticism of Louis
XIV’s authoritarian reign.2 On the other hand, revolutionary theories of national
representation, as embodied in Siéyes’ writings. From a genealogical perspective,
William I’s constitutions of 1814 and 1815 contained many elements prevalent in
the Belgian Constitution of 1831,3 or of present-day constitutional orders. Yet, its
modernity can also be questioned. The most evident angle of approach is that of the
lack of balance between the legislative and executive power in the domestic field.
This contribution proposes to add a less-studied, but crucial aspect of sovereignty:
the right to wage war and conclude treaties. I argue that this case embodies all
aspects of the ambiguous relationship between monarchical rule and national
1De Waresquiel (2015).
2Bély (1996, 243–257).
340% of all articles, see Gilissen (1979a, 405).
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representation. If constitutional precedence was an issue, it counted as such for both
sides. Both for those who favored a stronger restoration monarch, and for elite
resistance to the acquis of the revolutionary and Napoleonic regimes.
If the discussions on the constitutional regime of foreign relations have been
rather scarce, our attention should be aroused by the radical change in formulation
between the 1815 constitution and the 1831 Belgian constitution, or, at an even
further distance, the 1848 constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.4 At one
end of this spectrum, political liberalism has introduced ministerial responsibility
and the primacy of the legislative branch over the executive. Yet, surprisingly, some
liberal criticisms echo those of more conservative, Old Régime-thinking.5 In the
middle, the 1815 constitution has put William I in Napoleon’s clothes.6 In the
words of Cornelis Van Maanen (1769–1846), president of the highest jurisdiction in
the North and William’s minister of Justice, “Den prins in den plaats van den
Keizer stellen” (putting the Prince in the Emperor’s place).7 William’s monarchy
was ‘tempered’ by a Constitution, but was in no way a representative regime.8
The discussion on power sharing in foreign affairs necessitates a synthesis of two
strands in legal history. On the one hand, constitutional history. On the other, the
history of international law. The main difference in narrative between these two
angles lies precisely in the modern nature of restoration constitutions. Whereas the
acquis of the French Revolutions seems evident in the domestic sphere, this is not
the case for international relations. Looked at as a system of horizontal interaction
between sovereign entities, international law did not undergo a fundamental
transformation at the Congress of Vienna. The French Convention tried to subvert
the principle of non-intervention between sovereign states, by calling for the lib-
eration of populations all over Europe.9 The Congress of Vienna had the exact
opposite intention: the restoration of the Droit public de l’Europe.10 Legitimate
dynasties could return where they had been chased. Constitutional arrangements
were an affair of every state distinctly. Intervention was approved in the following
meetings of the Great Powers (Aachen, Verona, Laibach), when the repression of
liberal revolts was on the agenda. Movements in Spain, Italy or Germany were
forcefully struck down. The Fundamental Act of the German Confederation even
forbade constitutional provisions undermining the monarch’s right to rule.
4Van Sas and Te Velde (1998).
5Witte (2016a).
6Reproach by Van Hogendorp to Van Maanen, Koch (2013, 241); Thorbecke judged that the
French period had been of greater importance to the Dutch state than anything achieved after 1813
or before 1848, Worst (1992).
7Van Hogendorp, Geheime Aanteekeningen, quoted by Colenbrander (1908), I, xliii. This can be
explained by a ‘lack of schooling in public law’ in the Northern delegation. See further in this
chapter on the seemingly ill-thought through design of the constitution to William I’s benefit.
Bornewasser (1983b, 228).
8Bornewasser (1983b, 233); See further De Haan et al. (2013).
9Steiger (2015, 170), Bélissa (1998).
10Gentz (1806).
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Starting from this opposition, one would expect the provisions of the 1815 con-
stitution to allot a greater competence to the national representation, to the detriment
of the monarch. Conversely, it would not come across as illogical for Old Régime
doctrine and case law to consecrate the King’s exclusive right to govern international
relations. In the following paragraphs, I will first sketch the general characteristics of
the 1815 constitution (2) and its international context (3), before turning to the right to
conclude treaties and to declare war, as seen from the angle of the law of nations (4).
In domestic opposition to Dutch centralizing ideas, the figure of the conservative
catholic publicist Jan Jozef Raepsaet should attract our attention (5). Finally, I will
briefly consider the differences with the situation post 1831 (conclusion).
2 The Dutch-Belgian Constitution of 1815
The adoption of the 1814 Constitution in the North guided institutional develop-
ments. Whereas the North had known a decentralized, almost confederal system
under the Dutch Republic (1585–1795), the Batavian Revolt of 1795 had turned
this upside-down, by installing a centralized regime.11 This type of administration
was alien to the constitutional traditions of the South, which relied on privileges and
freedoms, regularly invoked against the monarch. The opponents to Joseph II
(1741–1790) and the French Revolution clung to a system of a ‘liberté sage et bien
ordonnée’, not to ‘ces droits pompeux et extravagans de l’homme, que les Français
ont proclamés que pour les fouler aux pieds’.12 Yet, in the eyes of 19th century
liberals, such as the legal scholar Thorbecke (1798–1872), the constitution of 1814
was nothing more than ‘a Napoleonic regulated state with a constitutional
façade’.13 A radical change had thus taken place.
Themerger of North and South was legitimized with historical arguments. Yet, the
divergent options taken at crucial instances of the early modern and revolutionary
periods turned this into a hybrid and ill-conceived memorial reconstruction. The
constitution maintained the precedence among provinces adopted under Emperor
Charles V (1506–1555), referred to the Southern tradition of inaugurations, mirroring
a tradition of contractual monarchy, but chose a radically different path in its essential
provisions. The emphasis on provincial autonomy in the preamble, as if a return to the
situation of 1572 would have been possible, was only symbolical.14 In reality, central
administrative supervision put these authorities, erstwhile the most powerful in both
North and South, under tutelage (art. 155). Gijsbert Karel Van Hogendorp (1762–
1834), who had invited William to return to the North in 1813,15 would soon see his
invented tradition evaporate. VanMaanen’s centralized bureaucracy would take over.
11Van Sas (2005).
12Colenbrander (1908, I, XXXIX).
13Bornewasser (1983a, 208).
14Bornewasser (1983a, 216), Judo and Van de Perre (2016).
15Bornewasser (1983a, 213).
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The text adopted in July 1815 by the Joint Constitutional Committee was
considerably longer (234 articles against 146 in the 1814 Constitution16), but did
not differ on fundamental points. A specific prescription for the monarch’s sub-
mission to the national representation was lacking.17 Legislative powers were
jointly exercised by the monarch and the Estates-General (Art. 105), representing
the nation as in the French 1791 constitution (Art. 77). Yet, the repartition between
the executive (where the King acted alone) and legislative branches had been left to
constitutional practice. A few situations were directly attributed to the
Estates-General, but they constituted exceptions.18 Conformable to e.g. the
‘Monarchical principle’ enshrined in Art. 57 of the Vienna Final Act on the German
Confederation,19 the King had the residuary competence to act in all cases not
explicitly attributed to the legislature.20
This created a besluitenregering (government by decree), one of the main causes
of the Belgian insurrection of 1830.21 A supplementary lacuna was William’s right
to deliver dispensations with regards to legislative acts, after consulting the highest
court of the realm, the Hoge Raad. This was conceived as an exceptional clause, for
cases where the delegates of the Estates would not be able to meet in time. Even
more, due to William’s conflictenbesluiten (‘conflict of attribrution’-decrees),
issued in 1822, the King excluded judicial review of administrative acts, claiming
the competence for himself, as head of government. Provincial Governors had the
duty to intervene in court cases where the judge threatened to scrutinize adminis-
trative acts, and order for the case to be conferred to the King.22 Regarding the
relationship of the executive branch to the Estates-General, ministerial responsi-
bility was not a case of the national representation, but the King’s affair. Prevention
of abuse relied on the personal discretion of the monarch, and on nothing more.23
The Constitution of 1815 was rejected by the assembled ‘notable’ figures in the






21Gilissen (1979a, 404), note 1 cites 1710 royal and 1075 ministerial decrees published in the
official journal Pasinomie, against 381 laws voted by the Estates-General. See also Koch (2015).
22William took this decision against the majority of his Council of State, which he clearly saw as
an Ancien Régime-council a latere principis, wherein the (qualitatively) sanior pars could ulti-
mately prevail over a quantitative majority, Bornewasser (1983b, 242). Governors were agents of
William’s central administration, and counterbalanced the provincial estates. This system had been
explicitly excluded by the Constitutional Committee in 1815. See Alen (1984, 692).
23Alen (1984, 666).
24Since a national representation had been lacking, an assembly of 1604 ‘notable’ figures, rep-
resenting grosso modo 0.02% of the population, had been composed on the advice of Van der
Capellen, William I’s governor-general Bornewasser (1983b, 232). Raepsaet derided this assem-
bly’s composition: ‘on y voyait accolés à quelque peu de personnes comme il faut, des noms
inconnus dans l’arrondissement, des petits commis de bureau, des gens qui ne possédaient pas un
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more favourable result for the monarch (934 pro, 796 contra25). William declared
the constitution adopted on 24 August 1815. Yet, the Southern ecclesiastical
authorities as well as the nobility rejected the constitutional system.26 The recog-
nition of freedom of conscience (Art. 190), in the line of Joseph II’s reforms, or the
insufficient checks on monarchical power, in a Montesquieuan sense, went against
their interests. Most of the Belgian provinces had rejected the document, save for
the districts of Hasselt, Leuven, Liège, Verviers, Luxemburg, Neufchâteau and
Diekirch.27 Louis Hymans (1829–1884), liberal member of parliament talked of the
Belgian people being abducted by the Great Powers, and delivered to the greedy
Dutch sovereign as a ‘troupeau de moutons’.28
The joint Constitutional Committee, which had met in The Hague in Spring
1815, consisted of a haphazard and divided Southern delegation and a more robust
Northern bloc. Cornelis Van Maanen (minister of Justice), Frederik Roëll (future
minister of the Interior, 1767–1835), Cornelis Theodorus Elout (1767–1841, future
minister of Finance) and Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp defended the outcome of
the 1814 constitution. Among the Belgian delegation, the more conservative
members François-Théodore de Thiennes (future president of William I’s First
Chamber, 1745–1822) and Raepsaet offered opposition, but were not able to prevail
on issues of paramount importance. Raepsaet even left the Committee’s sessions on
19 June 1815, eleven days before the end of negotiations.29
The final version (13 July 1815) saw the creation of a First Chamber within the
Estates-General, wherein the King could appoint forty to sixty members over 40 for
life, on the basis of their merit, birth or fortune (Art. 8030). This chamber, nicknamed
‘la ménagerie du roi’,31 only had the competence to approve or to reject texts
coming out of the Second Chamber. This chamber of 110 deputies was elected
pouce de terre, des personnes mal notées, des juges, des administrateurs destitués du temps des
Français pour corruption et concussion, etc.’ Raepsaet (1838, 186).
25Colenbrander (1908, II, 615–617).
26Letter by Bishop de Broglie of Ghent to the clergy of his diocese, Raepsaet (1838, 358).
William I added 281 abstentionists to the 527 votes in favour of the constitution, as well as 126
votes motivated on religious grounds. William I motivated this by pointing to the second of the
1814 eight articles, installing an equal treatment between the different religions in his Kingdom,
Gilissen (1979, 402), Bornewasser (1983b, 232).
27In Ypres and Antwerp, not a single vote was cast in favour of the Constitution. In Turnhout and
Namur, only one. The assemblies in Mons and Brussels rejected the text with a slight margin.
Ghent, Courtrai or Tournai overwhelmingly turned it down. Etienne De Gerlache (1785–1871), a
catholic nobleman, was a member of the Estates-General’s Second Chamber (1824–1830). He
presided over the commission in charge of the draft of the 1831 Belgian Constitution, was elected
in the House of Representatives (1831–1832) and ended his career as president of the Belgian
Court of Cassation (until 1867). His words are, of course, to be interpreted through the lens of
Belgian 19th century patriotism. See De Gerlache (1842, I, 310).
28Hymans (1869).
29Meyer to Raepsaet, The Hague, 30 June 1815, Raepsaet (1838, 322–323).
30Stevens (2016).
31Romein (1961, III, 65).
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indirectly by the provincial estates. Although the South was demographically pre-
dominant, seats were evenly split between North and South.32 The provincial estates
were divided in electoral colleges for nobility, cities, and the countryside. Provincial
borders, as established first by the Treaty of Münster in 1648 (which separated parts
of Flanders and Brabant) and consequently by the French annexation of 1795 (which
partitioned the province of Flanders) were not altered, mainly as a consequence of
the re-opening of the Scheldt. The Estates-General and government would become
alternating between Brussels, the traditional administrative high point of the
Habsburgs, and The Hague, ancient capital of the county of Holland.
3 International Context
Prenez la nouvelle Constitution de Hollande, huit articles de Londres et vingt-quatre
personnes dont bien six ont de la conscience et de l’instruction. Mettez tout cela ensemble
hermétiquement fermé à La Haye; secouez bien à plusieurs reprises, observant de choisir
un tems bien chaud et surtout bien orageux. Laissez fermenter pendant environ deux mois
et vous retrouverez les huit articles de Londres, la nouvelle Constitution de Hollande et les
24 personnes, le tout un peu froissé. Et la liqueur est faite, il faut la boire.33
The constitution’s preamble affirmed that William’s sovereignty over the Low
Countries was a purely domestic affair. The peace treaties that ‘pacified Europe’,
negotiated in Vienna while the Committee was meeting in The Hague, were of a
purely declaratory nature. Yet, the specific development of events from 1813 to
1815 cannot be understood without a clearer view of European diplomacy. When
William of Orange proclaimed himself sovereign in the Belgian provinces
(1 August 1814), the monarch pointed to the ‘magnanimity of Europe’s sovereigns’
and the political system they had projected to design as the main cause of the
extension of his own power.34 Even if the creation of the United Kingdom may
appear novel, it was a logical consequence of several earlier designs to employ the
Southern Netherlands as a stabilizer of international relations.
From the separation of the Netherlands on (1568–1648), the Southern Netherlands
had become a military contact zone between France, the Dutch Republic and the
German space. Ruled at a distance from Madrid, their physical defense had become
near-impossible and too expensive. Subsequent plans of partition between France and
the Dutch, between Britain and the Dutch, or the creation of an “independent canton
republic” did not materialize. Yet, from 1698 on, the Dutch obtained the right to
occupy several fortresses. The 1715 Barrier Treaty made their presence a precondi-
tion to the transfer of sovereignty to Emperor Charles VI of Habsburg.
32Bornewasser (1983b, 232). The 1814 constitution counted 55 seats for the Northern provinces of
Guelders, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Frise, Overrijssel, Groningen, (North-)Brabant and Drenthe.
The 1815 constitution added the same number for the more populous Belgian provinces, counting
3.25 million inhabitants against just two in the North, Romein (1961, III, 65).
33Anonymous pamphlet against the union of North and South, 1815. Anon (1815) Pourquoi faut-il
une nouvelle constitution? (Royal Library, Prints, II 86.908 A 1/5).
34Raepsaet (1838, 348–349).
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William of Orange’s sovereignty as prince was recognized for the North in 1813.
An ‘extension’ was part of a deal between Britain and the Dutch. Britain was the
active promotor of William’s ascent to the first rank of European monarchs.
William needed compensation in two regards. First, as dispossessed German ruler.
This legitimized his sovereignty over Luxemburg, which had traditionally been part
of the Southern Netherlands, as Grand-Duke. In this quality, William counted as a
member of the German Confederation.35 Second, as head of state of Holland, which
lost the Cape colony to Britain during the Napoleonic Wars.36 By extending
William’s sovereignty to the Meuse, Britain would interpose a neutral buffer
between France and the spectacularly aggrandized Kingdom of Prussia.37 The Eight
Articles of London, adopted in June 1814 in a diplomatic conference with Britain,
Prussia, Russia and Austria, imposed a “perfect amalgam” for the union of North
and South, imposing the necessary amendments to the 1814 constitution.38 This
would prove to be rather illusory. William could not pursue his state-building
adventure without this international support. Whereas his own father had been
chased in 1787 and only restored with Prussian help, William of Orange obtained
more ‘with a single penstroke, than the big sword of his ancestors William the
Silent, Maurice or Frederick Henry had ever done’.39 Consequently, the con-
struction, establishment and first years of the United Kingdom were also those of a
‘special relationship’ of tutelage under British aegis.40 Dutch affirmations of the
contrary—the Dutch people had spontaneously invited William to return-
emphasized this fragility.41
4 The Right to Declare War (Art. 57-58)
The 1815 constitution has drawn attention from scholars for its domestic implica-
tions. The creation of a First Chamber, the role of Provinces or the recognition of
many freedoms and liberties allow for a continuity or a more genealogical approach
with regards to present-day positive law. Yet, one of the most essential attributions
of sovereignty remains outside the perimeter of discussions: the right to wage war
and conclude treaties. William’s sovereignty could only be full in the arena of
European sovereigns when the constitution defined the extent to which the monarch
could represent the state externally.
35Van Sas (1981, 283).
36Van Sas (1981, X, 280).
37Prussia equally obtained the right to occupy the fortress of Luxemburg. Although William was
its ruler, the Grand-Duchy served as a common buffer against France, Bornewasser (1983b, 225).
38And thus not its replacement by an entirely new text, Raepsaet (1838, 128). For a published
version of the text, see Ibid., VI, 253–256.
39De Gerlache (1842, I, XV).
40Van Sas (1985).
41Van Sas (1981, 285).
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Within the range of possibilities, from full royal control to full parliamentary
participation, the 1815 constitution stands out as a more authoritarian restoration
constitution. The preamble already indicated that the Committee had not thought it
wise to limit William’s foreign competence, in view of the monarch’s personal
wisdom and good conduct in foreign affairs. As such, this reasoning, in continuity
with the 1814 Northern constitution, fails to incorporate the possibility of a less
capable successor. This is even more surprising in view of the traditional distrust
against the monarch in the Low Countries. Philip II of Spain was chased in the
North, Joseph II was declared destitute in the South.
Art. 57 (Art. 37 of the 1814 constitution) delegated the right to declare war or
make peace to the King. Only the information considered appropriate for the security
of the Kingdom could be communicated to the Estates-General. Art. 58 (Art. 38 of
the 1814 constitution) conferred the right to conclude and ratify all alliances and
treaties onto the King. The Estates-General had a right to be informed, but nothing
more. The only exception, added in 1815, constituted in the cession of territory in
peacetime, which required the approbation of the nation’s representatives. In war-
time, decisions could be so urgent, that the monarch could not be hindered.
Raepsaet argued that this was contrary to the most distinguished authors of the law
nations. Yet, WillemQueijsen (member of the Council of State, 1754–1817) opposed
that the royal decision to separate a part of his territory from the rest, could not
become subject of political games within the national representation. If the
Estates-General could be in a position as to prevent the King from concluding a treaty,
and oblige him to continue a fight against his own wishes, Queijsen added, he would
not be the Head of Government any more, and be deprived of his royal dignity.42 Van
Hogendorp nuanced this position. William I would not be completely unrestrained in
his foreign policy actions. War was the most costly of all state activities. Precisely the
budget had been listed as one of the rare specific competences of the national rep-
resentation. Extraordinary expenditures such as war did not fall within the decennial
vote of the ordinary budget.43 Moreover, tying foreign policy to parliamentary
consent would have gone further than the British system. TheKing’s negotiations and
treaties fell under the Crown Privilege, as Van Hogendorp thought. David Armitage’s
analysis of parliamentary debates after the United States of America’s Declaration of
Independence seems to provide support for this thesis. The names of Pufendorf and
Vattel were depicted as ‘lubrications and fancies of foreign writers’.44
From an external point of view, the right to wage war had been subject to
theological bellum justum-theories up to the middle of the 17th century. The
auctoritas or authority to wage war was confined to the supreme heads of the
Christian world, in an attempt to rein in aggression. Yet, the confessional frag-
mentation of Europe multiplied the number of sovereign actors. Early modern law
of nations-theory constructed a new set of norms, consisting essentially of a digest
42Queijsen, meeting of 12 May 1815, Van Maanen (1887, 40).
43Bornewasser (1983b, 230), Van Sas (1981, 289).
44Armitage (2012, 135–153).
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of state practice. They did not automatically derive from theological concepts. The
age of 19th century “positivism”, as it is often described45 or criticized by
present-day legal theorists46 was in the first place a product of continuity with 17th
and 18th century categories. Both naturalist and realist authors were common, from
Zouche and Rachel to Wolff and Pufendorf, or from Vitoria and Suárez to Moser
and Martens.47 The dichotomy between authors according priority to state practice
or to the world of ideas is eternal. The Vienna Congress is attributed a milestone role in
the history of international law for the installation of a collective security-system. Yet,
this position is subject to criticism. The institutional innovations of 1815 were scarce.48
The system ultimately collapsed due to the incessant waves of internal challenges, or
what contemporaries called the resurgence of the French Revolutionary heritage as the
‘nationality principle’. Doctrinal evolutions from Klüber (1762–1837) to Bluntschli
(1808–1881) should be seen as a continuum, with the latter starting point still entrenched
in Old Regime reasoning and exempla.
Whereas the 1815 constitution gives a blanco mandate to the King, most Old
Regime theorists had pleaded for bottom-up limitations on royal power, through
national representation. Grotius,49 Pufendorf and Vattel50 closely associated the
social corpus with important external decisions. Cutting off part of the population
from the others, with whom they had been associated in the same society, would be
impossible for Pufendorf.51 A moral corpus, such as a state, was only the result of
its members’ consent. Only their intention could guide the judgement of external
actions. Who could argue that the founders of any society between men would have
committed the folly to attribute the competence to alienate ad libitum? In case of
occupation by a third power, the population could exercise its natural right to revolt.
Vattel offered a complementary angle. Conformably to the French theory of
limits on monarchical power through the lois fondamentales, no ‘Prince or sover-
eign can naturally been called the owner of his State. He is only its caretaker. The
dignity of head of state does not confer the right to alienate’.52 Vattel’s affirmation
of the ruler’s competence as the beneficiary of a usufruct was in line with French
domestic constitutional tradition in the Old Regime.53 In 1713, the Parliament of
Paris used this principle to oppose Louis XIV’s wish to have his grandson abdicate






50Jouannet (1998), Chetail and Haggenmacher (2011).
51Pufendorf (1735).
52Vattel (1758, I, 226–227).
53See also Raepsaet’s use of Grotius, De iure belli ac Pacis, III, XX, nr.5 as introduction to the
‘Observations d’un Belge sur le sort éventuel des Pays-Bas Autrichiens’ Raepsaet (1838, 220):
The monarch does not hold his authority from a right of full property, but only in usufruct.
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this, as the people-roi was now governing itself. Louis XVIII, who succeeded his
brother Louis XVI in 1814, was able to lift this old theoretical limit on monarchical
power. In spite of the allegation of the perpetuity of the Bourbon dynasty across
political regimes, Louis XVIII was freer than his predecessors had been.54
Specific cases in European diplomatic history corroborated these ideas. In June
1720, George I of Britain promised the cession of Gibraltar to Philip V of Spain.
The British monarch communicated a letter through his secretary of state James
Stanhope. The cession would take place du consentement de mon parlement. In the
eyes of Philip V, this constituted an enforcable international promise. Yet, George I
retrenched behind the impossibility to act without the consent of Parliament,
arguing that territorial cessions required the application of the “King in
Parliament”-principle.55 Likewise, after Charles XII’s destructive defeat in the
Great Northern War, the Swedish Riksdag modified the constitution in such a way
as to impose the participation of the Estates in peacemaking.56
5 Leave Us as We Are: Jan-Jozef Raepsaet
the Constitution as a Pactum
C’est une maxime de sagesse et de prudence dans un Législateur, que celle qui porte:
Laissez-nous tels que nous sommes.57
Raepsaet, the Constitution’s main conservative critic, was trained in utriusque
juris at the University of Louvain, where he obtained prizes for rhetorical excel-
lence. It is no surprise that he considered history and literature as essential hand-
maidens for the exercise of the legal profession. He claimed that Flemish customs
of public law went back to the seventh century.58 His career as revolutionary and
icon of protest turned around completely. He became a member, and even president
of the Conseil Général in the Department of the Scheldt. Later on, he was even
called up as a member of the Corps Législatif in Paris.59 Although Raepsaet seemed
to have spent his time mainly on studying in the various libraries of the capital, his
enrolment in the Napoleonic system is not without significance. Pledging allegiance
to the parvenu-Emperor of France, or being present at his self-coronation in the
Notre Dame, where the pope was humiliated, did constitute a rupture with the Old
Régime-traditions Raepsaet advocated throughout his Austrian period.
Raepsaet was a specialist of feudal law. An elaborate essay on inaugurations in
the Southern Netherlands ranks among his main publications. This text was written
on purpose, in order to tie William I to the Old Regime idea of contractual
54Mansel (2004, 210–211), Evans (2016, 30).
55Dhondt (2015, 238).
56Vattel (1758, II, 256), Mattéi (2006, 152).
57Raepsaet (1838, 227).
58Dhondt (2001, III, 21).
59As one of the 26 Belgian members. Devleeshouwer (1983, 200).
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monarchy.60 Raepsaet personally met William I in September 1814. During six
quarters of an hour, Raepsaet recalled popular dissatisfaction, the virtues of the old
constitution and government and the ideal new system.61 A meeting between these
two figures was logical. During the Revolt against Joseph II, Raepsaet had been
advocating that the constitutions of the County of Flanders, a disparate hodgepodge
of incidental documents and declarations, held the same rank as that of the Duchy
of Brabant. Under the Austrian restoration (1790–1792), Raepsaet was charged
with the draft of a new constitution for Flanders.
In Raepsaet’s mind, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was of a double
nature. On the one hand, the creation of a new state corresponded to the necessity of
a titre légal in the Public Law of Europe. The diplomatic creation of the Kingdom
can thus never be seen in a solely domestic perspective. International circumstances
are co-creators and are never of a purely declaratory nature. Foremost in the case of
the ‘théâtre naturel des guerres du continent’.62 If the Great Powers had consented
in the transfer of the Southern Netherlands from Spain to Austria in 1713–1715, the
same ought to apply a century later.63 Loyalty did not reside in his faith in the
House of Habsburg, but in his loyalty towards institutions. Raepsaet’s incidental
laments on the Vienna Congress, where ‘on se serait permis de traiter de nous et
sans nous, par un simple article […] sur des bases convenues avec le prince
d’Orange, avant qu’il ne fut notre souverain’ should thus not be overstressed.64
On the other hand, Raepsaet argued that a change in international circumstances
could not invalidate internal traditions. The old constitutions of the Southern
Netherlands were the compass of political action.65 They had been reaffirmed time
and time again, in 1715 as well as in 1790.66 Louis XIV had even conserved them
when he conquered parts of French-speaking Flanders.67 Raepsaet even went so far
as to deny any unification intention to the Spanish and Austrian rulers of the
Southern Netherlands.68 The Code Civil of Napoleon had only been a vain attempt
to abolish the formal authority of Roman law, ordinances and customs. Their spirit
60Cornelissen (1841, XXII).
61A proposal to sit on the monarch’s Council of State was declined. After his Napoleonic
responsibilities, Raepsaet preferred the calm of his local Oudenaarde.
62Raepsaet (1838, 127, 205).
63Raepsaet (1838, 225).
64Raepsaet (1838, 177). See as well his accusations of corruption against the British ambassador
Clancarty, who would have obtained the marquisat of Heusden (near Ghent) in exchange for an
unequal burden-sharing between North and South. See, on this topic: Judo (2007).
65See also Anon (1814).
66Convention relative to the Affairs of the Austrian Netherlands between Austria and Great Britain,





had been explicitly acknowledged by the Code’s authors as the true inspiration.69
Uniformisation of regions as different as Frise, Hainault or Flanders would be
doomed beforehand. A commercial code, for instance, had never been necessary in
the heyday of Bruges, Ghent or Antwerp. Even more, the customs of the stock
exchange had travelled to Amsterdam!70
Raepsaet’s plea for upholding the spirit of Old Regime diversity was perfectly
congruent with the conservative perspective of the legitimacy-principle of the
Vienna Congress. Customs and traditions provided internal stability, whereas
treaties consecrated the external aspect of sovereignty, starting with state recogni-
tion. William’s use of an assembly of appointed “notables” to endorse the consti-
tution, seemed outright absurd. The Belgian nation had no other representatives but
the three orders of the traditional estates in every province.71 Happiness and opu-
lence were the logical consequences of the good government of ancient constitu-
tions.72 Certainly in contrast with the chaotic succession of constitutions in France.
Even more, its countryside nobility had always been perceived by the population as
protectors, benefactors and “fathers” of the villages under their jurisdiction.73
Raepsaet was not a mere advocate of a return to the Old Regime. He did
integrate the necessity of a new state. There was an explicit need for a ‘centre de
circonvallation’ to the North of France.74 Even more, if a change in statehood
would turn out to be beneficiary to the Southern Netherlands, the constitution could
and ought to be modified. William’s attempt to regenerate the XVII provinces was,
after all, an adaptation of Charles V’s Pragmatic Sanction (1549), which considered
the Low Countries as a single inheritance. Yet, within this new framework,
Raepsaet pleaded for a return of the societal forces that had been present since the
Middle Ages. Or, in more fashionable 18th century terms, for a cooperation of elites
as defended by Montesquieu.75 The estates’ cooperation in legislative power, or the
administration of the treasury was as self-evident as that to wage war or conclude
peace. In modern terms, we could call him an advocate of subsidiarity and
multi-level governance within the composite United Kingdom of the Netherlands.
A common constitution was necessary, but integration did not need to go beyond
69‘Suivant cet avis, le code n’est qu’une analyse de la loi romaine; l’on accorde force de loi à
l’analyse de la loi, mais on refuse force de loi à la loi même; et tandis qu’on accorde force de loi à
l’analyse, on reconnaît qu’elle est insuffisante sans le concours de la loi qu’on a abolie.´ The code
would furthermore generate nothing but disorders: ‘ces codes, qui ne laissent guère que droit
romain ou la force de la raison écrite, autorisent un juge à trouver sa raison meilleure que celle de
Papinien.’ Raepsaet (1838, 243).
70Raepsaet (1838, 250), De ruysscher (2009).
71Raepsaet (1838, 121).
72Raepsaet (1838, 227).
73Point made by de Thiennes and de Mérode. Raepsaet (1838, 151).
74Raepsaet (1838, 221).
75Dhondt (2001, VI, 201).
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what was required to maintain ‘la considération et l’influence dans la Balance de
l’Europe […] nécessaires pour nos intérêts commerciaux et politiques’.76
Raepsaet saw the new Constitution as a Pactum between the monarch and the
representative forces in society. Consent was explicit in the inauguration ceremony.
The monarch should be recalled regularly of the theoretical foundations of his
powers. He relied explicitly on Grotius and Vattel to sustain this point.77
In sum, William’s sovereignty relied on two elements: ‘titre légal’ (interna-
tionally conferred) and ‘anciennes lois et coutumes.’78 Unfortunately for him, the
advantages of French-style centralized administration had conquered the minds of
his interlocutors, passive Belgians and vigorous Dutchmen alike.79 This was per-
ceivable to the ultimate degree: the award of a near-unlimited competence in for-
eign affairs, designed to fit one single man, irrespective of his successors.80
6 Epilogue: The Eclipse of the Monarchical Principle
The Belgian Constitution of 1831 broke with the specific deficiencies of William I’s
constitution. The revolt of local elites and young graduates was a consequence of
the unequal distribution of favours and positions within the army and administra-
tion.81 The document approved in February 1831 by an elected National Congress
explicitly turned the order of priorities upside down. William’s sovereignty had
preceded the constitutions of 1814 and 1815. The Belgian people, represented in
Congress, established the nation’s sovereignty before any ruler could personify or
represent the state. Establishing this sovereignty, however, in view of the Southern
Netherlands’ delicate position on the European chessboard, was an external as well
as an internal affair. France applauded the reduction of the buffer state designed
against it in 1814–1815. Britain could support the liberal principles behind the
insurrection, as far as Belgium would observe a strict neutrality.
76Raepsaet (1838, 222).
77This is no surprise. Vattel’s popularity in 19th century thought is a corollary of the political
structure of the Republic of Neuchâtel. Vattel’s home state was ruled at a distance from 1707 on.
Consequently, Vattel advocated local sovereignty throughout his work, Dhondt (2015b). See also
the use of Bynkershoek by Raepsaet on the question of wartime indemnities for the civilian
population, Raepsaet (1838, 126, 222–224).
78Raepsaet (1838, 222), adding Montesquieu’s conservative appreciation of custom as the source
of a nation’s felicity, and Grotius’ similar point of view, confirmed by the ‘authority’ of Cicero.
79Olcina (2010, 36).
80Raepsaet (1838, 163): ‘que le roi, par diverses considérations, et surtout dans la situation
actuelle du royaume, pourrait se trouver personnellement trop faible pour résister aux instances
pressantes de puissances voisines.’
81This ran against article 11’s promise of equal treatment between the King’s subjects for
appointments in public service, Witte (2016b).
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The ill-reflected general delegation of powers to the monarch uncoupled the
administrative Napoleonic tradition from the popular legitimacy made necessary by
the French Revolution. As the constitution’s preamble stated, the ‘person of the
monarch’, had been the object and purpose of negotiations. This is striking, com-
pared with the criticism addressed to Joseph II. We shall only quote erstwhile
insurrection leader Hendrik Van der Noot (1731–1827)’s ‘Si nous avons un prince
c’est afin qu’il nous préserve d’avoir un maître.’82 The nation was not consulted in
the South. Individual freedoms and liberties were numerous, but the urge to ensure
‘the freedom of persons, the security of property, and all civil privileges’, was not
very different from the recipe used by Napoleon to urge figures as Raepsaet to
participate in the French regime.
Although little discussed during the National Congress session, Art. 67 of the
1831 Belgian Constitution put brakes on monarchical power in foreign affairs. This
was a consequence of the now generalized primacy of the legislative branch. Art.
67 should be seen in the context of judicial review by courts and tribunals of acts of
the executive branch, or the introduction of ministerial responsibility.
This general liberal tendency can be found in Thorbecke’s commentary on the
1815 constitution, which appeared in 1839. The distinction between wartime and
peacetime territorial cessions was absurd and without meaning, according to the
Dutch constitutionalist, who had taught in Ghent, as well as in Leiden.83 The
overarching structure of the constitution commanded to treat any alteration of
territory as an outright modification of the document itself. Practically speaking, the
monarch’s hands would equally be tied in wartime, since the national representation
had the—theoretical—possibility to oppose a modification of the constitution.
Diplomatic practice attributed a larger role to Belgium’s new King, Leopold of
Saxe-Cobourg. Thanks to his political and military experience, as well as his ties to
both ruling houses in London and Paris, the monarch’s negotiating position was
without comparison to that of civil ministers or diplomats. Parliamentary control of
the settlement of the nation’s borders was a fiction. In his commentary on the
Belgian constitution, Thonissen stated that most diplomatic information was
generically unsuitable for divulgation in the public arena.84 Jean Stengers equaled
Leopold I’s mental conception of foreign policy to that of an Old Regime prince.85
Yet, the domestic legal architecture behind the exercise of his competences differed
substantially from that of “monocrat” William I.86
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Abstract The Norwegian 1814 constitution became in the middle of the nineteenth
century an intellectual battleground between the constitutional ideals of the French
revolution on the one hand, and the constitutional ideals of the restoration era on the
other hand. According to the former understanding, the constitution was meant as
an instrument of delegation from the sovereign people as pouvoir constituant to the
state institutions as pouvoirs constituées. According to the latter understanding, the
constitution was a contract for sharing sovereignty between the king and the people.
Being an act of rebellion against the Treaty of Kiel, which stipulated that Norway
would enter into a personal union with Sweden, the constitution-making process
was consistently legitimized with the sovereignty of the people. The Norwegian
framers’ understanding of constitution was entirely conventional in American and
European revolutionary constitutionalism. The constitution was considered by the
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framers as an instrument of delegation from the people to the state institutions.
There was no trace of contract theory in neither the 1814 constitution’s text nor the
discussions at the constitutional assembly. The Norwegian 1814 constitution did
not follow the path European constitutionalism was heading at the time. The post
1814 European constitutions followed the so-called monarchical principle, which
rejected the sovereignty of the people and were legitimized by monarchical
sovereignty and contract theory. In the early 1820s, the monarchical principle
entered the Norwegian constitutional discourse with the question about a kings’
absolute veto on laws and constitutional amendments. King Carl Johan attempted to
reshape the constitution’s system of separation of powers in accordance with the
monarchical principle by a series of amendment proposals in 1821 to curb the
parliament’s power. These spurred an intense public debate in journals and pam-
phlets and were firmly rejected by the parliament in 1824. After the debates on
constitutional reform in the 1820s a contractual interpretation of the constitution
emerged. For the next 60 years, two contradictory interpretations of the 1814
constitution’s character existed side-by-side: One based on the sovereignty of the
people, the other based on contract theory and the monarchical principle. In the
1860s, the debate on the constitution’s character spilled over into a related issue,
namely the uniquely early Norwegian development of judicial review on the con-
stitutionality of laws and administrative acts. Norway was the first country in
Europe to develop a consistent and lasting system of judicial review. The Supreme
Court’s enforcement of the constitution as higher law was grounded in the notion of
the constitution being an act of the sovereign people as pouvoir constituant with
precedence over laws and administrative acts, being only decisions of delegated
authority by pouvoirs constituées. In the 1870s the long debated issue of the royal
veto was be put to the test and triggered a political crisis. The king claimed an
absolute veto on constitutional amendments, after the parliament adopted an
amendment allowing government ministers to attend debates in the parliament. The
liberal majority in the parliament rejected the royal veto with reference to the
sovereignty of the people. In 1883 the crisis reached its climax as impeachment
proceedings were instituted against the government for violating the constitution. In
1884 the Court of Impeachment finally pronounced that the constitution did not
allow the king to veto constitutional amendments, and that the exercise of such a
veto violated the constitution. The Court’s decision also settled the debate on the
constitution’s character as it firmly rejected the contractual interpretation and
instead entrenched the 1814 constitution in the constitutional ideals of the French
revolution.
1 What Is a Constitution? Delegation, Octroi or Contract?
What kind of legal instrument is a constitution? In the nineteenth century, the
answer to this basic ontological question would produce conflicting replies
depending on where, when and who you asked. Particularly so in Norway, where
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this question underpinned the constitutional debate for most of the century and
shaped Norwegian constitutionalism to be arguably the most progressive in con-
temporary Europe. The topic of this chapter is the competing views on the con-
stitution’s legal character in nineteenth century Norway.
In the first decade of the century, at the eve of the revolutionary era, constitutions
were, formally at least, considered acts of the sovereign people delegating public
authority to the various branches of government. This was, and indeed still is, a
defining feature of the modern written constitution following the American and
French revolutions in the late eighteenth century.1
The notion of the constitution as an instrument of delegation was most clearly
stated in the French 1791 constitution in Title 3 Art. 2 on the public powers:
«La Nation, de que seule émanent tous les Pouvoirs, ne peut les exercer que par
délégation.»
The nation was the sovereign, but could only exercise its sovereign authority
through delegation. The constitution then went on to delegate (“délégué”) the
legislative power to an elected and representative National Assembly, while the
executive power was delegated to the king through his ministers, and lastly,
the judicial power was delegated to judges elected by the people.2
We find the same notion of constitution in the American state constitutions of the
1770s and 1780s, though somewhat less clearly pronounced. The first modern
written constitution, the celebrated constitution of Virginia from 1776, states in
Section 2 of its influential Bill of Rights:
«That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates
are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them.»
Both documents refer to the fundamental distinction—famously coined for
posterity by the French abbé Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès in 1789—between the
people as pouvoir constituant and the branches of government as pouvoirs
constitués, deriving their authority from the former through an act of delegation and
set out in a written constitution.3
Constitutional development is however neither linear nor is it monolithic. On the
European continent the radical constitutional experiments of the 1790s were rather
short-lived due to Napoleon’s defeat in 1814 and the subsequent monarchical
restoration and numerous constitutions following the Congress of Vienna in 1814–
1815. From the second decade of the nineteenth century and for several decades to
follow, the answer to the question posed above would often be that a constitution is
an act of royal authority—an octroi in contemporary terminology. Other post-1814
constitutions could be and indeed were considered contracts between the monarch
1See Dippel (2005).
2See The French constitution of 1791 Titre 3 Art. 3-5.
3See the 1789 pamphlets Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État and Préliminaire de la Constitution in Sieyès
(1994[1789], 161 and 198–199).
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and the people or the estates for sharing sovereignty and distributing political rights
and obligations between them.
The question of the constitution’s legal-ontological character was effectively a
question of sovereignty and who possessed it:4 The people, the monarch, or both by
virtue of what Carl Schmitt has called a “Verfassungsvertrag”?5
What, if any, was the practical significance of these conflicting views on the
constitution’s legal-ontological character? An immediate consequence concerned
constitutional amendment. If the constitution was an instrument of delegation
enacted by the sovereign people, then only the people through a special procedure
involving the constituent power could amend the constitution and its terms of
delegation. Moreover, according to the distinction between the constituent power
and constituted powers, the people’s representatives in parliament could not amend
the constitution by an ordinary legislative act, since that was an act of a constituted
power by virtue of the authority granted by the constitution. The constitution thus
had precedence over legislative acts. If on the other hand the constitution was an act
of royal authority, then the monarch could amend or replace it as well. The monarch
would then serve in a dual capacity as both the constituent power and as the head of
the executive branch. Lastly, if the constitution was a contract between the monarch
and the people or the estates, then amendment to the contract would usually require
the assent of both parties to the contract. Here, the distinction between the con-
stituent and constituted powers would be blurred by the fact that both the monarch
and the parliament or the estates would also act in the capacity of constituted
powers.
2 The Case of Norway
Norway adopted its constitution on 17 May 1814, at a time when the source of
legitimacy of European constitutions was shifting from the sovereignty of the
people in the constitutions of the 1790s to the monarchical principle or contractual
foundations in the post-1814 constitutions. Stuck in an ideological limbo,
Norwegian lawyers debated for decades on the constitution’s legal-ontological
character and its relation to the post-1814 European constitutions. One issue was
more contested and sharpened the positions more than any other, namely consti-
tutional amendment. Specifically: Did constitutional amendments require the king’s
sanction to be valid? On this question, the constitution’s text was silent, causing
lawyers and politicians on both sides to resort to arguments of the constitution’s
character.
In the following we shall see how the debates on the royal veto on constitutional
amendment divided Norwegian lawyers and politicians between two fundamentally
4On the juridification of national sovereignty by means of constitutions, see Müssig (2016).
5Schmitt (1928, 63–64).
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different understandings of the 1814 constitution’s legal character (Sect. 5). This
division moreover unveiled an ideological divide between the Norwegian 1814
constitution and European constitutionalism following the Congress of Vienna.6
We shall also see how the Norwegian Supreme Court’s pioneering development of
judicial review of the constitutionality of laws, as the first court in Europe, was
framed in notion of the constitution as an instrument of delegation on behalf of the
sovereign people (Sect. 5.3). First however I will provide some context by
discussing the notion of constitutional amendment in the eyes of the Norwegian
1814 constitution’s framers (Sect. 3), and thereafter its post-1814 European con-
stitutional and political context (Sect. 4).
3 Background: The Constituent Power and the Norwegian
1814 Constitution
3.1 The 1814 Constitutional Assembly as the Embodiment
of the Constituent Power
How did the framers of the Norwegian 1814 constitution view its legal character,
and how did they understand constitutional amendment? This question may be
answered with relative certainty when we take into account the constitution’s
background, wording and context.
If we first consider the constitution’s background, we find the at the time familiar
pattern of an elected constitutional assembly deliberating on and adopting the
constitution. The Norwegian constitution-making process in 1814 was consistently
legitimised with reference to the sovereignty of the people and its prerogative of
adopting a constitution.
First of all, the constitution was an act of rebellion against the Treaty of Kiel,
concluded between the king of Denmark and Norway and the king of Sweden on 14
January 1814. Denmark and Norway had formed a union under one king since
1319. The Treaty of Kiel broke the union by stipulating that Norway was to be
transferred to the Swedish monarch. The Norwegians responded to the treaty by
declaring independence by way of adopting a constitution. The Swedish claims that
Norway’s independence and constitution violated the Kiel Treaty were rejected by
the Norwegians with reference to the sovereignty of the people and its right to
decide its own constitution.7 The same reasoning was applied when crown prince
Christian Frederik, acting as regent in Norway and now taking on the leadership in
the rebellion, intended to seize the Norwegian throne by right of inheritance. His
6On the distinctive character of Norwegian 19th century constitutionalism compared to Europe, see
Holmøyvik (2016a).
7See Mestad (2014).
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claims too were firmly rejected by leading Norwegian officials and academics with
the same reasoning as for the Swedish claims.
Secondly, the constitutional assembly was considered at the time as the
embodiment of the people’s constituent power. After his failed attempt to seize the
throne by virtue of inheritance, Christian Frederik issued a call for the election of a
constitutional assembly on 19 February 1814. In the call he stressed that that the
nation’s elected representatives should decide Norway’s form of government, and
crucially, that his anticipated accession to the Norwegian throne would depend on
the constitution eventually adopted.8 In other words, he as former heir to the
Norwegian throne and now leader of the provisional government would have no say
in the constitution’s adoption. That was the prerogative of the sovereign people
acting through the constitutional assembly.
Turning to the 1814 constitution itself, unlike many preceding European and
American constitutions, the Norwegian constitution does not contain lofty refer-
ences to the sovereignty of the people or other general principles. These principles
were of course well known by the framers, but the constitutional assembly delib-
erately left references to general principles out of the constitutional text.9 This leaves
us to search for the framers’ fundamental view on constitutional amendment in the
constitution’s operative provisions.
Art. 112 deals with constitutional amendment.10 The official 1814 translation
into English reads:
This Constitution, when sanctioned by the National Assembly [the constitutional assem-
bly], becomes the fundamental law of the Kingdom.
If experience should prove, that any part of it ought to be altered, a proposal concerning that
affair shall be made in an ordinary session of the National Assembly [the parliament] and be
published in print. But it is the business of the next National Assembly to decide, whether
the alteration proposed shall take place or not. Yet such an alteration must never be
inconsistent with the principles of this fundamentel [sic] law, but only concern modifica-
tions in particular cases, which do not alter the spirit of this Constitution, to which alteration
the consent of two thirds of the National Assembly is required.11
Keeping in mind the distinction between the constituent power and constituted
powers, the constitution’s amendment procedure is noteworthy in two respects.
Firstly, the constitution was adopted by an elected representative assembly with
the one task of writing and adopting the constitution. This fact is also stressed at the
end of the document, preceding the signatures of the 112 representatives at the
8See Holmøyvik (2012, 417).
9See Aall (1859, 409).
10Article 110 in the constitution adopted on May 17 1814, but renumbered to article 112 in the
revised constitution of November 4 1814. To avoid confusion, I refer to both as article 112.
11The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway. Jacob Lehmann: Christiania 1814. In the English
translation, the distinction between the constitutional assembly (“Rigsforsamlingen”) in the first
paragraph and the parliament (“Storthinget”) in the second paragraph has been lost in translation.
In the Norwegian language original, paragraphs one and two distinguish between the constitutional
assembly competent to adopt the constitution, and the procedure to amend it.
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constitutional assembly, where it was stated that the “Deputies of the Kingdom of
Norway, hereby declare this Constitution, sanctioned by the National Assembly, to
be the fundamental law of the Kingdom of Norway”.12
Secondly, future constitutional amendments were to be adopted by the parlia-
ment with a two thirds majority, but only after a general election. This mechanism
is significant in two respects: The intervening general election involves the
sovereign people directly in constitutional amendment. Moreover, the king is given
no role in constitutional amendment. The king’s absence is significant as consti-
tutional amendment then is left altogether to the people through the representatives
in parliament and, in theory, through the direct manifestation of the popular will in a
general election.
On the king’s role the constitutional amendment procedure differed from the
ordinary legislative procedure, where the constitution Art. 79 provided the king
with a suspensive veto modelled on the French 1791 constitution. For the framers in
1814, the enactment of constitutional law and ordinary laws were to fundamentally
different acts not to be confused.13 One was an act of the constituent power acting
as sovereign, the other the act of a constituted power. The distinction between the
two was fundamental and clear for everyone at the time. Two examples may
illustrate this conviction.
At one point during the deliberations of the constitutional assembly some rep-
resentatives wanted to extend the assembly’s deliberations to policy issues like
foreign affairs. To this suggestion one of the assembly’s leading members, Christian
Magnus Falsen, successfully reminded the assembly that it was not permitted to
exercise legislative or executive powers, since it operated on the specific authority
on the sovereign people to write and adopt a constitution.14
Another example is from the constitution’s revision on 4 November 1814 to
accommodate a personal union with Sweden. The Norwegian rebellion against the
Treaty of Kiel had failed, resulting in a short war with Sweden. The cease fire
agreement with the Swedish king, the Convention of Moss of 14 August, allowed
Norway to keep its with constitution with the necessary amendments to accom-
modate a personal union with Sweden. In the negotiations that ensued, the Swedes
argued that the new union king would have to consent to the revised constitution.
This was the contractual understanding of constitution. The Norwegian parliament
however, sitting in an extraordinary session for the purpose of revising the con-
stitution, made it plain that “the constitution, according to its nature, cannot be part
of those laws which require a royal sanction to become law”.15 For the framers,
12The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway. Jacob Lehmann: Christiania 1814.
13For an in-depth discussion on the framers’ view on constitutional amendment, see Holmøyvik
(2012, 492–517).
14See the records of the constitutional assembly on April 18, 1814 in Riksforsamlingens forhan-
dlinger. 1914. Vol. 1. Kristiania: Grøndahl & søns boktrykkeri, 116–117.
15Translated from the records of the extraordinary parliament in Det overord. St. Forh. (1814,
427–428).
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then, there was no inconsistency in denying the king any involvement in consti-
tutional amendment, while granting him a suspensive veto in the enactment of laws.
3.2 International Context and Influences
Considering the wider intellectual context, until 1814 the Norwegian framers’
understanding of constitution was entirely conventional in American and European
constitutionalism.16 The same distinction between constitutional amendment and
legislation was found in the monarchical French 1791 and Spanish 1812 consti-
tutions. Neither of them gave the monarch any say in constitutional amendment, yet
they awarded him a suspensive veto on legislation. Republican constitutions too
distinguished conceptually and institutionally between constitutional amendment
and legislation. American constitutions of the 1770s and 1780s and European
constitutions from the 1790s adopted different approaches to constitutional
amendment. Some constitutions, like the 1780 Massachusetts constitution, made
constitutional amendment a prerogative of a specifically elected constitutional
assembly, others, like the Spanish 1812 constitution and the 1790 constitution of
South Carolina, allowed the ordinary parliament to adopt amendments after an
intervening general election. Other constitutions again, like the French 1791 con-
stitution, combined both a constitutional assembly and the ordinary parliament. The
most radical approach was to leave the adoption of constitutional amendments to
the sovereign people directly by voting in the primary assemblies. In Europe the
1798 Batavian constitution is one example of this model, in America the 1792 New
Hampshire constitution is another.
What all these constitutions have in common is the notion of the constitution as
an instrument of delegation from the sovereign people as constituent power to the
branches of government as constituted powers, as proclaimed unequivocally in the
French 1791 constitution and in the 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights, both quoted
above. Important protagonists for this idea, apart from the above-mentioned Sieyès,
include Thomas Paine in the 1791 The Rights of Man and Emer de Vattel in the
1758 Droit de Gens.17
Of the more than 130 constitutions18 written between 1776 and the adoption of the
Norwegian constitution on 17 May 1814, there are in fact very few exceptions to the
said scheme. Arguably the sole notable exception is the Swedish 1809 constitution,
which provided the monarch with an absolute veto in both legislation and constitu-
tional amendment. Owing largely to the uniquely Swedish evolutionary constitutional
tradition at the time, this constitution did not subscribe to the ideology and form of the
constitutions that followed from the American and French revolution.
16See Holmøyvik (2012, 241–245).
17See Paine (1894[1791], 428) and de Vattel (1758, 34–37).
18Estimate based on the list of historical constitutions at www.modern-constitutions.de.
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The Norwegian constitutional assembly were well acquainted with foreign
constitutions and relied heavily on them in its work. We find numerous traces of
borrowing from contemporary constitutions in the final constitutional text, in par-
ticular the French 1791 constitution and the Swedish 1809 constitution, but also
other French and European constitutions as well as both the American federal
constitution and state constitutions.
The Norwegian framers in 1814 were however not unfamiliar with the notion of
the constitution as a contractual instrument. The English constitution was commonly
considered a contract between the king and the people, and as such it was conveyed
as a general model to a European public by celebrated writers like Charles de
Montesquieu in the 1748 De l’esprit des lois and Jean-Louis de Lolme in the 1771
Constitution de l’Angleterre.19 Both Montesquieu and de Lolme described the
English constitution as a contractual relation between the king, the nobility and the
commons. For both Montesquieu and de Lolme, but most explicitly stated by the
latter, the aim of the English constitution, facilitated by its separation of powers
system, was to put the said three powers in perfect equilibrium. As a result, the king,
the nobility and the commons in their respective assemblies, all would have to
consent to the formation of laws. Among the Norwegian framers, de Lolme was held
in particular esteem and he was quoted extensively in the introduction to the most
important private draft to the constitution.20 Nonetheless, the Norwegian framers
deliberately rejected his principal idea of a royal veto to maintain equilibrium.
The framers were also well acquainted with the Swedish 1809 constitution, and
indeed used some parts of it as a direct model for the 1814 constitution. Crucially
though they did not adopt the Swedish constitution’s contractual elements like the
royal veto on legislation and constitutional amendments.
The fact that there is no trace of contract theory in neither the 1814 constitution’s
text nor the discussions at the constitutional assembly, allows us to safely conclude
that the framers considered the constitution as an instrument of delegation. The
practical result of this understanding was that only the people could amend the
constitution. This understanding was codified in Art. 112 of the constitution.
4 Context: The Constituent Power in Post 1814
Restoration Era Europe
4.1 The Monarchical Principle and the Constituent Power
Despite its many borrowings from foreign constitutions, the Norwegian 1814
constitution did not follow the path European constitutionalism was heading at the
19See Montesquieu (1961[1748], 163–174, book 11 Chap. 6) and de Lolme (1771).
20See the draft of Johan Gunder Adler and Christian Magnus Falsen in Riksforsamlingens
forhandlinger. 1916. Vol. 3. Kristiania: Grøndahl & søns boktrykkeri, 3–8.
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time. As the Norwegian constitutional assembly laboured on its constitution in the
spring of 1814, another constitution project was under way in France. This con-
stitution, the Charte constitutionnelle, was granted by the newly instated king Louis
XVIII on 4 June, only 18 days after the adoption of the Norwegian constitution.
The Charte is a significant event in European constitutional history as it heralded
and served as model for a new European constitutional order in an era of monar-
chical restoration after decades of revolutions and the Napoleonic wars.21
European constitutional discourse following the Charte was influenced by the
so-called monarchical principle.22 The monarchical principle was a political slogan
directed against the revolutionary constitutional ideology of the previous decades.
Already in 1804–1806, the German philosopher Friedrich Schlegel had called for a
“monarchisches Princip” to provide the state with stability.23 The monarchical
principle did not however entail the return to the Ancien Régime and the rejection of
the essentials of modern constitutionalism introduced by the constitutions following
the American and French revolutions, like the separation of powers, representative
government or the acknowledgment of certain individual rights. These principles
were also implemented in the post-1814 monarchical constitutions and in the
Charte. After the French revolution there was no going back to absolutism, and the
Charte stated in its preamble that it recognised the progress of the Enlightenment
and the major intellectual changes which it had brought forth.24
The Charte and the monarchical principle did however reject the sovereignty of
the people as the source of legitimacy for a constitution. This rejection of popular
sovereignty created a fundamental rupture between pre and post-1814 European
constitutionalism. The Charte and many subsequent European constitutions in the
following decades were instead octroyed, which meant that they were granted by
the monarch by virtue of his sovereign authority. According to its preamble, the
Charte was granted “par le libre exercice de notre autorité royale”, making it an
“OCTROI à nos sujets”. For many German states, monarchical sovereignty even
became an international law obligation pursuant to Art. 57 in the 1820 Wiener
Schlubakte regulating the German Confederation established by the Congress of
Vienna in 1815. The monarchical principle was moreover enforced militarily by the
Great Powers, acting through treaty systems like the Holy Alliance and the
Quintuple Alliance, and authorising interventions in Naples and Spain in the 1820s
to suppress threats to monarchical rule.
21On the model character of the Charte Constitutionnelle 1814, see i.e. Müssig (2012).
22On the monarchical principle, see Böckenförde (1991), Stolleis (2001, 61–63) and Reinhardt
(2000, 426–431).
23Schlegel (1837, 331–332).
24See the preamble to the Charte: «Nous avons dû, à l’exemple des rois nos prédécesseurs,
apprécier les effets des progrès toujours croissants des lumières, les rapports nouveaux que ces
progrès ont introduits dans la société, la direction imprimée aux esprits depuis un demi-siècle, et
les graves altération qui en sont résultées […].».
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In addition to the octroyed constitutions, a number of the post-1814 constitutions
were presented as contracts between the monarch and the people or the estates. One
example is the constitution of Württemberg of 1819, which stated in its preamble:
Durch freie Uebereinkunft [sic] mit den Ständen des Landes ist das Grundgesetz des
Staates zu Stande gekommen, das schönste Denkmal der Eintracht zwischen dem König
und Seinem Volke.
In German constitutional discourse, the distinction between octroyed constitu-
tions and contractual constitutions was the subject of much debate during the first
half of the eighteenth century.25 In principle, octroyed and contractual constitutions
are fundamentally different in relation to sovereignty and the authority to adopt a
constitution.26 In practice however, even octroyed constitutions becomes functional
contracts if they require the consent of both the monarch and the people or the
estates for constitutional amendments. In such a case, even an octroyed constitution
would irrevocably limit the very sovereignty the monarch exercised when he
adopted the constitution in the first place. The fact that octroyed constitutions
limited the exercise of monarchical authority is an essential distinction compared to
the absolute monarchies of the Ancien Régime.27 Indeed, German legal scholars in
the early nineteenth century also considered octroyed constitutions as contracts, as
only popular consent was an essential requirement for a “wirkliche Verfassung”.28
The key question for defining the nineteenth century constitution’s
legal-ontological character is thus not how a constitution was adopted, but how it
could be amended. As such, most monarchical constitutions in nineteenth century
Europe were either formally or functionally contracts for sharing sovereignty.
The contractual notion of constitution appears to dominate European constitu-
tional discourse in the first half of the nineteenth century. The 1831 Belgian con-
stitution illustrates the pervasive influence of the monarchical principle in this
respect. Unlike its contemporaries, this constitution presented itself as an instrument
of delegation for the sovereign people in the same flamboyant manner as the French
1791 constitution. Not only did the Belgian constitution proclaim that all power
flowed from the nation (Art. 25), it also expressly stated that the king possessed
only those powers formally attributed to him by the constitution (Art. 78). In other
words, the nation was presented as the constituting power delegating authority to
the king and the parliament as constituted powers. The institutional system the
constitution established was however a contractual one, in the sense that both the
king and the parliament had to approve constitutional amendments (Art. 131) as
well as ordinary legislation. The Belgian 1831 constitution may have been dressed
25See Stolleis (2001, 58–61).
26See Grimm (2001: 100–141 on 123–124).
27An example on the constitution binding the monarch’s sovereign authority is the 1818 consti-
tution of Baden Article 5: “Der Grossherzog vereiniget in sich alle Rechte der Staatsgewalt, und
übt sie unter den in dieser Verfassungsurkunde festgesetzten Bestimmungen aus.”
28Grimm (2001: 100–141 on 123). See also Schmitt (1928, 63–64).
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in the robes of the revolutionary radicalism of the 1790s, but underneath its radical
veil we find the monarchical principle naked and clear.29
4.2 The Monarchical Principle and the Separation
of Powers
The monarchical principle also had consequences for the constitutions’ institutional
arrangement and distribution of powers. Whereas pre-1814 constitutions typically
placed the legislative power undivided to the people’s representatives in a repre-
sentative assembly, post-1814 constitutions like the Charte returned to
Montesquieu and de Lolme’s ideal of institutional equilibrium between the mon-
arch, the nobility and the people as the object for the separation of powers. At the
core of this institutional equilibrium was the legislative veto power of both the
monarch and the nobility in the legislative assembly’s upper chamber.
Only days after the adoption of the Norwegian constitution, on 24 May 1814 the
influential Swiss political theorist Benjamin Constant restated the theory of equi-
librium for the nineteenth century constitutional monarchy in his Réflexions sur les
constitutions, la distribution des pouvoirs, et les garanties, dans une monarchie
constitutionnelle, aptly subtitled Equisse de constitution.30 Constant’s innovation
was the institutional separation between the monarchical power (“pouvoir royal”)
and the executive power (“pouvoir exécutif”) directed by government ministers.31
Freed from the executive, Constant elevated the monarch to what he called a neutral
power (“pouvoir neutre”) in the state, which specific function was to maintain the
balance between the legislative, executive and judiciary in order to provide stability
to the state. In Constant’s system, the monarch would check the executive by his
right to appoint and dismiss ministers, while the judiciary would be controlled by
appointments as well as the monarch’s prerogative to pardon. To check the leg-
islative, Constant provided the monarch with the right to appoint members of the
aristocratic upper chamber, while excesses by the representative lower chamber
could be checked by the monarch by his right to dissolve the parliament and by a
royal veto on legislation.
Constant’s institutional arrangement and distribution of powers was funda-
mentally different from pre-1814 monarchical constitutions like the French of 1791
or the Spanish of 1812 as well as the Norwegian of 1814. Whereas Constant’s
system in accordance with the monarchical principle placed the monarch above the
other branches of government, the pre-1814 constitutions in accordance with
29See also Dippel (2005, 153–169 on 164), who refers to the Belgian constitution as a “master-
piece of constitutional camouflage”.
30See Constant (1814).
31On Constant’s theory of separation of powers, see Vile (1998, 224–227) and Holmøyvik (2012,
536–538).
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notions of popular sovereignty typically made the representative parliament the
institutional centre. In these constitutions, the monarch and the executive played
second fiddle, while aristocratic upper chambers were abolished altogether. The
Charte and other monarchical European constitutions in the subsequent decades,
including later constitutions like Italy’s Statuto Albertino of 1848 and the Danish
constitution of 1849, were however largely in accordance with Constant’s Equisse
de constitution.
This brief outline shows that the Norwegian 1814 constitution was from the
outset out of step with the constitutional developments Europe guided by the
monarchical principle. As we shall see in the following, the Norwegians were soon
to discover their constitutional solitude, and it was to become a source of contention
for the next seventy years.
5 Who is the Constituent Power? Norwegian
Constitutionalism Contested 1824–1884
5.1 The Monarchical Principle Introduced to Norway
In the early 1820s, the monarchical principle entered the Norwegian constitutional
discourse and disrupted the constitutional unity from 1814. This shift from the
sovereignty of the people to the monarchical principle is nicely illustrated by the
already mentioned Christian Magnus Falsen. He is often referred to as the father of
the 1814 constitution due to his leading role at the constitutional assembly and due
to the highly influential draft constitution he authored with the Dane Johan Gunder
Adler. Falsen’s draft constitution, which became the single most important direct
source to the 1814 constitution,32 opened with 32 basic principles, two of which
concerned constitutional formation and amendment:
§ 10. Since the purpose of every society is: the happiness of all; since government is
instituted to secure man the enjoyment of his natural rights, then only the people as a whole,
through its representatives, may constitute its government.
§ 11. On the same grounds, the people have the right to, according to specific intervals and
rules, to review and improve on the constitution; though so that what was once considered
its essence, may not be changed. The current generation cannot impose its laws upon future
generations.33
These two articles borrowed heavily from the 1780 Massachusetts declaration of
rights (Art. 7) and the 1793 French declaration of rights (Art. 28). Their message
was clear: The people are the constituent power and only the people through their
representatives can adopt and amend a constitution. The same was true for the
32See the list of direct sources to the 1814 constitution in Höjer (1882, 195).
33Riksforsamlingens forhandlinger. 1916. Vol. 3. Kristiania: Grøndahl & søns boktrykkeri, 10. My
translation.
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specific constitutional amendment procedure in Falsen’s draft constitution. Here, all
amendments were first to be proposed by an elected constitutional assembly ever
25 years, and then voted on by the people directly in the primary assemblies.34 The
king, to whom the draft constitution provided a suspensive veto on legislation, was
not given any role in constitutional amendment in Falsen’s draft constitution.
Ten years later, in 1824, Falsen wrote the following in a pamphlet:
Concerning amendments to the constitution, then presumably the king has already an
absolute veto, and there is thus nothing left to discuss concerning this part of the
argument.35
Here Falsen presented a contractual view on the constitution, the very opposite
of his position in 1814, and importantly, squarely contrary to the constitutional
assembly’s position that year. Why this radical turnaround?
The immediate occasion for the royal veto’s comeback in Norwegian constitu-
tional discourse was the union king Carl Johan’s attempt to re-shape the consti-
tution’s system of separation of powers by a series of amendment proposals in
1821. The king argued that the 1814 constitution did not provide a “perfect equi-
librium” between the branches of government, and that the scales were in fact
tipped in the parliament’s favour.36 The king was moreover concerned—unfounded
it later turned out—that the Holy Alliance might take notice of the radical
Norwegian constitution and use military force to supress it like it did in Naples the
same year.37
In order to restore constitutional equilibrium and to bring Norway into line with
European restoration constitutionalism the king proposed in 1821 a number of
amendments meant to curb the parliament’s power. One of the amendment pro-
posals would give the monarch the right to dissolve the parliament. Montesquieu
had argued that the executive’s right to dissolve parliament was required to
maintain equilibrium.38 The framers in 1814 had like most pre-1814 constitutions
denied the executive this competency, while the Charte and other post-1814
monarchical constitutions had re-introduced it.
The by far most important and controversial amendment proposal concerned the
introduction of an absolute royal veto on legislation. The monarch’s absolute veto
on legislation was the cornerstone of Montesquieu and de Lolme’s separation of
powers systems aimed to produce equilibrium. Rejected by the Norwegian framers
in 1814, the absolute veto was an essential feature in the later European octroyed
and contractual constitutions. It was also a key component in Benjamin Constant’s
conception of the monarch as a neutral power to guarantee stability.
34See article 228 in the draft, in Riksforsamlingens forhandlinger. 1916. Vol. 3. Kristiania:
Grøndahl & søns boktrykkeri, 56.
35Falsen (1824a, 20). My translation and italics.
36My translation of the royal proposition included in the parliamentary records of 1821, see St.
Forh. (1821, vol. 7, 685).
37See Nielsen (1873, 108–109, 175–176, 181).
38See Montesquieu (1961[1748], 169, book 11 Chap. 6).
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Incidentally, Constant had served as Carl Johan’s adviser in 1813–1814. At that
time the former French plebeian, who rose to general in Napoleon’s armies and
eventually to Marshal of France before in 1810 being offered to succeed
Charles XIII of Sweden, had considered making an attempt on the French throne.39
We do not know however if Constant’s constitutional theory influenced Carl Johan
directly in 1821, or if he simply followed the pattern set by the new monarchical
constitutions in Europe. Nonetheless, Carl Johan’s view on the monarch’s consti-
tutional role resembled Constant’s notion of a neutral power above the three
branches of government. As he set forth his constitutional amendment proposals in
1821, Carl Johan argued that such amendments, including an absolute royal veto on
legislation, were required for the king to “guard the nations’ rights”.40
The king’s amendment proposals spurred an intense public debate in journals
and pamphlets. It was during this debate that Christian Magnus Falsen, who sup-
ported the king’s reform, claimed that the constitution already granted the king an
absolute veto on constitutional amendment. As late as in 1818, Falsen had pub-
lished a commentary to the constitution where he made no mention of a royal veto
on constitutional amendments.41 Falsen’s change of heart may have been triggered
by the king’s call for a constitutional reform, but his call for a stronger executive
may also been due to his outspoken scepticism of the substantial representation of
farmers in the Norwegian parliament. The combination of a large number of free-
holders in Norway and quite liberal voting qualifications in the 1814 constitution
awarded voting rights to around 45% of all male citizens above the age of 25,
including a substantial part of the peasantry.42 At the first session of the parliament
in 1815, roughly one third of the representatives were from the peasantry, while in
1833 almost half of the representatives were of this class.43 In 1821 Falsen himself
unsuccessfully proposed a reform of the parliament in order to reduce the number of
farmers eligible and to restrict admission to the parliament’s upper chamber.
Even though an absolute veto on constitutional amendments was not on the table
in the contested amendment proposals, nobody could fail to notice that the king and
his supporters championed a new notion of constitutionalism compared to the
constitutional assembly in 1814. This new constitutionalism emphasised monarchy
and contractualism instead of the sovereignty of the people. The absolute royal veto
on constitutional amendments was only a corollary to this new notion of
constitution.
Falsen and the king’s supporters made no secret of the source of their novel
constitutional interpretation. In one of his pleas for the absolute veto, Falsen
attributed his new view on the constitution to “the monarchical principle, on which
39On the relation between Constant and king Carl Johan, see Hasselrot (1950, 9).
40Quoted from the parliamentary records of 1824 where the constitutional amendment proposals of
1821 are included, see St. Forh. (1824. Vol. 2, 40). My translation.
41See Falsen (1818, 181–184).
42See Kuhnle (1972).
43See Mohn (1874).
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so much is written these days”.44 During the debate in 1824, the king’s supporters
made frequent references to the monarchical principle, to its implementation in the
post-1814 European constitutions and to the Holy Alliance’s enforcement of
restoration constitutionalism.45
The novelty of these constitutional arguments was recognised and criticised by
the opponents of the king’s amendment proposals. They accused the king trans-
forming the constitution based upon the sovereignty of the people into a contract
between the king and the people—in other words turning the 1814 constitution into
a post-1814 European restoration constitution.
In the end, the king’s amendment proposals, including his demand for an
absolute veto on legislation, were firmly rejected by the parliament on the very
symbolic date of 17 May 1824. For the Norwegian parliament, the rejection of the
king’s reform was also a matter of defending Norway’s independence in the per-
sonal union with Sweden. The Norwegians rightly feared that a strengthened
executive in the hands of the union king seated in Stockholm, could lead to Swedish
influence on Norwegian affairs and institutions.
Concerning the specific grounds for a constitutional reform, a unanimous
standing committee for constitutional affairs rejected the king’s claims that the
legislative and executive branches were imbalanced in the 1814 constitution. Yet in
order not to provoke the king, the committee’s report was carefully worded and
devoid of any discussion of the monarchical principle. At the very end of the report,
the committee even stated that the king, according to the nature of things, did enjoy
an absolute veto on constitutional amendment.46 The committee gave no reasons for
the statement and it was not considered significant at the time. Since the veto on
legislation and constitutional amendments had been considered interrelated in the
preceding debate, the committee’s statement is surprising and contradicts its con-
clusion on the legislative veto. Most likely, the committee’s acknowledgement of a
royal veto on constitutional amendment was intended to sugar the report’s rejection
of the constitutional reform.47
The preceding debate was however a taste of what was to come. The arguments
made on the monarchical principle were seeds of a new understanding and rein-
terpretation of the constitution among conservatives and other supporters of the
monarchy in the decades to come. From now on, there would be no unity among
Norwegian lawyers and politicians on sovereignty and the 1814 constitution’s
legal-ontological character.
44Quoted and translated from Falsen’s anonymous article with the title “On the Absolute Veto” on
March 18, 1824 in the journal Tilskueren.
45On the debates in 1821–1824, see Holmøyvik (2013).
46See St. Forh. (1824, Vol. 2, 108–109).
47Most commentators have interpreted the committee’s statement in the same way, see Castberg
(1964, 327) and Kaartvedt (1964, 283).
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5.2 Contract or Delegation? Competing Views
on the Constitution’s Character
The parliament’s rejection in 1824 of the king’s constitutional reform effectively
blocked any major reform of the constitution’s separation of powers until the end of
the century. King Carl Johan persisted however in his demand for an absolute veto
on legislation, and put forth constitutional amendment proposals to this effect at
every session of the parliament until 1839, but to no avail. Yet even though the
avenue to formal amendment was blocked, the constitution’s interpretation con-
tinued to be disputed.
The most contested question was the royal veto on constitutional amendment.
The king claimed to have such a right, and indeed exercised it by sanctioning
constitutional amendments passed by the parliament. On six occasions between
1818 and 1863 the king refused to sanction amendments passed by parliament. In
all six cases the parliament respected the royal vetoes. It is not clear however
whether the parliament did so in order not to provoke conflict with the king or if it
acknowledged a royal veto on constitutional amendments.48
Since the framers in 1814 considered constitutional amendment a prerogative of
the people through their representatives in the parliament, the constitution’s text did
not make any reference to the king in this respect, not to speak of a royal veto. As a
result of the text’s silence on the matter, any argument for a royal veto on con-
stitutional amendment would have to be based on an interpretation of the consti-
tution’s character or fundamental principles rather than the text. With the debate
that followed the king’s proposed constitutional reform in the early 1820s, two
distinct interpretations of the 1814 constitution materialised in Norwegian consti-
tutional doctrine.
The first commentaries to the 1814 constitution, by law professor Henrik
Steenbuch in 1815 and Christian Magnus Falsen in 1818, before the latter suc-
cumbed to the monarchical principle, held that the parliament alone could amend
the constitution.49 At this time, the monarchical principle appears to have been
unknown in Norway, and these early commentaries followed the constitution’s text
closely.
After the debates on constitutional reform in the 1820s however, a contractual
interpretation of the constitution emerged. A treatise on Norwegian public law from
1830 held simply and without reasoning that the constitution was a “pact and
contract between the king and the people, and which cannot be amended without
the consent of both parties to the contract”.50 Consequently, the king’s veto fol-
lowed from the constitution’s contractual character, not the constitution’s wording.
The author, lawyer and politician Fredrik Georg Lerche, did however add a footnote
48For an overview of cases, see the faculty of law’s 1881 report on the royal veto in Sth.
Prp. No. 20 (1881), 29.
49See Steenbuch (1815) and Falsen (1818, 181–184).
50Lerche (1830, 53). My translation.
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where he made reservations to the validity of this “common assumption” if sub-
jected to further scrutiny. Still, Lerche’s treatise does indicate that a contractual
interpretation of the constitution had become commonplace by 1830.
At this time, Benjamin Constant’s constitutional doctrine of the king as a neutral
power to balance the three branches of government influenced Norwegian consti-
tutional doctrine. A widely read constitutional law pamphlet written by the military
officer Nicolai Tidemand and published in 1829, referred to Constant and argued
for a separation of the monarch from the government in order to establish the
monarch as a neutral power with an absolute veto on legislation.51 In a 1834, the
philosopher Niels Treschow similarly called for a constitutional reform with ref-
erence to Constant’s model, including an absolute royal veto on legislation and the
establishment of a true upper chamber in the parliament.52 However, Treschow was
hesitant in recommending an absolute royal veto on legislation as long as Norway
was part of a personal union with Sweden.53 Like the parliament in 1824, he feared
Swedish influence on Norwegian institutions.
From the 1830s and 1840s, these two opposing interpretations of the Norwegian
constitution were grounded in more coherent theories on constitutional formation.
In 1833, the young university lecturer Frederik Stang published the first sys-
tematic treatise on Norwegian constitutional law.54 Stang’s treatise was the most
comprehensive, important and influential presentation of Norwegian constitutional
law until the 1870s. In his 1833 treatise, Stang specifically addressed the consti-
tution’s legal-ontological character and its relation to European post-1814
constitutionalism.
According to Stang, the Norwegian 1814 constitution was fundamentally dif-
ferent from most contemporary European constitution as it was neither octroyed nor
a contract between the king and the people. While Stang acknowledged that the
contractual notion of constitution was dominant in Europe, he explained to the
reader that the Norwegian 1814 constitution subscribed to a different kind of
constitutionalism as it was adopted “at a time when the people did not recognize
any monarchical power, only its own sovereignty”.55 The time Stang had in mind
was the revolutionary constitutionalism of the 1790s, when constitutions were held
to be acts of delegation by the sovereign people. According to Stang, the
Norwegian 1814 constitution was precisely such a constitution and the people alone
were sovereign. As a result, the king could not have an absolute veto on consti-
tutional amendment, although Stang allowed for a suspensive veto by analogy of
51See Tidemand (1829, 76–114).
52See Treschow (1839).
53In Tidemand’s pamphlet, published posthumously, the publisher Jonas Anton Hielm, a former
attorney general and liberal politician, added similar concerns over the absolute veto in a separate
postscript to the pamphlet, see Tidemand (1829, 130–131).
54See Stang (1833).
55Stang (1833, 654 and 31).
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the king’s veto on legislation.56 A suspensive royal veto was however impossible to
reconcile with the text in the constitution’s amendment clause. As a result, Stang’s
interpretation on this point gained few followers.57
Stang also addressed the possible constitutional consequences of the negotia-
tions with Sweden in the autumn of 1814 for revising the constitution to accom-
modate a personal union with Sweden. Did the negotiations on the constitutional
revision turn the constitution into a contract between the union king and the
Norwegian people? Stang rejected all such claims, as he concluded that the con-
stitutional revision was minor and that it did not in any way alter the constitution’s
fundamental character as an act of the people acting as the constituent power
through the constitutional assembly in 1814.58
While Stang emphasised the historical context of the Norwegian 1814 consti-
tution to distinguish it from subsequent octroyed and contractual European con-
stitutions, others called instead for the constitution to be interpreted in light of and
accordance with the monarchical principle and contemporary European constitu-
tionalism. The most influential reinterpretation of the Norwegian constitution was
later attorney general Bernhard Dunker’s Om den Norske Constitution (“On the
Norwegian Constitution 1814”) published in 1845.59
Dunker’s reinterpretation of the constitution was a response to a comprehensive
commentary to the constitution published earlier that year and written by the liberal
lawyer Peder Krabbe Gaarder. Like Stang in 1833, Gaarder rejected a contractual
interpretation of the constitution and emphasised the sovereignty of the people as
the constitution’s basic and guiding principle contrary to most contemporary
European constitutions:
[…] our entire constitution as a product of the sovereignty of the people, and [is] also
founded upon this principle, which is perhaps more extensively implemented in our con-
stitution than in any state with a monarchical form of government.60
As a result of this understanding of the constitution, Gaarder denied the king any
veto, suspensive or absolute, on constitutional amendment. His was a classical
1790s style understanding of constitutional formation. In Gaarder’s system, the
king was only a constituted power, while constitutional amendment was a pre-
rogative of the people as the constituent power.
Bernhard Dunker on the other hand, rejected such a historical interpretation of
the 1814 constitution. According to Dunker, the Norwegian constitution had to be
interpreted with regard to the constitutional development in Europe after its
adoption in 1814 and thus according to the monarchical principle.61 Dunker found a
56See Stang (1833, 639–642).
57See also Ræder (1841, 80), Hjelm (1863, 91–92) and Höjer (1882, 139–146).
58See Stang (1833, 33–34 and 639–642).
59See Dunker (1845).
60Gaarder (1845). My translation.
61See Dunker (1845, 2).
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textual basis for his reinterpretation in the constitution’s article 1, which stated that
the “form of government is a limited and hereditary monarchy”.62
Before Dunker, the phrase “limited … monarchy” in Art. 1 of the constitution
was commonly understood in its historical context as a rejection of monarchical
sovereignty and absolutism, which the 1814 constitution abolished. Between 1661
and 1814, the kingdom of Denmark-Norway had been an absolute monarchy, the
only of its kind governed by a written constitution, the Lex Regia of 1665. The
constitutional commentaries of Steenbuch in 1815, Falsen in 1818, Gaarder in 1845
and Stang’s 1833 treatise, all held that Art. 1 was a reference to the separation of
powers, in which monarchy was limited by democracy through an elected
parliament.63
Dunker on the other hand, reading the constitution through the lens of the
monarchical principle, interpreted the words “limited … monarchy” as an expres-
sion of monarchical sovereignty:
The constitutional meaning of the phrase, saying that the form of government is limited
monarchical, is really that all public authority is vested in the monarch, although he may be
limited in its exercise, so that he in certain matters may not act without the consent of the
parliament, this does not really deprive him of any part of it.64
According to Dunker, the monarch, not the people, was the source of sover-
eignty and thus all public authority, limited only by the constitution. Dunker’s
novel interpretation of the Norwegian constitution was nothing but a mirror-image
of provisions in German restoration constitutions proclaiming monarchical sover-
eignty. The 1818 Bavarian constitution, for example, contained the following
provision, that may very well have influenced Dunker:
Der König ist das Oberhaupt des Staats, vereiniget in sich alle Rechte der Staatsgewalt, und
übt sie unter den von Ihm gegebenen in der gegenwärtigen Verfassungs-Urkunde festge-
setzten Bestimmungen aus.65
Having established monarchy as the source of all public authority, Dunker went
on to systematically reinterpret the constitution according to the monarchical
principle.
A complete reinterpretation was not possible however due to the constitution’s
clear wording on key issues. Art. 49 proclaimed unequivocally that the legislative
power resided in the people through the parliament, while Art. 79 made it clear that
the king only had a suspensive veto in legislation. These facts Dunker simply
dismissed as an error made by the framers in 1814 due to their inexperience. Like
62The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway. Jacob Lehmann: Christiania 1814.
63See Steenbuch (1815, 11–12), Falsen (1818, 6), Stang (1833, 49–50, 64) and Gaarder (1845, 11).
64Dunker (1845, 4). My translation and italics.
65The constitution of Bavaria of 1818 Titel II art. 1. My italics. See similar provisions in the
constititions of Baden of 1818 art. 5, Württemberg of 1819 Chap. 2 art. 4, Hesse-Darmstadt of 1820
art. 4, Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld of 1821 art. 3, Saxony of 1831 art. 4, Hesse-Cassel of 1831 art. 10,
Brunswick of 1832 art. 3, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen of 1833 art. 3 and Hanover of 1833 art. 1.
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Montesquieu, de Lolme, Constant as well as king Carl Johan in 1821, Dunker
argued that an absolute veto was a constitutional necessity in order to maintain the
equilibrium between the branches of government.66 Moreover he argued that the
“very concept of monarchy” in Art. 1 of the constitution demanded an absolute
royal veto on all decisions made by the parliament.67 As evidence, he pointed to the
fact that the absolute royal veto was found in all monarchies save for Norway.
Dunker’s method was thus to reshape the Norwegian constitution in the image of
European restoration constitutionalism. The same method was applied on consti-
tutional amendment. Here, article 112 in the constitution did not expressly bar an
absolute royal veto as it made no mention of the king at all. The text’s silence
allowed Dunker to argue that the king already possessed an absolute veto by virtue
of the constitution’s basic principle and fundamental contractual character.68
Whether or not the 1814 constitution was an actual contract between the king and
the people was beyond the point. For Dunker, the constitution was a functional
contract in the sense that sovereignty flowed from the king to be shared by the
people in the manner decided by the constitution. According to this understanding
of constitution, a monarchical constitution simply could not be amended by the
people alone.
5.3 The Constituent Power as an Argument for Judicial
Review
The debate on the constitution’s character concerned primarily, but not solely the
royal veto on constitutional amendments. It also spilled over into a related issue,
namely the uniquely early Norwegian development of judicial review on the con-
stitutionality of laws and administrative acts.69 This issue too concerned constitu-
tional amendment in the sense that it placed the courts as the supreme interpreters
and guardians of the constitution. In the 1860s, the people as the constituent power
and the specific understanding of the constitution as an instrument of delegation
became an important argument to legitimatise judicial review.
Judicial review of the constitutionality of laws was introduced by the US
Supreme Court in the celebrated judgement Marbury v. Madison in 1803.70 In
France, Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès’ had proposed the establishment of a jury
66See Dunker (1845, 95–97).
67See Dunker (1845, 92).
68See Dunker (1845, 126–127).
69For an English language account of the historical development of judicial review in Norway, see
Kierulf (2014). For the Norwegian development in a Nordic perspective, see Helgadóttir (2006)
and Rógvi (2013). In the Nordic languages, see Sunnqvist (2014), Holmøyvik and Michalsen
(2015, 326–361 and Smith (1993).
705 U.S. 137 (1803).
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constitutionnaire already in 1795,71 and a similar constitutional review of legisla-
tive acts was introduced in the 1799 constitution.72 However, the French system of
constitutional review was abolished in 1814 by the adoption of the Charte con-
stitutionnelle. Moreover, it was not a true ex post judicial review by the courts, but
rather an ex ante review by one of the legislative bodies, the Sénat conservateur.
On this background, Norway was the first country in Europe to develop a consistent
and lasting system of judicial review of legislation and administrative acts.
Despite having no provision which explicitly granted the court’s competence to
review the constitutionality of laws and administrative acts, the 1814 constitution
was from its adoption considered as positive law to be enforced by the branches of
governments, including the courts. As early as in 1822 we find the first known case
before the Supreme Court concerning legislation violating the constitution. In 1818
the parliament had adopted a law regulating the sale of copper from a specific mine.
As a direct consequence of the law, a number of civil servants in the area lost
income stipulated in their employment contracts by imposing fees on the sale of
copper. The law itself did not provide compensation for the civil servants’ loss. The
majority in the Supreme Court however, awarded the civil servants compensation
with reference to the constitution’s Art. 105 which required full compensation for
expropriation as well as the prohibition of retroactive laws in Art. 97.
Even though the Supreme Court in the 1822 case shied away from explicitly
declaring the law unconstitutional, the case is still an example of the constitution
taking precedence over ordinary laws and thus judicial review exercised by a court.
The law was considered constitutional only if the plaintiffs were awarded com-
pensation for the violation of their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court adopted
the same approach in review cases in 1841, two cases in 1844, 1854, 1855 and
1862.73
Until 1863, the grounds for Supreme Court judgements were not made public.
Moreover, the grounds were usually terse and without any discussion of the
legitimacy and scope of judicial review. In 1866 the Supreme Court decided
another review case, in which a majority of four justices found that an 1857 law on
conscription was unconstitutional unless the plaintiff, a naval officer, was com-
pensated for additional workload imposed by the law. This time Peder Carl Lasson,
chief justice for 18 years between 1855 and 1873, felt compelled to address the
principle of judicial review. In a separate opinion, he wrote:
How shall the Supreme Court rule, when at the same time the constitution and ordinary
laws are submitted to it? As far as I know constitutional law doctrine, in such cases it is
generally agreed, that since one cannot instruct the courts to rule according both laws at the
same time, then they must necessarily give preference to the constitution […].74
71See Sieyès (1939).
72See The French constitution of 1799 art. 21.
73For a detailed discussion of these review cases, see Smith (1993, 78–110).
74The judgement is published in Ugeblad for lovkyndighed, statistik og statsøkonomi. Vol. 6.
1866–1867, 165–174 on 172.
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Lasson’s wording and reasoning is similar to that of his American colleague
chief justice John Marshall in the 1803 case Marbury v. Madison.75 Due to
Lasson’s principled and explicit stand on judicial review, the 1866 judgement has
become known as Norway’s Marbury v. Madison. According to Lasson, the con-
stitution had precedence over ordinary laws, but his opinion did not provide any
reasons other than a general consensus on the matter.
In the 1850s and 1860s, the Supreme Court’s competence to exercise judicial
review and its legitimacy was publically debated in Norway.76 The majority of
lawyers and legal scholars accepted that the Supreme Court had the competence to
exercise judicial review, but there was less agreement on its scope. There were also
critics, like the Danish law professor Johannes Nellemann, who in 1868 criticised
judicial review as incompatible with “the nature of constitutional monarchy” as it
involved the judicial branch in politics.77 In 1869, chief justice Lasson published a
supplement to his 1868 treatise on criminal procedure where he addressed the
legitimacy of judicial review in more detail than in his opinion in the 1866
judgement.78
Lasson made a number of arguments for the legitimacy of judicial review.79 His
point of departure was the separation of powers, to which he considered judicial
review of legislation and administrative acts as an essential component in order to
protect the individuals’ constitutional rights from legislative and executive inter-
vention. He also endorsed the development of judicial review in the United States,
and referred to Joseph Story’s discussion of judicial review in the 1833
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.80 The similarities between
Lasson’s separate opinion in the 1866 case and Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v.
Madison were thus not incidental.
In addition to these arguments, Lasson also addressed the 1814 constitution’s
character and the distinction on this point between the Norwegian constitution and
other European constitutions.
According to Lasson, judicial review by the Supreme Court was legitimate due
to the distinction between the constitutive and the constituted powers in the 1814
constitution. For him, the understanding of the 1814 constitution as an act of
delegation rather than a contract was essential to the legitimacy of judicial review.
Lasson argued that the constitution had to take precedence over laws since “the
75“So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a
particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding
the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine
which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.” 5 U.
S. 137 (1803, 178).
76On the early Norwegian debates on judicial review, see Slagstad (2011, 367–392).
77Nellemann (1868, 113). My translation.
78See Lasson (1869).
79For an in-depth discussion of Lasson’s reasoning, see Holmøyvik and Michalsen (2015,
341–346).
80See Story (1833, 425 pp.).
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constituent power in article 112 of the constitution is superior to the legislative, the
executive and the judicial power”.81 Thus judicial review and the constitution’s
supremacy over legislation was only a natural and necessary consequence of the
distinction between constitutive and the constituted powers.
Lasson also addressed the fact that in Europe, judicial review was unique to
Norway. Like Stang in 1833, Lasson made it clear that the Norwegian 1814 con-
stitution was fundamentally different from the octroyed constitutions in other
European monarchies as these were contracts involving both the king and the
people in constitutional amendment.82 His reasoning seems to be that judicial
review of a contractual constitution might not be legitimate, since the courts as a
third party would then interfere in the contract between the king and the parliament.
If on the other hand the constitution was an act of delegation from the sovereign
people as the constituent power, then judicial review was legitimate since the
parliament and the king as constituted powers could always resort to
the remedy prescribed by the constitution itself in article 112, that is to appeal to the sover-
eignty of the people – the highest tribunal possible in a free form of government, […].83
To emphasise this point, Lasson referred to the famous French political scientist
and historian Alexis de Toqueville and his celebrated De la démocratie en
Amérique from 1835.84 In his study of the American democracy, Toqueville was
both puzzled and enchanted by the American judicial system and in particular
judicial review. His observation as to how judicial review was possible in the
United States and not in his native France, was that
[i]n America the Constitution rules both legislators and simple citizens. It is therefore the
primary law and cannot be modified by law. Hence it is right that the courts should obey the
Constitution rather than all the laws.85
In other words, in the United States the constitution was an act of delegation by
the sovereign people as the constituent power and thus superior to the laws adopted
by the constituted powers. Toqueville also pointed to the fact that unlike in France,
where the Charte constitutionnelle of 1830 was octroyed and unamendable, the
constitution of the United States could be amended by the people through a pro-
cedure designated in the constitution. This distinction between the French and the
American constitutions led Tocqueville to conclude that judicial review by
American courts would not put sovereignty in the hands of the judges as the people
could ultimately amend the constitution. This was exactly Lasson’s point too when
he referred to the amendment procedure in Art. 112 in the constitution as an appeal
to the sovereignty of the people.
81Lasson (1869, 18). My translation.
82Lasson (1869, 20).
83Lasson (1869, 18). My translation.
84See Lasson (1869, 18).
85Toqueville (1966[1835], 123).
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By referring to Toqueville, Lasson identified the Norwegian 1814 constitution
with the republican 1787 constitution of the United States. At the same time he
distinguished it from the octroyed and contractual monarchical constitutions in
Europe.
Other lawyers too argued like Lasson for judicial review as an appeal to the
sovereign people as the constituent power.86 Yet there appears to be no causal link
between the understanding of the 1814 constitution as an act of delegation and the
acceptance of judicial review. Prominent defenders of the royal veto on constitu-
tional amendments, like law professors L. M. B. Aubert and Torkel Halvorsen
Aschehoug (see Sect. 5.5) also accepted the Supreme Court’s development of
judicial review.87
For the topic of this chapter however, it is sufficient to conclude that the chief
justice Lasson formulated his famous separate opinion in the landmark 1866 case
on the specific understanding of the constitution as an instrument of delegation from
the sovereign people as the constituent power.
5.4 The Royal Veto Put to the Test
The scholarly debate on the royal veto on constitutional amendment concerned
abstract notions of monarchy and sovereignty, yet this question had a very real
political significance: a royal veto could block any constitutional reform initiated by
the parliament. As long as the king continued to sanction constitutional amend-
ments, or the parliament respected a royal veto, open conflict between the king and
the parliament was kept at bay. Eventually, though, in the increasingly uneasy
relationship between the king and the parliament, a constitutional reform was
destined to be considered existential by both parties. The unresolved constitutional
dispute would then turn into a political crisis in which the existence of a royal veto
would be put to the test. That crisis came in the 1870s and reached its climax in
1884 with the entire government being convicted in the Court of Impeachment.
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, the liberal fraction in the parliament
pushed for constitutional reforms to strengthen the parliament and to increase
popular influence in public matters. As a result of this campaign, annual sessions in
the parliament were finally introduced by a constitutional amendment in 1869,88
voting rights were expanded in 1884 and a constitutional amendment in 1862
allowed for the introduction of juries in criminal cases, which were finally intro-
duced by the Criminal Procedure Act of 1887.
86See Andresen (1862). See also Slagstad (2011, 385).
87See Aubert (1864, 41).
88According to the 1814 constitution, parliament was assembled only three months every three
years, though in practice the parliament remained assembled for longer periods. In 1863 the king
had refused to sanction a constitutional amendment for annual parliaments.
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At the same time, the liberal fraction also campaigned for an amendment of
article 74 in the constitution to allow government ministers to attend debates in the
parliament. The aim was to put government ministers under increased parliamentary
control and scrutiny by forcing them to justify the government’s policies directly
before the parliament. According to Art. 12 in the 1814 constitution, the govern-
ment ministers were the king’s personal advisers and appointed and dismissed at his
will. Even though the amendment of Art. 74 would not provide the parliament with
any formal control over the government and its composition, the king and his
supporters rightly feared that its adoption would be a first and decisive step towards
a full-blown parliamentary system.89 The parliamentary system was an existential
threat to the king and his government, as it meant that a government would live and
die on the mercy of the parliamentary majority instead of the king. This constitu-
tional amendment was thus conceived by its opponents as an attempt to dismantle
the separation of powers system in the 1814 constitution and to shift the balance of
power radically in favour of the parliament.
In 1872 the parliament, where the liberal fraction enjoyed a large majority,
adopted an amendment of article 74 to allow government ministers to attend
debates in the parliament. Not surprisingly, the king refused to sanction and pro-
claim the amendment, claiming an absolute veto. In order to exhaust any argument
of a two times suspensive veto by analogy of the king’s legislative veto like Stang
claimed in 1833, the parliament then adopted in 1874, 1877 and in 1880 identical
amendments after three consecutive general elections. Again, the king refused to
sanction and proclaim the amendments. In 1880 however, after the third consec-
utive adoption of the amendment and the king’s subsequent refusal to sanction and
proclaim it, the parliament responded by adopting a resolution declaring the con-
stitutional amendment valid without royal sanction.
The parliament’s rejection of the royal veto in 1880 sparked the most serious
political crisis in Norway since the struggle for independence in 1814. The king and
his government, led by prime minister Christian August Selmer, considered a coup
d’état and made certain military preparations.90 In response, supporters of the
liberal majority in the parliament organised militias all over the country to defend
the parliament. The extreme political tensions are vividly illustrated by the famous
playwright and later Nobel laureate in literature Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, who in a
speech published in 1882 openly threatened with civil war if the king would not
respect the “decision of the sovereign people”.91
In the end, the issue would be settled in court. In the 1882 general election the
liberal fraction won a landslide victory. This allowed them to win majority in the
parliament’s lower chamber as well as all seats in the upper chamber. Their strategy
was to convict the government in the Court of Impeachment, to which the
89For an overview of the subsequent development of a parliamentary system with emphasis on its
constitutional status, see Holmøyvik (2016b).
90See Hagemann (2005, 167–168).
91Bjørnson (1882, 12). My translation.
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parliament’s lower chamber could institute a prosecution. Since the Court of
Impeachment was composed of nine supreme court judges and seventeen members
of the parliament’s upper chamber, the well organised liberal fraction could
effectively dictate the outcome of the proceedings. On 18 May 1883, impeachment
proceedings were instituted against the government for violating the constitution by
advising the king to refuse to sanction the 1880 constitutional amendment.92 The
indictment thus presupposed that the constitution did not allow the king to veto
constitutional amendments, and that the exercise of such a veto violated the
constitution.
5.5 The Impeachment Case of 1883–1884
The impeachment proceedings were preceded by an intense public debate from the
mid-1870s following the king’s refusals to sanction the contested constitutional
amendments on the government ministers. While the liberals enjoyed a large
majority in the parliament, the country’s judicial elite sided predominantly with the
king and the government. At the government’s request, the faculty of law at the
university of Christiania (Oslo), the country’s only university at the time, published
a comprehensive report on the royal veto in 1881. The six law professors concluded
unanimously that the constitution provided the king with an absolute veto on
constitutional amendments.93 The report became the mainstay of the campaign for
the royal veto, yet it did little to deter the liberals in their pursuit of the contested
constitutional amendment.
The public debate and the impeachment proceedings cultivated the arguments
and positions from the preceding scholarly debate. As the constitution’s text was
open on the issue—it neither expressly prohibited nor allowed for a royal veto—
arguments for and against the royal veto, and thus also the impeachment case,
hinged upon the understanding of the constitution’s basic character: If the consti-
tution was an actual or functional contract between the king and the people, then a
royal veto on constitutional amendments naturally followed from its contractual
character. If on the other hand the constitution was an act of delegation from the
sovereign people as constituent power, then a royal veto was logically impossible as
92The government was also charged on two other minor counts for not executing two parlia-
mentary decisions. One of them concerned the financing of militias directed against the king and
the government.
93The faculty of law’s 1881 report is published in Sth. Prp. No. 20 (1881). One of the professors,
Frederik Brandt, agreed on the conclusion, but dissented on the reasoning. Brandt dismissed all the
report’s arguments for the royal veto, in effect saying that the constitution did not provide a royal
veto on constitutional amendments. Still he agreed with the report’s conclusion since he consid-
ered a royal veto on constitutional amendments to be a natural consequence of a monarchical form
of government.
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the king was only a constituted power acting on authority delegated to him by the
constitution.
After nearly 60 years of discussion, these two opposing views on the constitu-
tion were now clearly articulated and subject of a heated public debate dominating
political life in Norway for more than a decade before being settled by the Court of
Impeachment. What were the arguments?
The point of departure for the liberal fraction in the parliament and the prose-
cutor in the impeachment case was that the constitution “is not a pact between
people and king, but a constituent act, by which the people can determine its
constitution by virtue of its sovereignty”.94 Here we clearly see the understanding
of the constitution as an instrument of delegation. This claim was supported by
historical sources intended to prove that the omission of the king in the constitu-
tion’s amendment procedure in Art. 112 was no mistake or oversight by the fra-
mers, but rather a deliberate move motivated by the understanding of the
constitution as an act of delegation from the sovereign people. Moreover, this
argument was supported by a historical-contextual interpretation of the constitution.
The parliamentary majority and its supporters pointed to the framers being influ-
enced by the constitutional doctrine and constitutions following the American and
French revolution and based upon the sovereignty of the people.95 In the
impeachment proceedings, the prosecutor argued that the constitution had to be
interpreted in light of preceding constitutions like the United States Constitution of
1787, the French constitution of 1791, the Batavian constitution of 1798 and the
Spanish constitution of 1812.96 The constitutional amendment procedure in all of
these constitutions, though different in the details, followed the same basic model as
the Norwegian constitution by involving the parliament and the people, but not the
executive branch (see Sect. 3).
For the king and his supporters, the constitution was a contract in the sense that
its basic principle was that “sovereignty shall be divided between the branches of
government in equal measures”, according to the conclusion in the faculty of law’s
1881 report.97 Yet a contractual argument for shared sovereignty was sensitive to
historical criticism, as it was clear and not contested that the constitution was
adopted by the constitutional assembly in 1814 by virtue of the sovereignty of the
people. To get around the constitution’s historical context the king and his sup-
porters resorted to two lines of reasoning, both intended to prove that subsequent
events had transformed the constitution into a contract.
94The citation is from the liberal majority in the parliament’s standing committee for scrutiny in
1878, quoted from the parliamentary records, see Indst. O. IV. 1878, 17.
95A key study is Berner (1878).
96See the records of the Court of Impeachment in 1883–1884 in Rigsrets-Tidende. 1883–1884. 3.
Vols. Vol. 2. Kristiania: Th. Steens Forlags-Expedition, 85–89.
97Quoted from the faculty of law’s 1881 report in Sth. Prp. No. 20 (1881), 39. My translation. The
same argument was made by the defender in the impeachment case, see in Rigsrets-Tidende.
1883–1884. 3. Vols. Vol. 2. Kristiania: Th. Steens Forlags-Expedition, 505.
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One line of reasoning challenged the liberals’ historical interpretation by
emphasising the constitution’s revision in the autumn of 1814. The negotiations
between the Norwegian parliament and the Swedish king on the constitution’s
revision had, the royalists argued, rendered it into an actual contract between the
parliament and the king.98 However, as seen in Sect. 3, the extraordinary parliament
revising the constitution in the autumn of 1814 had explicitly rejected the idea of
the revised constitution as a contract. Regardless of the constitution’s origins, the
king’s supporters argued that a royal veto on constitutional amendments had at least
been established by constitutional practice and customary law, since the king had in
fact sanctioned all constitutional amendments since 1814.99
The other and more important line of reasoning was a systemic interpretation of
the constitution’s separation of powers aimed to prove that it was intended as
functional contract. This argument held that while the constitution had indeed been
adopted by virtue of the people’s sovereignty, the people had then transferred its
sovereignty by means of the constitution to the king and the parliament.100 There
was little historical evidence to support such a claim however. Instead it was based
on a deduction from the very concept of separation of powers. For the royalists,
separation of powers simply meant Montesquieu’s doctrine of equilibrium, in which
the royal veto was a key element (see Sect. 4). While there were hardly any
references made to Montesquieu at the constitutional assembly in 1814, arguments
for the royal veto in the 1870s and 1880s were full of references to him. For the
royalists, Montesquieu’s prestige was so great that at one point in the impeachment
proceedings, the defender referred to him as nothing less than “Montesquieu the
master”.101
The resurgence of the Montesquieuan doctrine of equilibrium was merged with
arguments according to the monarchical principle. During the impeachment pro-
ceedings, the defender repeatedly argued that an absolute royal veto on constitu-
tional amendments was nothing more than a corollary of monarchy.102 Europe’s
post-1814 monarchical constitutions were employed to prove the point, although
the European constitutional landscape was more diverse now than in the 1820s. The
use of European restoration constitutionalism to interpret the Norwegian constitu-
tion can be illustrated with the already mentioned Frederik Stang. In his 1833
98See i.e. the debate on June 14 1878 in the parliamentary records, Storthingstidende (1878), vol.
2, 507–522 and the defender in the Court of Impeachment in See examples in Rigsrets-Tidende.
1883–1884. 3. Vols. Vol. 2. Kristiania: Th. Steens Forlags-Expedition, 717.
99See the faculty of law’s 1881 report in Sth. Prp. No. 20 (1881), 17, 29 and 39 and Aubert (1880,
5–6).
100See the records of the Court of Impeachment in 1883–1884 in Rigsrets-Tidende. 1883–1884. 3.
Vols. Vol. 2. Kristiania: Th. Steens Forlags-Expedition, 505, the faculty of law’s 1881 report in
Sth. Prp. No. 20 (1881), 19 and Aubert (1880, 24).
101Quoted from the records of the Court of Impeachment in 1883–1884, see Rigsrets-Tidende.
1883–1884. 3. Vols. Vol. 2. Kristiania: Th. Steens Forlags-Expedition, 525.
102See examples in Rigsrets-Tidende. 1883–1884. 3. Vols. Vol. 2. Kristiania: Th. Steens
Forlags-Expedition, 515–517, 531, 570.
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constitutional law treatise, Stang the young scholar had rejected any link between
the 1814 constitution and the later octroyed and contractual constitutions of
post-1814 restoration Europe. Later however, like Christian Magnus Falsen in the
1820s, Stang changed his view on the royal veto. As prime minister between 1861
and 1880, Stang advised the king to veto the constitutional amendment on the
government ministers in 1872, 1874 and 1877. In 1883, the ageing Stang published
a pamphlet arguing for the royal veto on constitutional amendments and called for
the interpretation of the Norwegian constitution in light of “later monarchical
constitutions” in Europe.103
5.6 The Constituent Power Decided
The proceedings before the Court of Impeachment lasted for almost eleven months
until 1 April 1884.104 The written records from the proceedings span three volumes
with a total of around 2900 pages.105 In the end, the Court of Impeachment ruled
that the constitution did not allow the king to veto constitutional amendments.
Prime minster Selmer and the government ministers were all convicted and most of
them dismissed from their offices.106
The verdict was political in the sense that the parliamentarian members of the
Court of Impeachment all voted for conviction, while the Supreme Court judges all
voted for acquittal. The Court was sharply divided on class lines as well. The
Supreme Court judges belonged to the nation’s traditional ruling class of senior
civil servants, like the law professors and government ministers. Among the sev-
enteen parliamentarians, only one was a lawyer, the rest being a motley group of
farmers, school teachers and others representing the common people.
Despite the case’s political context, the Court of Impeachment in 1883–1884
finally settled the 60-year-old dispute on the royal veto on constitutional amend-
ment and the constitution’s character. The sovereignty of the people had prevailed
over the monarchical principle. Sovereignty was not divided between the king and
the people. The people alone were the constituent power, and the constitution was
not a contract for sharing sovereignty, but an instrument of delegation for the
sovereign people.
The king and some royalist lawyers, like the leading constitutional law scholar
and conservative politician Torkel Halvorsen Aschehoug, refused however to accept
103Stang (1883, 30–31). My translation.
104Due to procedural reasons, the prime minster and the government ministers were indicted
individually, leading to separate judgements being rendered from February 27 to April 1 1884.
105Rigsrets-Tidende. 1883–1884. 3. Vols. Kristiania: Th. Steens Forlags-Expedition.
106The Court of Impeachment’s protocol is published in Dokument nr. 1 (1930) Voteringer i
Riksrettene 1814–1884, 109–192. See also Hallager (1915–1916, 101–128).
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the judgement as an authoritative interpretation of the constitution.107 The conser-
vative press reacted with shock and horror, accusing the liberals for annihilating the
1814 constitution and complaining about the “flood of democracy that has now been
released”.108 The king continued to sanction constitutional amendments, so that in
1913 Art. 112 in the constitution was formally amended as to explicitly ban the royal
veto.109 Yet after the 1884 judgement by the Court of Impeachment, no subsequent
constitutional amendments would be contested with reference to the royal veto. The
contractual understanding of constitution was no longer prevalent. Equally impor-
tant, shortly after the judgement the constitutional amendment on the government
minister’s access to the parliament went into force. As the king and his supporters
had feared, within two decades the presence of government ministers in the par-
liament had turned into a full-blown parliamentary system.110
6 Conclusion
Perhaps the Norwegian 1814 constitution was destined to be torn between different
interpretations of its basic legal character. Adopted at the very eve of the revolu-
tionary era and modelled on the constitutions following the American and French
revolutions, the 1814 constitution was put into effect in a radically different ideo-
logical context due to the dominance of the monarchical principle in post-1814
Europe. As a result, two incompatible notions of constitutionalism existed
side-by-side in Norway for 60 years until the great clash in 1880–1884.
In the proceedings before the Court of Impeachment in 1883–1884, both sides
conjured up terrifying images of their opponent’s notion of constitutionalism. For
the prosecutor, the contractual understanding of constitution was equal to abso-
lutism. With reference to Montesquieu’s doctrine of equilibrium, the prosecutor
remarked:
If this system prevails, then clearly the principle of constitutionalism in our constitution is
dead. Monarchy would once again and with only minor limitations have won absolute
supremacy in the state.111
107See Aschehoug (1893, 565–581) and Morgenstierne (1900, 378–386).
108Morgenbladet July 7 1884.
109A second paragraph with the following wording was added to article 112: “An amendment to
the Constitution adopted in the manner aforesaid shall be signed by the President and the Secretary
of the Storting, and shall be sent to the King for public announcement in print as an applicable
provision of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway.” Official translation retrieved from the
Norwegian parliament’s website: https://stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/english/constitutionenglish.
pdf [accessed 16.09.2016].
110For an overview, see Holmøyvik (2016b).
111See in Rigsrets-Tidende. 1883–1884. 3. Vols. Vol. 2. Kristiania: Th. Steens Forlags-Expedition,
301. My translation.
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The defender for his part referred again and again to the prosecutors arguments
as “the constitutional law of the French revolution” and of Rousseau.112 More than
once the defender alluded to the notorious Robespierre’s reign of terror by the
guillotine as a certain outcome in Norway too if the people’s representatives were
left unchecked by a monarch.
Nineteenth century Norway was in many ways an intellectual battleground
between the sovereignty of the people and the constitutional ideals of the French
revolution on the one hand, and the monarchical principle and the constitutional
ideals of the restoration era on the other hand. In Norway, unlike in Europe, the
French revolution prevailed.
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within the structures of the Albertine Statute and to the amendment mechanisms of
the constitutional text. The preamble of the Albertine Statute speaks of «perpetual
and irrevocable fundamental law». The word «perpetual» meant the prohibition of
revoking constitutional concession, while the word «irrevocable» was intended as a
pact between the Sovereign and the Nation. Over the years, very few were the
changes to the letter of the Albertine Statute. The interpretation and the practice
represented the most important mechanisms of constitutional change (implicit
constitutional changes). A primary role was acknowledged to non-written norms. In
this perspective, it may well be said that the Italian Constitution consisted in
something more than the written text and dwelt in the spirit and not in the letter of
the Albertine Statute.
1 Overview
Under the Albertine Statute speaking of constitution meant referring to the «fundamental
law of the State» as well as to the act by which the sovereign limits himself transforming
the absolute Monarchy into a constitutional government.1 For the purpose of defining the
Constitution, references to Gian Domenico Romagnosi did not go amiss, a jurist who had
explained that through the word ‘Constitution’ one was referring both to a written text
and to the legal order of the State.2 In the commentary by Carlo Boncompagni, to the
question: what is the constitution?, its pactional nature (an agreement among the various
parties in society) was highlighted and the idea was reinforced, through the metaphor of
the human body and natural sciences, according to which the constitution was a law that
defined the skeleton of the State.3
By way of these examples, we may approximately say that the word
‘Constitution’ referred to a political organisation based on consociationalism
1Cf. Dizionario politico popolare, ed. Pietro Trifone, introduction by Luca Serianni. Roma:
Salerno, 1984, ad vocem: «oggi suona come la legge fondamentale di uno Stato; ma più
comunemente equivale a costituzione, o, a meglio dire, alla carta costituzionale, ossia a quell’atto
col quale un principe assoluto cangia la monarchia dispotica in monarchia temperata» (today it
sounds like the fundamental law of a State, but it is more commonly equivalent to a constitution,
or, to put it another way, to the constitutional charter, rather to that act with which an absolute
prince changes the dispotic monarchy into a moderate monarchy).
2The reference is contained in the Dizionario politico nuovamente compilato ad uso della gioventù
italiana. Torino: Pompa, 1849. Cf. Romagnosi (1937).
3«Nelle società che hanno origine da una convenzione la Costituzione è il patto che fissa le
condizioni della loro esistenza. Le azioni de’ soci sono coordinate secondo il patto sociale, onde
concorrono tutte ad un effetto voluto da tutti. In quella società che è lo Stato, Costituzione è la
legge secondo cui lo Stato esiste: mancando l’esistenza di quella legge lo Stato si sfascerebbe» (In
societies which originate from a convention, the Constitution is the pact which fixes the conditions
of their existence. The actions of the associates are coordinated according to the social pact so that
they all contribute to an effect desired by all. In that society which is the State, the Constitution is
the law according to which the State exists: lacking the existence of that law the State will come
apart). Cf. Boncompagni (1880: UTET, 4–5).
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(pactum societatis), but also to a normative act, to the subdivision of supreme
powers within the State and to the idea of limitation/equilibrium of power, to the
guarantee of liberties. These definitions recall the modern meaning of Constitution
which, from mere empirical concept that described the political condition of a State,
ever more took on a prescriptive meaning enriching itself with normative elements.4
The Italian language had no word indicating the normative layout of the State until
the late Eighteenth century.5
Having said this, it is fruitless to wish to find the normative superiority of the
Constitution, as expression of a positivistic concept, within the Italian experience of
the liberal period.6 It is neither worth our while focussing attention on the normative
text of the Albertine Statute to demonstrate its shortcomings and ambivalences. The
perspective is rather that of verifying how the Albertine Statute was intended in the
liberal era, that of the value attributed to the constitutional charter during the
process of national unification, that of constitutional interpretation. It is a matter of
reading the Albertine Statute through its evolution, considering contests and con-
trasts to keep the institutions in harmony with civil society. Specifically, the focus
of this investigation is the constitutionalisation, understood on the one hand as the
process of legal integration within the structure of the Albertine Statute, extended
to all the pre-Unitary States following political Unification, which implies
never-fully-successful attempts at developing representative institutions and par-
liamentarianism, at democratisation and consensus, while on the other the mech-
anism of interpretation and amendability (revision) of the constitutional text which
leads to an integration without a written document as an act of a constituent power
exercised by the people. In this respect literature talked about «weak constitu-
tionalisation» as an original character and permanent feature of the Italian State,
highlighting how from the very beginning the Italian constitutional development
happened without breaks, without revolutions and in the name of continuity.7
4Regarding these aspects, see Stourzh (2007, 80–99). Please, also see the essays: The origins and
Transformation of the Concept of the Constitution (3–37); Conditions for Emergence and
Effectiveness of Modern Constitutionalism (41–87) and The Concept of Constitution in Historical
Perspective (89–124) published in Grimm (2016). The author distinguishes between an empirical
concept of Constitution and a concept of Constitution which, over time, becomes richer of nor-
mative elements. He concludes that the concept of constitution will never come to establish itself
as a mere juridical dimension. Compare the thought of Comanducci (1990). The author identifies
three models: axiological model where the word Constitution indicates the social order of natural
phenomena; descriptive model where the word indicates the artificial order, the State structure and
the balance of powers; the normative model where the constitution indicates the juridical norms
expressed in documents or customary law. On the meaning and role of the Constitution in different
periods, please see: Fioravanti (1999, 2007). Further bibliography in § 3.1.
5Mannori (2016). By the same author, please see also Mannori (2011).
6Fioravanti (2009).
7Cassese (2014, 329–335). The author, while observing the way in which Italy gave itself a
constitution, speaks of constitutionalisation by evolution and of missed and/or imperfect revolu-
tion. He observes that the process of national unification changed itself from a “national-popular”
movement to “monarchical-governmental movement. “Original character and permanent features”
were firstly mentioned by Sbriccoli (2009, 591 ff).
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If it is true that in Italy constitutionalisation has been a “downward process”, this
can be partly explained with the culture of the liberal-moderate party concerned
about avoiding excesses, favouring compromise and shunning big breaks and
upheavals. It is extremely appropriate to underline how the promulgation of a
written constitution constitutes only the first step of the slow and difficult process of
constitutionalisation, made of progresses but also of reactions, standstills. The other
phase is that of experimenting which led to an evolution of the meaning of the
Statute in the light of the socio-cultural context.
In Italy, constitutionalisation of National unification is a long-term phenomenon,
constituting the key feature for reading the National Building.8 Specifically, the
Albertine Statute is a starting point more than an arrival point.9 From the moment
when the sovereign grants the constitution, we realise that the normative act
deriving from the granting is insufficient in itself, the constitutional law is simply an
act which cannot be revoked, but the constitution in order to live must obtain
consent and public opinion must believe in it.
2 Constitution, Charte and Statuto: Different Names
for the Same Thing?
In the Commento allo Statuto del Regno (1909) by Francesco Racioppi and Ignazio
Brunelli we read:
Sostanzialmente, Costituzione è il complesso delle regole, scritte o non scritte – leggi, usi,
precedenti, consuetudini – che danno la fisionomia e il modo di essere politico di uno Stato,
ossia determinano in qual modo la sovranità si esercita per mezzo degli organi varii che nel
loro complesso costituiscono il governo, e quali sfere di diritti sono garantiti dalla sovranità
ai cittadini singoli di fronte al governo medesimo. In breve, Costituzione sostanzialmente è
il complesso delle regole che determinano l’ordinamento del governo e le libertà dei
cittadini. Formalmente, invece, Costituzione è l’atto o documento scritto, che contiene le
regole fondamentali dell’ordinamento politico.10
8On this aspect, interesting are the remarks by Manca (2014).
9Cf. Lacchè (2016b).
10«Substantially, Constitution is the whole gamut of written and non-written rules—statute laws,
customs, legal precedents, customary law—which give the appearance and the way of looking
political of a State, rather they determine in which way sovereignty exercises itself by way of
various bodies which as a whole constitute the government, and which spheres of rights are
guaranteed by sovereignty to individual citizens against the same government. In short,
Constitution is substantially the whole of rules which determines the legal order of the government
and liberties of citizens. Formally instead, Constitution is the act or written document, which
contains the fundamental rules of the political order». Cf. Racioppi and Brunelli (1909a, 45).
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The definition allows highlighting how, for historical reasons, the conviction that
the Constitution had a life beyond the written text affirmed itself quickly. It was a
matter of a vision already present in the thought of the primeval Italian constitu-
tional doctrine.11
The Commentary by Brunelli and Racioppi highlighted also that in the Italian
experience the word ‘constitution’ was a synonym for Statute. It was indeed a
matter of two words of Latin origin respectively deriving from the verbs constituere
and statuere.12 During the Ancien Regime with ‘constitution’ were generically
indicated all the normative acts issued by the Sovereign.13 The word ‘statuto’ was
directly linkable to the late medieval experience of the Italian Communes where the
word indicated the whole of rules which regulated the life of the civitas.
In the minutes of the Consiglio di Conferenza (Council of Conference) there is
no sign of the reasons which led to the denomination even though the hypothesis
that the nomen juris had been proposed by Giovanetti was put forward.14 The
choice of the denomination was not devoid of relevance if it is duly considered, as
the above-mentioned commentary underlines, that the word ‘statute’ had its French
corresponding word in the expression charte constitutionelle.
In the France of 1814, the question was, indeed, the subject of careful discussion.
Constitution called the revolutionary period back to mind in that act which came
from people. The French monarchy wanted, on the contrary, to unequivocally
underline that the new normative text was a direct derivation of monarchical power.
Therefore, once completed the drawing of the text within the Council of the King,
the Chancellor Charles Henri Dambray proposed to use the expression Ordonnance
de reformation, while Antoine-François-Claude Ferrand suggested the expression
Acte constitutionnel. The position of Jacques Claude Beugnot prevailed, who
shunning both proposals suggested the term Charte to which the adjective con-
stitutionnelle was coupled according to the decision of King Louis XVIII.15
11Opposition between written text and material constitution will have more complete theoretical
formulations in the very fortunate volume by Mortati (1998). The original text dates back to 1940.
12For a juridical and linguistic analysis of the meaning of the words ‘Constitution’, ‘Statute’ and
‘Brief’ see Bambi (1991).
13For example, in the Kingdom of Sardinia the sovereign, Vittorio Amedeo II, gathered in 5
volumes the royal decrees in force in the State entitling Costituzioni piemontesi (Piedmont
Constitutions) the work of normative rearrangement. On this collection please see: Viora (1986).
14Cf. Ciaurro (1996, 44–45).
15On the point Rosanvallon (1994), Lacchè (2002) and Alvazzi del Frate (2013). «Le mot de
Constitution, dit-il, suppose le concours pour établir un nouvel ordre des choses, entre le roi et les
représentants, soit du peuple, soit du peuple et des grands; et il est bien évident que rien de tel ne se
rencontre ici … Puisqu’il s’agit d’une concession faite librement par un roi à ses sujets, le nom
anciennement usité, celui consacré par l’histoire de plusieurs peuples et par la nôtre est celui de
Charte» (The word Constitution, he says, supposes the cooperation—in order to establish a new
order of things—between the king and the representatives both of the people and of the people and
the great men; and it is very clear that nothing of this will be found here … Since it is a matter of a
concession made freely by a king to his subjects, the name anciently used, that name consacred by
the history of many people and by ours, is that of Charter). Cf. Beugnot (1866, t. II, 219).
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If, in Italy as well, very probably the word Constitution was rejected because it
was considered too ‘revolutionary’, the adjective ‘constitutional’ was instead
associated with the government in order to indicate the way in which the monar-
chical power was shared with the people.16 The Statute, indeed, defined the con-
stitutional government as that form of power exercising shared between Sovereign
and Parliament where a connection between those ruled and rulers was
guaranteed.17
3 Albertine Statute as Fundamental Law
The language of the Albertine Statute was archaic and ambiguous, the text was
without organic connections. The constitution of Charles Albert contained
eighty-one articles and three transitory regulations. The first twenty-three articles
were mainly dedicated to the person of the King and to the institution of Regency.
Art. 24-32 were gathered under the title On rights and duties of the citizen. Art.
33-64 concerned the Parliament and were respectively dedicated to the Senate, to
the Chamber of Deputies and contained shared regulations for the functioning of
both branches of Parliament. Art. 65-67 concerned Ministers; Art. 68-73 referred to
the judicial power; the remaining part was general regulations.
The written constitution was bare and many rules had the taste of general
principles rather than directly binding juridical norms.18 Consequently, the true
game was played at the level of praxis and interpretation, of the perennial difficulty
to bring the principles therein contained within the doctrinal borders of modern
constitutionalism.19 Substantially it was a matter of extrapolating the effective
limitations to the monarchical power from the text of the Constitution and enu-
cleating rules which consented a real development of the parliamentary principle
guaranteeing fundamental rights and liberties.
16On this aspect please see the remarks of Mannori who highlights how during the
post-revolutionary period in Italy literature preferred to talk about «governi liberi» (free govern-
ments) rather than «governo costituzionale» (constitutional government). Cf. Mannori (2016, 120).
17Ragazzoni and Urbinati (2016).
18The Knight Des Ambrois noted: «L’urgenza, dice, non è di formulare una Costituzione che
bisognerebbe dare dopo matura deliberazione, come conviene al bel paese e alla dignità del
Governo, ma è indispensabile fissare principi» (Urgency, he says, is not that of formulating a
Constitution which should be granted after mature deliberation, as befits the Bel paese and the
dignity of its Government, but it is indispensable to fix principles). Cf. Minutes of the Consiglio di
Conferenza (Council of Conference) of 3rd February in Ciaurro. Lo statuto albertino illustrato dai
lavori preparatori cit., 115–116.
19Reference is to the classical volume by McIlwain (1998).
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3.1 The Albertine Statute by Means of Its Preamble
The Albertine Statute was preceded by an ample preamble. The introductive for-
mula «per la grazia di Dio» (by the grace of God) recalled the expression Reges Dei
gratia, reges Catholici probably used for the first time by the Lombard Kings, then
made his own by Charlemagne and, finally, after a long evolution become an
expression of royal legitimism.20 It was inserted in the preamble nearly to mark
without any doubts that the constitution was an act of sovereignty of the King.
Then, the list of the feudal and honorary titles of Savoy Sovereigns followed. The
same expression «con la lealtà di Re e con l’affetto di padre» (with the loyalty of
King and the love of Father), which precedes the manifestation of will directed to
grant representative institutions more in tune with the new times and the interests of
the Nation, is typical of the paternalistic vision of the State d’ancien regime. It is
not difficult to find a certain lexical familiarity with the 1814 Charte
Constitutionnelle in the Preamble of the Albertine Statute.21 The beginning of the
Albertine Statute reproduces the magniloquent expressions of the French model.
The formula «par la grace de Dieu» had its precedent besides in the Charte also in
the Déclaration de Saint-Ouen by which the King rejected the text elaborated by
the Senate (so-called senatorial constitution) and established the bases for a new
Constitution with the Proclamation of 2 May 1814.
Following the Restoration, the French Monarchy had dedicated an obsessive
care to the Preamble inaugurating a new form of constitutionalism.22 The
Commissioner Beugnot summarised the new constitutional philosophy with the
formula «to absorb the Revolution into the Monarchy».23 In a project of Preamble
drawn up by Louis de Fontanes, a free and monarchic constitution which kept all
the prerogative of the Crown was already outlined.24 Such a layout was restated in
the definitive text.25 In other words, the Charte was an act by the King who decided
to self-limit his own powers maintaining free and monarchic institutions together.
20Cf. Maranini (1926, 128).
21See Müßig (2016, 66–67).
22On the model of the so-called granted constitutions inaugurated in Restoration Europe please
see: Lacchè (2016c).
23«absorber la Révolution dans la Monarchie» (to absorb the Revolution within the Monarchy). Cf.
Rapport de Beugnot au roi sur la forme de promulgation de la Charte. In Rosanvallon, La
Monarchie impossible. Les Chartes de 1814 et de 1830 cit.
24The text «Projet de préambule de la Charte rédigé par Fontanes» in Rosanvallon, Pierre. La
Monarchie impossible, cit. 243–245.
25The Preamble of the 1814 Charte constitutionnelle: «[…] une Charte constitutionnelle était
l’expression d’un besoin réel; […] En même temps que nous reconnaissions qu’une constitution
libre et monarchique devait remplir l’attente de l’Europe éclairée, nous avons dû nous souvenir
aussi que notre premier devoir envers nos peuples était de conserver, pour leur propre intérêt, les
droits et les prérogatives de notre couronne» (a constitutional Charter was the expression of a real
need; […] At the same time that we would acknowledge that a free and monarchic constitution
should fill the expectation of Enlightened Europe, we should have remembered also that our first
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Almost at the end of the preamble the Albertine Statute is defined «perpetual and
irrevocable fundamental law». It is highly probable that, according to the king’s
will, also the expression «fundamental law» evoked the theories concerning the lois
fondamentales typical of the French absolute monarchy.26 «Perpetual» meant the
oath (political and juridical obligation) taken by the King for himself and his
successors, of not revoking the constitutional granting in any way.
The word «irrevocable» was, instead, intended in the meaning of a pact between
the Sovereign and the Nation.27 The idea of pact referred, above all, to the ancient
conception which saw, in the leges fundamentales, a contract by which the rela-
tionships between sovereigns and parliamentary assemblies were regulated guar-
anteeing the succession to the throne. Moreover, such an idea allowed basing the
State origins not so much on popular sovereignty, rather on a pact. In such a way,
the State was based upon monarchy and people without having to go through a
constituent assembly. In the background there were the positions of the French
doctrinarians. In this sense the position of Constant was emblematic: according to
him the constitution essentially had a political supremacy expressing the great pact
between Monarchy and Nation.28 In a letter sent to Minister Ricci, Antonio Costa
duty towards our people was to keep, for their own interest, the rights and the prerogatives of our
crown).
26On “fundamental law” in Ancien Régime please see among the abundant bibliography: Lemaire
(1907), Gough (1955), Thompson (1986), Höpfl (1986), Schmale (1987), Valensise (1988), Tomás
y Valiente (1995), Coronas González (1995, 2011), Saint-Bonnet (2000), Vergne (2006),
Mohnhaupt and Grimm (2008), Mohnhaupt (2014), Bambi (2012, 11–28). And finally also Tavilla
(2016).
27«Lo Statuto è un patto che lega il Principe ed il popolo sotto una determinata forma di Governo,
e per conseguenza viene ad essere la legge fondamentale perpetua ed invariabile dello Stato, in
modo che se il Principe tentasse di rivocarla, il popolo rimarrebbe sciolto da ogni dovere di
sudditanza, e potrebbe con giusto titolo impedire l’esazione delle imposte, non che avrebbe il
diritto d’insorgere contro il Governo. D’altronde il popolo non ha un dritto di immutare le basi
fondamentali dello stato, né tanto meno quello di sovvertirle o distruggerlo. Coloro quindi che, con
improvvido consiglio meditassero o tentassero di fondare sulle rovine di una dinastia regnante la
repubblica, cospirerebbero ad un tempo e contro il popolo e contro il Re, comprometterebbero
l’intera nazione per velleità di maggiori libertà, che sovente si risolvono in illusioni o sogni,
seppure non menano un’anarchia e quindi al dispotismo» (The Statute is a pact which binds the
Prince and the people under a determinate form of Government and consequently becomes the
perpetual and invariable fundamental law of the State, so that if the Prince tried to revoke it, the
people would remain free from every duty of subjection, and could, with every right, impede the
collection of taxes, as well as they would have the right of rising up against the Government.
However, the people have no right of changing the fundamental bases of the State, nor that of
subverting or destroying them. Therefore those who, with short-sighted advice, meditated or
attempted to found the republic on the ruins of a ruling dynasty, would conspire, at the same time,
against the people and against the King, would compromise the whole nation because of fanciful
ambitions of greater liberties, which often result in illusions or dreams, if they do not bring anarchy
and therefore despotism). Cf. La Pegna (1871). Also, Vismara (1865).
28Constant (1815). Cf. Fioravanti. Costituzionalismo. percorsi della storia e tendenze attuali cit.,
38. Concerning the Albertine Statute, please see Fioravanti (2006).
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noted that the Preamble little complied with the principles that regulated a con-
stitutional government highlighting:
Uno Statuto rappresentativo, dovrebbe essere, anziché un ordinamento sovrano, il risultato
di un patto tra Popolo e Re; e dovendo d’altronde servir di Legge fondamentale dello Stato;
Legge che deve ammorzare ogni dissidio tra il Re ed il Popolo, parrebbe non tanto con-
veniente quanto importante il consultare il Popolo sulle basi che dovrebbero adottarsi.
Epperò sarebbe assai profittevole che venisse lo Statuto pubblicato, dichiarato meramente
provvisorio; provvisorio; cioè nel senso non dell’effetto, ma del disposto, per essere poi
discusso da una Nazionale Assemblea, che assumerebbe il titolo di Costituente. Che se una
Costituente riuscisse impossibile ad ottenersi, lo Statuto domanda, per i tempi in cui fu
pubblicato, di essere riformato.29
The remarks of Antonio Costa neatly disputed the traditional idea which made
the fundamental law of the State rest on the conventional moment of the pactum
and therefore the idea which tied up the will of the Prince to a public contract
because of mutual consent. Such was indeed the value that some important docu-
ments of the European political tradition assumed.30 According to the Ligurian
scholar, a representative constitution could not be defined a pact between People
and King without having consulted the people on the fundamental rules to adopt.
The same words «perpetual» and «irrevocable» were an anachronism with reference
to the reason of the times in that they bound government action for a more or less
long lapse of time. In such a context Costa asked to consider the Albertine statute as
provisional and to convene an assembly for its reform.
In Subalpine tradition, the idea of the contract was however destined to survive
in the institutional everyday life. The notion of pact which—as it has been recently
underlined—did not come out of the Statute but it preceded it,31 was destined to be
reaffirmed every time it was highlighted that the representative government was the
fruit of the cooperation between King and Parliament by which the most important
choices for the nation were made.
29«A representative Statute should be, rather than a sovereign order, the result of a pact between
People and King; and after all having to serve as Fundamental Law of the State; Law that must
soften every tension between the King and the People, it would seem not just convenient rather
important to consult with the People about the foundations which should be laid down. However,
it would be much more fruitful that the issued Statute was declared merely temporary; temporary,
that is in the sense not of its effect, rather of its provision, in order to be then discussed by a
National Assembly, which would assume the title of Constituent Assembly. If it would be
impossible to obtain a Constituent Assembly, the Statute requires, at the time in which it was
issued, to be reformed». The letter is included in Ghisleri (1922, 7–8).
30For example, among these documents beside the English Magna Charta, we would also include
the Joyeuse Entrée de Brabant of 1356 considered then as one of the historical sources of the
Belgian constitution of 1831; the Pacta conventa of 1573 with which the Polish Diet set limita-
tions to the French king Henry of the House of Valois. For these examples please see cf. Tavilla,
Sovranità e leggi fondamentali cit., 95–96.
31On the idea that the pact did not originate only from the Statute, see Ferrari Zumbini (2016, 40–47).
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3.2 Constitutional/Unconstitutional Law
in Parliamentary Acts
The expression “unconstitutional” was not unknown when the Albertine Statute was
in force.32 While examining sources it is not difficult to find how during parlia-
mentary sessions speakers raised questions of the unconstitutionalability of statute
laws and regulations without affirming a prominence of the Constitution over the
other juridical norms for this reason.33 Rather there was a certain coincidence
between the meaning which the term ‘unconstitutional’ assumed within English
public law and the expression used in Italian constitutional practice where ‘uncon-
stitutional’ was generically intended «every incorrect constitutional behaviour».34
Generally, validity of a juridical norm should be found in its most generic confor-
mity to the sensitivity of public opinion. Therefore, a normative act or fact was con-
sidered unconstitutional whenever it was discordant with the spirit of the Constitution.
Cavour inaugurated this form of interpretation of the Albertine Statute. This was
the most important legacy of the statesman to the constitutional theory of the liberal
period. From 1850 every normative act was examined in the light not only of the
32For an overall view of the main questions on the theme please see Miceli (1902).
33Many examples taken from parliamentary acts are included in Ferrari Zumbini. Tra norma e vita.
Il mosaico costituzionale a Torino 1846–1849 cit. The author notes how the Statute norms were
reference parameters which changed according to cultural and social awareness. Generally, in the
Italian case there had been a constitutionalisation without a hierarchicalisation of norms. With
reference to the relationship between hierarchicalisation and constitutionalisation Dieter Grimm
noted: «The hierchicalization of legal norms does not by itself produce a constituzionalization».
Cf. Dieter Grimm, The origins and transformation of the Concept of the Constitution. In
Constitutionalism cit., 6.
34In his renowned volume dedicated to English public law, Albert V. Dicey specified, referring to
the concept of sovereignty of the Parliament, that in England no juridical distinction existed
between Constitution and the other laws and that no power existed to nullify an Act of Parliament
(86). Later the author clarified that «The expression “unconstitutional” has, as applied to a law, at
least three different meanings varying according to the nature of the constitution with reference to
which it is used: (1) The expression, as applied to an English Act of Parliament, means simply that
the Act in question, as, for instance, the Irish Church Act, 1869, is, in the opinion of the speaker,
opposed to the spirit of the English constitution; it cannot mean that the Act is either a breach of
law or is void. (2) The expression, as applied to a law passed by the French Parliament, means that
the law, e.g. extending the length of the President’s tenure of office, is opposed to the articles of the
constitution. The expression does not necessarily mean that the law in question is void, for it is by
no means certain that any French Court will refuse to enforce a law because it is unconstitutional.
The word would probably, though not of necessity, be, when employed by a Frenchman, a term of
censure. (3) The expression, as applied to an Act of Congress, means simply that the Act is one
beyond the power of Congress, and is therefore void. The word does not, in this case, necessarily
import any censure whatever. An American might, without any inconsistency, say that an Act of
Congress was a good law, that is, a law calculated in his opinion to benefit the country, but that
unfortunately it was “unconstitutional” that is to say, ultra vires and void». Cf. Dicey (1889).
Appendix, Note V—The meaning of the “unconstitutional” law, 427–428. «The epithet un-con-
stitutional is applied to breaches of conventions as well as of law, meaning that the public opinion
condemns (or should condemn) the act». Cf. Wade and Phillips (1931, 8).
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letter of the Constitution, but especially of its Spirit. This allowed keeping the legal
order in constant harmony with public opinion.
One of Cavour’s first interventions in this respect took place on the occasion of
the discussion of the Bill concerning the immovability of judges.35 The Parliament
asked itself if the constitutional principle according to which judges are immovable
should be interpreted in the sense that immovability shall be calculated from their
appointment date or rather from the promulgation of the Statute. Cavour was in
favour of the first interpretation because it was more in tune with the new consti-
tutional regime.36
Examples can multiply. Think also of the discussion on the Bill for the tax on
individuals and goods.37 Deputy Farina accused the Cabinet of violating the most
general principles proclaimed by the Statute. Cavour, minister of Finances,
defended himself establishing that the new tax was perfectly in compliance with the
Spirit of the Statute which imposed every citizen to contribute to the expenditure of
the State proportionally to his own income.38 The Parliament handled questions
which dealt with central aspects of public finance. Thanks to the great ability of the
speakers, budget questions were considered from a constitutional viewpoint so
much as to become, in salient moments of national history, the place where to
favour a greater political integration and to better develop constitutional rules. In
such direction, can we also call an intervention in financial matters, as well, by
Deputy Minghetti to mind. A Bill concerning stamp duties was accused of being
contrary to the Spirit of the Constitution, also because some years before, a statute
law of similar content had been rejected by the legislative assembly. During the
parliamentary debate, Minghetti had the chance of clarifying the relationship among
Constitution, public opinion and constitutional government: the true nature of the
35Cavour (1863).
36«Io rilevo al principio la questione chiarissima e al mio senso la prima interpretazione mi pare la
più chiara, la più ovvia e la più conforme allo Spirito ed alla lettera dello Statuto» (I notice, at the
beginning, a very clear matter and the first interpretation appears to me to be the most clear, the
most obvious and the most consistent with the Spirit and the letter of the Statute). Cf. Cavour
(1863, 150–151).
37Cavour (1866).
38«L’onorevole deputato Farina chiudeva il suo discorso quasi quasi tacciando il Ministero d’aver
commesso un delitto di leso Statuto nel proporre questa legge. Io in verità non so se abbia
commesso così grave delitto; ma sicuramente non ne provo nessun rimorso. Io era anzi tutto pieno
di rispetto per lo Statuto quando preparava e proponeva questa legge; ed aveva, come ho, l’intima
convinzione, di essere con questa legge rimasto fedele e alla lettera, e ancora di più allo spirito
dello Statuto medesimo, il quale vuole che le imposte siano ripartite secondo i mezzi che ha
ciascuno per pagarle» (The honourable Deputy Farina closed his speech almost accusing the
Ministry of having committed a crime of lese Statute in proposing this law. I, truly, do not know if
I committed such a serious crime; but surely I feel no remorse. I was, first of all, full of respect for
the Statute when I prepared and proposed this law; and I had, as I have, the innermost conviction,
with this law, of having been faithful to both the letter and even more to the spirit of the same
statute, which wants taxes to be shared according to the means that each one has for paying them).
Cf. Cavour (1866, 210).
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constitutional government was that of introducing legislative novelties while
keeping the Constitution connected with popular feeling.39
During the liberal period, was instead inexistent and/or irrelevant the category of
constitutional law. The distinction between constitutional law and the others laws
was formally introduced by Art. 12, Law of 9 December 1928 No 2693, which
formally sanctioned the institution of the Grand Council of Fascism. This legislative
provision established the compulsory opinion of the Grand Council on every law
proposal with a constitutional nature such as those dealing with the following matters:
succession to the throne, attributions and prerogatives of the Crown; the composition
and functioning of the Grand Council, of the Senate of the Kingdom and of the
Deputies’ Chamber; attribution and prerogatives of the Head of the Government,
Prime Minister, Secretary of State; the faculty of the Executive power to issue
juridical norms; trade union and corporative legal order; the relationship between
State and Holy See; international treaties which involved variations to the territories
of the State and its colonies, or rather the surrender to acquire territories.40 This
caused Italian doctrine to discuss, if this new law provision had triggered a new
hierarchy among sources giving juridical prominence to the constitution and the
constitutional laws over the other law sources. The difference was indeed at proce-
dural level, in that it foresaw a heavier procedure, consisting in the advice of the
Grand Council, for the approval of constitutional laws, and not really at the level of
source hierarchy thanks to which an ordinary law could be declared void.41
4 Theories on Constitutional Revision
The Albertine Statute did not foresee a heavier procedure for constitutional revision.
The lack of an explicit legal provision generated no small measure of uncer-
tainty, the reflections of the French jurists weighed upon the Italian debate. They
39«l’indole del regime costituzionale sta in ciò appunto, che le riforme non si compiono e le novità
non s’introducono, se non se quando siano maturate nella pubblica opinione, e che per con-
seguenza una medesima proposta la quale oggi non ha trovato favore nella Camera, può trovarlo
un anno o cinque anni appresso quando la pubblica opinione vi sia preparata. Questo è il senso
letterale delle parole dello Statuto; questo è lo spirito vero delle istituzioni costituzionali» (the
nature of the constitutional regime rests in this indeed; that reforms are not made and novelties are
not introduced, if they are not matured in the public opinion, and that consequently the same
proposal which today did not find any favour in the Chamber of Deputies, can find it a year or five
years later when public opinion is ready. This is the literal meaning of the words of the Statute; this
is the true spirit of the constitutional institutions). Cf. Atti Parlamentari. Resoconti: Discussione
del progetto di legge sulla inefficacia giuridica degli atti non registrati. Meeting of Thursday 21st
May 1874, 3830.
40Regarding the distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law: Saredo (1886), Ugo
(1887), Id. (1888), Jona (1888), Miceli (1902), Liuzzi (1929), Ferracciu (1930, 1931), Sofia
(1931), Agostino (1933). Cfr. Azzariti (1947).
41Cfr. Ferracciu. Le leggi di carattere costituzionale cit., 79 SS.
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asked themselves, facing a normative gap, if the Charte constitutionelle could be
amended and, if so, about who the competent authority would be.42 While the 1814
Constitution was in force, the conviction that constitutional changes could come
exclusively from the King affirmed itself. With the 1830 Charte, accepted by King
Louis Philippe, the English model of parliamentary omnipotence was reinforced.
Particularly, the issue was discussed with reference to the regency law (30 August
1842). On this occasion, Deputy Guizot pronounced the sentence, then become
famous, according to which the distinction between constituent power and con-
stituted power was like distinguishing between holiday power, and every day
power.43
As far as the Italian constitutional experience is specifically concerned, three
different theories which followed one another and coexisted for all the duration of
Kingdom of Italy were prefigured.44
4.1 Immutability of the Constitution and Constituent Power
Above all, in an initial phase (two-year period 1848–49) the theory of the
immutability of the Statute affirmed itself. The fear of a repealing of the constitu-
tional grants generated an intransigent position. Such a theory was hermeneutically
based on the words contained in the Preamble. According to this theoretical layout,
the clause «perpetual and irrevocable law» was interpreted not only as the prohi-
bition directed to the Sovereign of repealing the Constitution, but indicated also the
absolute prohibition of amendability of the document.
This interpretation was enriched by further normative bases found in Art. 49,
which required deputies and senators to take an oath of being faithful to the king
42Cf. Barthélemy (1909).
43For an accurate historical reconstruction please see: Rosanvallon (1985).
44For a first overview of the theme: Carbone (1898). The author, by way of a comparative analysis
of the main constitutions in force in the Nineteenth Century (United States of America,
Switzerland, South American States: Mexico, Columbia, Argentina, etc., France, Belgium, The
Low Countries, Luxemburg, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, Norway,
Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Constitutions of the German area:
Imperial Constitution of 16th April 1873, Bavaria, Saxony, Baden, Japan), singles out three
different ways of proceeding to constitutional revision: the system of parliamentary omnipotence
(Italian and English cases) that is constitutional revision by the constituted powers, the system of
recurring to popular sovereignty for every constitutional amendment implies directly recurring to
popular sovereignty (for example see the case of Switzerland, United States of America and Latin
America) and a mixed system which, although not having recourse to popular sovereignty, admits
the distinction between constitutional laws and ordinary laws and foresee heavier procedures for
the revision. The author is favourable to the mixed system, that is, to the introduction among the
Statute articles of a revision clause. In France, the question was the subject of comparative doctoral
studies: Bousquet de Florian (1891), Borgeaud (1893), Arnoult (1896). For an initial recon-
struction of the Italian case are also useful: Arangio-Ruiz (1895), Minguzzi (1900), Garello (1898).
Racioppi and Brunelli (1909b). Among the literature please see Contini (1971, spec. 67–106).
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and of being loyal to the Statute before they started exercising their functions, and
in Art. 22 which required the monarch to faithfully respect the Statute of the
Kingdom.45 By the oath of faithfulness to the Statuto, sovereign and representative
of the people committed themselves not to amend the letter of the constitution.
Consequently, the only tool for proceeding towards a formal revision of the
constitutional text was to recur to the constituent power. This solution found a
reference in the words of King Charles Albert who on the occasion of the opening
of the second legislature made explicit reference to a constituent assembly which
had the revision of the constitutional text as a duty.46
The discourse of the sovereign was pronounced on 1 February 1849 in a very
particular moment of the national history: the five days of Milan were just over,
there had been the armistice of Salasco and the resurgence of the conflicts with
Austria, while Venice resisted siege and in Rome the republic had been proclaimed.
The Lombardy-Venetian people were going to hold universal-suffrage elections and
they had voted for joining the Kingdom of Piedmont forcing the latter to convene a
national assembly which had to proceed to revising the Statute.47
Giuseppe Mazzini, moved to Milan in order to give his support to the patriots,
sent a note to the Lombardy provisional Government highlighting his
45Concerning the political oath and its constitutional value: Bonghi (1882), Luciani (1883),
Semmola (1882), Bertolini (1883), Pierantoni (1883), Zanichelli (1890), Ugo (1900–1904), Di
Jorio (1893), Guidi (1914), Pardo (1915), Gatta (1938).
46«Riguardo agli ordini interni, dovrà essere nostra cura di svolgere le istituzioni che possediamo,
metterle in armonia perfetta col genio, coi bisogni del secolo, e proseguire alacremente
quell’assunto che verrà compiuto dall’Assemblea Costituente del Regno dell’Alta Italia» (With
regard to the internal orders, we will take care of developing the institutions that we have, of
perfectly tuning them with the genius and the needs of the century, and of readily following that
assumption which will be made by the Constituent Assembly of the Kingdom of Northern Italy).
Cf. Monti (1938).
47Lombardy provisional Government of 12th May 1848 convened the plebiscite using the formula:
«Noi sottoscritti, obbedendo alla suprema necessità che l’Italia intiera sia liberata dallo straniero, e
all’intento principale di continuare la guerra della indipendenza colla maggiore efficacia possibile,
come Longobardi in nome e per l’intercessione di queste provincie, e come Italiani per l’interesse
di tutta la Nazione, votiamo fin d’ora l’immediata fusione delle provincie Lombarde cogli Stati
Sardi, sempreché, sulle basi del suffragio universale, sia convocata negli anzidetti paesi e in tutti gli
altri aderenti a tale fusione una comune Assemblea costituente, la quale discuta e stabilisca le basi
e le forme d’una nuova Monarchia costituzionale colla dinastia di Savoia» (We, the undersigned,
obeying the supreme necessity that the whole of Italy be freed from foreign occupation and with
the main aim of continuing the war of independence with the utmost possible efficaciousness, as
Lombards in name and for the intercession of these provinces, and as Italians for the interest of the
whole Nation, we vote, from now on, the immediate merging of the Lombard provinces with the
Sardinian States, on condition that, on the basis of universal suffrage, a common constituent
assembly is convened in the abovesaid countries and in all others adhering to such a merging. The
common constituent assembly shall debate and establish the bases and the forms of a new con-
stitutional Monarchy with the dynasty of Savoy). Cf. Le assemblee del Risorgimento: atti raccolti
e pubblicati per deliberazione della Camera dei Deputati. Roma: Tipografia della Camera dei
Deputati. 1911. Vol. 1: Piemonte, Lombardia, Bologna, Modena, Parma, 217. Diffusely deals with
these aspects Mongiano (2003, see especially 152–171)
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disappointment for having called universal-suffrage elections which offered the
choice of unifying with the monarchy of Charles Albert or of keeping a separate
government.48 Popular consultation was carried on anyway and the Lombardy
people voted for the relative joining together which was approved by the Chamber
of Deputies on 28 June 1848.49
48«il vostro decreto del 12 (…) sanziona quei provvedimenti fatali, e chiama i cittadini non
preparati a decidere in un subito le sorti del paese con un metodo illegale, illiberale, indecoroso,
architettato al trionfo esclusivo di un’opinione sull’altre. Il metodo dei registri è illegale. Perché
viola, per autorità vostra, il programma ch’era condizione della vostra politica in faccia al paese;
perché invola la più vitale, la più decisiva fra le questioni all’Assemblea Costituente. Illiberale,
perché sopprime la discussione, base indispensabile al voto, cancella un diritto inalienabile del
cittadino; e sostituisce all’espressione pubblica e motivata della coscienza del paese il mutismo e la
servilità dell’Impero. Indecoroso, perché affrettato; perché tende a trasmutare ciò che potrebb’esser
prova d’affetto sentito e di maturato convincimento in dedizione di codardi impauriti; (…)
Architettato al trionfo esclusivo d’un’opinione sull’altra, perché coglie a imporsi il momento in cui
quell’opinione ha preparato in tutti i modi e con tutti gli artificii il terreno; e perché voi non vi
limitate neppure a chiedere al popolo se intenda o no procedere immediatamente a una decisione,
ma escludete dai vostri registri una soluzione al problema, e ne sopprimete qualunque espressione»
(your decree of 12th (…) sanctions those fatal provisions and calls citizens not prepared to
promptly decide the fate of the country with an illegal, illiberal, indecorous method designed for
the exclusive triumph of one opinion over the others. The method of the registers is illegal.
Because it violates, in agreement with your authority, the programme which was the condition of
your politics before the country; because it steals the most vital, the most decisive matters among
those of the constituent assembly. Illiberal, because it suppresses discussion, indispensable basis to
the vote, it cancels an inalienable right of the citizen; and replaces the public and motivated
expression of the conscience of the country with dumbness and servility to the Empire. Indecorous,
because rushed; because it tends to transform that which could be evidence of heart-felt affection
and matured conviction into devotion of frightened cowards; (…) Planned for the exclusive
triumph of one opinion over the other, because it seizes, in order to impose itself, the moment in
which that opinion prepared the ground in every way and with all its stratagems; and because you
do not limit yourselves not even to ask the people if they want or not to immediately proceed to a
decision, but you exclude a solution to the issue from your registers, and suppress any expression
of it). Cf. Mazzini (2011). On Mazzini`s ideas about the constituent assembly please see Falco
(1952). Also, see Recchia and Urbinati (2009).
49On 15th June 1848 in Parliament a Bill presented by the Government was discussed concerning
the Unification of Lombardy with the Venetian Provinces of Padua, Vicenza, Treviso and Rovigo.
During the discussion the Government presented an amendment which affirmed: «L’assemblea
costituente non ha altro mandato che quello di discutere le basi e la forma della monarchia. Ogni
altro suo atto legislativo è nullo di pien diritto. La sede del potere esecutivo non può quindi essere
variata che per legge del Parlamento» (The constituent assembly has no other mandate than that of
debating the bases and the form of monarchy. Every other legislative act of it is nil by full right.
The seat of the executive power therefore can be changed only by parliamentary law). Cf. Le
assemblee del Risorgimento: atti raccolti e pubblicati per deliberazione della Camera dei
Deputati cit., 219. During the discussion the reporting Deputy Rattazzi made the audience note
how the formulation by the Government transformed the constituent assembly into a consultative
assembly («Orbene, si dichiara che l’Assemblea Costituente non ha altro mandato tranne che
quello di discutere. Così, mentre il voto dei Lombardi e dei Veneti, e quello che noi pure abbiamo
espresso, portava che l’Assemblea costituente dovesse stabilire; il Ministro, il quale aveva e l’uno
e l’altro sott’occhio, dopo di avere maturamente esaminato ogni cosa, vorrebbe che l’Assemblea
costituente venisse circoscritta a discutere, ed assumere così il carattere di una semplice assemblea
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The idea of a constituent power spread from the territories of Lombardy-Venetia
to all the Italian peninsula. The debate which initially was directed at organising
those freed territories forced the most important characters to measure themselves
with the ideologies at the base of the constituent power. Distinctions between
moderates and democrats were outlined in a clearer way.50 The group of moderates
sustained the monarchical-representative form and a unification under the aegis of a
Monarch, at most reaching an idea of confederal assembly. Within this group there
was, for example, Vincenzo Gioberti who ever since his Primato civile e morale
degli italiani (1843) proposed a monarchical federalism of a neo-Guelph orienta-
tion, that is a confederation of States with the Pope as its head, and in September
1848 in Turin took part in the constitution of the Società per la confederazione
italiana (Society for the Italian confederation) which had the programme of
favouring a federal pact in Italy.51 The Society deemed the summons of a con-
stituent assembly which established the forms and norms of the Confederation of
the Italian States opportune and for this purpose nominated a commission for the
drawing up of a Bill on the electoral law and of a model of federal act. These Bills
were read, modified and approved during the public meeting which was held at the
national theatre on 27 October 1848 under the presidency of Mamiani and they
were sent together with an Indirizzo ai Principi e ai Parlamenti italiani. Another
supporter of a confederation was Antonio Rosmini who intervened on the merging
of Piedmont with the provinces of Lombardy-Venetia by way of a series of articles
published in Il Risorgimento and afterwards, collected under the title of La
Costituente del Regno dell’Alta Italia.52
The group of the democrats considered, instead, the Lombard war from a
national viewpoint to be solved by recurring to a constituent assembly elected by
universal suffrage which would have drawn up the pact among all individuals of the
consultiva» (Well, the constituent assembly is declared to have the sole mandate of discussing. So,
while the vote of the inhabitants of Lombardy and Venetia, and that which we as well expressed,
established that the Constituent Assembly should decide; the Minister, who had both in front of
him, after having maturely examined everything, would like the constituent assembly to confine
itself to discussion, assuming in such a way the character of a simple consultative assembly)). Cf.
Le assemblee del Risorgimento cit. 222. Therefore the Assembly reputed the introduction of further
limitations to the constituent Assembly besides those already indicated in the formula of the
Lombardy vote. The Chamber approved the law of unification which accepted the convening of a
constituent assembly in «conformità del voto emesso dal popolo lombardo» (in compliance with
the vote issued by the people of Lombardy). Mongiano (2003) and Ferrari Zumbini (2016, 321–
333).
50Cf. Prestandrea (1881, 131). Moreover, the author distinguished between Constitution granted
by the Monarch and popular constitution and noted that the revision procedure should necessarily
be different because of the different nature of the document. Please add: Del Balzo (1904).
51Coppi (1860, 440–446), Zama (1946), Oddo (1979).
52Articles appeared respectively in Il Risorgimento of 1st July 1848; Il Risorgimento of 2nd July
1848; Il Risorgimento of 6th July 1848; Il Risorgimento of 8th July 1848; Il Risorgimento of 11th
July 1848; Il Risorgimento of 13th July 1848; Il Risorgimento of 17th July 1848; Il Risorgimento
of 20th July 1848; Il Risorgimento of 27 July1848; Il Risorgimento of 27th July 1848; Il
Risorgimento of 1st August 1848; Il Risorgimento of 5th August 1848.
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dawning nation.53 Also Giulio Pisani, in a small volume dedicated to Giuseppe
Montanelli, favoured the idea of a constituent power as the only tool for Italian
independence.54 Mazzini’s press contributed to spread the ideas of a constituent
assembly with a popular base.55 An important educative mission was attributed to
journalism: to form a public opinion alert and informed.
The binomial “revision of the constitution” and “constituent power” heightened
the tones of the political debate. On the one hand, the limits of constitutionalism by
means of monarchical granting were highlighted, while on the other, the necessity
of a sovereign power for a full legitimisation was underlined.56 The end of the war
with the Austrian victory made the idea of a constituent assembly which was able to
modify the Albertine Statute doze off again.
4.2 Omnipotence of Parliament
It was the legal doctrine which better corresponded to the feeling of the time.57
Parliamentary omnipotence, otherwise called Parliamentary sovereignty, acknowl-
edged, to the legislative body, the power of modifying the letter of the constitution,
of abrogating its principles, of waiving them or interpreting them by way of the
ordinary legislative activity; rather, by way of the constitutional practice. This
theory, borrowed with appropriate adjustments from the English juridical doctrine,
had the advantage of sterilising the issue concerning the constituent power as
summa potestatis attributed to the people, and at the same time guaranteed the
possibility of adapting the constitutional text to the changing and inevitable
necessities of the real life, without reducing the Constitution to the written docu-
ment. Consequently, it was impossible to distinguish between constituent powers
53«una rivoluzione nazionale può iniziare da chicchessia; ma non può compiersi che da
un’Assemblea nazionale. E quest’assemblea non può uscire legittima ed efficace che dall’elezione
popolare: eletta da governi o da Stati, non potrebbe rappresentare che il vecchio principio, più o
meno modificato, di smembramento, contro il quale il paese s’agita e s’agiterà … L’assemblea
costituzionale non può dunque essere che costituente» (a National revolution can start from
anybody; but it can be completed only by a National Assembly. And this assembly may come out
as legitimate and effective only by popular election: elected by governments or States, it could only
represent the old principle, more or less modified, of dismembering, against which the country
protests and will protest … The constitutional assembly therefore can only be constituent).
Mazzini (2011, 623).
54Pisani (1849).
55Particularly see L’Italia del popolo which appeared for the first time in Milan from 20th May to
3rd August 1848. The title remained the same, coming out in various critical moments of Italian
national life, like in Rome during the Roman Republic and then in Lausanne, Lugano and Genoa.
Mazzini’s press see: Ravenna (1967), Scirocco (2004, 353–394). Bruni (2007). Della Peruta
(1847), Pau (2015).
56Cf. Bianchi-Giovini (1849).
57Cf. Racioppi and Brunialti (1909).
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and constituted powers, between ordinary sovereignty and extraordinary sover-
eignty; rather, a sole and unique sovereignty existed.58
Such a layout was inaugurated by the well-renowned article by Camillo Cavour
published in Il Risorgimento where voice was raised against those who criticised
the expression ‘irrevocable’ as if in such a way a system of absolute immutability
was established. He clarified that such a layout ran contrary to common sense,
society’s needs and also to the most common constitutional theories, affirming that
«the word ‘irrevocable’, as used in the Preamble of the Statute, is only literally
applicable to the new and great principles proclaimed by it, and to the important
fact of a pact destined to indissolubly link the people and the King. However, this
does not mean that the particular conditions of the pact were not susceptible to
progressive improvements operated with the common agreement of the two con-
tracting parties: the King, with the help of the nation, in the future will always be
able to introduce, within them, all the changes which will be indicated by experi-
ence and reason of the time period».59
Little knowing the English parliamentary system, it was deemed convenient to
imitate it. From here, according to the model of the King in Parliament, the body
competent for the constitutional revision was considered to be the Parliament, to be
understood indeed as the Monarch together with the Senate and the Chamber of
Deputies. The normative base was found in Art. 3 of the Albertine Statute according
to which the King and the two Chambers collectively exercised the legislative
power.
The revision procedure was that briefly required for the promulgation of ordinary
statute laws. The legislative initiative jointly belonged to the Sovereign and the
Chambers (Art. 10). The bills should be firstly examined, then discussed and
approved. Over time three different modalities for the examination of a bill
developed: Offices system, three-readings system and committees system.
Discussions were public and were carried on article by article (Art. 55). In the case
that a bill was rejected, it could not be proposed again in the same parliamentary
58On these aspects, I refer to my contribution: Mecca (2016a, 159–214).
59«La parola irrevocabile, come è impiegata nel preambolo dello Statuto, è solo applicabile let-
teralmente ai nuovi e grandi principi proclamati da esso, ed al gran fatto di un patto destinato a
stringere in modo indissolubile il popolo ed il Re. Ma ciò non vuol dire che le condizioni
particolari del patto non siano suscettibili di progressivi miglioramenti operati di comune accordo
tra le parti contraenti: il Re, col concorso della nazione, potrà sempre nell’avvenire introdurre in
esse tutti i cambiamenti, che saranno indicati dall’esperienza e dalla ragione dei tempi» (The word
‘irrevocable’, as it is used in the preamble of the Statute, is only literally applicable to the new and
great principles proclamed by it, and to the great fact of a pact destined to indissolubly bind the
people and the King. However, this does not mean that the particular conditions of the pact are not
susceptible of progressive improvements operated by mutual consent of the contracting parties: the
King, with the nation’s aid, will always be able in the future to introduce all the changes in them,
which will be indicated by experience and the reason of the times). Il Risorgimento. Giornale
quotidiano, A. I, 10th March 1848.
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session (Art. 56). The procedure concluded with the royal approval and promul-
gation (Art. 7).60
The above mentioned theory was not just useful to neutralise the constituent
power in the hands of the people, but it was also functional to legitimise the
representative government.61 Supporters of parliamentary omnipotence were aware
of the novelties introduced by the Albertine Statute and were also alert to the
immaturity of the new institutions which needed consent and legitimisation. In the
initial imprinting the cohabitation between monarchical principle and representative
principle was affirmed in that they were considered genetic elements: the nation was
jointly represented by the Monarch and the Parliament. Practice was entrusted with
the duty of better defining the relationships between the two constitutional bodies.
4.3 Intermediate Theory
After almost forty years from the entering into force of the Albertine Statute, the
Italian juridical doctrine, the constant changes made in the constitutional text
having been acknowledged—on the matter please see infra § 6—made the effort of
singling out some corrections for the theory of parliamentary omnipotence.
Among the jurists the strengthened conviction that more things should be done
in order that the distinction between Constitution and ordinary statute law be more
clear cut.62 At the same time the theory according to which the Omnipotence of
Parliament should necessarily meet some juridical limits for the purpose of avoiding
the risk of a despotic government of the majority made inroads as well.
Along this direction, the difference between the English constitutional system
and the Italian one was above all noted. Indeed, Italy based the form of its gov-
ernment on a written constitution which was missing in Britain. Moreover, as in
England the law established that Parliamentary activity will find its limitations in
the general law, fruit of constitutional centuries-old experience, in the same way in
Italy the legislative function was limited by the juridical principles proclaimed by
the Statute and, however, by the triadic nature of the legislative power subdivided
between the King and the two branches of Parliament.63
60On procedural aspects, please see: Broglio (1865), Mancini and Galeotti (1887), Donati (1914).
Cf. Dickmann (2007).
61Please refer once more to my contribution: Mecca (2016a).
62Cf. Carbone (1898, 117).
63Marchi (1921). The author noted: «Che del resto, in genere, la funzione legislativa esser stretta
da limiti risulta da quel complesso di principii che si affermano, qui come altrove, coll’affermarsi
dello Stato libero moderno: il movimento storico che portò alla proclamazione delle Carte
Costituzionali, alla attuazione dei principi dei poteri, alla distribuzione delle competenze fra i
diversi organi costituzionali, l’enumerazione in tali Carte dei diritti fondamentali di libertà ebbero,
tutte, per scopo di porre, in definitiva, dei limiti all’arbitrio degli organi dello Stato nell’esercizio
delle diverse funzioni, quella legislativa compresa. Fu una tendenza codesta che, rispondendo ad
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On these aspects, Santi Romano, jurist with great talents and a pronounced
sensitivity, entered into the merits of the question singling out the legal, not just
moral, limits to Parliamentary sovereignty with more precision.64 First of all, the
author warned that the boundaries of the legislative power were constituted by
internal limits deriving from the same layout of powers and that it was impossible to
single out external limits to the legislative power, like for example a syndicate on
the legitimacy of the statute law to be attributed to the judges, both in the case of it
being shaped as a control of constitutionality spread among all judges, and in the
case of it being shaped as a control of constitutionality concentrated in the hands of
special judges designated to perform this duty.65
Santi Romano singled out absolute limits to Parliamentary sovereignty, like for
example the prohibition of usurping the prerogatives of the other powers or the
prohibition of derogating from international commitments by way of legislatives
acts, and relative limits which allowed the Parliament to modify the constitutional
norms only on particular conditions. Such conditions were: the necessity under-
stood as living law, thanks to which at legislative level a dichotomy between law
and life was cancelled; the derogation from Statute for the purpose of acknowl-
edging a constitutional custom that already modified the constitutional letter in fact;
integrative statute law, phenomenon which was halfway between the mechanism of
text amendability and constitutional interpretation, which broadened the cases of
implementation of the Albertine Statute. The author noted that the written consti-
tution has its base in a non-written law, which directly emanates from social
forces.66 From this assumption came the fact that customs played a primary role in
public law.
Generally, the attempt of the legal doctrine between the Nineteenth and the
Twentieth centuries was that of distinguishing within the Statute between essential
and/or fundamental norms and contingent or accessory norms, in such a way
narrowing the absolute prohibition of constitutional revision to the sole first group
of norms. This layout, however, only moved the question from the possibility of
un bisogno della coscienza giuridica popolare, doveva portare a non dovere più riconoscere in
nessun organo costituzionale una sovranità della stessa natura di quella dei Re assoluti, una legibus
absoluta potestas» (However, generally, the fact that the legislative function is bound by limita-
tions comes out by that whole of principles which are affirmed, here as everywhere else with the
affirmation of the modern free State: the historical movement which led to the proclamation of the
Constitutional Charters, to the implementation of the principles of the powers, to the distribution of
competences among the different constitutional bodies, the enumeration in such Charters of the
fundamental rights of liberties had, them all, the purpose of definitely setting limitations to the
discretional power of the State bodies while exercising their different functions, the legislative one
included. This was a trend which answering a need of the popular juridical conscience should lead
to no more having to recognise a sovereignty of that same nature as the absolute Kings, a legibus
absoluta potestas, in any constitutional body) (17–18).





modifying the text to the often ephemeral attempt of classifying norms into primary
and secondary. Doctrinal positions in the late Nineteenth century were many.67
A common feature of these theories can be found in the intangibility of the rep-
resentative government upon which the whole constitutional structure inaugurated
by the Albertine Statute rested. In this sense the position expressed by Livio
Minguzzi is exemplifying. He declared that the limit of parliamentary omnipotence
lies within the same nature of the institution. Indeed, the Parliament being a body of
the State, if the power of modifying the form of the State were attributed to it, it
would mean acknowledging, to a sole body, the power to change the whole
organism to which it belongs.68 Minguzzi remarked once again how also in
England Parliamentary omnipotence met a limit in the Crown. Indeed, the
Parliament could never have acted against the royal prerogatives, in that monarchy
had the power of approving the statute laws.
5 Flexibility and Elasticity of the Constitution in the Legal
Debate
In this context, the Italian constitutional doctrine speaks of ‘flexibility’ and/or
‘elasticity’ of the Albertine Statute.
As is known, according to James Bryce’s theory the Constitutions could be
classified as rigid or flexible. Bryce denied any usefulness to the distinction
between written and unwritten constitutions because «in all written Constitutions
there is and must be, as we shall presently see, an element of unwritten usage, while
in the so-called unwritten ones the tendency to treat the written record of custom or
precedent as practically binding is strong, and makes that record almost equivalent
67Cf. Borsi (2009).
68Minguzzi (1899). «Conseguentemente quella dell’onnipotenza parlamentare è un’espressione
erronea e pericolosa; la quale viene usata, perché esprime energicamente, anzi iperbolicamente, il
potere del Parlamento, ma che dovrebbe essere bandita dalla scienza. Maggiormente viziata
intrinsecamente è quella che il Parlamento sia una costituente perpetua» (Consequently that of
parliamentary omnipotence is an erroneous and dangerous expression; which is used, because it,
energetically rather hyperbolically, expresses the power of the Parliament, but which should be
banished by science. That which the Parliament is a perpetual constituent is more intrinsically
flawed) (103–104). The author reached the conclusion that «nei governi costituzionali l’attività del
Parlamento nella sua più ampia estensione ha per suo limite la forma politica dello Stato» (in
constitutional governments the activity of Parliament, in its widest extension, has the political form
of the State as its limitation) (105); «Il Parlamento italiano, per servirci di un esempio, può
riformare liberamente come crede la costituzione del regno, ma che sempre costituzione del regno
rimanga» (The Italian Parliament, in order to use an example, can freely reform, as it wishes, the
constitution of the kingdom, but on condition that it forever remains the constitution of the
kingdom) (106).
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to a formally enacted law, not to add the Unwritten Constitutions».69 Specifically,
the English jurist explained that «The Statutory Constitutions become developed by
interpretation and fringed with decisions and enlarged or warped by custom, so that
after a time the letter of their text no longer conveys their full effect».70 Also, Bryce
noted that «Excluding despotically governed countries, such as Russia, Turkey and
Montenegro, there are now only these in Europe, those of the United Kingdom, of
Hungary—an ancient and very interesting Constitution, presenting remarkable
analogies to that of England—and of Italy, whose Constitution, though originally
set forth in one document, has been so changed by legislation as to seem now
properly referable to the flexible type. Elsewhere in Europe, all Constitutions would
appear to be rigid».71 Definitely, the distinction between flexible and rigid
Constitutions was in a formal method (or special revision procedure) of amending
the constitution.
The Italian legal doctrine accepted Bryce’s classification only at the beginning of
the twentieth century, as a result of the constitutional changes introduced by the
Fascist regime.
In particular, Teodosio Marchi analysed the flexibility of the Albertine Statute in
two important essays: Lo Statuto albertino ed il suo sviluppo storico (1926) and Sul
carattere rigido o flessibile della Costituzione italiana (1938).
In the first work, the author recognised two different merits of the Albertine
Statute: the first, being a ‘written constitution‘ and the second being a ‘flexible
constitution’. According to Marchi, the Albertine Statute could adapt continuously
without violent tremors because it is similar to a centuries-old tree which keeps its
trunk and changes leaves each new spring («può continuamente adattarsi, senza
scosse violente, al graduale, perenne mutarsi della coscienza giuridica, quasi albero
secolare, che, mantenendo saldo il suo tronco, si spoglia, via via, di rami inutili e
secchi per rinverdirsi al soffio di ogni nuova primavera»).72
In his second essay (Sul carattere rigido o flessibiule della Costituzione ital-
iana), Teodosio Marchi reaffirmed that in the Subalpine experience there was no
distinction between ordinary law and constitutional law, but the constitutional
changes occur by means of the ordinary law.73 Furthermore, he affirmed that even
in flexible constitutions there was a principle unmodifiable and that was the form of
Government.74
69Bryce (1905, 6). In the preface to the Italian edition, Alessandro Pace noted how in Bryce’s
thought the prominence of the constitution and the constitutional rigidity were two faces of the
same coin. He then specified that the prominence of constitution is a relational concept: it exists
when the Constitution imposes respect of its provisions to the legislator. Cf. Pace (1998, XXVI).
70Bryce (1905).
71Bryce (1905, 11–12).
72Marchi (1926, spec. 188).
73Marchi (1938).
74Marchi (1938, 327): «in tutte le Costituzioni, monarchiche o repubblicane, per quanto flessibili
esse siano, un principio esiste che, se non proclamato in modo esplicito, vi è sempre implicita-
mente contenuto, il quale riconosce la rigidità, la intangibilità, di ciò che costituisce l’essenza
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Without knowing Bryce’s theory well, Luigi Rossi preferred, however, to talk of
L’elasticità dello Statuto Albertino (1939), meaning the ability of the Albertine
Statute to adapt to the circumstances, because its formulas, summarising charac-
teristics and generic, leave an enormous margin for development and their inte-
gration through special constitutional laws, various customs and interpretations
(«alle variabili necessità dei tempi e delle circostanze, perchè le sue formule, sin-
tetiche e generiche, lasciano largo margine al loro sviluppo e alla loro integrazione
mediante leggi costituzionali particolari, consuetudini e interpretazioni varie»).75
Elasticity of the Statute also meant reconciling two opposites: the stability of the
basic principles with the ability of transformation and change in special provisions.
The author recognised that the issue of elasticity had something to do with flexi-
bility, but they could not be equated.76 The elasticity of the Constitution consisted
not in the competence of Parliament to amend the constitution, but in the wide field
reserved for the customary law to be understood in a broad sense, also, including
usus fori, the consuetudo parlamenti and all sources not covered by the law. In
flexible types of Constitutions, indeed, there was a variety of sources, there was not
a primary source, a precise and reliable law; but there was a set of several different
rules, which were intersected, made up, or deleted, according to the circumstances.
Staying with Rossi, the characteristics of elasticity is useful in overcoming the
distinction between flexible constitution and rigid constitution and surmounting the
difficulties of this classification.
From these essays, the Albertine Statute was universally considered a flexible
and an elastic Constitution meaning that the text could be innovated by ordinary
law or the text could be changed without formal amendments. This debate was so
pervasive that it even continued under the Italian Republican Constitution (1948).
For example, by discussing the nature of the Albertine Statute, Alessandro Pace
denied the logical assumption that only rigid constitutions do provide a special
proceeding to amend the Constitutional text. Finally, in the evaluation of a
Constitutional character the constitutional interpretation plays an important role.77
stessa della forma speciale di Governo» (in every Constitution, monarchic or republican, no matter
how flexible they are, a principle exists that, if it is not proclamed explicitly, it is always implicitly
contained in them, which recognises the rigidity, the intangibility of that which constitutes the
same essence of the special form of Government).
75Rossi (1940, spec. 27–28).
76Rossi (1940, 35).
77It is difficult to summarise the Italian debate on the matter. For an overview please see Pace
(1996). The author demonstrates the reasons for the historical mistake directed at identifying the
causes of rigidity of the constitution in having foreseen, in the same constitution, a special
procedure of constitutional revision. Pace’s reflection had among its merits that of clarifying the
concept of constitutional prominence and the essential characteristics of a fundamental law.
Among those studies that move along that path, please see: Varela Suanzes (1994), Blanco Valdés
(1997), Bignami (1997), Soddu (2003), Lanchester (2011). Finally, Ferrari Zumbini (2011) and
Id., Tra norma e vita cit. The author speaks of mobility of the Statute due to three requisites:
elasticity, flexibility and ductility.
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6 Interpreting the Constitution: Letter of Statute,
Customs and Practice
The category “flexible constitution” was acknowledged late, even though it had
extraordinary fortune and circulation.78 Early on, jurists talked generically about
interpretation in compliance with the spirit of the Constitution, changes, waivers or
abrogation of the Statute.
Changes of the letter of the Albertine Statute were very few.79 Among these,
there was the article dedicated to the flag: the Constitution established the azure
colour among the characteristics of the ensign, however after the
Lombardy-Venetian war the Parliament approves a statute law which acknowledge
the tricolour with the coat of arms of the Savoy family as a flag. A further example
can be statute law N° 665 of 1912 with which Art. 50 of the Statute which pre-
scribed no retribution or allowance for exercising the role of parliamentarian.80
For the purpose of better understanding the Italian experience, attention must,
however, not be paid not the changes of the letter, rather to the so-called tacit
changes, that is to those changes of the meaning of the constitution without
changing the written text for this reason. In other words, the interpretation and the
practice represented the most important mechanism of constitutional change.81
In this context a primary role was acknowledge to non-written norms.82
78About “flexibility” Miceli (1898) talked for the first time. Cfr. Colombo (2003, 131).
79For a thorough examination of the (implicit and explicit) changes of the letter of the Statute
please see Arangio-Ruiz (1913, 466–467). For a comparison between letter of the Statute and text
integrated with customs and practices, it is very useful the Attachment A to the volume by Ferrari
Zumbini. Tra norma e vita cit.
80For an overview of the matter without any pretension of exhaustiveness, please see: Montalcini
(1935, 371), Chimienti (1915), Arcoleo (1913), De Dominicis (1913), Brunelli and Racioppi
(1909), Malvezzi (1905), Trespioli (1900), Piscel (1897), Zanichelli (1887), Brunialti (1882), De
Mauro 1882), Linati (1882), Castagna (1865), Casanova (1859), Peverelli (1849). Cf. Musso
(2000), Mola (1988).
81Arangio-Ruiz explicitly spoke of tacit (implicit) changes. Cfr. Arangio-Ruiz, Istituzioni di diritto
costituzionale italiano cit. For a theoretical framework see Voigt (1999).
82Cfr. Longo (1892). Custom is legal norm when it occurs two assumptions: diutunitnas and opinio
juris ac necessitatis. Ranelletti clarified the importance of customs in the Italian legal order: «il
sistema legislativo del nostro diritto pubblico, per la sua formazione recente e senza tradizioni
nazionali e imitato da altri popoli con un procedimento precipitoso, anzi abborracciato, è incom-
pleto e difforme dalle tendenze dello spirito nazionale; e d’altronde non tutto in esso si può regolare
con leggi, poiché molte materie mal si prestano ad essere contenute nella rigidità della formula
legislativa; (…) supplisce bene la consuetudine, che ha maggiore flessibilità per adattarsi alla
varietà delle condizioni di fatto e tenere il dovuto conto dell’interesse pubblico» (the legislative
system of our public law, for its formation which is recent and without national tradition and
inspired by the law of other people with an overly hasty rather patchy procedure, is incomplete and
dissimilar to the trends of the national spirit; and therefore not everything in it can be regulated with
laws, since many matters are badly suited to being contained within the rigidity of the legislative
formula; (…) customary law which has greater flexibility in adapting itself to the variety of the
factual conditions and to rightly consider public interest compensates well). Cfr. Ranelletti (1913).
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Italian writers justified this importance adopting the following reasons: the lack
of a century-old tradition of doctrinal and legislative elaborations, the laconicism of
the constitutional text, and finally the greater adaptability of customary law to the
changeable practical needs. Scholars considered customary law as an autonomous,
spontaneous and unintentional juridical source. The foundation of unwritten
juridical norms was to be found in real and fundamental needs of constitutional
life.83 That which characterised customary law compared to other constitutional
norms was the predominance of the political element, since certain relationships
between State bodies, because of their complexity and changeability, are better
suited to be regulated by the flexibility of customary law rather than the rigour and
stability of written norms. Moreover, starting from Santi Romano’s reflection,
doctrine associated constitutional customary law with the so-called «correttezza
costituzionale» (constitutional fairness), which only partially coincided with the
English conventions of constitution.84 The rules of «correttezza costituzionale»
(constitutional fairness) were rules relating mainly to custom and political morality
from which constitutional bodies should draw inspiration. These rules could not be
classified among juridical norms and could not be confused with customary law,
affirming themselves immediately and without expiry of time.85 They often rep-
resented the first step toward a juridification of the same rules.86
All the unwritten rules greatly contributed to the evolution of the Constitution. In
particular, the «tacit changes» intervened on the document at least in a twofold way:
they implemented/developed the written document and corrected eventual mistakes.
This is the case in which, through constitutional practice and interpretation,
principles and rules, not explicitly considered by the constitution were set. These
rules essentially derived from the long and uninterrupted practice and were based
Another author in relation to the Italian public law distinguished three types of customs: inter-
pretative, rescinding and innovative. Cfr. Ferracciu (1913), Id. (1919), Id. (1921). Si veda, inoltre,
Girola (1934). In 1909, for the first time in Italy, Romano debated the issue of constitutional
conventions. Next to the customs, Romano identified a complex of flexible and folding rules
regulating the very delicate relationship between the powers and the political conduct. Cfr.
Romano (1950c). The author debated, also, the relationship between law and morality. Cfr.
Romano (1947). It is noted, in fact, that «le norme di correttezza bene spesso si applicano a
rapporti, che, per la posizione eminente degli organi costituzionali cui si riferiscono, per gli alti
interessi di natura pubblica che sono destinati a tutelare, per l’indole eminentemente politica della
materia che essi concernono, risultano assolutamente inidonei a venir regolati dal diritto, sia pure
per mezzo di norme consuetudinarie» (appropriateness rules often apply to relationships, which,
for the prominent position of the constitutional bodies to which they refer, for the high interests of
public nature which they are destined to protect, for the eminently political nature of the matter
which they are concerned with, result absolutely unsuitable for being regulated by law, even if by
way of customary laws) (96). Cfr. Biscaretti di Ruffìa (1939). Please see also Caristia (1953).




86Biscaretti di Ruffia (1939, 96).
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on the tacit agreement of constitutional bodies. A disavowal of these norms con-
stituted, in fact, a systematic violation of the spirit of the constitution.
The main example is that of a primordial development of representative gov-
ernment in the form of parliamentary government. The Albertine Statute established
the role of Deputies in only three articles: Art. 65—The King appoints and dis-
misses (removes) his Deputies; Art. 66—Deputies have no right to vote in
Parliament; Art. 67—Deputies are responsible.
The letter of the Statute granted the King the absolute right of appointing the
Cabinet; customary practice, instead, had established that the Prime Minister won
the double confidence of the King and the Chamber of Deputies.87 Italian scholars
found the foundation of the rules concerning the representative government in
customary law.88
More often non-written rules, interpretations and practices intervened in the
letter of the Statute in order to soften its rigour, favouring in such a way a better
functioning of the constitutional system.
The most evident example was constituted by Art. 53 of the Albertine Statute
which required an absolute majority of members for parliamentary meetings and
decisions. The difficulty in reaching the legal number produced the development of
the practice according to which senators and deputies who were absent for a just
cause, bishops and public officials who were busy in the exercise of their own
functions, were not counted for purpose of the decision.89 Moreover, it was the
same Cavour who, intervening against Deputy Moia, who deprecated certain par-
liamentary practices, recollected the distinction between decisions and discussions
and highlighted how the practice was not contrary neither to the letter nor to the
Spirit of the Statute.
7 National Unification by Constitutionalisation
The historical and legislative events which led to national Unification are well
known.90 The statute law of 25 April 1859 conferred, to the Sardinian Government
for the duration of the war, all legislative and executive powers and the faculty of
doing, under ministerial responsibility by way of simple royal decrees, all the acts
necessary for the defence of the homeland.91 On the basis of such law, extraordi-
nary magistratures were instituted in almost all the Italian Provinces and States
87About the origins of the confidence vote procedure see Rossi (2001).
88For an analysis of the different theories on the matter please see: Raggi (1914).
89Please allow me to refer to Mecca (2016b).
90Among the many works, please see Martucci (1999), Ghisalberti (2002, 87–122 (chapter III.
L’Unificazione politica e la costruzione dell’apparato Statale)), Pene Vidari (2010a), Genta
Ternavasio (2012, especially chapter III. L’unificazione politica: dal regno di Sardegna al regno
d’Italia).
91Latini (2005, spec. 210–226) and Pene Vidari (2010b).
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which aspired to a union with the Sardinian State.92 A Lieutenant Decree of 11 June
1859 instituted a General Directorate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to which all
the matters concerning the annexed Italian Provinces were conferred. With the
exclusion of Lombardy for which the consent expressed through the 1848 popular
consultation (infra § 4.1.) was deemed sufficient, in other Italian provinces between
March and November 1860 plebiscites with voting rights granted to 21 year-old
male citizens were carried out.93 After the law of 3rd December 1860 the
Government accepted the annexation of those Provinces of central and Southern
Italy. The royal Decree of 17 December 1860 declared the annexation of the
provinces of Naples into the Subalpine Constitutional Monarchy; the Royal Decree
of 16 December the annexation of Sicily, the Royal Decrees of 17 December the
annexation of the provinces of Marche and Umbria, by way of similar plebiscites
the Royal Decree of 22 March annexed the provinces of Tuscany and the Royal
Decree of 18 March the province of Emilia.
Historiography dedicated important pages to single moments or juridical insti-
tutions which consented political-institutional integration. Alongside studies on the
customary institution of lieutenancies and on the activity of provisional govern-
ments, on plebiscites and on the law concerning full powers, scholars discussed, as
well, if the Italian State was the prosecution of the Sardinian Kingdom or if it was a
new State, the fruit of the reunion of the ancient kingdoms.94 Here, however, we
would like to observe the national Unification through a constitutional perspective.
In other words, I will try to underline in which way constitutional forms were given
to the dawning Kingdom of Italy. The constitutionalisation was realised by the
recourse to three tools: the formula contained in the plebiscites, the granting of the
Albertine Statute to all conquered territories and the parliamentarisation of the
national cause.
The formula of the plebiscites was more or less the same: accession to the
constitutional monarchy of King Victor Emmanuel II was required.95 According to
92Santangelo Spoto (1902–1905); Marchi (1918, 1920, 1925).
93Cf. Mongiano (2003), Fruci (2007, 2011), Lacchè (2016d) and Pene Vidari (2016).
94Anzillotti (1912), Romano (1950b), Marchi (1924), Orlando (1940).
95Formula of Tuscany plebiscite (11th and 12th March 1860): «Unione alla Monarchia costi-
tuzionale del Re Vittorio Emanuele II, ovvero Regno separato» (Union to the constitutional
Monarchy of the King Victor Emmanuel II, rather separated Kingdom); Formula of Emilia
plebiscite (11th and 12th March 1860): «Annessione alla Monarchia costituzionale del Re Vittorio
Emanuele II, ovvero: Regno separato» (Annexation to the constitutional Monarchy of the King
Victor Emmanuel II, or: a separate Kingdom); Formula of Neapolitan Provinces plebiscite (21st
October 1860): «Il popolo vuole l’Italia una e indivisibile con Vittorio Emanuele Re costituzionale
e suoi legittimi discendenti?» (Do the people want one and indivisible Italy with Victor Emmanuel
constitutional King and his legittimate descendants?); Formula of Sicily plebiscite (21st October
1860): «Il popolo Siciliano vuole l’Italia una e indivisibile con Vittorio Emanuele Re costi-
tuzionale e suoi legittimi discendenti?» (Do the Sicilian people want one and indivisible Italy with
Victor Emmanuel constitutional King and his legittimate descendants?); Formula of Marche
plebiscite (4th and 5th November 1860): «Volete far parte della Monarchia costituzionale del Re
Vittorio Emanuele II?» (Do you wish to become part of the constitutional Monarchy of the King
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Alberto Mario Banti the consensus by the Plebiscites was not a “founding act” but an
“confirming act” of the will of the Nation.96 Plebiscites were a political act more than
a juridical act: they were made in order to please certain trends and necessities which
manifested themselves in the public conscience and for reasons of international
politics. In them there was a generic reference to the constitutional monarchy which
meant gathering the main forces of the nation around the Sovereign. The constitu-
tional monarchy should represent Unity and should stop those substantial discourses
which prevented working at a common project.97 In opposition to those who saw the
constitutional monarchy only as an initial step that anticipated the Republic or at
least the convening of a constituent assembly, Carlo Boncompagni said:
Per l’Italia, il Re non è solamente colui che regge le sue sorti, e che la guida alla sua
liberazione; egli simboleggia una grande istituzione destinata a proteggere i suoi destini
futuri. Che se lo stare in fede della monarchia fu necessario finora, questa necessità divenne
più stretta dappoiché l’unità nazionale fu posta in cima del nostro programma. La
monarchia fu la unificatrice di tutte le grandi nazioni d’Europa: la unificazione fallì là dove
mancò quel simbolo del diritto nazionale che è il Re.98
National unification was realised without a constituent assembly in that the
Albertine Statute was deemed sufficient. In the two-year period 1859–60 the
Constitution of Charles Albert was published/promulgated in every province
for mere needs of legitimisation of the ongoing historical process of unification.
Victor Emmanuel II?); Formula of Umbria plebiscite (4th and 5th November 1860): «Volete far
parte della Monarchia costituzionale del Re Vittorio Emanuele II?» (Do you wish to become part
of the constitutional Monarchy of the King Victor Emmanuel II?); Formula of the plebiscite of the
provinces of Venetia and Mantua (22nd October 1865): «Dichiariamo la nostra unione al Regno
d’Italia sotto il governo monarchico costituzionale del Re Vittorio Emanuele II e dei suoi suc-
cessori» (We declare our union to the Kingdom of Italy under the constitutional monarchic
government of the King Victor Emmanuel II and his descendants). Cf. Mongiano (2003, 216).
96Banti (2011).
97Luigi Lacchè noted that on the European Continent the constitutional monarchy is a general
formula, a complex political order, a conceptual space which took on a variety of characteristics.
Cf. Lacchè (2016a, History & Constitution cit., 252).
98«For Italy, the King is not only he who holds its fate, and who guides it to its liberation; he
symbolises a great institution destined to protect its future destiny. If to trust the monarchy has
been necessary till now, this necessity became more urgent ever since the national unity was
placed at the top of our programme. The monarchy was the unifier of all the great nations of
Europe: unification failed there where that symbol of national law that is the King was lacking».
Boncompagni (1861, 34). Lampertico as well noted that: «L’idea di monarchia costituzionale
richiama non solo l’idea di monarchia limitata ed è in contrapposto quindi a monarchia assoluta,
ma inoltre di monarchia rappresentativa ed in cui i poteri sovrani si esercitano dal Principe e dai
rappresentanti della nazione» (The idea of constitutional monarchy brings to mind not only the
idea of limited monarchy and therefore is in contrast with absolute monarchy, but moreover it
recalls the idea of representative monarchy where the sovereign powers are exercised by the Prince
and by the representatives of the nation). Cfr. Lampertico (1886, 56).
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The Statute was again elevated to the role of political symbol (not legal) of the new
State and devaluation of the letter of Constitution continued.99 Fedele Lampertico
(1833–1906) noted that:
La Costituzione dello Stato Sardo ha bastato, perché mediante il concorso del Re, del
Senato e della Camera dei deputati, ossia senz’uopo di costituente venisse proclamato il
Regno d’ Italia, e ne divenissero parte integrante i paesi d’Italia o soggetti già allo straniero
o smembrati negli antichi Stati. Qui però l’atto costitutivo si è trovato immedesimato
coll’atto stesso di unione, d’aggregazione, d’incorporazione nazionale. Il quale atto di
unione ritrae origine e valore dai plebisciti, per cui venne a costituirsi l’unità d’ Italia.100
According to Lampertico the Statute was the fundamental and irrevocable law
because by way of the nation consent permitted to share the sovereignty between
the King and the Parliament. In a key passage the author noted that the Constitution
was not only the written text but Constitution was inside the public sentiment, the
practice, the customs, the legislation and in the history of Risorgimento.101 In the
same years, public opinion constantly asked to restore constitutional order within
the framework of the Albertine Statute. La Gazzetta del popolo of 13 January 1860,
with the explicative title of Give us back the Statute! (Restituiteci lo Statuto!), noted
In fatto di costituzione non si può e non si deve far credito, essenchè il semplice fatto di un
credito costituiscono un debito verso la Costituzione, quindi un atto incostituzionale.
Soggiungiamo che a noi non importa gran fatto che il Ministero si chiami Pietro o Paolo o
che sia costituzionale in teoria, ciò che chiediamo che siano costituzionale in pratica.102
Moreover, La Gazzetta del popolo of 12 August 1860 noted:
Lo Statuto nostro è buono, e possiamo dirlo anche migliore di quasi tutte le contemporanee
costituzioni scritte. (…) Lo Statuto italiano (…) ha eziando agevolato il futuro ordinamento
delle altre provincie d’Italia che aspettano la liberazione.103
99Manca (2015, 89–134).
100«The Constitution of the Sardinian State was enough, because by way of the involvement of the
King, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, or without the need of a constituent assembly the
Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed, and the countries of Italy, which were either subject to foreign
occupation or dismembered into the old States, became integral part of it. Here however, was the
constitutive act identified with the same act of national union, aggregation, incorporation. Such act
of union derives its origin and value from the plebiscites, by which the unification of Italy was
constituted». Lampertico (1886. Lo statuto e il senato cit., 50).
101Lampertico (1886, 99).
102«On the matter of constitution, credit cannot and must not be given, since the simple fact of a
credit constitutes a debt towards the Constitution, therefore an unconstitutional act. We add that we
do not care a lot for the fact the Ministry is called Peter or Paul or that it is constitutional in theory,
that which we ask is that it is constitutional in practice».
103«Our Statute is good, and we can also define it better than almost all the other written con-
temporary constitutions. (…) The Italian Statute (…) has also facilitated the future legal order of
the other Italian provinces which wait for liberation».
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The newspaper L’Opinione pubblica focused on specific constitutional issues
like for example the legitimacy of the law concerning full powers and on provi-
sional governments.104 Alongside the restoration of constitutional rules by way of a
return to the Statute, a part of the public law doctrine hoped for the immediate
summoning of the Parliament.105 According to Mazzini and the Mazzinians the
Parliament did not have any title for facing the issue of national integration.106
Cavour, however, decided to face the situation at parliamentary level. On 2 October
1860 the Prime Minister presented a Bill with only one article to the Chamber in
which he asked for the authorisation of the Government to proceed onto the
annexations of new provinces through royal decrees.107 Cavour admitted in front of
the Parliament that during the annexation process of Tuscany and Emilia many
unconstitutional acts had been carried out:
Il nuovo Ministero si affrettò di dar opera all’annessione; ma, siccome questa incontrava
gravi ostacoli nella diplomazia, parve opera savia e prudente l’associare il Parlamento al
suo compimento; ed egli è per ciò che quando i dittatori dell’Emilia e della Toscana
promossero il plebiscito, il Governo del Re li invitò a promuovere immediatamente l’ele-
zione dei deputati di quelle provincie, chiamandoli tutti insieme a sedere in quest’aula. Ma
così facendo, o signori, io lo dichiaro altamente, noi ci siamo scostati dalla stretta legalità,
noi abbiamo commesso un atto incostituzionale; noi non avevamo, a termini di rigoroso
diritto, facoltà di invitare i deputati dell’Emilia e della Toscana a sedere in Parlamento per
deliberare assieme ai rappresentanti delle antiche provincie (e tra queste annovero anche la
Lombardia) intorno all’annessione delle nuove provincie.108
In this speech, the Count underlined that under international pressure the
annexation procedure was not properly carried out according to a legitimate pro-
cedure, since the act was authorised through an enlarged Parliament with
104L’Opinione pubblica, 29th September 1859, N° 271; L’Opinione pubblica, 6th October 1859, N°
278; L’Opinione pubblica, 14th October 1859, N° 286; L’Opinione, 24th November 1859, N° 327.
105La nazione provvega alla nazione. Il diritto. 28th April 1860, N° 118 and L’appoggio del
parlamento. L’opinione, 6th May 1860, N° 126. Articles are also reprinted in the Appendix of the
volume by Caracciolo (1960).
106Mazzini, Giuseppe. Assemblea e plebisciti. Il Popolo d’Italia. 19th October 1860.
107For a detailed analysis on the statute law and on the content of the Relation by Cavour to the
bill, please see Santoncini (2008, 217–232).
108«The new Ministry hastened to realise the annexation; but, since this met serious obstacles in
diplomacy, a wise and prudent operation appeared to be associating the Parliament to its reali-
sation; and it is for this reason that when the dictators of Emilia and Tuscany promoted the
plebiscite, the Government of the King invited them to immediately promote the election of the
deputies of those provinces, summoning them all together to sit in this Chamber. However, in
doing so, Milords, I declare it loudly, we diverged from the strict legality, we have committed an
unconstitutional act; we did not have, according to rigorous law, the faculty of inviting the deputies
of Emilia and Tuscany to sit in Parliament in order to decree together with the representatives of
the old provinces (and among them I include Lombardy as well) on the annexation of the new
provinces». Cf. Artom and Blanc (1868, 606).
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representatives of new provinces. To the South of Italy the statesman, therefore,
proposed an alternative solution. In the same report, he asked for a motion of
confidence. Cavour noted that it was «more consistent with the spirit of our insti-
tutions» to legally proceed, that is making the electoral committees vote the
annexations first and then summoning the Parliament.109
After a long discussion, the Chambers approved the annexations. The opposition
was limited to more advanced criticism of different procedure than in the past. The
statute law was approved on 16 October 1860, but it was promulgated only on 3
December 1860 after that the plebiscites of the Southern provinces, of the Marche
and Umbria were carried out. Then, the Parliament was dissolved on 28 December
1860. The results of the elections of 27 January substantially rewarded the Cavour
politics. On 18 February 1861 the new parliamentary session was inaugurated with
a solemn meeting where for the first time the new representatives of the new State
filed in together. Some days later a Bill was presented by way of which Victor
Emmanuel II assumed the title of King of Italy for himself and his descendants.
8 Epilogue
Constitutionalisation was not a moment, it was rather a continuous process which
characterised Italian Unification. It was a question of a phenomenon which had the
purpose of giving constitutional forms to the Nation. The parabola of this process
remains an open question with non-defined features for many aspects: it had its
origins in Piedmont-Savoy when the small State connected its own politics and
institutional transformations to the national cause; it proceeded during the making
up of the Kingdom of Italy and continued also after the Unification. This phe-
nomenon consisted in making a “common” constitutional patrimony based on the
idea that statute laws and institutions must agree with the Spirit of the Albertine
Statute come to the surface, and in making sure that this spirit spread within all the
social body. A good part of the results are not easily valuable if we do not want to
get to the heart of the matter with judgements on its value which often position
themselves around the incompleteness of the constitutional forms and the limits of
the institutional results which characterise the Italian State.
The constitutionalisation of the Italian Unification had a written constitution at
its core. The Albertine Statute was considered the main bond for the political-social
dimension, a political necessity, but it did not rise to the role of a law higher than
the other norms of public law (hierarchicalisation of norms) and a control of
constitutionality was lacking.110 No judge had the faculty of pronouncing on the
109Artom and Blanc (1868, cit., 607).
110Among those who fought for a control of constitutionality there was for example, Racioppi
(1905). The author admitted a judicial control all the times that procedural norms included in the
Constitution were not respected. Moreover, the judiciary could verify if the Parliamentary consent
was validly formed. Racioppi tried to single out norms included in the Albertine Statute which
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legitimacy of a statute law. The Court of Cassation, in a decision of 26th January
1871, was firm in holding that searching for the opposition of a norm to the Statute
and to the rights of the citizens was a duty exclusively reserved to the Parliament
and the Sovereign.111 Such a reconstruction was corroborated by the theory of
separation of powers, according to which it was not acceptable that the judicial
power syndicated the act of another power. The guardian of the Constitution was
solely and only the legislative power (so-called parliamentary syndicate).
Within this framework the term-concept Constitution referred both to the idea of
a pactum which gave shape to the Nation and to the written document. De facto, the
same normative dimension of the Constitution rested on the idea of a “perpetual
constituent assembly”. Common features could be found in all the experiences that
belong to the model of the so-called granted constitutions. That which makes the
Italian experience a unique case as regards the Charte costitutionelle (1814 and
1830) or the Landständische Verfassung was the longevity of the constitution of
Charles Albert. The Albertine Statute survived political and institutional changes
without there being a formal change of juridical norms. Institutional mechanisms
and dynamics generated constitutional forms which were diverse according to
contingencies and spontaneous requests. In this context, jurists could affirm that the
essence of the Constitution was the Spirit, not its letter and that the Constitution was
something more than the written text.
allowed a syndicate by the judge. Instead, Gaetano Silvestri both acknowledged a normative
prominence to the Albertine Statute, and invoked a jurisdictional syndicate: «La “legge costi-
tuzionale”, dunque, si distingue dalla massa delle “leggi ordinarie” per un rapporto di priorità
storica, che la costituisce come presupposto di tutti gli atti del potere legislativo. Ma si distingue
pure per un rapporto materiale di priorità logica e giuridica. Difatti, lo Statuto, oltre a fissare i
caratteri formali obbligatorii di ogni legge, ha per contenuto un particolare corpo di norme aventi
per oggetto la tutela dei diritti fondamentali (Grundrechte) dei cittadini: diritti, i quali costituiscono
il minimum indispensabile per l’esistenza e per la struttura dello “Stato giuridico”. La “carta
costituzionale”, invero, non stabilisce dei precetti vaghi e indefiniti, i quali non siano suscettibili di
applicazione pratica, ma chiude e tutela diritti determinati in precise disposizioni positive, dotate di
una adeguata garanzia di stabilità» (The “constitutional law”, therefore, distinguishes itself from
the mass of “ordinary laws” for a relationship of historical priority, which constitutes it as pre-
supposition of all the acts of the legislative power. However, it distinguishes itself also for a
material relationship of logical and juridical priority. Indeed, the Statute, besides fixing the
compulsory formal characteristics of every statute law, contains a particular body of norms whose
object is the protection of fundamental rights (Grundrechte) of the citizens: rights which constitute
the indispensable minimum for existence and for the structure of the “juridical State”. The
“constitutional charter”, indeed does not establish vague and indefinite precepts, which are not
susceptible to practical application, rather it encloses and protects determinate rights in precise
positive provisions endowed with an adequate guarantee of stability). Cf. Graziano (1914, 39). On
these aspects please see Meccarelli (2002) and Stronati (2015).
111The decision is quoted by Miceli (1902. Incostituzionalità, cit., 775).
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9 Summary (Italian)
Il focus di questa indagine è la costituzionalizzazione intesa come processo di
integrazione legale, entro la struttura dello Statuto Albertino, e meccanismo d’in-
terpretazione e d’emendabilità (revisione) del testo costituzionale, che porterà ad
un’unificazione nazionale senza un documento scritto quale atto di un potere cos-
tituente esercitato dal popolo. Si tratta di leggere lo Statuto Albertino attraverso la
sua evoluzione, tenendo conto delle competizioni e delle contrapposizioni per
mantenere in armonia le istituzioni con la società civile.
La promulgazione dello Statuto Albertino costituiva la prima tappa del lento e
difficile processo di costituzionalizzazione fatto di progressi, ma anche di reazioni,
battute di arresto. L’altra fase è quella della sperimentazione che portava ad un’e-
voluzione della lettera dello Statuto alla luce del contesto storico-sociale. La cos-
tituzionalizzazione dell’Unificazione nazionale è, pertanto, un fenomeno di lungo
periodo, costituendo la cifra per leggere il National Building. Specificamente, lo
Statuto Albertino era un punto di partenza più che un punto di arrivo. Dal momento
in cui il sovrano concedeva la costituzione, ci si rendeva conto che l’atto normativo
era di per sé insufficiente, lo Statuto Albertino era un atto che non poteva essere
revocato, ma la costituzione per vivere doveva riposare sul consenso e l’opinione
pubblica doveva credere in essa.
Nel preambolo lo Statuto Albertino è definito «legge fondamentale perpetua ed
irrevocabile». È assai probabile che, nell’intenzione del sovrano l’espressione
«legge fondamentale» evocasse le teorie sulle lois fondamentales proprio della
monarchia assoluta francese. «Perpetua» stava a significare il giuramento (obbligo
politico e giuridico) assunto dal Re, per sé e per i suoi successori, di non revocare in
alcun modo la concessione costituzionale.
La parola «irrevocabile» era, invece, intensa nel significato di un patto tra
Sovrano e Nazione. L’idea del patto rinviava anzitutto all’antica concezione che
vedeva nelle leges fundamentales un contratto attraverso cui si regolavano i rapporti
tra sovrani e assemblee parlamentari garantendo la successione al trono. Tale idea
consentiva di fondare le origini dello Stato non sulla sovranità popolare ma sulla
parità giuridica delle due parti contraenti.
Sebbene l’esperienza italiana non conoscesse il principio di supremazia della
Costituzione, l’espressione “incostituzionale” non era sconosciuta sotto lo Statuto
Albertino. Ad un esame delle fonti non è difficile rinvenire che durante le sessioni
parlamentari gli oratori sollevavano questioni di incostituzionalità di leggi e rego-
lamenti. Vi era una certa coincidenza tra il significato che assumeva il termine
incostituzionale in seno al diritto pubblico inglese e l’espressione impiegata nella
prassi costituzionale italiana, ove incostituzionale era genericamente inteso «ogni
comportamento costituzionale scorretto».
In generale, la validità di una norma giuridica doveva rinvenirsi nella più
generica conformità al sentire dell’opinione pubblica. Pertanto si faceva risultare
incostituzionale ogni atto o fatto normativo discorde o contrario allo spirito della
Costituzione. Fu Cavour che inaugurò questa forma di interpretazione dello Statuto
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Albertino. Ciò fu il più importante lascito dello statista alla teoria costituzionale del
periodo liberale. A partire dal 1850 ogni atto normativo veniva vagliato alla luce
della lettera ma soprattutto dello Spirito della Costituzione che consentiva di
mantenere in costante armonia l’ordine legale con la pubblica opinione.
È cosa nota che la costituzione scritta era scarna e molte norme avevano il sapore
di principi generali piuttosto che di norme giuridiche direttamente vincolanti. Di
conseguenza, la vera partita si giocava sul piano della prassi e dell’interpretazione,
sulla perenne difficoltà a ricondurre i principi in esso contenuti entro i confini del
costituzionalismo moderno. Si trattava, in sostanza, di estrapolare dal testo della
Costituzione limiti effettivi al potere monarchico ed enucleare regole che consen-
tissero un reale sviluppo del principio parlamentare garantendo diritti e libertà
fondamentali.
I giuristi parlavano in modo generico di interpretazione secondo lo spirito della
Costituzione, modifiche, deroghe o abrogazione dello Statuto. Le modifiche alla
lettera furono pochissime. L’attenzione deve però essere concentrata sulle c.d.
«modifiche tacite», cioè sui cambiamenti al significato della costituzione senza che
per questo si cambi il documento scritto. Le modifiche tacite intervenivano sul
documento implementando, sviluppando la lettera dello Statuto e correggendo gli
eventuali errori. L’interpretazione e la prassi costituivano i più importanti mecca-
nismi di cambiamento costituzionale. In questo contesto si riconosceva un ruolo di
primo piano alle norme non scritte.
In conclusione, la costituzionalizzazione avvenne attraverso il ricorso a tre
strumenti: la formula contenuta nei plebisciti, l’estensione dello Statuto Albertino a
tutti i territori conquistati e la parlamentarizzazione della causa nazionale. Essa non
fu un momento ma un processo continuo che caratterizzò l’Unificazione italiana. Si
è in presenza di un fenomeno che aveva per scopo dare forme costituzionali alla
Nazione. La parabola di questo processo resta una questione aperta, per molti
aspetti dai tratti non definiti: aveva origine nel Piemonte-Savoia quando il piccolo
Stato legava la propria politica e le trasformazioni istituzionali alla causa nazionale,
proseguiva durante la formazione del Regno d’Italia e perdurava anche dopo
l’Unità. Questo fenomeno consisteva nel far emergere un patrimonio costituzionale
“comune” fondato sull’idea che le leggi e le istituzioni debbano essere concordi con
lo Spirito dello Statuto Albertino, fare in modo che questo spirito si diffondesse per
tutto il corpo sociale. Buona parte dei risultati non sono facilmente valutabili se non
si vuole entrare nel merito con giudizi di valore che spesso si attestano attorno
all’incompiutezza delle forme costituzionali e sui limiti degli esiti istituzionali che
caratterizzarono lo Stato italiano.
La costituzionalizzazione dell’Unificazione italiana aveva a fondamento lo
Statuto Albertino che era considerato il principale collante della dimensione
politico-sociale, una necessità politica, ma non assurgeva al ruolo di legge più alta
rispetto alle altre norme di diritto pubblico. Mancava, inoltre, un controllo di
costituzionalità. Nessun giudice aveva la facoltà di pronunciarsi sulla legittimità di
una legge. In questo orizzonte è difficile poter dire quando il termine-concetto
Costituzione rinviava alla tradizione delle leges fundamentales, all’idea di un ordine
precostituito frutto di un pactum unionis e alla tradizione, e quando si rinviava al
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documento scritto. Per certi versi i due momenti tendono a coincidere e rendono
l’esperienza italiana originale in quanto conciliava un costituzionalismo a base
scritta con un costituzionalismo a base consuetudinaria. Restava di fatto che la
stessa dimensione normativa della Costituzione poggiava sull’idea di una “cos-
tituente perpetua”. Lo Statuto Albertino era sopravvissuto a cambiamenti politici ed
istituzionali senza che ci fosse un formale cambiamento delle norme giuridiche.
Meccanismi e dinamiche istituzionali generavano forme costituzionali diverse a
seconda delle contingenze e delle domande spontanee. In questo contesto, i giuristi
potevano affermare che l’essenza della Costituzione fosse lo Spirito non la lettera e
che la Costituzione fosse qualcosa di più del testo scritto.
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Abstract At Austrian universities, the problem of ‘Precedence of Constitution’ is
usually taught within the framework of the ‘theory of the hierarchical structure of the
legal order’, an essential part of the so-called ‘Pure Theory of Law.’ Whilst
the famous jurist Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) was the founder of the Pure Theory, the
‘theory of the hierarchical structure’ has been introduced by Kelsen’s disciple
Adolf J. Merkl (1890–1970) in 1918 and is accepted also by those who do not follow
Kelsen’s Pure Theory. According to the Pure Theory, the basis of the validity of a
norm can only be another norm, which can be seen as the ‘higher’ norm. The legal
order can be seen as a structure of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ norms, and within the legal
order of a certain state, its constitution is the highest norm of all—the ‘paramount
law’, as has been said by US Supreme Court in its famous caseMarbury v. Madison,
in 1803. The ‘theory of the hierarchical structure’ also gives the justification for
constitutional justice: the constitutional court reviews whether the legislator has
remained within the framework of the constitution.
‘Precedence of Constitution’ or, in German, Verfassungsvorrang, the phrase which
is in the centre of this conference, is hardly ever used in the Austrian legal language,
even almost unknown. The problem discussed here, which is the question of the
relationship of the constitution to other norms, in particular to statutes, is usually
taught at Austrian universities within the framework of the ‘theory of the hierar-
chical structure of the legal order’—in German: Lehre vom Stufenbau der
Rechtsordnung.
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This theory is recognised as so fundamental that it is already taught to students in
their first semester, albeit in very simplified manner, which does not really reflect
the revolutionary character that the theory had in the days when it was first
developed.1 At any rate this theory is common sense in the Austrian scientific
community. This is true not only for the followers of Hans Kelsen’s ‘Pure Theory
of Law’, which continues to be quite popular in Austria, but also for its critics. Just
a short while ago it was argued that the ‘hierarchical structure of the legal order
[was] the most important achievement of the Vienna School of Legal Theory, and
indeed its only element that was not built on sand but stands on solid ground.’2
Hardly ever do people remember that the theory of the hierarchical structure was
not developed by Hans Kelsen, and that, in fact, Kelsen had originally intended to
banish as non-juristic from his theory of law the central problem which is resolved
by the theory of the hierarchical structure, which is the question of the formation
and annulment of legal norms.3 It was his disciple Adolf Julius Merkl, who from
1918 onward developed the first ideas in this regard,4 and thereby made such an
important contribution to Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law that Merkl was even
‘crowned’ co-founder of the Pure Theory by his academic teacher.5 However, it
remained Kelsen’s task to connect the theory of the hierarchical structure with the
other propositions of the Pure Theory of Law and to integrate it into his theorem in
such a skilful way that it would hardly occur to latter-day readers that it had not
been part of this theory from the beginning.6
From what has been said so far, one can infer that the theory of the hierarchical
structure, even if it is nowadays often taught independently of more detailed
theoretical considerations, can only be fully understood if it is elaborated against the
backdrop of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. This will be briefly addressed in the
following.
The vantage point of the Pure Theory of Law is the difference between ‘is’ and
‘ought’: With the sentence ‘A certain state of affairs exists’, we express something
completely different than with the sentence ‘A certain state of affairs ought to exist.’
The first sentence is a statement about the actual state of affairs; the latter sentence
is a normative order, a norm.7 Admittedly, it is often the case that the content of a
norm corresponds to an actual state of affairs, so that what ought to be does actually
1See f.e. Kneihs et al. (2014, p. 21f.) and Thaler (2016, p. 29).
2Koller (2005, p. 106).
3Kelsen (1911, pp. 543–547).
4Merkl (1918). The „classical” version of the theory is given in Merkl (1931).
5Kelsen (1960, p. 313). The historical development oft he idea of the „Stufenbau” is described by
Borowski (2005, pp. 124–131).
6See esp. the sum of Kelsen’s theory in Kelsen (1967), and the chapter on „The dynamic aspect of
law”, pp. 193–278.
7Kelsen (1967, pp. 5–6).
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happen. But this would be a ‘material-historical-psychological approach’. From the
point of view of logic, there is no bridge that would lead from the one to the other.8
Therefore, it is in particular impossible to deduce from factual power relation-
ships the validity of a norm. If a gangster says to me: “Give me your money!”, and,
because I am refusing to comply, uses force, he is perhaps only in gradual terms
different from the income-tax official, who also wants my money and is prepared to
use force, if necessary, to recover it. Nevertheless, the official’s order, quite dif-
ferent to that of the gangster, will be interpreted as a norm. Behind his subjective
volition there is an objective ‘ought’.9 How can this be explained? What is the basis
of the validity of this norm?
According to the Pure Theory of Law, the basis of the validity of this norm can
only be another norm, which in our case authorises the officer to create norms.10 In our
concrete case this would be a court order to direct a civil execution against someone’s
property. This only diverts the question for the basis of the validity, though. Now it
sounds like this: What is the basis of the validity of the court order? If the court with
which we are dealing here is situated in a continental European Rechtsstaat, a state
under the rule of law, it will have applied a statute. And the norm which in turn
provides for the validity of the statute is the constitution as the highest norm of the
state.11 The word ‘highest’ does suggest a certain idea of spatiality, for whose char-
acterisation the phrase ‘hierarchical structure’ is ideal; the entire legal order of the state
appears as a hierarchy, with the constitution forming its highest level.
Obviously we cannot stop here, because the constitution must derive its validity
from another norm, for example from a previous constitution, but this only works if
this previous constitution included norms regulating how changes to the constitu-
tion should be made, and if these norms were actually applied.12 If the new con-
stitution, however, has come about in a revolutionary act, then we have arrived at a
provisional end point, at least as far as national law is concerned. I only want to hint
here at the fact that another of Kelsen’s disciples, Alfred Verdross, quite vehe-
mently argued that national law has some norms of the international law as the basis
of its validity.13 One could say that he extended the hierarchical structure from
including only national law to comprising international law as well. Kelsen himself
at least regarded this as one of several ways to solve the problem14; I myself share
Verdross’ opinion. But for us here it is not necessary to delve further into this
discussion. In the present context we are only concerned with national law, and
there, the constitution does indeed form the highest level of positive law. One level
further down are the statutes, another level under them the ordinances or
8Kelsen (1911, p. 87).
9Kelsen (1967, p. 8).
10Kelsen (1967, p. 193).
11Merkl (1931, p. 282).
12Kelsen (1967, p. 200).
13Verdross (1923, p. 134).
14Kelsen (1967, p. 336).
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administrative regulations, then the court decisions and individual administrative
acts, and so on.15
The hierarchical structure which I have just described is a typical one, but not the
only possible one. The actual sequence of the individual levels does not follow a
principle of legal theory, but the positive law instead.16 This is why I said before, ‘if
the court with which we are dealing here is situated in a continental European
Rechtsstaat, a state under the rule of law.’ A court in a common law jurisdiction
might not base its decision on a statute but on a precedent. A court in a fascist
dictatorship might perhaps base its decision not on a statute but on the will of the
dictator, which may have been issued only orally. The possibilities are endless.
It is crucial here to recognise that it is a characteristic of the law that it regulates
its own creation.17 A highly developed legal order contains not just detailed rules
which directly affect the coexistence of people but also equally detailed rules which
authorise certain organs to create rules themselves. How detailed these rules are,
how many levels there are in this hierarchical structure, entirely depends on the
respective legal order. Always there has to be a highest level, which at least needs to
state who is authorised to create law. But even if one imagines this norm in the
simplest possible terms—for instance, regis voluntas suprema lex (the king’s will is
the supreme law)18—there needs to be at least one lower-level norm which contains
some more specific expressions of the norm-issuer’s will. Whether these are sta-
tutes, court decisions or administrative acts, whether a corresponding statute is
needed to issue an administrative act, whether a difference is even made between a
court decision and an administrative act—all these are questions of positive law,
which may differ from one country to another.19 At any rate there needs to be a
lowest level: the practical execution of a norm, which is the act in which the bailiff
takes, for example, the laptop computer into his hands and carries it out of the
apartment of the person against whom the execution is directed. This lowest level is
not a norm; it is a legally relevant fact.20
Between the highest level, the constitution, and the lowest level, the factual
execution of a norm, there are other norms whose creation is determined by a higher
norm but which also serve as a precondition for the creation of lower-lever norms.
While the highest level is a level of absolute law creation, and while the lowest
level is a level of absolute law application, the levels in between have—to quote
Merkl’s famous dictum—‘two faces’: they are law application (from the point of
15Merkl (1931, p. 259).
16Merkl (1931, p. 273).
17Kelsen (1929, p. 2), Merkl (1931, p. 281), Kelsen (1967, p. 221) and Vašek (2013, p. 10).
18Merkl (1931, p. 252).
19Kelsen (1929, p. 2).
20Merkl (1923, p. 2010), Merkl (1931, p. 260), Koller (2005, p. 109). See also Borowski (2005,
p. 137f), who is on the opinion that it is not possible to construct a two-step legal order, so there
has alway to be at least one level between the highest and the lowest one.
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view of the higher level) as well as law creation (from the point of view of the
lower level).21
Law-creation from one level to the next was characterised by Merkl as a gradual
individualisation and concretion22: Very general norms develop gradually into more
specialised ones; at first, they apply to an infinite number of material facts, then to a
large number of them, then only to a few and eventually only to one. For example,
the constitution only stipulates that the federal parliament is competent to create
private law; private law stipulates that in the case of a divorce the child should stay
with the parent who is best suited to bring him or her up; the judge finally needs to
make a decision whether little Peter should be brought up by his father or by his
mother. In this process, the creation of a new level is in part an act of thought, in
part an act of will.23 In an act of thought, the legislator needs to understand the
content of the constitution, the judge the content of the statute. One could say that
these higher-level norms demarcate the outer frame of what is actually possible in
terms of the law. Usually, this framework will allow for a number of alternatives.
The legislator who is competent to create private law could also have said that
divorce is illegal or that whenever a divorce occurs the child has to stay with his or
her mother. But the legislator has found another solution, namely that the judge
must decide which parent should bring up the child—this is the legislator’s act of
will. This means, however, that the judge is only dealing with a framework, he may
decide in favour of the father as well as in favour of the mother, depending on what
he thinks will be best for the welfare of the child.
At this point I should make a comment on the theory of interpretation that comes
with the Pure Theory of Law24: The highest principle of the Pure Theory of Law, as
you know, is that it wants to ‘purify’ the study of the law of all non-juristic
elements. It stipulates that only the ‘act of thinking’ just described, that is, the
definition of the frame provided by the higher-level law, constitutes legal
scholarship. This is true for the academic lawyer (for instance at a university) as
well as for the practising law professional. The filling of this frame on the other
hand, that is, the act of will in which a concrete decision is made, does not con-
stitute scholarship but is an act of judgment which needs to follow extra-legal
criteria.25 In the language of the Pure Theory of Law, this is a ‘political’ act, but
‘political’ not in terms of party politics. At any rate, scholarship stops, as it were,
one step before the goal; unlike the judge, it accepts that for an academic question
there is often not one but there are several equally valid answers.
But let us now return to the hierarchical structure: The question on which level
of the hierarchical structure a norm is situated is not determined based on its content
but on its form: Constitutional provision—simple statute—ordinance—court
21Merkl (1918, p. 10).
22Merkl (1931, p. 283); see also Kelsen (1929, p. 3).
23Merkl (1923, p. 219).
24Kelsen (1967, pp. 348–356).
25Kelsen (1967, p. 351).
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decision or individual administrative act (formal administrative decision). It should
be stressed at this point that court decisions and individual administrative acts are
situated at the same level, that is, below the statute. In this respect, the theory of the
hierarchical structure constitutes a counterpoint to the traditional theory of the
separation of powers, which regards legislature, executive, and judiciary as standing
next to each other and does not structure them hierarchically, whereas the theory of
the hierarchical structure quite easily accounts for a precedence of the statute.26
This has led us to the core of our subject: the precedence of the constitution, which
like the precedence of the statute can be understood in terms of the theory of the
hierarchical structure.
The constitution is thus the level of the law which contains the preconditions
according to which simple statutes can be created.27 One can distinguish two types
of such preconditions: there are preconditions in regard to the legislative process on
the one hand, and preconditions in regard to the content of the statutes on the
other.28 The constitution may contain provisions on who may initiate the legislative
process, how many members of parliament need to be present during the poll, who
needs the sign the bill once it has been passed, and so forth. It may also contain
substantive provisions, however, in regard to a certain content that must not become
law. One example is the distribution of competences in the federal state, which may
prevent the federal parliament or the parliaments of the member states, respectively,
from enacting laws on certain subjects. In particular, however, this concerns the
fundamental rights and liberties, precisely because they are not written down in
simple statutes but form part of the constitution, that is, rules which primarily
address the legislator. They forbid him to overly restrict the freedom of speech, to
discriminate against women, to impose the death penalty, etc.
This example, in particular, makes clear that we are referring to constitutional
law in a formal sense, not to constitutional law in a substantial sense.29 If parliament
enacted only a simple statute that says: ‘Everyone is entitled to enjoy freedom of
speech’, and immediately afterwards another statute which imposes censorship on
newspapers and other media, then the first statute could not block the second one.
Only if the freedom of speech is constitutionally guaranteed, if in the hierarchical
structure of the legal order it is one level above the statute, can it block the statute.
However, this also means: if the statute that introduced censorship was itself
enacted in the form of a constitutional provision, a constitutional guarantee against
censorship will not have the desired effect, because the enabling and prohibiting
norms are situated at the same level.30
Here again it should be noted that all of the examples provided depend on the
respective national legal order. The example which I have chosen here is at any rate
26Merkl (1931, p. 285).
27Kelsen (1929, p. 7).
28Kelsen (1929, p. 8).
29Kelsen (1929, p. 7) and Kelsen (1967, p. 222).
30Kelsen (1929, 8, 35).
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in accordance with the Austrian legal order. In Germany, the freedom of speech is
guaranteed by Art. 5 of the Basic Law. This article is, at least to a certain extent,
protected by the ‘eternity clause’ of Art. 79 of the Basic Law, which stipulates that
the ‘fundamental principles’ of Art. 1–20 can never be changed.31 In the present
context we need not delve into the question of what precisely these ‘fundamental
principles’ are or which limitations to the freedom of speech might be introduced
even in the Federal Republic of Germany by means of a constitutional amendment.
We can however note that there seem to be in Germany two types of constitutional
law: Constitutional law which is affected by the eternity clause, on the one hand,
and all the other constitutional law, on the other. This necessarily implies that even
within constitutional law, separate levels may exist, and that Art. 79 constitutes as it
were the highest level of national law. The Austrian counterpart would be the
‘structural principles’ of the Austrian Federal Constitution. This idea was developed
by legal theorists on the basis of Art. 44 of the Federal Constitutional Act; it
stipulates that a fundamental change to the democratic, republican, federal, or other
basic principle of the constitution requires a two-thirds majority in parliament as
well as a referendum. The point is that by means of this complicated procedure a
total change of the constitution would at least theoretically be possible, which is not
the case in Germany.32
But what are the implications then if a statute was passed in a procedure that
deviated from the procedure laid down in the constitution, or if it has some content
that is ruled out by the constitution? Given that the constitution sets the precon-
ditions under which statutes can come into existence, the answer must primarily be
that any deviation from these preconditions, as small as it may be, must have as its
consequence that the statute has not accrued the force of law, that is, that it is null
and void.33 The argument was also a similar one in the US Supreme Court case
Marbury v. Madison, where the court came to the conclusion that the Act in
question was null and void.34
This state of affairs will only be different if the constitution contains a provision
which expressly prohibits the courts to exercise judicial reviews of statutes or at
least contains a prohibition of reviewing statutes in terms of their content. Such
prohibitions could be found in many constitutions of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries and seemingly had the effect that the judges had to apply statutes even if
they were clearly unconstitutional.35 But was that indeed the case?
Let us remind ourselves of the significance of the hierarchical structure of the
legal order. This stepped pyramid traces all legal acts in the state back to
higher-level legal acts and these are traced back to the constitution. The constitution
31See Dreier (1994, p. 265ff.), with further references; Vašek (2013, p. 30).
32See now the sharp-witted analysis by Vašek (2013).
33Kelsen (1929, p. 15) and Merkl (1923, p. 292).
34Urofsky and Finkelman (2002), Documents No. 46.
35See for example article 7 of the Austrian Staatsgrundgesetz über die richterliche Gewalt, 21st
December 1867, Reichsgesetzblatt No. 144.
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is the origin of all national law, it provides for the unity of the legal order, figu-
ratively speaking: it expresses the will of the state. An unconstitutional statute is
characterised by the facts that it cannot be incorporated into the hierarchical
structure; that it cannot base its validity on the constitution; that it does not reflect
the will of the state.
But if the constitution says: ‘I want you to apply this law, and whether its content
is compatible with the provisions which I have made elsewhere does not need to
concern you’, then it is the will of the constitution that this apparently unconsti-
tutional statute should be valid. But in this case the statute is not unconstitutional at
all, it is indeed constitutional.
Here an example as well: If the constitution says that freedom of speech is
guaranteed and a statute introduces censorship, then this statute is unconstitutional
and therefor null and void. If the constitution however also says that the judges
must not review the censorship statute, then this statute is constitutional and valid.
The question that remains to be asked then is: To what extent is the guaranteed
freedom of speech still significant? The answer is rather frustrating: This consti-
tutionally guaranteed right has no significance vis-a-vis the simple legislator, it
cannot bind him. In other words, in the hierarchical structure of the legal order it is
not above but at the same level as the censorship statute. By means of the simple
sentence: ‘Judges are not competent to carry out judicial review’, the differentiation
between constitutional law and simple statutes loses its significance, and even more:
it does not exist.
And this is exactly the point where Hans Kelsen’s concept of constitutional
courts sets in. As soon as there is a court which is competent to review the con-
stitutionality of statutes, this introduces also a special level of formal constitutional
law in the hierarchical structure of the legal order.36 This constitutional court simply
checks whether the preconditions for the creation of statutes as stipulated in the
constitution have been met. If the constitution offers the simple legislator several
alternatives and if the legislator has chosen one of these legitimate alternatives, then
the constitutional court must not criticise this choice; it is not the legislator’s choice
which is under review, but only whether he has remained within the framework of
the constitution. Its role is not different to that of a court of higher instance, which
reviews the decision of the court of first instance but may only decide whether the
decision was legally correct, but not whether it was lenient or harsh, fair or unfair.37
The particularity of the Austrian model of judicial review by a constitutional
court, by which it differs from the American model, is its centralisation in a single
court: All the other courts cannot undertake the judicial review themselves; they
may only request that the constitutional court, which has a monopoly in this respect,
checks a statute for its constitutionality.38 If it comes to the conclusion that a statute
is unconstitutional, it annuls this statute. This means that its decisions have a
36Kelsen (1929, p. 48).
37Kelsen (1931, p. 71).
38Olechowski (2014, p. 87).
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constitutive effect; the statute is not invalidated until it is declared null and void.
Until then it is only annullable, or in other words, not an absolute but a relative
nullity.39
How can this provision be understood in terms of the hierarchical structure?
Annulment is only an option for something which has previously existed. This
means that until they are annulled, unconstitutional statutes are valid. And this also
corresponds to the prohibition directed at other courts to undertake the judicial
review themselves. So the constitution does, as just explained, indeed contain a
general sanction according to which statutes, as long as they have the outward
appearance of a statute, have at least provisional validity, even if they are otherwise
flawed. For this phenomenon, Merkl coined the term Fehlerkalkül, which means
that the constitution takes the possible faultiness of statutes into account and merely
provides for the possibility of their annulment by a special court.40
With this I am arriving at the last aspect: I have made use of the hierarchical
structure in two different ways41: On the one hand, it shows how the entire legal
order consists of norms which are in a relation of super- and sub-ordination; one
norm owes its validity to the validity of another norm. On the other hand, however,
the hierarchical structure provides also the theoretical basis for the annulment of
statutes; higher-level law destroys lower-level law. It must be clear that the hier-
archical structure understood in terms of legal conditionality does not have to be
completely identical with the hierarchical structure understood in terms of
derogatory power.42 A constitutional provision can form the basis for the annulment
of a simple statute even if it was created after the statute and thus cannot have been
a precondition for the creation of this statute in the first place. A converse example
would be the parliamentary rules of procedure, which will usually either be at a
lower level or at most at the same level as a simple statute, but which are also a
precondition for the creation of simple statutes and even constitutional provisions. It
is thus justified to join Merkl in distinguishing between two ‘hierarchical con-
structions’: the hierarchical structure understood in terms of legal conditionality and
the hierarchical structure understood in terms of derogatory power. In both of them,
however, the constitution will claim the highest level.
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Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Du Jury
Constitutionnaire (an III)
Presented on 18 Thermidor III (5 August 1795)
French Original1
ARTICLE PREMIER
Il y a un dépositaire conservateur de L’ACTE CONSTITUTIONNEL, sous le
nom de jury constitutionnaire.
II
II est composé de cent huit membres, qui se renouvelleront annuellement par
tiers, et aux mêmes époques que le corps législatif.
III
L’élection du tiers ou des trente-six entrants se fait par le jury constitutionnaire
lui-même, sur les deux cent cinquante membres qui doivent, à la même époque
annuelle, sortir de l’un et l’autre conseil du corps législatif.
IV2
La première formation du jury constitutionnaire se fera au scrutin secret par la
Convention, de manière qu’un tiers des membres soient choisis parmi ceux de
l’assemblée nationale, dite Constituante, un autre tiers parmi ceux de l’assemblée
législative, et un autre parmi les membres de la Convention.
V
Les séances du jury constitutionnaire ne seront point publiques.
VI
Le jury constitutionnaire prononcera sur les violations ou atteintes faites à la
constitution, qui lui seraient dénoncées contre les actes,
1Archives Nationales 284 AP 4 doss. 8.
2C’est un article à décréter à part.
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Soit du conseil des Anciens,
Soit du conseil des Cinq-Cents,
Soit des assemblées électorales,
Soit des assemblées primaires,
Soit du tribunal de cassation,
Lorsque ces dénonciations lui seront portées,
Soit par le conseil des Anciens,
Soit par le conseil des Cinq-Cents,
Soit par des citoyens en nom individuel.
II prononcera sur semblable dénonciation qui lui serait portée par la minorité
contre la majorité de l’un ou l’autre des susdits corps constitués.
VII
Les décisions du jury constitutionnaire porteront le nom d’arrêt.
VIII
Les actes déclarés inconstitutionnels par arrêt du jury constitutionnaire, sont nuls
et comme non avenus.
IX
Si les actes dénoncés comme inconstitutionnels, sont des actes responsables ou
mêlés d’actes responsables, le jury constitutionnaire pourra, avant ou après avoir
juge le point d’inconstitution, adresser la dénonciation aux tribunaux
compétents, avec ordre de poursuivre.
X
Le jury constitutionnaire s’occupera habituellement des vues qui lui paraitront
propres à perfectionner l’acte constitutionnel et la déclaration des droits de
l’homme.
L’opinion de la majorité, quand elle sera formée, sera inscrite dans un registre
particulier.
XI
Dans le courant de chaque dixième année, à commencer de l’an 1800, huitième
de la république, douzième de la révolution, le jury constitutionnaire examinera
de nouveau ses avis consignés dans son registre.
Il composera son cahier de propositions pour améliorer l’acte constitutionnel,
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Et il en donnera officiellement communication au conseil des Anciens et à celui
des Cinq-Cents, afin qu’il reçoive la plus grande publicité.
Cette communication se fera trois mois au moins avant la tenue annuelle des
assemblées primaires.
XII
Les assemblées primaires, après lecture faite du cahier de propositions,
déclareront oui ou non, si elles entendent donner au conseil des Anciens le
pouvoir d’y statuer.
Si la majorité des assemblées primaires a dit non, le cahier sera regardé comme
non avenu, et ses propositions ne pourront être reproduites avant la dixième
année suivante.
Si la majorité des assemblées primaires a dit oui, le pouvoir constituant est
délégué, par ce seul fait, au conseil des Anciens, pour statuer sur les propositions
faites, sans qu’il puisse ni les amender ni en substituer d’autres.
XIII
Les séances où le conseil des Anciens exercera le pouvoir constituant y seront
exclusivement affectées.
Elles ne pourront excéder le nombre de douze en tout, ni celui de deux par
décade.
II y aura, pour les séances du pouvoir constituant, un procès-verbal séparé, sur
un registre particulier, qui sera, à la fin, solennellement déposé aux archives du
jury constitutionnaire.
XIV
Chaque année, le dixième au moins des membres du jury constitutionnaire, pris
au sort, se formera en jury d'équité naturelle.
Cette section sera, en sus des deux attributions précédentes, exclusivement
chargée de prononcer sur les demandes officielles qui lui seraient portées par les
divers tribunaux, à l’effet d’avoir un arrêt d’équité naturelle sur les cas qu’ils
déclareraient n’avoir pu juger, faute de loi positive qui pût s’y appliquer, ou ne
pouvoir juger que contre leur conscience, d’après le texte seul de la loi.
XV
Les arrêts d'équité naturelle seront exécutés par le tribunal qui aura formé la
demande officielle, ou par toute autre, au choix du jury constitutionnaire.
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XVI
Les arrêtés d’équité naturelle seront officiellement communiqués, dans le mois,
au conseil des Cinq-Cents.
XVII
Le jury constitutionnaire ne peut rendre aucun arrêt du propre mouvement.
À Paris, de l’Imprimerie nationale.
Thermidor, L’an III.
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Appendix B
Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Du Jury
Constitutionnaire (an III)
Presented on 18 Thermidor III (5 August 1795)
English Translation by Ulrike Müßig
FIRST ARTICLE
There is a depository keeper of the CONSTITUTIONAL ACT, under the name
of the constitutional jury.
II
It consists of 108 members, a third of whom are annually replaced, and at the
same time as the legislative body.
III
The election of a third or of the thirty-six entrants is executed by the constitu-
tional jury themselves, among the 250 members who have to, at the same time of
the year, leave one or another council of the legislative body.
IV3
The first formation of the constitutional jury will be made secretly by the con-
vention, in such a manner that one third of the members are selected among that
of the national assembly, i.e. the constituent assembly, another third among that
of the legislative assembly and still another by the members of the Convention.
V
The sessions of the constitutional jury will not be open to the public.
VI
The constitutional jury will comment on the violations or the impairments of the
constitution, which will be denounced to them, against the acts,
3This is an article to be decreed separately.
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either of the Council of Ancients,
or of the Council of Five Hundred,
or of the electoral assemblies,
or of the primary assemblies,
or of the tribunal of cassation,
when these denunciations will be addressed to them,
either by the Council of Ancients,
or by the Council of Five Hundred,
or individually by the citizens.
They adjudicate on a similar denunciation addressed to them by the minority
against the majority of one or another of the constitutional bodies mentioned
above.
VII
The decisions of the constitutional jury will bear the name ‘decision.’4
VIII
The acts declared as unconstitutional by the decision of the constitutional jury
are null and void.
IX
If the acts denounced unconstitutional are responsible acts or involve responsible
acts, the constitutional jury can, before or after having judged the point of
unconstitutionality, address the denounciation to competent tribunals with the
order to pursue.
X
The constitutional jury will habitually take care of the views which for them
seem to be suitable to improve the constitutional act and the declaration of the
human rights.
The opinion of the majority, when they are formed, will be particularly
registered.
4The original French—arrêt—most accurately translates to the English ‘judgement.’ However, in
modern terminology, ‘judgement’ refers to the first instance jurisdiction. The modern usage of the
term ‘decision’ is closer to Sieyès’ intention.
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XI
In the course of each tenth year, starting from year 1800, eighth of the Republic,
twelfth of the Revolution, the constitutional jury will examine again their
opinions registered.
They will create their notebook of propositions in order to improve the consti-
tutional act,
and they will officially communicate with the Council of Ancients and that of
Five Hundred, in order to receive the greater publicity.
This communication will be made three months at least before the primary
assemblies are annually held.
XII
The primary assemblies will, after having read the notebook of propositions,
declare yes or no, if they understand giving the council of Ancients the power to
lay them down as rules.
If the majority of the primary assemblies said no, the notebook will be seen as
void and its propositions cannot be reproduced before the following tenth year.
If the majority of the primary assemblies said yes, the constituent power is
delegated, by this fact only, to the Council of Ancients, to lay the propositions
made down as rules without being able to either amend them or to substitute
them with others.
XIII
The sessions at which the Council of Ancients will exercise the constituent
power will be exclusively affected.
Altogether, they cannot exceed the number of twelve nor that of two per decade.
There will be, for the sessions of the constituent power, a separated written
report, about a particular register, which will be, in the end, solemnly placed in
the archives of the constitutional jury.
XIV
Every year, the tenth of at least the members of the constitutional jury, which
will be randomly taken, will build a jury of natural equity.
This section will be, in addition to the two preceding attributions, exclusively
assigned to adjudicate on the official requests submitted to them by the different
courts, for having a decision of natural equity in the case that they declare not
having been able to judge, due to the absence of a positive law which can apply
to that, or to being forced to judge only against their conscience, according to the
text only of the law.
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XV
The decisions of natural equity will be executed by the tribunal who will make
the official demand or by any other on the choice of the constitutional jury.
XVI
The decisions of natural equity will by officially communicated, within one
month, to the Council of Five Hundred.
XVII
The constitutional jury cannot make any decision of the proper movement.
In Paris, National Printing House.
Thermidor, Year III.
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Appendix C
Projet de Constitution pour le Royaume
de Pologne, 1812
Collection of the National Museum Cracow (Muzeum Narodowe w Krakowie), The
Princes Czartoryski Library (Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich)
Ref. Ms. 13078, provenance: Archiwum Druckich-Lubeckich no 5.
Transciption with (tracked=[ ]) alterations of grammar, syntax and spelling errors as
necessary for the French comprehensibility. The correction of the Cyrillic additives
for the nobility’s charte, the cities’ constitution, the governing council and the
districts takes into account the terminology in use since Catherine’s II adminis-
trative and judicial reforms. For readability’s sake tracking has been suspended in
the latter case as well as in regard to the French separation rule.5
Sommaires[.]
Titre Premier. Lois fondamentales.
Titre Second. Du Roi.
Titre Troisi[è]me. De la Diète.
I. Formation.
II. Attributions.
Titre Quatrième. Des Diètines.
I. Formation.
II. Attributions.
Titre Cinqui[è]me. De l’Ordre Equestre[.]
Titre Sixi[è]me. Des Villes.
Titre Septieme. Des Communes des Cultivateurs[.]
5Deviating titles, varying in the table of contents and in the body of text (headings), are kept as in
the original source.
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Titre Huitième. Des Etrangers.
Titre Neuvième. De l’Administration centrale.
I. Du Conseil Dirigeant[.]
II. Du Conseil d’[É]t[a]t.
Titre Dixi[è]me. De l’administration exécutive et de [la] Police dans les
Provinces.
I. Dans les Chefs lieux[.]
II. Dans les Districts et Communes.
III. Dans les Villes.
Titre Onzième. De l’Administration Judiciaire.
I. Des Tribunaux de première Instance.
II. Des Tribunaux d’Appel.
III. Du Tribunal Supr[ê]me.




Le Royaume de Pologne est joint et confédéré indissolublement avec l’Empire
de Russie, il conservera à jamais toute son intégrité politique et celle des Droits
qui lui sont assurés par la présente constitution.
II.
La Couronne est héréditaire dans la Famille de Sa Majesté l’Empereur et
Roi ALEXANDRE Ier.
III.
Dans le cas d’extinction de la Famille Impériale actuellement régnante, celle qui
alors occupera le t[rô]ne Impérial succ[è]dera aussi à celui de la Pologne.
IV.
Chaque Empereur de Russie se fera couronner comme Roi de Pologne àWilna et
indiquera le jour de son couronnement lors de son av[è]nement au T[rô]ne.
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V.
L’Empereur et Roi régnera selon la présente Constitution par laquelle toute autre
loi ou acte constitutionel antérieur, est aboli.
VI.
La Religion catholique apostolique et Romaine est, et restera à jamais la
Religion nationale dans le Royaume.
VII.
La Religion Catholique apostolique grecque professée dans les différentes pro-
vinces, continuera de jouir des mêmes avantages dont elle a joui jusqu’à présent.
VIII.
Le Gouvernement assure en même tem[p]s à toutes les Religions ou cultes, leur
libre exercice, en abolissant les lois qui porter[ai]ent atteinte à ce principe.
IX.
Les droits et fondations accordés à l’Universit[é] de Wilna et aux autres
Institutions de l’Instruction publique seront conservés.
X.
Dans le cas de minorité du Roi, un Conseil du Régence composé de la Reine
Douairière et de trois membres du Sénat (désignés par le Roi ou s’il ne l’eut pas
fait par les [É]tats) remplira les fonctions du Roi.
XI.
Les Lois Civiles et Pénales, actuellement en vigueur, continueront de l’être
jusqu’à ce que les [É]tats aient décidé sur le nouveau Projet du
Code ALEXANDRE, qui leur sera présenté par une Commission que le
Gouvernement nommera.
XII.
Le Roi, L’Ordre Equestre, les villes libres et les communes des Cultivateurs,
constituent la Nation.
XIII.
Leur ré[u]nion en Diète du Royaume (en assemblée des [É]tats) constitue le
Pouvoir législatif.
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XIV.
Le Gouvernement et Pouvoir exécutif, réside dans le Roi seul, aid[é] d’un
Conseil dirigeant composé des Ministres ou Chefs, et d’un Conseil d’[É]tat.
XV.
L’Empereur de Russie, comme Roi de Pologne, ainsi que chacun de ses
Successeurs, nommera un Lieutenant (ou Vice-Roi) soit parmi les Princes de Sa
Maison, soit tel autre individu qu’il Lui plaira de nommer, et à qui il déléguera
telles attributions de Son autorité qu’il trouvera convenable.
XVI.
Le Pouvoir judiciaire est distinct des deux précédents, il est confié à des juges
élus aux diètines et à la diète, et confirmés par le Roi.
XVII.
Il y aura trois ordres de tribunaux, ceux de première, de seconde et en dernière
instance.
XVIII.
La présente Constitution, sera revue par la Diète tous les vingt cinq ans.
[Le deuxième titre et les premières dispositions du troisième titre sont man-
quants].6
21. La Chambre des Nonces se renouvellera par moitié tous les deux ans.
22. Dans chaque Province, la corporation de l’Ordre Equestre en nomme un, et
celle des villes, l’autre. Un Règlement spécial déterminera les arrondisse-
ments, dont les propriétaires constitue ront une diètine.
23. La Chambre des Nonces est présidée, pendant la diète, par un Maréchal
choisi dans l’ordre de la Noblesse, à la majorité des voix, et confirmé par le
Roi.
6Le Réf. Manuscrit 13078 ne contient pas les dispositions numérotées XIX et XX. Avec le n° 21
suivant, la numérotation change pour être en chiffres arabes. Cette lacune fait l'objet de contro-
verses dans la littérature polonaise (Smolka Stanisław, Polityka Lubeckiego przed powstaniem
listopadowym, vol. II. Kraków (1907), 506; Izdebski Hubert, Litewskie projekty konstytucyjne z
lat 1811–1812 i ich wpływ na Konstytucję Królestwa Polskiego. Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne
(XXIV) (1972), 105). La position de Smolka, selon laquelle le “deuxième titre et les premières
dispositions du troisième titre manquent,” semble préférable, car il n´y a aucune raison de cau-
tionner la supposition d´Izdebski, selon laquelle les dispositions manquantes couvrent jusqu´à 20
articles. Ce dernier ne prend pas en considération que chaque titre comprend plusieurs articles (par
exemple, le titre X: 16 articles, le titre XI: 36 articles, le titre VIII: quatre articles).
374 Appendix C: Projet de Constitution pour le Royaume de Pologne, 1812
24. La Diète s’assemblera tous les deux ans, à moins que le Roi ne juge à propos
d’ordonner une Assemblée extraordinaire.
25. Elle ne peut être convoquée que par des lettres Circulaires, signées par le
Roi.




27. La Chambre des Nonces donnera en premier lieu, son avis sur les propo-
sitions faites par le Roi, son Conseil d’[É]tat entendu, relativement à
l’augmentation ou la distribution des impôts, ou sur tout autre objet que le
Roi trouve à propos de leur faire communiquer.
28. Elle décidera aussi des propositions faites par chaque Nonce, relativement à
la situation et aux besoins de sa classe dans l’arrondissement.
29. Ces Propositions doivent préalablement être communiquées au Gouvern-
ement, qui ne pourra suspendre la discussion sur cet objet, que lorsqu’elle
ser[a]it contraire à la Constitution, ou si les faits n’ét[ai]ent pas justifiés.
30. L’emploi des sommes destinées pour les dépenses locales de chaque cor-
poration, sera contr[ô]lé par un Comité, nommé par la Chambre, après qu’il
l’aura été par la Diètine.
31. Chaque Projet de Loi générale (civile et pénale) sera discuté par la Chambre
des Nonces.
32. Des Commissaires (ou Orateurs) nommés par le Gouvernement, exposeront
les motifs des lois ou des propositions faites par le Gouvernement.
33. Après que la Chambre des Nonces aura manifesté son opinion à la majorité
des voix, le Commissaire (ou Orateur) du Gouvernement, un des Nonces et
le Maréchal, se pr[é]senteront à la barre du Sénat, pour soumettre le Projet de
la Loi à sa décision.
34. On fera une seconde lecture des mêmes pièces, et le Sénat a le droit d’ac-
cepter ou de reje[t]er simplement la proposition et l’avis de la Chambre des
Nonces.
35. Le Sénat manifestera son acceptation ou son rejet par la pluralité des voix et
au scrutin secr[e]t. Si le Sénat rejette la proposition ou la Loi proposée par la
Chambre des Nonces, elle ne peut être présentée une seconde fois dans la
même Diète.
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36. Lorsque la majorité des deux Chambres sont d’accord sur l’acceptation
d’une proposition, elle n’obtient force de la loi que par la sanction du Roi ou
de son délégué.
37. Le Roi a une double voix pour résoudre la parité, quand elle aura lieu.
38. Le Roi peut reje[t]er la proposition, quand même elle aur[a]it pass[é] à la
totalité des voix dans les deux Chambres.
39. Dans le cas de l’article [38] l’Ordre, ou la corporation, dont la proposition a
été reje[t]ée, peut s’adresser au Roi par un Député et lui exposer sa prière,
pour obtenir qu’elle devienne l’objet d’une nouvelle proposition à la Diète.
40. On nommera trois Comités (ou Députations) composées de Membres des
deux Chambres pour préparer les objets qui seront portés à l’Assemblée. Ces
comités seront:
1. Celui des finances.
2. – des Lois.





41. Les Diètines sont composées par les députés choisis par l’Ordre Equestre, les
Villes et les Communes.
42. Elles seront précédées des réunions ou Assemblées électorales de District,
composées de députés de chaque classe.
43. Le Mode de ces reunions sera fixé par un Règlement particulier qui
déterminera conformément aux localités, le nombre des députés de chaque
district.
44. Les Diètines s’assembleront dans les Chef lieux des Provinces (ou villes de
Gouvernement.)
45. Les Diètines ordinaires auront lieu tous les deux ans et précéderont la Diète
des [Éta]ts.
46. Le Gouvernement en fixera le tem[p]s.
47. Les Membres seront élus pour 6 ans.
48. Le tiers sera renouvél[é] tous les deux ans.
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49. L’assemblée élira un Président ou Maréchal de la Classe de l’Ordre Equestre
et un Secrétaire pour la rédaction des Procès- Verbaux et des propositions à
faire à la Diète.
50. La durée de chaque diètine ne peut excéder trois semaines.
II.
Attributions.
51. Les objets dont les Diètines s’occuperont sont; 1., d’émettre leur opinion sur
la distribution impartiale des impôts et le mode de perception le plus con-
venable [dans les] localit[é]s et [par] rappor[t] [aux] habitan[t]s. 2., sur l’état
et les besoins des différentes classes dans leur arrondissement, pour éclairer le
Gouvernement sur la meilleure voie de faciliter et améliorer l’administration
publique.
52. Ils feront parvenir directement leurs observations et représentations, à cet
égard, au Conseil dirigeant, par les Ministres respectifs, et ces mêmes objets
seront le contenu des instructions des Nonces et Députés choisis pour la
Di[è]te des [É]t[a]ts.
53. Ils seront obligés d’examiner les comptes sur l’Emploi des sommes destinées
aux besoins locaux de chaque district et arrondissement.
Titre V.
De L’ordre Equestre.
54. Les Nobles terriens constituent le premier Ordre de la Nation.
55. L’ét[a]t noble de Pologne est égal en dignité à celui de tous les autres Pays.
56. Il jouira de tous les Privilèges accordés à la Noblesse Russe par la Charte de
la Noblesse (Двopянcкaя Гpaмoтa).
57. Dans leur sein, seront choisis exclusivement les grands Dignitaires et tous les
autres fonctionnaires du Royaume, à l’exception de ceux auxquels les
députés des villes et communes concourront, en vertu de la constitution.
58. Tous les Membres de ce corps sont égaux, non-seulement quant aux droits
de posséder dans le Royaume, toutes espèces de charges, et de remplir les
fonctions, mais aussi quant aux autres immunités et prérogatives qui sont
attribuées à l’ordre [É]questre par cette Constitution.
59. Les Membres de l’ordre [É]questre sont les premiers défenseurs de la liberté
du Royaume et de la nation.
60. L’ordre [É]questre participe à la législation par la réunion de ses Députés aux
diètines, comme Propri[é]taires, pour concourir à une distribution impartiale
des impôts.
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61. Il participe à la législation par l’[é]lection de Nonces à la Diète (vu
l’Assemblée des [É]t[a]ts)[.]
62. Il participe encore au pouvoir judiciaire en choisissant les juges et étant
choisi comme Candidats, pour la plus grande partie des places judiciaires.
Titre VI.
Des Villes libres et Bourgeois.
63. Les villes libres comme corporations des bourgeois, constituent le second
ordre de l’[É]t[a]t.
64. Ils jouiront de tous les Privilèges et Droits accordés aux Villes de l’Empire
Russe par la Charte des Villes (Гopoдoвoe пoлoжeниe)[.]
65. Ils participeront à la législation, en s’assemblant par leur Députés aux
diètines pour concourir à la distribution des Impôts.
66. Ils participeront à la législation par l’élection des Députés à la Di[è]te (ou
l’Assemblée des [É]t[a]ts)[.]
67. La Diète s’occupera d’un Projet de loi sur la Constitution à donner aux autres
villes.
Titre VII.
Des Colons et cultivateurs.
68. La Constitution assure à la Classe des Cultivateurs un ét[a]t légal.
69. Les travaux et redevances auxquelles les cultivateurs, comme usufruitiers
des terres (appartenant aux propri[é]ta[ir]es des biens-fonds) sont assujettis,
ne seront pas arbitraires, mais détermin[é]s, par des Lois et Règlements
particuliers, ou par des Contrats.
70. Le principe sur lequel les redevances dues aux Propriétaires seront fixées, est
celui, que l’usufruitier jouisse d’un bénéfice proportionné à son travail et au
produit de la terre.
71. Une Commission spéciale s’occupera à cet effet, d’un Projet de loi sur
l’arpentage et l’estimation des terres et sur la confection d’un cadastre.
72. Pour ce même effet, les Paysans ou cultivateurs établis sur les terres d’une
certaine étendue, formeront des communes qui seront solidairement
responsables [envers] l’[É]tat et [les] Propriétaires des Droits et Impôts
auxquels ils seront obligés.
73. Ces Communes jouiront, sous le rapport des droits civils, des droits des
Corporations.
74. Plusieurs communes formeront un Canton.
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75. Chaque Commune choisira ses anciens pour le maintien de l’ordre dans
l’intérieur, et pour juger les différends de peu d’importance.
76. Ils seront surveillés par les Juges de Paix ou Commissions du bon ordre.
77. Dans le contentieux, les cultivateurs ne participeront à la judicature [i.e. le
corps judiciaire] que comme juges du fait. L’application de la Loi appar-
tiendra aux Juges ordinaires choisis par les diètines.
78. Il sera libre aux Propriétaires, de conclure avec leurs colons des contrats par
lesquels les redevances et travaux seront fixés d’un accord commun.
79. De telles conventions, conclues avec la communauté entière, ou séparement
avec chaque habitant de village, deviendront, pour les parties contractantes,
une obligation commune et r[é]ciproque, et cela, suivant l’énonciation




80. Tout individu à qui l’entrée dans le Royaume n’est pas défendu par les Lois,
y jouira de la libert[é] de faire valoir son industrie de la manière et dans tel
endroit que bon lui semblera, de se choisir un ét[a]t et de quitter le pays à
son gré, en se conformant aux lois de Police établies à ce sujet.
81. Tout étranger qui se sera établi dans le Royaume et qui y a vécu paisible-
ment un certain tem[p]s pourra être naturalisé en remplissant les conditions
prescrites par les Lois à cet égard.
82. L’indigenat ne peut être accordé à un [É]tranger d’extraction noble que du
Consentement de la Diète.
83. La r[é]ception d’un [É]tranger bourgeois ou Cultivateur dans les
Corporations des villes et Communes des habitan[t]s de village, dépendra du
consentement des autorit[é]s locales y établies, toutefois en observant ce qui
est prescrit par les Lois de Police.
Titre IX.
De l’administration centrale.
84. Le Pouvoir exécutif de l’administration est confié.
1., Au Conseil Dirigeant. (Пpaвитeльcтвyющий Coвeт)
2. [,] Au Conseil d’[É]tat.
85. Les Membres de ces Conseils sont nommés et revoqués par le Roi.
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I.
Du Conseil Dirigeant.
86. Le Lieutenant du Roi, les Chefs des Départemen[t]s et un Secrétaire d’[É]tat
forment le Conseil Dirigeant (ou le Ministère) qui est présidé par le Roi, et
dans son absence par Son Lieutenant.
87. Le Lieutenant du Roi exerce en son nom celles des attributions Royales que
Sa Majesté lui aura spécialement dél[é]gués.
88. Il surveillera en même tem[p]s la Police du Royaume.
89. Les Ministres ou Chefs qui siègent au Conseil Dirigeant sont:
1. Le Primat, comme Chef du Clergé et Président de la Commission
d’[É]ducation.
2. Le Ministre des affaires étrangères.
3. La Ministre de la Guerre (ou Hetman) [.]
4. Le Ministre de l’Intérieur.
5. Le Ministre ou Chancelier de la Justice et Garde du Sceau.
6. Le Trésorier et Contr[ôl]eur du Royaume.
90. Le Conseil dirigeant se trouve dans la Capitale du Royaume de Pologne qui
est Wilna.
91. Chaque Chef aura un Département et dirigera sa partie dans toute l’étendue
du Royaume.
92. L’organisation des Autorités établies. dans les différentes Provinces
(Gouvernements Palatinats) ainsi que dans les Districts (Уeзды) et com-
munes, répondra aux attributions du Conseil Dirigeant. Des Règlemen[t]s
particuliers contiendront le développement des détails.
93. Lorsque le Roi appelle chez lui un Chef de Département (un Ministre) il sera
remplacé ad interim par le Vice Chef ou le Membre le plus ancien du même
Département.
94. Dans l’assemblée des Chefs de Départemen[t]s, l’opinion du Lieutenant du
Roi est décisive.
95. Le Ministre qui enfreint ses devoirs, devient responsable.
96. Ayant quitté sa place, il peut être accusé devant le Tribunal suprême, après
que le Conseil d’Etât aura trouvé qu’il y a lieu à l’accusation.
97. En outre, chaque fonctionnaire Public qui a lésé les droits d’un Citoyen, en
abusant de son pouvoir, peut être pris à partie par la voie civile, pour la
réparation due à l’individu lésé.
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II.
Du Conseil d’[É]tat.
98. Le Conseil d’[É]tat réside auprès de Sa Majesté l’Empereur et Roi qui y
préside.
99. Le Conseil d’[É]t[a]t est composé
1., d’un Président qui a la préséance dans l’absence du Roi, et qui dirige la
marche des affaires.
2., de quelques membres référendaires et d’un Secrétaire d’[É]tat.
3., de Membres extraordinaires qui assistent aux Séances lorsqu’ils y sont
appellés.
100. Les Ministres et Sénateurs sont par leur place Membres extraordinaires du
Conseil d’[É]t[a]t.
101. Le Président est le Rapporteur général de toutes les affaires, et l’organe des
ordres du Roi.
102. Le Conseil d’[É]tat s’assemble ordinairement une fois par mois.
103. En outre, le Président convoque le Conseil d’[É]t[a]t, chaque fois que le Roi
l’ordonne.
104. Hors des Séances, le Président, les Référendaires et le Secrétaire d’[É]t[a]t
travaillent en Comité.
105. L’objet de l’activité du Président et des Conseillers-Référendaires, est de
rendre compte au Roi de la marche et de l’[é]t[a]t des affaires, suivant les
rapports qui sont entrés du Conseil Dirig[e]ant, afin de réunir toutes les
données qui peuvent servir à constater des faits et éclairer la Religion du
Roi.
Titre X.
De l’administration exécutive dans les Provinces.
106. Le Royaume est divisé, sous le rapport de l’administration, en Provinces
(Gouvernements Palatinats) Districts et Communes.
107. Sous le rapport militaire, la division sera fixée par un règlement particulier.
I.
Dans les Chefs-Lieux.
108. Dans chaque Province[,] il y aura un Président (Palatin) (Gouverneur Civil)
et quelques Membres, qui formeront un Département administratif central,
dont les attributions répondent à celles du Conseil dirigeant auquel il est
subordonné.
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109. Le Président et les Membres seront nommés par le Roi.
110. Ils surveilleront l’activité des Autorités de District ainsi que des Juges de
Paix et des Commissions du bon Ordre.
111. Les autorités judiciaires ne sont point sous la direction du Département
administratif.
112. Dans les affaires administratives, la voix du Chef est décisive.
113. Le Chef assistera aux discussions des Diètines sur la distribution des




114. Dans chaque District, il y aura
1. Un Chef de District (Castellan, Wo[j]ewoda7) avec un ou plusieurs
adjoints (selon que les localités l’exigent) exerçant des attributions qui
répondent à celles du Département administratif sans les Chefs-lieux.
2. Une Commission du bon [O]rdre composée d’un Juge de Paix et de
quelques Membres (ou Commissaires).
115. Ces fonctionnaires seront élus par les Diètines, tous les quatre ans, et
renouve[l]és par moitié tous les deux ans.
116. La Commission du bon Ordre est chargée de la Police judiciaire dans le
District.
117. Le Juge de Paix et les Commissaires sont chargés de la Conciliation. Un
R[é]glement particulier r[é]glera cet objet.
118. Dans les Provinces ou les localités l’exigeront on pourra établir plusieurs
Commissions du bon Ordre dans un District.
119. Leur Jur[i]diction s’étendra sur toutes les classes.
120. Les autorités locales des Communes (art …[114]) seront surveillées par les
Commissions du bon Ordre.
121. Personne ne pourra [ê]tre Chef ou Membre du D[é]partement administratif
de la Province, du Tribunal d’appel, de la Cour supr[ê]me, Nonce, ou
S[é]nateur [s’il] n’a pas occupé pendant 2 ans au moins une Place dans les
Commissions du bon ordre ou dans l’administration du District.
7L’orthographe originale est Woewod, ce qui renvoie en polonais au terme “Wojewoda” (voïvode
= gouverneur), qui administre la voïvodie (territoire administratif).
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III.
Dans les Villes libres.
122. L’administration des Villes libres sera organisée sur le même Principe
comme il sera developpé par un R[é]glement particulier.
Titre XI.
De l’administration judicaire.
123. Il y aura trois ordres de Tribunaux.
1. Cour de première instance dans les Districts (yeзды) et dans les villes.
2. Cour de seconde instance dans les Chefs lieux des Provinces
(Gouvernements Palatinats).
3. Un Tribunal en dernier ressort pour tout le Royaume.
I.
Des Tribunaux de première Instance.
124. Les tribunaux de premi[è]re Instance seront compos[é]s d’un Président et
de quelques membres.
125. Ils seront élus par Les Diètines tous les quatre ans et renouve[l]és par
moitié tous les deux ans.
126. Les tribunaux de première instance conn[aî]tront des affaires civiles, de
police correctionelle et criminelles.
127. Dans les Districts ou la Population est plus consid[é]rable le Tribunal de
première instance sera divisé en deux Chambres.
128. Dans les cas (civils et de Police correctionelle) ou les Juges de Paix et les
Commissions du bon Ordre ainsi que les autorités des Communes, n’auront
pas [de] juge en dernier ressort, les parties peuvent exercer les recours
[devant] Tribunaux de première instance.
129. Les Tribunaux de première Instance conn[aî]tront de certains objets en
dernier ressort.
130. L’instruction et le jugement du fait ser[ont] separé[s] de la question du
droit; le premi[è]re appartiendra à des Jurés choisis dans la classe des
parties litigeantes; l’application de la loi sera reservée aux Juges.
131. Le Code Judiciaire qui sera presenté à la Diète, developpera ces Disposi-
tions et en les appliquant selon les localités tant aux habitans des cam-
pagnes que des villes, r[é]glera les autres objets relatifs à l’organisation
definitive des tribunaux et des formes de Proc[é]dure à suivre.
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II.
Des Tribunaux d’appel.
132. Les Tribunaux d’appel siègeront dans les Chefs-lieux des Provinces.
133. Leur Jur[i]diction s’[é]tendra sur toutes les classes.
134. Ils seront divisés en deux Chambres, l’une pour les affaires civiles, l’autre
pour les affaires criminelles.
135. Chacune sera composée d’un Président et de plusieurs Conseillers.
136. Les Président et Membres seront élus par les diètines et confirmés par le
Roi.
137. Ils seront élus pour quatre ans et renouve[l]és par moitié tous les deux ans.
138. Personne ne peut [ê]tre nomméMembre d’un Tribunal d’appel [s’il] n’a pas
rempli pendant un certain temps les fonctions de jug[e] dans les tribunaux
de première instance ou celles de Juge de Paix.
139. En cas de parité de voix celle du Président départage.
140. Ils surveilleront les tribunaux de premi[è]re instance.
141. Ils jugeront en dernier ressort des objets d’une certaine importance.
142. Leurs Jugemen[t]s seront exécutoires; dans certains cas, ils ne le seront que
contre des s[û]retés.
143. Les Jugemen[t]s criminels seront toujours portés à la r[é]vision de la Cour
suprême.
144. Les deux Chambres se r[é]uniront sous la Présidence du plus ancien des
Presiden[t]s pour juger du contentieux de l’administration, entant qu’il est
du ressort des tribunaux civils.
145. Le tem[p]s et la durée des séances et les autres objets accessoires, seront
regl[é]s comme il est dit à l’article 131.
III.
Du Tribunal Suprême.
146. Il y aura pour tout le Royaume un Tribunal de Justice Suprême[.]
147. Il sera composé d’un Premier President de trois Présidents et de Membres,
tous nommés par le Roi, sur un nombre double des Candidats présentés par
la Diète.
148. Les Nonces qui composent le Comit[é] (ou la Députation) des lois à la
Diète, font partie des Membres de la haute Cour dans la cas désignés à
l’article 152.
384 Appendix C: Projet de Constitution pour le Royaume de Pologne, 1812
149. Le Tribunal supr[ê]me surveillera l’administration de la Justice dans toute
l’etendue du Royaume.
150. Le Tribunal sera divisé en trois Sections; la première, pour les affaires
civiles; la seconde, pour les affaires criminelles et la troisième, pour les
affaires contentieuses avec la Couronne (le contentieux de
l’administration).
151. Les Sections se réuniront en Assemblée générale: 1., lorsqu’il n’y a pas
deux Jugemen[t]s conformes et que les voix auront été partagées, 2. lorsque
le Roi l’ordonnera, 3. pour les objets généraux qui se rapportent au service
et à la Police du Tribunal.
152. Les Nonces (art: 148.) se joindront à l’assemblée générale : 1., lorsqu’un
Membre de l’administration centrale devra [être] jugé. 2., dans les cas où il
se manifeste une lacune dans la loi et que les Tribunaux inf[é]rieurs
demandent une disposition régulative à ce sujet.
153. Si le Tribunal suprême trouve que l’objet est suffisamment déterminé par
les lois existantes, il le renvoi[e] au Tribunal d’appel, pourqu’il [en]
conn[a]isse en vertu de la Loi.
154. S’il trouve qu’en effet il existe une lacune, il présentera l’objet au Conseil
Dirigeant, qui soumettra au Roi son opinion relativement à une disposition
préalable, jusqu’à ce que la Diète prochaine y [ait] pourv[u].
155. Tous ces cas seront toujours portés à la discussion de la Diète, qui en
d[é]cidera sous le rapport législatif.
156. Dans le cas de l’article 148 et 152. le Roi nommera celui qui pr[é]sidera le
Tribunal suprême.
157. Les Jugemen[t]s du Tribunal Suprême, ne sont pas sujets à l’appel et seront
toujours exécutoires.
158. Les Jugemen[t]s criminels qui emportent la perte des droits civils et poli-
tiques, ne pourront être exécutés sans la confirmation du Roi ou de Son
Lieutenant.
159. Une Loi particulière d[é]terminera les fonctions des Procureu[r]s (ou
Commissaires) Royaux, celles, des Chancelleries, Secrétaires, de même que
la Surveillance que le Ministre ou Chancelier de la Justice exercera sur les
autorités judiciaires.
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The Kingdom of Poland is united to and connected indissolubly with the Russian
Empire and will protect forever its political integrity and the integrity of rights
assured to it by the present constitution.
II
The crown is hereditary, vested in the family of His Majesty the Emperor and
King ALEXANDER I.
III
In the case of extinction of the currently-ruling Imperial Family, the family
occupying the Imperial throne will also succeed the Polish throne.
IV
Every Emperor of Russia will be crowned as King of Poland in Vilnius, and the
day of His coronation will indicate consequently His accession to the throne.
V
The Emperor and King will rule according to the present constitution by which
every law or previous constitutional act is abolished.
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VI
The Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church is, and will remain, the national
religion of the Kingdom.
VII
The Greek Catholic and Apostolic Church in the different Provinces will con-
tinue to enjoy the same advantages as it has enjoyed hitherto.
VIII
The Government guarantees at the same time freedom of worship to all religions
or cults, abolishing every law that limits this principle.
IX
The rights and foundations granted to the University of Vilnius and other
institutions of the public educational system will be secured.
X
In the case of the King’s minority, a Council of Regency formed by the Queen
Dowager and three members of the Senate (nominated by the King or, if he has
not done so, by the estates) will fulfil the functions of the King.
XI
The civil and criminal laws currently in effect will continue to be in force until
the estates have decided on the new draft of a Code Alexander, which will be
presented by a Commission appointed by the Government.
XII
The King, the Equestrian Order, the Free Towns, and the communities of
peasants constitute the nation.
XIII
Their association in the Diet of the Kingdom (in the Assembly of the Estates)
constitutes the legislative power.
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XIV
The Government and executive power reside in the hands of the King, with the
assistance of a Governing Council composed of Ministers or Heads [of gov-
ernment departments], and a Council of State.8
XV
The Emperor of Russia, as King of Poland, as well as each of His successors,
will nominate a Lieutenant (or Viceroy), either from amongst the princes of His
House, or another individual He may choose to nominate, and to whom He will
delegate such authority that He considers appropriate.9
XVI
Judicial power is divided into two orders, the one entrusted to Judges who are
elected by the Diet, and the other at the Dietine, both confirmed by the King.10
XVII
There will be three ranks of tribunals, those of first, second, and last instance.
XVIII
The present constitution will be revised by the Diet every twenty years.
[The Second Title and the first provisions of the Third Title are missing]11
8The French term chef translates directly to ‘chiefs’; in this context, however, the ‘chiefs’ being
referred to are the equivalent of departmental heads within government, which is therefore a more
accurate translation of the intended term.
9The term ‘Lieutenant’ appears both in the original French, and in the English translation of the
later constitution of 1815. Here it is used as a synonym of ‘Governor.’ Constitutional Charter of
the Kingdom of Poland in the Year 1815 (London: James Ridgway, 1831), 13.
10The French term diètine, in its anglicised form (without the accent grave), is used to describe
what in sixteenth-century Poland was termed a ‘Provincial Assembly.’ In the 1791 Constitution,
‘Dietine’ and ‘Primary Assembly’ are used interchangeably. Daniel Stone, The Polish-Lithuanian
State, 1386–1795 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 64; New Constitution of the
Government of Poland, Established by the Revolution, the Third of May 1791 (London: J. Debrett,
1791), 59ff.
11The Ref. Ms. 13078 does not contain provisions numbered XIX and XX. With the following
No. 21 the numbering changes to arabic counting. This gap is the subject of controversy within the
Polish literature (Smolka (1907), 506; Izdebski (1972), 105). The position of Smolka that the
‘Second Title and the first provisions of the Third Title are missing’ seems preferable, as there are
no indications to support Izdebski’s assumption that the missing provisions cover up to 20 articles.
The latter does not take into account that every title comprises several articles (e.g. Title X: 16
articles, Title XI: 36 articles, Title VIII: four articles).
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21. Half of the Representatives of the Chamber of Envoys will be renewed every
two years.12
22. In every Province, the corporation of the Equestrian Order nominates one
Chamber, and the corporation of the Towns the other Chamber. A special
regulation will determine the Districts, whose landowners will constitute a
Dietine.
23. During the session of the Diet the Chamber of Envoys is presided over by a
Marshal, chosen from the noble estate with the majority of votes and con-
firmed by the King.
24. The Diet will assemble every two years, unless the King decides to convene
an extraordinary assembly.
25. It can only be convened by circular letters, signed by the King.
26. Its ordinary duration amounts to six weeks. The King has the power to
extend the duration, and to prolong its sessions.
II.
Attributions
27. The Chamber of Envoys will give, in the first place, its opinions about
proposals made by the King, after His Council of State had been heard, in
relation to the increase or distribution of taxes, or any other object the King
sees fit to communicate with the Envoys.
28. It will also decide about proposals of every Envoy concerning the situation
and needs of his estate in the District.
29. These proposals must be previously communicated to the Government,
which cannot suspend the discussion about this object unless it is contrary to
the constitution, or the facts have not yet been justified.
30. The use of the determined sums for local expenditure of every corporation
will be controlled by a Committee, nominated by the Chamber, after being
appointed by the Dietine.
12The original French term, la Chambre des Nonces, can be translated variously as ‘Chamber of
Deputies’, ‘Chamber of Envoys’, or ‘Chamber of Nuncios’, although the latter term is customarily
used to denote functionaries of the Holy See of Rome. The English translation of the preceding
Polish Constitution of 1791 uses ‘Chamber of Envoys’ and ‘House of Deputies’ interchangeably,
and ‘Chamber of Envoys’ appears commonly in the secondary literature concerning Poland (and
occasionally France) in the nineteenth century. Today, the Lower House of the modern Polish Sejm
is officially referred to in English as the Chamber of Envoys. Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon
(London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 446; New Constitution of the Government of Poland
1791, 13.
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31. Every bill concerning general law (civil and criminal) will be discussed by
the Chamber of Envoys.
32. Commissioners (or Speakers) nominated by the Government will set out the
motives of laws or proposals made by the Government.
33. After the Chamber of Envoys has given its opinion with the majority of
votes, the Commissioner (or Speaker) of the Government, one of the
Envoys, and the Marshal will present the draft before the Senate for its
decision.
34. There will be a second reading of the same objects, and the Senate has the
right to accept or simply reject the proposal and the opinion of the Chamber
of Envoys.
35. The Senate will declare its acceptance or rejection through a plurality of
votes and via secret ballot. If the Senate rejects the proposition or the law put
forward by the Chamber of Envoys, there will be no possibility to present it
a second time during the same term of the Diet.
36. When the majority of the two Chambers agree with the acceptance of a
proposal, it will be enacted only by the King’s consent, or that of his
delegates.
37. The King has a double vote to solve the parity of votes, when this takes
place.
38. The King has the right to reject a proposal, even after it has been passed with
unanimous approval by the two Chambers.
39. In the case of this article [Art. 38], the order or the corporation whose
proposition has been rejected may address the King through a Deputy and
forward the request to him that it becomes the object of a new proposal
before the Diet.
40. Three Commissions (or Delegations) will be nominated, composed of
members of the two Chambers, in order to prepare the objects to be pre-
sented in front of the Assembly.13 These Commissions will be:
1. Commission of Finance;
2. – of Law;
3. – of Police.
13The term ‘Commission’ is used in the English translation of the 1815 Constitution.





41. The Dietines are constituted by the Deputies chosen from the Equestrian
Order, the Towns, and the Communes.
42. They will be introduced by meetings or District electoral assemblies, com-
posed of Deputies of every estate.
43. The mode of these meetings will be fixed through a particular regulation that
will determine the number of Deputies in every District, in accordance with
the localities.
44. The Dietines will meet in the capital centres of the Provinces (or seats of
Government).
45. The ordinary Dietines will take place every two years, preceding the
Assembly of Estates [Sejm].
46. The Government will fix the times of session.
47. The Members will be elected for six years.
48. One-third [of the Members] will be renewed every two years.
49. The Assembly will vote for a President or a Marshal of the estate of the
Equestrian Order, and a Secretary for the writing of the minutes and the
proposals made at the Diet.
50. The duration of every Dietine term may not exceed three weeks.
II.
Attributions
51. Dietines are in charge of:
1. The expression of their opinion on the impartial distribution of taxes and
the most appropriate procedure of tax collection for villages and their
inhabitants;
2. [The expression of their opinion] on the condition and needs of the various
classes in their respective Districts, in order to enlighten the Government
on the best way to facilitate and improve public administration.
52. They will send their observations and perceptions, in this respect, directly to
the Governing Council, by the respective Ministers, and the same objects
will be the content of the instructions of the chosen Envoys and Deputies for
the Assembly of the Estates [Sejm].
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53. They will be obliged to examine the accounts for the use of the sums that are
destined for the local needs of every District and arrondisement.
TITLE V
Of the Equestrian Order
54. The noble landowners form the first order of the nation.14
55. The noble estate of Poland is equal in terms of dignity to that of all other
countries.
56. All members of that estate enjoy all the privileges granted to the Russian
nobility by the Charter of the Nobility (Двopьиcкaя Гpaмoтa).
57. From amongst them, the most high-ranking dignitaries and all other officials
of the Kingdom will be chosen, with the exception of those offices for which
the Deputies of the Towns and Communes compete in accordance with the
constitution.
58. All members of this [noble] corps are equal, not only concerning the rights
of property in the Kingdom, all kinds of charges, and the fulfilment of their
functions, but also concerning the other privileges and prerogatives that are
attributed to the Equestrian Order by this constitution.15
59. The members of the Equestrian Order are the first defenders of the liberty of
the Kingdom and the nation.
60. The Equestrian Order participates in legislation through the meeting of its
Deputies, as landowners, in the Dietines, in order to confirm an impartial
distribution of taxes.
61. It participates in legislation through the election of Envoys at the Diet (see
Assembly of Estates).
62. It also participates in the judicial power by choosing the Judges and being
chosen as candidates, for the majority of the judicial posts.
TITLE VI
Of Free Towns and Citizens
63. The Free Towns, as the corporations of the citizens, form the second order of
the state.
14Here, the terms ‘class’, ‘order’, and ‘estate’ are effectively used interchangeably.
15The original French refers to ‘immunities’ (immunités), though the meaning in practice refers to
the system of privileges.
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64. They enjoy all privileges and rights that are attributed to the Towns of the
Russian Empire by the Charter of the Towns (Гopoдoвoe пoлoжeниe).16
65. They will participate in legislation by assembling their Deputies in Dietines
in order to confirm the distribution of taxes.
66. They will participate in legislation through the election of the Deputies at the
Diet (or the Assembly of the Estates [Sejm]).
67. The Diet will occupy itself with a bill concerning the Constitution, to be
handed over to other Towns.
TITLE VII
Of Settlers and Peasants
68. The Constitution guarantees a legal status for the peasant class.
69. Labours and fees imposed on the peasants, as usufructuaries of the land
(belonging to the proprietors of the land), will not be arbitrary, but deter-
mined by particular laws and regulations, or by contracts.
70. The principle by which royalties due to the proprietors will be fixed is that
which requires that the usufructuary receives a benefit commensurate to his
labour and the produce of the land.
71. For this purpose a Special Commission will occupy itself with a bill about
land surveying and estimation, and the preparation of a land registry.
72. To this end, the farmers or peasants established on lands of a certain extent
will form Communes, being jointly and severally responsible to the State
and the proprietors in regard to their obligatory rights and taxes.
73. These Communes will enjoy, in respect to civil rights, the right of
corporations.
74. Several Communes will form a Canton.
75. Every Commune will choose its elders for maintaining internal order, and for
settling disagreements of little importance.
76. They will be supervised by Judges of the Peace, or Commissions of Good
Order.
77. In the case of litigation, the peasants will only participate in judicature
concerning issues of fact. The application of law will be entitled to the
ordinary Judges chosen by the Dietines.
16Isabel de Madariaga, Politics and Culture in Eighteenth-Century Russia (Abingdon: Routledge,
1998), 187.
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78. It will be the responsibility of proprietors to conclude contracts with their
settlers, setting fees and labour by common agreement.
79. From such conventions, concluded with the entire community, or separately
with each inhabitant of the village, a common and reciprocal obligation will
arise for the contracting parties, following the specific enunciation and the
content of the contract, under the protection of the Government.
TITLE VIII
Of Foreigners
80. Every individual whose entry into the Kingdom is not prohibited by law will
enjoy the freedom of conducting business in the manner and at the place he
wishes, of choosing an estate, and of leaving the country at his discretion,
complying with the Laws of Police established in this case.
81. Every foreigner who establishes himself in the Kingdom and who lives there
peacefully for a certain time will have the opportunity to be naturalised in the
case of fulfilling the conditions required by the law in this regard.
82. Naturalisation cannot be offered to a foreigner of noble origin, except by the
consent of the Diet.
83. The reception of a bourgeois foreigner or peasant in the corporations of
Towns and Communes of villagers will depend on the consent of the local
authorities there established, in accordance with what is required by the
Laws of Police.
TITLE IX
Of the Central Administration
84. The executive power of the administration is vested:
1. In the Governing Council (пpaви тeльcтвyющий coвeт)17;
2. In the Council of State.
85. The members of these Councils are nominated and dismissed by the King.
17The term ‘Governing Council’ is used as a more exact translation of the original French Conseil
Dirigeant, although the English translation of the 1791 Constitution refers to the ‘Council of
Inspection.’ Czubaty refers to the ‘Council of Ministers.’ Jaroslaw Czubaty, The Duchy of Warsaw
1807–1815: A Napoleonic Outpost in Central Europe (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 37 ff.
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I.
Of the Governing Council
86. The Lieutenant of the King, the Heads of the Departments, and a Secretary
of State form the Governing Council (or the Ministry), which is headed by
the King and, in His absence, by His Lieutenant.
87. The Lieutenant of the King exercises in His name royal attributions, par-
ticularly delegated to him by His Majesty.
88. At the same time he will supervise the police of the Kingdom.
89. The following Ministers or Heads sit in the Governing Council:
1. The Primate, as Head of the Clergy and President of the Commission of
Education;
2. The Minister of Foreign Affairs;
3. The Minister of War (or Hetman);
4. The Minister of the Interior;
5. The Minister or Chancellor of Justice and Keeper of the Seals;18
6. The Treasurer and Inspector of the Kingdom.
90. The Governing Council is located in the capital of the Kingdom of Poland,
which is Vilnius.
91. Every Head will have a Department and will manage the same throughout
the Kingdom.
92. The organisation of the Authorities established in different Provinces
(Palatinate Governments), as well as the Districts and Communes, will take
responsibility for the attributions of the Governing Council. Particular reg-
ulations will contain these developments in detail.
93. When the King sends for a Head of Department (a Minister), he will be
replaced ad interim by the Deputy Head or the most senior member of the
same Department.19
94. In the Assembly of the Heads of the Departments, the opinion of the
Lieutenant of the King is decisive.
18See Burdette Poland, French Protestantism and the French Revolution: A Study in Church and
State, Thought and Religion 1685–1815 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 54
19The French term used here is Vice Chef—literally, ‘Vice Chief.’ In the context, this role is
analogous to a deputy head or undersecretary.
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95. Any Minister who ignores his duties will be held responsible.
96. Having left office, he can be prosecuted before the Supreme Court, if the
Council of State determines that prosecution should be brought.
97. In addition, any public official who injures the rights of a citizen by abusing
his power can be brought before the civil courts for the compensation of the
injured individual.
II.
Of the Council of State
98. The Council of State resides with His Majesty the Emperor and King, who
presides over it.
99. The Council of State is composed:
1. Of a President, who has precedence in the King’s absence, and who
manages the course of business;
2. Of some Referendaries, and a Secretary of State;20
3. Of Extraordinary Members, who attend the sessions when they are called.
100. The Ministers and Senators are, by virtue of their offices, Extraordinary
Members of the Council of State.
101. The President is the general rapporteur of all affairs, and the organ of the
King’s orders.
102. The Council of State usually convenes once a month.
103. Furthermore, the President calls the Council of State together whenever the
King orders him to do so.
104. Outside of sessions, the President, the Referendaries, and the Secretary of
State work in committee.
105. The purpose of the activity of the President and the Counsellor-
Referendaries is to report to the King on the function and the status of
affairs, according to the reports that have been issued by the Governing
Council, in order to collate all data that may serve to ascertain facts and
enlighten the King’s Religion.
20The term ‘Referendaries’ is used in the English edition of the 1791 constitution. The original
French translates to ‘referendum members’; in practice, these members could also be referred to as
‘law clerks.’
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TITLE X
Of the Executive Administration in the Provinces
106. The Kingdom is divided, in regard to the administration, into Provinces
(Palatinate Governments), Districts, and Communes.
107. Concerning the military aspect, the division will be fixed by a particular
regulation.
I.
In the Administrative Centres
108. In every Province there will be a President (Palatine) (Civil Governor) and
a few Members, who will form a Central Administrative Department,
whose functions shall correspond with those of the Governing Council, to
which the first is subordinate.
109. The President and the Members will be nominated by the King.
110. They will supervise the activities of District Authorities, as well as those of
Judges of the Peace and the Commissions of Good Order.
111. Judicial authorities are not under the control of the Administrative
Department.
112. Concerning administrative affairs, the vote of the Head is decisive.
113. The Head will assist in discussions of the Dietines regarding the distribu-
tion of taxes, about their accounting, and other objects, which the
Government has communicated to them.
II.
In the Districts
114. In every District, there will be:
1. A Head of the District (Castellan, Wojewoda), with one or more
Deputies (according to the demands of the localities) exercising their
attributions, which correspond with those of the Administrative
Department without the Administrative Centres21;
2. A Commission of Good Order consisting of a Judge of the Peace and a
few Members (or Commissioners).
115. These officials will be elected by the Dietines every four years and half of
the members will be newly elected every two years.
21The original draft uses the term Woewod, though this is certainly a misspelling of the Polish
Wojewoda.
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116. The Commission of Good Order is responsible for the judicial police in the
District.
117. The Judge of the Peace and the Commissioners are charged with
Conciliation. A particular regulation will govern this object.
118. In the Provinces in which the localities require it, several Commissions of
Good Order may be established in one District.
119. Their jurisdictions will extend to all classes.
120. The local authorities of the Communes (art…[114]) will be supervised by
the Commissions of Good Order.
121. No one may become Head or Member of the Administrative Department of
the Province, the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court, Envoy, or Senator,
without holding at least one seat for two years in the Commissions of Good
Order or in the administration of a District.
III.
In the Free Towns
122. The administration of the Free Towns will be organised in the same way, as
will be developed in a particular regulation.
TITLE XI
Of the Administration of Justice
123. There will be three orders of tribunals:
1. A Tribunal of First Instance in the Districts and in the Towns;
2. A Court of Second Instance in the Administrative Centres of the
Provinces (Palatinate Governments);
3. A Court of Last Instance for the whole Kingdom.
I.
Tribunals of First Instance
124. The Tribunals of First Instance will be composed of a President and a few
Members.
125. They will be elected by the Dietines every four years and half of the
Members will be newly elected every two years.
126. The Tribunals of First Instance will adjudicate civil affairs, those of cor-
rectional police, and criminal affairs.
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127. In Districts with a higher population the Tribunal of First Instance will be
divided into two Chambers.
128. In cases (civil and those of correctional police) in which the Judges of the
Peace and Commissioners of Good Order as well as the authorities of the
Communes have not decided in last instance, the parties can appeal to
Tribunals of First Instance.
129. The Tribunals of First Instance will decide certain objects in last instance.
130. The inquiry and trial of a case will be separated from the question of law;
the first will belong to the Jurors, chosen from the class of the litigating
parties; the application of law will be reserved for Judges.
131. The Judicial Code, which will be presented before the Diet, will develop
these provisions and apply them to the localities, both to the inhabitants of
the countryside and the Towns, and will regulate other matters concerning




132. The Courts of Appeal are situated in the Administrative Centres of the
Provinces.
133. Their jurisdiction will extend to all classes.
134. They will be divided into two Chambers, one for civil affairs, the other for
criminal affairs.
135. Each Chamber will be composed of a President and several Judges
(Conseillers).
136. The President and the Members will be elected by the Dietines and con-
firmed by the King.
137. They will be elected for four years and half of the Members will be newly
elected every two years.
138. No one may become be appointed as a Member of the Court of Appeal
without having held a judicial office in a Tribunal of First Instance or as a
Judge of the Peace for a certain period.
139. In the case of parity of votes, the vote of the President is decisive.
140. They will supervise the Tribunals of First Instance.
141. They adjudge in last instance on affairs of a certain importance.
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142. Their judgements will be binding; in certain cases, judgements will only be
binding by way of sureties.22
143. Criminal judgements will always be subject to review by the Supreme
Court.
144. The two Chambers will meet under the chairmanship of the most senior
President to judge on contentious administrative matters, as it is the task of
the civil courts.
145. The time and duration of the sessions and other incidental articles will be
regulated as per Article 131.
III.
Of the Supreme Court
146. There will be a Supreme Court of Justice for the whole Kingdom.
147. It will be composed of a First President among three Presidents, and of
Members, all of whom are appointed by the King from a double number of
candidates presented by the Diet.
148. The Envoys, who make up the Committee (or the Delegation) of the Laws
in the Diet, are part of the Members of the High Court in the cases
determined per Article 152.
149. The Supreme Court will supervise the administration of justice throughout
the whole Kingdom.
150. The Court will be divided into three sections: the first, for civil affairs; the
second, for criminal affairs; and the third, for the contentious cases con-
cerning the Crown (proceedings in contentious administrative matters).
151. The sections will convene in a General Assembly: 1., When there are not
two judgements consistent with each other and the votes have been shared;
2.[,] If the King orders them to do so; 3., For general purposes relating to
the service and the Police of the Court.
152. The Envoys (Art. 149) will join the General Assembly: 1., If a Member of
the Central Administration is to be tried; 2., In cases in which there is a
loophole in the law and the lower courts request a regulatory provision on
this matter.
153. If the Supreme Court decides that the object is sufficiently determined by
existing laws, it remits the case to the Court of Appeal in order to find a
solution in accordance with the law.
22The French secreté (‘secret’) is used in the original. This is most likely intended to be sûreté
(‘surety’).
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154. If it finds there is indeed a loophole, it will present the object before the
Governing Council, which will submit to the King its opinion with regard
to a preliminary provision, until the next Diet provides for it.
155. All these cases will be brought to discussion by the Diet which will decide
them in the legislative aspect.
156. In the cases of Articles 148 and 152 the King shall appoint the person who
will preside over the Supreme Court.
157. The judgements of the Supreme Court are not subject to appeal and will
always be enforceable.
158. Criminal judgements, entailing the loss of civil or political rights, cannot be
executed without the confirmation of the King or His Lieutenant.
159. A special act will determine the functions of the Royal Prosecutors (or
Commissioners), those of the Chancelleries, the Secretaries, as well as the
supervision exercised by the Minister or the Chancellor of Justice over
judicial authorities.
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